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Abstract 
Despite  the  known  benefits  offered  by  intergovernmental  organisations  (IGOs)  to  governments,  the
inception of the intergovernmental Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization in 2006, as well as various
academic proposals for the creation of other space-specific IGOs in Asia in the 21 st century, recent years
have  still  not  seen  a  real  engagement  amongst  Asian  governments  with  dedicated  space  programmes
towards establishing a broad regional space-specific IGO. 
Within this context, this study has decided to ask whether there is a reasonable potential amongst Asian
governments to commence negotiations towards establishing an Asian Space Agency (ASA) – perceived
within certain stipulations as a broad IGO-based regional space cooperation mechanism – based on the
general political and legal status quo of their space programmes as of 2017.
In particular, this study focusses on whether the governments with the most ambitious space programmes
and domestic access to leading space technology (development) capabilities in Asia, identified as China,
India, Iran, Japan, North Korea and South Korea, currently display such a potential. After all, they might be
likely at the centre of an ASA.
For  that,  this  study  develops  and  employs  a  methodological  approach  based  on  Moravcsik’s  well-
established International Relations theory ‘Liberalism’ and a plausible determination of basic political and
legal ASA characteristics.
At the analytical core is a government-by-government assessment and subsequent specialised comparison
of the state preferences (somewhat constituting national interests) underlying the current space programmes
of the six selected governments, their major domestic and cooperative space-related measures promoted in
the  pursuit  of  these  state  preferences,  as  well  as  their  respective  basic  political  and  legal  framework
concerning IGO-based regional space cooperation.
In contrast to its confident hypothesis, this study concludes in the end that the present space-related state
preference situation amongst the six selected governments  is such that there is currently no reasonable
potential amongst them to commence negotiations towards establishing an ASA. The most problematic
factor  for  the  establishment  of  an  ASA is  each  government’s  respective  current  second  space-related
autonomy-oriented state preference.
Notably, to finish on a more positive and practical note, this study’s final sections further discuss generally
the closest IGO-based regional space agency variant to a fully-fledged ASA about which the six selected
governments might reasonably negotiate in the context of their current space-related state preferences. Also,
the final  sections put forward  some general  policy and regulatory recommendations that  might help to
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SPRINT-A Spectroscopic Planet Observatory for Recognition of Interaction of Atmosphere
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1  Research context, interest, hypothesis and literature  
 1.1  Research context
According to the Institutionalist school in the field of International Relations (IR) studies,
collaboration through an intergovernmental organisation (IGO)1 can bring many benefits
to governments. For example, IGOs can provide a framework for exchanging information
reliably,  reducing  uncertainty  about  interstate  behaviour,  stabilising  expectations,  and
decreasing  transaction  costs  like  for  contract  negotiation  and  implementation  or
monitoring of compliance with contractual obligations.2 As such, it is not surprising that
21st century  Asia  has  seen  some  engagement  towards  setting  up  IGO-based  regional
cooperation in the space sector.
Most prominently, the ‘Convention of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization’
(APSCO Convention) entered into force in 2006 and established the intergovernmental
Asia-Pacific  Space  Cooperation  Organization  (APSCO).3 After  the  intergovernmental4
European Space Agency (ESA), created by the ‘Convention for the establishment of a
European Space Agency’ (ESA Convention) that entered into force in 1980,5 APSCO
presently  constitutes  the  world’s  second  most  comprehensive  regional  IGO  mainly
attending to space-related matters.6
Besides  that,  various  academics  have,  underpinned  by  political  and  legal  reasoning,
proposed the establishment of other space-specific IGOs in Asia (and the Pacific region)
in the past two decades. To date, the most salient amongst these proposals call for an
1 Sometimes  also  known  as  international  governmental  organisation:  Graham  Evans  and  Jeffrey
Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (Penguin Books 1998) 238.
2 Volker Rittberger, Bernhard Zangl and Andreas Kruck, International Organization (2nd edn, Palgrave
Macmillan 2012) 18–25.
3 Convention of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) (signed 28 October 2005,
entered  into force  12 October 2006) 2423 UNTS 128 (APSCO Convention);  for  a  copy,  see also:
‘Convention  of  the  Asia-Pacific  Space  Cooperation  Organization  (APSCO)’
<http://www.apsco.int/UploadFile/2009924/F1TKF8A2009924.pdf> accessed 14 September 2018. For
more information on APSCO, see this study’s Section 4.6.1.2.
4 For  a  reference  to  ESA  constituting  an  IGO,  see:  ‘ESA  and  the  EU’  (ESA,  1  June  2011)
<http://www.esa.int/About_Us/Welcome_to_ESA/ESA_and_the_EU> accessed 25 January 2016.
5 Convention for the establishment of a European Space Agency (signed 30 May 1975, entered into force
30 October 1980) 1297 UNTS 161 (ESA Convention);  for a copy including the latest amendment as of
10.06.2009,  see:  ‘Convention  for  the  Establishment  of  a  European  Space  Agency’
<http://download.esa.int/docs/LEX-L/ESA-Convention/20101200-SP-1317-EN_Extract_ESA-
Convention.pdf> accessed 15 September 2017.
6 Based on information in: Haifeng Zhao, ‘Current Legal Status and Recent Developments of APSCO
and Its Relevance to Pacific Rim Space Law and Activities’ (2009) 35(2) Journal of Space Law 559,
562,572-573,597;  Marco  Aliberti,  ‘Regionalisation  of  Space  Activities  in  Asia?’  (2013)  66  ESPI
Perspectives 1, 2.
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Asian Space Development Agency, as promoted by Kim Doo Hwan from South Korea,7
an Asia and the Pacific Space Agency, as promoted by Minoru Suzuki from Japan,8 or an
ASEAN9 Space Organization, as promoted by Chuckeat Noichim from Thailand.10 Kim
draws  heavily  on  the  ESA Convention  in  developing  a  convention  for  his  proposed
agency.11 Suzuki  endorses  a  merger  of  APSCO and  the  Asia-Pacific  Regional  Space
Agency Forum (APRSAF)12.13 Noichim models, from a legal point of view, an IGO that
shall serve the sustainable space-related development among ASEAN member states.14
Lastly,  it  is  notable  that  delegates  to  the  1st Asia-Pacific  Regional  Space  Generation
Workshop, organised by the Space Generation Advisory Council  (SGAC) in Japan in
2014, discussed, among others, the topic of an Asia-Pacific Space Agency. Against the
backdrop that  ESA is a good example of a regional  space agency,  their  deliberations
ended  in  the  recommendation  for  the  treaty-based  formation  of  such  an  agency.  In
particular, it shall engage in peaceful space exploration and utilisation, conduct ambitious
space  projects,  allow  for  membership  of  any  Asia-Pacific  state,  receive  equal
contributions of leading Asian space powers and provide region-wide benefits.15
 1.2  Research interest
Interestingly, the combination of the known benefits offered by IGOs to governments,
APSCO’s inception,  the  various  academic  proposals  for  other  space-specific  IGOs in
Asia (and the Pacific region) and the related recommendation of some SGAC members16
7 Doo Hwan Kim, Essays for the Study of the International Air and Space Law   國際航空法 宇宙法 硏
 究論叢 (   국제항공법 우주법 연구논총) (Korean Studies Information Co, Ltd 2008) 443–466; for an
earlier  version of Kim’s article,  in which he referred to the organisation as ‘Asian Space Agency’
instead,  see:  Doo Hwan  Kim,  ‘The  Possibility  of  Establishing  an  Asian  Space  Agency’  (2001)  5
Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law 214.
8 Minoru  實 Suzuki 鈴木, ‘  アジア太平洋宇宙機関構想 Toward the Establishment of Asia and the
Pacific Space Agency’ (2010) 34  総合政策研究 Journal of Policy Studies 57.
9 ASEAN  stands  for  Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations.  Its  members  as  of  2017  are  Brunei,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
10 Chukeat Noichim, ‘The Asean Space Organization. Legal Aspects and Feasibility’ (PhD thesis, Leiden
University  2008)  <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/13358/Full%20text.pdf>
accessed 6 October 2016.
11 Kim, Essays for the Study of the International Air and Space Law (n 7) 459–464.
12 For more information on APRSAF, see this study’s Section 7.6.1.
13 Suzuki  鈴木 (n 8) 59–60.
14 Noichim (n 10) 150–167.
15 SGAC,  ‘Final  Report  1st  Asia-Pacific  Regional  Space  Generation  Workshop  (AP-SGW)’  (Final
Report, SGAC 2014) 10–12 <http://spacegeneration.org/images/stories/AP-SGW/2014/AP-SGW-Final
%20Report23FEB15.pdf> accessed 9 February 2016.
16 As all introduced in this study’s Section 1.1.
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has still not triggered a stable process towards establishing broad IGO-based Asian space
cooperation.
For example, in 2011, Turkey became only the eight and so far the last country to ratify
the  APSCO  Convention,  joining  the  ranks  of  Bangladesh,  China,  Iran,  Mongolia,
Pakistan, Peru and Thailand. Indonesia has remained a signatory state since 2005 but has
yet to ratify the convention.17 Several prominent Asian space-faring nations like India and
Japan have abstained from substantial interaction with the organisation altogether. Also, a
significant  portion  of  the  APSCO members’  major  space-related  measures  fitting,  in
theory, with the organisation’s general purpose of ‘effectively improv[ing] the capability
of the Member States in space science, space technology and their peaceful applications,
and bring[ing] more socio-economic benefits to each of the Member States’,18 continues
to be implemented outside of APSCO.19
Withal, the many Asian governments with dedicated space programmes by 201720 have
made no discernable attempt to realise or at least earnestly deliberate about setting up any
other regional space-specific IGO.
Considering  all  that,  this  study  has  decided  to  ask  the  following primary  research
question:
Is  there  a  reasonable  potential  amongst  Asian  governments  to  commence
negotiations  towards establishing  an Asian Space Agency  (ASA) based on the
general political and legal status quo of their space programmes as of 2017?21
17 Wei Zhang and others (eds), Major Events of Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization 2009-2011
(APSCO n.d.) 29.
18 APSCO Convention preamble.
19 This study’s Chapters 4 and 6 on China and Iran provide ample evidence and indicators in this regard.
20 This study’s Chapter 3 identifies 15 such governments.
21 Henceforward, the terms ‘current’,  ‘present’,  ‘currently’ and ‘presently’ refer to ‘as of 2017’ if not
indicated otherwise.
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In essence, an  ASA is stipulated22 here (see Table 1) as an IGO that,  with a view on
representing a somewhat broad Asian space cooperation mechanism, has a membership
comprising  at  least  a  majority  of  the  Asian  governments  with  dedicated  space
programmes and takes on a significant role in the realisation of its government members’
space programmes. Also, this group of government members has to contain at  least a
majority of the governments with the most ambitious space programmes and domestic
access to leading space technology (development) capabilities in Asia (henceforward: the
preeminent Asian governments in the space sector).23





• Comprising  at  least  a  majority  of  the  Asian  governments  with
dedicated space programmes
◦ that  also  contains  at  least  a  majority  of  the  preeminent  Asian
governments in the space sector
General agenda:
• Taking  on  a  significant  role  in  the  realisation  of  its  government
members’ space programmes
In addressing its research question, this study has further decided to analytically focus on
the current space programmes of the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector24.
One rationale behind that is that the specific research outcome determines whether there
is a reason to even immerse in an additional related study concerning the remaining Asian
governments with currently dedicated space programmes. Moreover, it is likely the initial
engagement of these preeminent Asian governments in negotiations towards establishing
a somewhat broad regional space-specific IGO like an ASA that functions as a strong
incentive for other Asian governments with currently less ambitious space programmes
and  less  advanced  domestic  space  technology  (development)  capabilities  to  consider
joining in. To the latter, the opportunity to gain stable access to these preeminent Asian
22 This study derives these stipulations by inductive reasoning from ESA as the prime example of a fairly
comprehensive regional space-specific IGO and as a positively perceived institution by various Asian
scholars.  ESA is known to encompass the majority of European governments with dedicated space
programmes, including all those with the most ambitious space programmes and domestic access to
leading space technology (development) capabilities in Europe (ie France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the
UK). Also, it plays a significant role in the realisation of its members’ space programmes. For some
indicators in this regard, see the information presented in: UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee) ‘The
European  Space  Agency  as  mechanism  and  actor  of  international  cooperation’  (28  March  2014)
A/AC.105/C.2/2014/CRP.28; concerning the positive remarks about ESA by Asian scholars, see the
aforementioned references to ESA by Kim and some SGAC members, as well as the references in:
Mingyan Nie,  Legal Framework and Basis for the Establishment of Space Cooperation in Asia  (Lit
Verlag 2016) 7; Noichim (n 10) 121,125; Zhao, ‘Current Legal Status and Recent Developments of
APSCO and Its Relevance to Pacific Rim Space Law and Activities’ (n 6) 563.
23 For  a  determination of  the  basic  political  and  legal  ASA characteristics  taking into account  these
stipulations, see this study’s Section 2.2.
24 This study’s Chapter 3 identifies them as the governments of China, India, Iran, Japan, North Korea
and South Korea.
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governments’  more  sophisticated  space  technology  (development)  capabilities  is
presumably  highly attractive.  Finally,  this  study’s  particular  research  findings  already
enable  the  formulation  of  policy  and  regulatory  recommendations  to  advance  the
evolution of an ASA at the core stage, as well as broader intergovernmental cooperation
amongst the selected governments in general.
 1.3  Hypothesis
This study hypothesises regarding its primary research interest is that there is a reasonable
potential amongst the  preeminent Asian governments in the space sector  to commence
negotiations towards establishing an ASA based on the general political and legal status
quo of their space programmes as of 2017.25
After  all,  at first  glance  current  governmental  space  programmes  of  prominent  Asian
space-faring states like China, India and Japan appear to involve several similar major
space-related measures.  Moreover,  the engagement  of various prominent  Asian space-
faring  states  in  APSCO,26 APRSAF,  the  Centre  for  Space  Science  and  Technology
Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP),27 the Regional Centre for Space Science
and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (China) (RCSSTEAP)28 and the Inter-
Islamic  Network  on  Space  Sciences  and  Technology  (ISNET)29 displays  a  certain
readiness for intergovernmental space collaboration in the Asian region.
 1.4  Existing literature
This study’s substantial consultation of English publications, as well as its look into some
Chinese and German writing,30 has unearthed a variety of previous political  and legal
research  discussing  aspects  of  intergovernmental  space  cooperation  in  Asia,  either  in
25 This  is  coherent  with  Nie’s  recent  interpretation  that  the  scale  and  achievements  of  space-related
cooperation in Asia, including within APSCO, ‘are not satisfactory’: Nie (n 22) 5,177.
26 Notably, this study does not consider APSCO to constitute an ASA yet. For example, APSCO currently
does not include a majority of the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector.
27 ‘Centre  for  Space  Science  and  Technology  Education  in  Asia  and  the  Pacific’  (CSSTEAP)
<http://www.cssteap.org/> accessed  18 August  2015.  For more information on CSSTEAP, see this
study’s Section 5.6.11.2.
28 ‘Regional  Centre  for  Space  Science  and  Technology  Education  in  Asia  and  the  Pacific(China)’
(RCSSTEAP)  <http://www.rcssteap.org/Index/index.html>  accessed  14  May  2018.  For  more
information, see this study’s Section 4.6.11.2.
29 ‘About ISNET’ (ISNET) <http://www.isnet.org.pk/index.asp> accessed 15 April 2018.
30 The author has working proficiency in these three languages.  English publications receive the most
attention  in  this  study  because  English  is  the  lingua  franca of  the  international  space  sector  and
prominent Asian researchers usually publish their essential findings also in this language.
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specialised  studies31 or  as  part  of  wider  assessments  of  Asian  space  programmes.32
However, even though such research has yielded many exciting findings, no combination
constitutes the particular political and legal analysis of the current space programmes of
all preeminent Asian governments in the space sector necessary to address this study’s
IGO-specific research interest outlined above to the fullest extent.
If anyone, Nie conducted the most recent legal inquiry in this direction. His work at least
‘discuss[es]  the  legal  opportunities  for  establishing  an  institutionalized  framework  of
space cooperation in Asia[, taking into account such existing regional institutions like
APSCO and APRSAF].’33 After that,  the work of the regional  Space Policy and Law
Network in Asia Pacific, set up by the University of Tokyo, Japan and India’s National
Institute of Advanced Studies, appears the most likely candidate to be able to provide
some expedient answers to this study’s research question in the near future. Researchers
involved in this network have already looked at Indian, Japanese, Malaysian, Philippine
and Singaporean space programmes and policy perspectives in recent years to identify
common interests and regional cooperation opportunities.34
Ultimately, this study has decided to refrain from crafting a detailed overview of such
existing literature at this point. It holds that the latter offers no significant merit to the
execution  of  its  relevant  analysis  and  would  unnecessarily  increase  the  thesis’  girth.
Instead,  it  diligently  refers  to  and  incorporates  information  and  findings  in  others’
previous work on the Asian space sector as pertinent throughout its chapters.
31 For  example:  Kim,  Essays  for  the  Study  of  the  International  Air  and Space  Law (n  7)  443–466;
Noichim (n 10); Suzuki  鈴木 (n 8); Aliberti (n 6); Rong Du, ‘Space Cooperation in Asia: A Mystery’,
IAC-14.E3.1.4 (65th  IAC,  Toronto  2014)
<https://swfound.org/media/187608/rong_du_paper_iac_2014.pdf>  accessed  20  February  2018;
Zachary P Jones, ‘Southeast Asian Space Programs: Motives, Cooperation, and Competition’ (Master’s
Thesis,  Naval  Postgraduate  School  2014)
<https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43935/14Sep_Jones_Zachary.pdf>  accessed  20
February 2018; Nie (n 22); Yuichiro Nagai and others, ‘Assessment of Space Programs and Policies for
Regional  Cooperation  in  the  Asia  Pacific  Region’,  IAC-17-E3.1.8 (68th  IAC,  Adelaide  2017)
<http://nias.res.in/sites/default/files/2017-MKRao-IAC-17-E3.1.8ApSpacePolicyFullPaper.pdf>
accessed 20 February 2018; Yun Zhao, ‘Space Cooperation and Space Security in the Asia-Pacific
Region’ (2017) 4(1) Fletcher Security Review 77.
32 For example: James Clay Moltz,  Asia’s Space Race. National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and
International  Risks (Columbia University  Press  2012);  Ajey  Lele,  Asian  Space  Race:  Rhetoric or
Reality? (Springer 2013).
33 Nie (n 22) 1–9. Citation on 1.
34 Nagai and others (n 31) 1.
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2  Methodology  
This  study draws  on a  Liberal  IR theory  (Section  2.1)  and  a  determination  of  basic
political  and  legal  ASA  characteristics  (Section  2.2)  in  developing  a  suitable
methodological approach to address its research interest (Section 2.3). 
 2.1  Theoretical pillar: Liberalism
Consistent with Sheehan’s argument that many political developments in the international
space sector since the end of the Cold War align well  with the Liberal  IR school’s35
interpretation  of  international  politics,36 this  study  has  selected  Moravcsik’s  well-
established IR theory ‘Liberalism’ as the theoretical  foundation on which to build its
methodological  approach.  Liberalism  provides  sufficient  tools  to  conclude  which
amongst  the  preeminent  Asian  governments  in  the  space  sector  have  a  reasonable
potential  to  enter  into  negotiations  towards  establishing  an  intergovernmental  space
cooperation mechanism based on the general political and legal status quo of their space
programmes as of 2017.
At  its  core,  Liberalism  holds  that international  politics,  including  in  the  form  of
intergovernmental  cooperation,  takes  place  in  an  anarchic  international  environment,
meaning there is neither a world government nor another authority with a monopoly on
the legitimate right to the use of force.37 Undoubtedly, this is true for the international
space sector. 
The theory further contends that the main explanatory variable influencing the interaction
among governments, which represent states in the international arena, regarding a specific
issue-area or even a whole policy field consists of their ‘state preferences’ concerning the
issue-area or policy field in question. In practice, state preferences usually correspond to
what governments call their national interests or main objectives.
A  government’s  state  preferences  develop  from  the  preferences  –  here  meaning  the
central interests – of the respective state’s dominant domestic societal actors, e.g. a strong
35 For more information on IR schools and their related theories,  see for example: Tim Dunne, Milja
Kurki  and  Steve  Smith  (eds),  International  Relations  Theories.  Discipline  and Diversity (3rd  edn,
Oxford University Press 2013).
36 Michael Sheehan, The International Politics of Space (Routledge 2007) 12–16.
37 Andrew  Moravcsik,  ‘Liberal  Theories  of  International  Relations:  A  Primer’  (Memo,  Princeton
University 2010) 2 <www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/primer.doc> accessed 14 September 2017.
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national  leader,  the  government  as  a  social  group,  political  parties,  ministerial  staff,
companies, non-governmental action groups or a combination of them. The transmission
of such societal actors’ preferences into government-pursued state preferences takes place
through the respective  state’s  formal  and informal  domestic  political  decision-making
system. The domestic dominance of societal actors, and thus their preferences’ relevance
in the formulation of state preferences, stems from their position of influence within this
system.  Overall,  Moravcsik  puts  forward  three  theoretical  strands  of  Liberalism  in
support of the analysis of state preference formation, but, of course, they are not final.
Through  the  lenses  of  ‘Ideational  Liberalism’,  a  researcher  looks  at  domestic  actors’
social identities like ‘national identity, political ideology, and socioeconomic order’ as a
source  of  state  preferences.  ‘Commercial  Liberalism’  focuses  on  ‘the  pattern  of
transnational market incentives’, meaning the economic opportunities and risks offered
by this  market  to  societal  actors.  Lastly,  ‘Republican  Liberalism’  concentrates  on the
impact  of  a  state’s  ‘institutional  structure  of  domestic  political  representation’  on the
formulation of state preferences.
Liberalism  explains  the  particular  effect  of  state  preferences  on  intergovernmental
behaviour through ‘the concept of policy interdependence. Policy interdependence refers
to the distribution and interaction of preferences—that is, the extent to which the pursuit
of state preferences necessarily imposes costs and benefits (known as policy externalities)
upon  other  states,  independent  of  the  “transaction costs”38 imposed  by  the  specific
strategic  means  chosen  to  obtain  them.’39 Overall,  Moravcsik  outlines  three  general
patterns of policy interdependence, whereby only one offers a sound basis for cooperation
among governments.
First, naturally compatible or harmonious state preferences among governments, which
means policy externalities resulting from the respective unilateral pursuit of their state
38 Following from Gilligan’s deliberations,  this study assumes that, when it comes to institutionalised
strategic  means  like  IGOs,  Moravcsik  alludes  here  primarily  to  the  following:  independent  of  the
‘transaction costs in the formation of institutions’ chosen to obtain them. See: Michael J Gilligan, ‘The
Transaction Costs Approach to International Institutions’ in Helen V Milner and Andrew Moravcsik
(eds),  Power,  Interdependence,  and Nonstate  Actors  in  World  Politics (Princeton  University  Press
2009) 63.
39 Based  on  information  in:  Andrew  Moravcsik,  ‘The  New  Liberalism’  in  Christian  Reus-Smit  and
Duncan Snidal (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (Oxford University Press 2008)
234–246. Citations on Ideational, Commercial and Republican Liberalism on 241,242,244; Moravcsik,
‘Liberal Theories of International Relations: A Primer’ (n 37) 1–10. Citation on policy interdependence
on 4; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’
(1997) 51(4) International Organization 513, 516-520,524-533.
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preferences are either optimal or insignificant among them, usually lead to coexistence
with no or only little conflict. If any, collaboration might take place in the form of simple
interstate  coordination.  Intense  cooperation  is  expected  to  yield  no  notable  additional
benefits.  Obviously,  such  a  state  preference  constellation  among  Asian  governments
based on their space programmes is unlikely to trigger negotiations towards setting up an
intergovernmental space cooperation mechanism (like a space-specific IGO).
Second, conflictual behaviour amongst governments occurs typically if the pursuit of one
side’s state preferences necessarily creates a negative policy externality for the other side,
e.g. in zero-sum games. The greater the benefits for one side and the higher the costs for
the other side, the more likely and severe is their conflictual behaviour towards another.
Therefore,  Asian governments  in  such a  state  preference  setting based on their  space
programmes also have no solid foundation to commence negotiations towards creating an
intergovernmental space cooperation mechanism (like a space-specific IGO).
Third, Moravcsik argues within his Liberal theory that ‘[w]here, finally, motives[, which
are  based  here  on  state  preferences,]  are  mixed  such  that  an  exchange  of  policy
concessions  through coordination  or  precommitment  can improve the welfare of both
parties relative to unilateral policy adjustment (i.e., a collective action problem), states
have an incentive to negotiate policy coordination. Games like coordination, assurance,
prisoner’s dilemma,  and suasion have distinctive dynamics, as well  as impose precise
costs,  benefits,  and risks  on  the  parties.’  Based  on this  argument  and further  related
information  presented  in  Moravcsik’s  writings,  this  study  ultimately  considers,  on  a
general level, state preference-based situations amongst governments that are mixed such
that cooperation in the pursuit of their state preferences can notably improve benefits or
reduce  or  prevent  losses  for  each  side  relative  to  the  unilateral  pursuit  of  their  state
preferences (henceforward:  mixed-motive games) as the most suitable springboard for
governments  to  reasonably  engage  in  negotiations  towards  establishing  an
intergovernmental cooperation mechanism.40 In terms of its research interest, this study
thus has to primarily search for  current space-related mixed-motive games amongst
the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector. The main explanatory variable
40 Based on information in: Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics’ (n 39) 520–521. Citation on 521; Moravcsik, ‘The New Liberalism’ (n 39) 239; Moravcsik,
‘Liberal  Theories  of  International  Relations:  A Primer’  (n 37) 3–5; for  more information on game
variants, see for example: Andrew M Colman,  Game Theory and Its Applications in the Social and
Biological Sciences (2nd edn, Routledge 1999).
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in  this  regard  consists  of  the state  preferences  underlying  the  current  space
programme  (henceforward  also:  current space-related  state  preferences)  of  each
preeminent Asian government in the space sector, with an analytical focus on each
such programme’s general political and legal status quo.
At this  point,  it  needs to be taken into account  that  Liberalism does not  assume that
negotiations towards setting up an intergovernmental space cooperation mechanism in the
context of a (set of) space-related mixed-motive game(s) automatically result in talks to
establish  a  space-specific  IGO  (like  an  ASA).  Instead,  governments  are  known  to
strategically choose the mechanism they deem suitable for the cooperative pursuit of their
state preferences in question.41 On average, they engage internationally in a rational42 and
risk-averse43 manner.44 As such, this study’s methodology needs to further incorporate a
way to discern when preeminent Asian governments in the space sector with an identified
reasonable potential to commence negotiations towards establishing an intergovernmental
space cooperation mechanism can, also based on the general political and legal status quo
of their  space programmes, plausibly consider negotiating about such a mechanism to
take the form of an ASA.
 2.2  Theoretical pillar: basic political and legal ASA characteristics
The  basic  political  and  legal  ASA  characteristics  are  the  methodological  approach’s
second theoretical pillar. They are a useful kit to conclude which potential negotiations
amongst the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector towards establishing an
41 Moravcsik, ‘Liberal Theories of International Relations: A Primer’ (n 37) 2–3; Moravcsik, ‘The New
Liberalism’  (n  39)  237–239;  Moravcsik,  ‘Taking  Preferences  Seriously:  A  Liberal  Theory  of
International Politics’ (n 39) 519.
42 ‘The rationality assumption means that state leaders and their domestic supporters engage in foreign
policy for the instrumental purpose of securing benefits provided by (or avoiding costs imposed by)
actors outside of their borders, and in making such calculations, states seek to deploy the most cost-
effective means to achieve whatever their ends (preferences) may be.’ Moravcsik, ‘Liberal Theories of
International Relations: A Primer’ (n 37) 2.
43 ‘[Dominant domestic societal actors...] strongly defend existing investments but remain more cautious
about assuming costs and risks in pursuit of new gains.’ Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A
Liberal Theory of International Politics’ (n 39) 517; see also: Moravcsik, ‘The New Liberalism’ (n 39)
236.
44 Concerning the negotiation process itself, which is not part of this study’s analysis, Moravcsik adds that
the ‘relative preference intensity’ determines states’ respective bargaining power over one another. For
more  information  on  this  issue,  see:  Andrew  Moravcsik,  ‘Sequencing  and  Path  Dependence  in
European Integration’ (Conference on The Sequencing of Regional Economic Integration: Issues in the
Breadth and Depth of Economic Integration in the Americas, Mendoza College of Business, University
of  Notre  Dame,  September  2005)  15–16  <http://www3.nd.edu/~jbergstr/MoravcsikSept2005.pdf>
accessed 19 December 2016; Moravcsik, ‘Liberal Theories of International Relations: A Primer’ (n 37)
5; Moravcsik, ‘The New Liberalism’ (n 39) 239–240; Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A
Liberal Theory of International Politics’ (n 39) 523–524.
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intergovernmental space cooperation mechanism45 can, also based on the general political
and legal status quo of their space programmes, reasonably consider consultations about
the formation of an ASA.
Concerning the determination of such characteristics, it needs to be understood that the
specialised  political  and  legal  literature  presents  neither  a  definition  of  an  ASA  as
stipulated under Section 1.2 nor any other authoritative ‘regional space agency’ definition
that can be adapted in this regard.
Based on this background, this study has decided to resort to a synthesis of Rittberger and
others’  introduction  to  the  field  of  International  Organisation  (IO) studies,46 Archer’s
research on IOs47 and the IO and IGO definition attempts by Evans and Newnham in their
IR  dictionary48 to  achieve  a  tenable  description  of  basic  political  and  legal  IGO
characteristics.  It  then  combines  these  IGO  characteristics  with  its aforementioned
essential stipulations49 about an ASA to establish a plausible and applicable array of basic
political and legal ASA characteristics. Ultimately, five such ASA characteristics emerge:
(1) Rittberger and others explain that an IGO constitutes one of two50 general IO formats.
Compared to an international regime, most prominently defined by Krasner as ‘implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’
expectations converge in a given area of international  relations’,51 an IO has an actor
quality regarding its ascribed purpose.52
As  a  space-specific  IGO,  an  ASA  thus  can  be  considered  to  have  an  actor  quality
concerning a space-related purpose.
45 As identified on the basis of Liberalism introduced in this study’s Section 2.1.
46 Rittberger, Zangl and Kruck (n 2). IO studies belong into the realm of IR studies.
47 Clive Archer, International Organizations (4th edn, Routledge 2015).
48 Evans and Newnham (n 1) 238-240,270-271.
49 See especially Table 1 in this study’s Section 1.2.
50 The other but here irrelevant IO format is that of an international non-governmental organisation.
51 ‘Principles are beliefs of fact,  causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in
terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.’ Stephen D
Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’ in Stephen
D Krasner (ed), International Regimes (Cornell University Press 1983) 2.
52 Rittberger, Zangl and Kruck (n 2) 5–7. Point (3) is the reason why this study speaks of purpose instead
of issue-area here.
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(2) An  IGO  is  established  by  an  intergovernmental  agreement  between  two  or  more
states.  The  agreement  is  usually  formalised  by  a  treaty  or  convention  that  acts  as  a
constitution  and  gives  the  organisation  a  legal  personality  within  international  law.
Typically, membership is voluntary. Regardless of how numerous its membership grows,
and even though an IGO might allow for non-governmental parties as formal members
with participatory rights or a consultant status, the majority of an IGO’s membership has
to consist of governments, or, at the minimum, its decision-making has to be dominated
by them. Otherwise, it loses its genuine intergovernmental trait.53
Hence, an ASA can be considered  to  be established by a  formal,  usually  voluntarily
entered  intergovernmental  agreement  amongst  at  least  a  majority  of  the  Asian
governments with dedicated space programmes, while this group of government members
also encompasses at least a majority of the preeminent Asian governments in the space
sector. Asian government members must continuously make up the majority of the ASA
membership  or,  at  a  minimum,  dominate  its  internal  decision-making  to  uphold  the
agency’s status as an Asian IGO.
(3) An  IGO  serves  a  purpose.  According  to  Evan  and  others,  an  IGO  ‘engages  in
problem-solving in the interests  of,  and possibly on behalf  of,  their  member states.’54
Similarly, Archer holds that IOs have ‘the aim of pursuing the common interest of the
membership.’55 Considering the introduction of Liberalism in the previous section, such
interests can be understood in this study to refer to state preferences.
In order  to take on the stipulated  significant  role  in the realisation  of its  government
members’ space programmes, it is reasonable to argue that an ASA’s purpose has to be
the pursuit of a significant portion of their overall current space-related state preferences.
(4) In terms of its actor quality, an IGO assumes an actor role executing certain functions
to fulfil its ascribed purpose.
53 Based  on  information  in:  ibid  7,9,73;  Evans  and  Newnham (n  1)  238,270;  Archer  (n  47)  29–31.
Rittberger and others’ argument that existing IGOs may also establish other IGOs is, at its core, still a
decision among states since they are the principal  actors  within IGOs. Archer’s  argument  that two
member states can set up or uphold an IO, and thus an IGO, is given preference over Rittberger and
others’ explanation that IGOs are usually established among at least three states. Nothing stops two
governments from entering into an agreement to establish an IGO, and there is always a chance that
membership in an existing IGO is, due to a loss of members, reduced to two states.
54 Evans and Newnham (n 1) 238.
55 Archer (n 47) 29-31,45-49. Citation on 31.
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Rittberger  and  others  outline  three  ideal-typical  IGO  actor  roles,  namely  that  of  an
instrument, an arena, and a corporate actor. As an instrument, an IGO is a mere tool for
implementing decisions by its members concerning its ascribed purpose. As an arena, it is
a ‘permanent institution[...] of conference diplomacy’, e.g. it acts as a platform for policy
coordination  amongst  its  members  concerning  its  ascribed  purpose.  Finally,  an  IGO
holding  some  sway  over  decision-making  vis-à-vis  its  full  members  concerning  its
ascribed purpose is a corporate actor. The degree of its clout depends on how strongly its
members pooled their sovereignty within it (unanimity not required for decision-making)
or delegated their  sovereignty to it  (IGO’s potential  for autonomous decision-making,
without its members wielding the power to veto or of an intervening vote).56
According to Archer, functions executed by an IGO within its actor roles can range from
interest  articulation  and  aggregation,  norm establishment,  recruitment  of  participants,
socialisation, rule-making, rule application, rule adjudication, informational exchange and
provision,  to operations.57 Rittberger  and others present  a  more concise classification,
seemingly  covering  Archer’s  list.  They  differentiate  between  ‘programme  function’,
which encompasses ‘the setting of behavioural  and distributive norms and rules’,  and
‘operational  function’,  which  refers  to  ‘implementation,  especially  the  monitoring  of
compliance with norms and rules and capacity-building for implementation.’58 In practice,
an IGO can be a hybrid assuming a combination of actor roles and functions for the
fulfilment of its ascribed purpose.59
Due to its attributed significance concerning the realisation of its government members’
space programmes, an ASA’s actor role(s) and function(s) thus arguably need be such
that it is responsible for a significant portion of the major measures promoted within their
current space programmes (henceforward also:  current major government-promoted
space-related measures) regarding its ascribed purpose.
(5) Until  its  dissolution,  an  IGO,  and therefore  also  an  ASA,  maintains  a  permanent
existence. It has an agreed executive body, official seat of its headquarters and internal
56 Rittberger, Zangl and Kruck (n 2) 4-6,8. Citation on 4; see also the input of Archer and Evans and
others in: Archer (n 47) 114–135; Evans and Newnham (n 1) 239–240.
57 Archer (n 47) 135–149.
58 Rittberger, Zangl and Kruck (n 2) 7–8. For a detailed description of the output dimension related to
these two functions, see: ibid 119-137.
59 As indicated in: Archer (n 47) 134–135.
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structure and decision-making system.60 Naturally, the  ASA headquarters might be best
situated in a territory under the jurisdiction of an Asian government member.
Eventually,  this  study  holds  that  not  all  of  these  basic  political  and  legal  ASA
characteristics need to be analytically considered to address its particular research interest
adequately.  It  contends  that  a  (set  of)  current  space-related  mixed-motive  game(s)
amongst  preeminent  Asian  governments  in  the  space  sector61 needs  to  fit  only  the
following three principal prerequisites62 based on the general political and legal status
quo of their space programmes to allow for their game(s)-related potential negotiations
towards  establishing  an  intergovernmental  space  cooperation  mechanism  reasonably
consider consultations about the formation of an ASA:
i. the (set of) game(s) - and consequently the potential negotiation process – needs
to involve at least a majority of the preeminent Asian governments in the space
sector;
ii. the (set of) game(s) - and consequently the potential negotiation process – needs
to concern the pursuit of a significant portion of the involved preeminent Asian
governments in the space sector’s overall current space-related state preferences;
iii. the preeminent  Asian governments in the space sector involved in the (set  of)
game(s) must at least not be opposed to
◦ entering into an agreement for regional IGO-based cooperation, as well as
◦ a transfer of a significant portion of their current major government-promoted
space-related measures regarding the pursuit of their game(s)-defining current
space-related state preferences under the responsibility of a regional IGO.
This study holds that the main explanatory variable for this point’s first element is
each involved preeminent  Asian government in the space  sector’s  current
basic  political  and  legal  framework  concerning  IGO-based regional  space
cooperation.  The  main  explanatory  variable  for  this  point’s  second  element
covers  each  involved  preeminent  Asian  government  in  the  space  sector’s
current major government-promoted space-related measures regarding the
pursuit of its game(s)-defining current space-related state preferences.
60 Evans and Newnham (n 1) 270; Archer (n 47) 30–31; for a detailed discussion on internal structures
and decision-making procedures of IGOs, see: Rittberger, Zangl and Kruck (n 2) 13–137.
61 As identified on the basis of Liberalism introduced in this study’s Section 2.1.
62 Primarily derived from aforementioned basic political and legal ASA characteristics (2), (3) and (4).
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It is plausible to suggest that all the other components of the basic political and legal ASA
characteristics determined above, e.g. the agreement’s exact format,  the organisation’s
internal  decision-making  system  and  the  seat  of  it  headquarters,  are  no  principal
prerequisites to commence such negotiations but will  be decided upon throughout the
actual negotiation process.
 2.3  Methodological approach
Pursuant to these two theoretical pillars, this study puts forward and applies the following
methodological  approach  to  address  its  research  interest.  Table  2  in  Section  2.3.3
provides a condensed overview.
  2.3.1  First step: assessment of the three main explanatory variables
To  achieve  a  proper  application  of  this  study’s  three  main  explanatory  variables  as
determined  under  Sections  2.1-2,  the  methodological  approach’s  first  step  is,  while
focussing on the general political  and legal status quo of their space programmes and
while adding some analytically tenable constrictions, the assessment of each preeminent
Asian government in the space sector’s
• current space-related state preferences;
• current basic political and legal framework concerning IGO-based regional space
cooperation; and
• current major government-promoted space-related measures regarding the pursuit
of its current space-related state preferences
in a separate chapter for each such government.
Coherent with Liberalism as introduced above, this study looks especially for national
interests  and  main  objectives  driving  each  selected  government’s  present  space
programme  in  its  attempt  to  determine  their  respective  current  space-related  state
preferences. Overall, it finds that the latter can be split along five categories:
• space-related socioeconomic state preferences;
• space-related political state preferences;
• space-related national security state preferences;
• space-related science and technology state preferences;
• space-related autonomy-oriented state preferences.
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Within each category, this study also condenses the state preference specifics into a more
general terminology. Altogether, this categorisation and generalisation allow for a more
structured  comparison  of  current  space-related  state  preferences  and  subsequent
identification  of  current  space-related  mixed-motive  games  amongst  the  selected
governments. Notably, in most instances, this study sees no analytical need to detail these
space-related state preferences’ respective domestic evolution.
In  terms  of  the  current  basic  political  and  legal  framework  concerning  IGO-based
regional space cooperation, this study looks especially for information about the general
political and legal considerations and imperatives put forth in the context of each selected
government’s current space programme concerning its engagement in IGO-based regional
space cooperation.
On the topic of the current major government-promoted space-related measures regarding
the pursuit of current space-related state preferences, this study has decided to concentrate
analytically on each selected government’s
• major government-promoted domestic space-related measures; and
• major  government-promoted  cooperative  space-related  measures  (with  a
presumed high potential for) involving other preeminent Asian governments in the
space sector.63
It categorises such measures along activity fields common to the space sector, e.g. remote
sensing, human spaceflight and launchers, to facilitate a more structured comparison of
such measures amongst the selected governments and subsequent identification of their
reasonable potential to commence negotiations towards establishing an ASA. One reason
for  putting  the analytical  spotlight  on these two particular  sets  of  major  government-
promoted space-related measures is, for one, the fact that this study has a limited scope of
writing space available and thus cannot address each and every space-related measure of
the selected governments. Also, this study holds that its specific findings regarding these
two sets of measures already suffice to draw plausible conclusions regarding its primary
research interest,  including the assessment of the selected governments’ current space-
related state preferences.
63 This study does its best to find and present such measures. However, it acknowledges that it cannot
claim completeness. It is up to the individual researcher to classify a specific government-promoted
space-related domestic or cooperative measure as ‘major’. Ultimately, this study is confident that it has
not overlooked any measure that would render its conclusions void.
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In support of the assessments above, each government-specific chapter starts with 
• a  description  of  the  main  analytical  considerations  concerning  this  study’s
particular  evaluation  of the respective  government’s  current  space programme,
e.g. limited access to English translations of government policy documents;
• an overview of the (known/assumed) main domestic political and legal documents
guiding the respective government’s current space programme; and
• an introduction of the (known/assumed) basic domestic decision-making system
behind  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  the  respective  government’s
present space programme.
Altogether, these three points reduce the risk that this study overlooks or misinterprets
any  fundamental  piece  of  information  in  its  particular  evaluation  of  the  selected
governments’ current space programmes. Also, they indicate analytical limitations.
The  relevant  data  for  this  methodological  approach’s  first  step  is  extracted  from  a
smorgasbord of primary and secondary material in English and, to a limited degree, in
Chinese  and  German.64 This  includes,  for  example,  domestic  government  policy  and
strategy  documents,  domestic  legislation,  international  agreements,  press  releases,
conference presentations, news reports and previous studies in the field. The search for
and  interpretation  of  this  material  has  greatly  benefited  from the  input  by  renowned
academics and professionals in the Asian space sector and at ESA.65 Naturally, this study
addresses the interpretation of data in other researchers’ previous work as necessary.
  2.3.2  Second step: identification of current space-related mixed-motive games
The  methodological  approach’s  second  step  materialises  from  the  combination  of
Liberalism’s mixed-motive game aspect introduced under Section 2.1 and the first two
(i/ii) of the three principal prerequisites developed under Section 2.2.
More specifically, this step comprises a comparison of the just identified current space-
related state preferences amongst the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector
64 As already mentioned before, this study’s author has working proficiency in these three languages. If
any,  (unofficial)  translations  of  primary  sources  regarding  the  selected  governments  are  usually
available  in  English  because  it  functions  as  the  lingua  franca of  the  international  space  sector.
Moreover, this status of the English language makes it so that government representatives and Asian
researchers  communicate  essential  information  on  their  respective  government’s  space  programme
commonly also in this language.
65 For more information on these experts, see this study’s ‘Acknowledgement’ chapter. Any mistakes in
this study are its author’s alone.
34
to detect current space-related mixed-motive games amongst them. Analytically,  these
governments are  considered to be situated in  a space-related  mixed-motive game if  a
plausible argument can be made that their space-related state preference-based situation is
mixed such that cooperation in the pursuit  of their  space-related state preferences can
notably  improve  benefits  or  reduce  or  prevent  losses  for  each  side  relative  to  the
unilateral pursuit of their space-related state preferences.
Following from the two principal prerequisites, the primary focus in this comparison is on
identifying the (set of) current space-related mixed-motive game(s) amongst preeminent
Asian governments in the space sector that arguably involves at least a majority of these
governments  and  concerns  the  pursuit  of  a  significant  portion  of  the  latter’s  overall
current space-related state preferences.
  2.3.3  Third step: evaluation of ASA potential
The methodological approach’s third analytical step evaluates which of the just identified
research-relevant (set of) current space-related mixed-motive game(s) also fits the third
(iii)  principal  prerequisite  developed  under  Section  2.2,  and  thus  currently  offers  the
involved  governments  with  a  reasonable  potential  to  commence  negotiations  towards
establishing an intergovernmental cooperation mechanism in the form of an ASA.66 This
answers this study’s primary research question.
Again, this prerequisite is that the governments involved in the research-relevant (set of)
current space-related mixed-motive game(s) must at least not be opposed to entering an
agreement for regional IGO-based cooperation, as well as to a transfer of a significant
portion of their current major government-promoted space-related measures regarding the
pursuit  of  their  game(s)-defining  current  space-related  state  preferences  under  the
responsibility of a regional IGO. The main explanatory variable for the first element is
each involved preeminent Asian government in the space sector’s current basic political
and  legal  framework  concerning  IGO-based  regional  space  cooperation.  The  main
explanatory variable for the second element, incorporating certain constrictions lined out
in Section 2.3.1, covers each involved preeminent Asian government in the space sector’s
current major government-promoted (domestic and cooperative) space-related measures
66 Whereby this does not mean that they will definitely choose to establish such an organisation.
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regarding the pursuit of its game(s)-defining current space-related state preferences. The
methodological approach’s first step provides all the relevant information in this regard.
At this point, this study wants to note that, analytically-speaking, there is no perfect way
to standardise the criteria  of significance under any of the methodological  approach’s
steps. It is ultimately up to the individual study to offer compelling arguments for its
ruling why a (set  of)  space-related mixed-motive game(s) conforms with or lacks the
criteria of significance.
Table 2: Overview of methodological approach
Methodological approach
First step (addressed in Chapters 4-9):
Evaluation of each preeminent Asian government in the space sector’s
• current space-related state preferences;
• current basic political and legal framework concerning IGO-based regional space cooperation; and
• current major government-promoted (domestic and cooperative) space-related measures regarding the pursuit of its current space-related
state preferences
Second step (addressed in Chapter 10):
Comparison of the just identified current space-related state preferences amongst the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector
            → aimed at determining the particular (set of) current space-related mixed-motive game(s) amongst them that arguably
• involves at least a majority of these governments; and 
• concerns the pursuit of a significant portion of the latter’s overall current space-related state preferences
Third step (addressed in Chapter 10):
Evaluation of which of the just identified research-relevant (set of) current space-related mixed-motive game(s) also fits the following:
            → the involved governments must at least not be opposed to
• entering into an agreement for regional IGO-based cooperation based on their already identified respective current basic political and legal
framework concerning IGO-based regional space cooperation; and
• a transfer of a significant portion of their already identified respective current major government-promoted (domestic and cooperative)
space-related measures regarding the pursuit of their game(s)-defining current space-related state preferences under the responsibility of a
regional IGO
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3  Determination of preeminent Asian governments in the space sector  
As put forth in Section 1.2, this study has decided to focus analytically on the current
space programmes of the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector, which are
understood to encompass the governments with the most ambitious space programmes
and domestic access to leading space technology (development) capabilities in Asia.
Unfortunately,  there  is  no  authoritative  list  of  such  governments  in  the  specialised
literature, as well as no generally accepted index of Asian governments with dedicated
space  programmes  upon  which  to  draw.  Even  APSCO  and  APRSAF  have  never
published a compilation of all their potential Asian member states.67 If any, Moltz and
Lele have attempted the most prominent determination of a space-related Asian region by
states in their respective writings discussing whether there is an Asian space race. Yet,
their delineations differ considerably from each other.68
Under these circumstances, this study resorts to the following reasoning to arrive at a
plausible list of preeminent Asian governments in the space sector as of 2017.
First of all, it acknowledges that there is no universally accepted delineation of the Asian
region  in  general.69 Withal,  it  recognises  that  the  term  ‘region’  has  not  seen  an
authoritative definition. For instance, Evans and others argue that a region is made up by
geographical  contiguity  and  a  degree  of  –  e.g.,  social,  economic  and  political  –
homogeneity among states.70 MacFarlane holds that ‘[r]egions are geographically limited
spaces linked by notions of shared history, culture, custom, or threat.’71 Herz calls regions
‘areas of the world formed by a number of countries that are economically and politically
interdependent  and are defined politically  by the actors  involved in  building regional
67 In their cases, it might be a precaution to remain flexible in expanding their future membership. They
might want to avoid missing out on benefits that come with certain states joining them.
68 Moltz has taken 14 states into account in his deliberation of an Asian space race, namely Australia,
China, India,  Indonesia,  Japan,  Malaysia,  North Korea,  Pakistan,  the Philippines,  Singapore,  South
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam: Moltz (n 32) 8,158-159; Lele has considered a group of 21 UN
member states in discussing the topic of an Asian space race:  Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia,
Israel, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam. Moreover, he refers to the
UAE in his work: Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality? (n 32) 9,38-39.
69 Philip Bowring, ‘What Is “Asia”?’ (1987) 135(7) Far Eastern Economic Review 30.
70 Evans and Newnham (n 1) 472–473.
71 S Neil MacFarlane, ‘Regional Organizations and Global Security Governance’ in Thomas G Weiss and
Rorden Wilkinson (eds), International Organization and Global Governance (Routledge 2014) 431.
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institutions.’72 However,  what  can be gleaned from these definition  attempts  is  that  a
researcher who wants to determine a list of states making up a particular region has to
search for combined geographical as well as topic-relevant linkages amongst them.
With this in mind, this study finds it practical to mimic Lele’s approach73 of looking at the
Statistics Division of the United Nations (UN) Secretariat’s ‘M49 Standard’ to achieve an
initial broad geographical delineation of an Asian region by states. In short, this Standard
splits  the world into ‘geographic regions [...]  based on continental  regions; which are
further subdivided into sub-regions and intermediary regions drawn as to obtain greater
homogeneity  in  sizes  of  population,  demographic  circumstances  and  accuracy  of
demographic statistics.’ By mid-2017, it describes Asia as a nexus of 48 geographically
connected  states.  Asia’s  five  ascribed  subregions  are  Central74,  Eastern75,  Southern76,
South-Eastern77, and Western78 Asia.79 Notably, Russia is not part of this Standard’s Asian
region despite having most of its landmass situated on the Asian continent.
After  that,  this  study  explores,  on  a  general  level,  these  48  states  for  (somewhat
verifiable) dedicated governmental space programmes and related linkages amongst each
other  to  identify  a  plausible  current  list  of  Asian  governments  with  dedicated  space
programmes.
In this regard, this study agrees again with Lele who sees Russia together with all the
other former Soviet Union member states to be situated outside of Asia in terms of outer
space.  He  explains  that  the  latter  states  have  not  presented  notable  space-specific
investments in recent years. In the limited scope that they have shown engagement in the
space sector, they have usually interacted with Russia, which experts consider being more
72 Monica Herz, ‘Regional Governance’ in Thomas G Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson (eds), International
Organization and Global Governance (Routledge 2014) 237.
73 Lele,  Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality? (n 32) 8. Lele uses a by now outdated version of the
Statistic Division’s geoscheme.
74 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.
75 China (incl. Hong Kong and Macao), Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea.
76 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
77 Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-
Leste, Vietnam.
78 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, the State of Palestine, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Yemen.
79 ‘Methodology Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use (M49)’ (United Nations Statistics
Division) <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/> accessed 14 September 2017. It is added on
the webpage: ‘The assignment of countries or areas to specific groupings is for statistical convenience
and does not imply any assumption regarding political or other affiliation of countries or territories by
the United Nations.’
38
of an independent European space power that has some special interests in Asia. Most
prominently,  Kazakhstan,  which  hosts  the  former  Soviet  Union  spaceport  known  as
Baikonur Cosmodrome, mainly fosters Russia’s space-related interests.80 It has leased the
spaceport to Russia until 2050, and they have jointly invested in its extension.81 
Adding to that, this study finds that Moltz makes, for the most part, further a reasonable
point  in  omitting  all  so-called Middle Eastern states from the delineation  of a space-
related Asian region because they usually display an overall localised political, economic
and military orientation.82
Altogether, this means that the M49 Standard’s 48 states can be reduced by 23 states,
namely  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Georgia,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan  and  Uzbekistan  (former  Soviet  Union),  as  well  as  Bahrain,  Iran,  Iraq,
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the State of Palestine, Syria,
Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen (Middle East).83 Yet, in practice,
this study argues that an exception has to be made for Iran and Turkey. Their territory
(Iran) or at least a major part of it (Turkey) is not only geographically located on the
Asian  continent,  but  their  full  APSCO  membership  also  indicates  the  existence  of
dedicated governmental space programmes with a deliberate and sustainable orientation
towards all of Asia.
Regarding the other states subsumed under the M49 Standard’s Asia delineation, Cyprus
can be excluded here on the grounds that it is a member state of the European Union (EU)
and a European Cooperating State of ESA.84
Besides  that,  Afghanistan,  Bhutan,  Brunei,  Cambodia,  Laos,  the  Maldives,  Myanmar,
Nepal,  Sri  Lanka  and  Timor-Leste  can  be  subtracted  from  a  current  list  of  Asian
governments  with  dedicated  space  programmes  because  their  governments  presently
80 Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality? (n 32) 8–9.
81 ‘Kazakhstan  Finally  Ratifies  Baikonur  Rental  Deal  With  Russia’  (SpaceDaily,  12  April  2010)
<http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Kazakhstan_Finally_Ratifies_Baikonur_Rental_Deal_With_Russi
a_999.html> accessed 6 January 2017.
82 Moltz (n 32) 8. Notably, he also excludes all former Soviet Union member states from such a region
but gives less reasons for it than Lele.
83 No authoritative political or legal definition of the ‘Middle East’ exists but these states fit  into the
common interpretation of this subregion.
84 ‘Cyprus  Becomes  11th  ESA  European  Cooperating  State’  (ESA,  8  July  2016)
<http://www.esa.int/About_Us/Welcome_to_ESA/Cyprus_becomes_11th_ESA_European_Cooperatin
g_State> accessed 26 October 2016.
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either have no identifiable or at most seem to maintain very limited space programmes.
Regarding the latter, Bhutanese engineers mostly engage with a Japanese university in the
Bhutan-1 cubesat  project  to  foster  Bhutan’s  space  science  and  technology  capacity
building.85 Royal Group of Cambodia, a Cambodian investment firm, has entered into a
framework agreement with the Chinese  government-related China Great Wall Industry
Corporation86 (CGWIC)  in  January  2018  to  build  and  launch  the  Techo-1
communications  satellite.87 Laos  only  owns  45%  of  the  LaoSat-1 communications
satellite as a partner in the Sino-Laotian LaoSat-1 Joint Venture Co. Moreover, Laos has
relied on the Chinese side for a loan to finance this project, and in building the satellite
and training Laotian personnel for satellite operation.88 The government in Myanmar has
just  set  up  a  steering  committee  in  2017  to  commence  discussions  on  developing  a
Myanmar-owned satellite system.89 Finally, the private Sri Lankan operator SupremeSAT
that  is reportedly backed by its government  owns the  SupremeSAT-1 communications
satellite together with China Satcom. A Chinese launcher put the satellite into orbit in
2012. In the same year, SupremeSAT further signed a commercial  contract over $215
million  with CGWIC for the construction and launch of  SupremeSAT-2 around 2018,
whereby a Chinese bank apparently helps to finance this project.90
Singapore is a special case. Singaporean entities seem quite active in the space sector, but
it is hard to assess how much of a role the government has in that. Reportedly,  most
Singaporean space undertakings are led by universities and commercial companies.91 As
85 Younten Tshedup, ‘BHUTAN-1 Expected to Be in Space by May’ (Kuensel, 1 February 2018) <http://
www.kuenselonline.com/bhutan-1-expected-to-be-in-space-by-may/> accessed 30 April 2018.
86 ‘Shareholder  Profile’  (CGWIC)  <http://www.cgwic.com/About/Shareholder.html>  accessed  21
November 2017.
87 Caleb Henry, ‘Cambodia to Buy Chinese Satellite as Relations Tighten on Belt and Road Initiative’
(SpaceNews,  12 January 2018) <http://spacenews.com/cambodia-to-buy-chinese-satellite-as-relations-
tighten-on-belt-and-road-initiative/> accessed 30 April 2018.
88 Peter B de Selding, ‘Laos, with China’s Aid, Enters Crowded Satellite Telecom Field’ (SpaceNews, 30
November  2015)  <http://spacenews.com/laos-with-chinese-aid-is-latest-arrival-to-crowded-satellite-
telecom-field/> accessed 18 November 2016.
89 ‘First Coordination Meeting of Steering Committee to Set up Myanmar Owned Satellite System Held’
(Global  New  Light  Of  Myanmar,  29  April  2017)  <http://www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/first-
coordination-meeting-of-steering-committee-to-set-up-myanmar-owned-satellite-system-held/>
accessed 30 October 2017; ‘Second Coordination Meeting on Setting up Owned Satellite System Held’
(Global  New Light  Of  Myanmar,  4  July 2017)  <http://www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/second-
coordination-meeting-on-setting-up-owned-satellite-system-held/> accessed 30 October 2017.
90 Peter B de Selding, ‘Sri Lanka Paying China Great Wall $215M To Build, Launch SupremeSAT-2’
(SpaceNews,  30  May 2013) <http://spacenews.com/35545sri-lanka-paying-china-great-wall-215m-to-
build-launch-supremesat-2/>  accessed  30  October  2017;  ‘SupremeSAT-I’  (SupremeSAT)
<http://www.supremesat.com/satellites/supremesat-i/>  accessed  30  October  2017;  ‘SupremeSAT-  2’
(SupremeSAT) <http://www.supremesat.com/satellites/supremesat-ii/> accessed 30 October 2017.
91 Leong Keong Kwoh,  ‘Singapore  Country  Report  2017’  (Presentation,  APRSAF-24,  Bengaluru,  16
November  2017)  <http://www.aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf24/data/day16/3_1_171115-
APRSAF24.pdf> accessed 13 March 2018.
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such,  this  study  exempts  the  Singaporean  government  from its  current  list  of  Asian
governments with dedicated space programmes.
Considering all  that and based on some accessible  material  providing evidence for or
somewhat indicating the existence of dedicated governmental space programmes in the
remaining group of states, a current list of 15 Asian governments92 with dedicated space
programmes manifests at this point. These are the governments of Bangladesh,93 China,
India,  Indonesia94,  Iran,  Japan,  Malaysia95,  Mongolia96,  North  Korea,  Pakistan97,  the
Philippines98, South Korea, Thailand99, Turkey100 and Vietnam101 (see also Table 3).
Among those, this study holds that the governments of China, India, Iran, Japan, North
Korea and South Korea are the most plausible candidates for the list of preeminent Asian
92 Moltz’s own determination that Australia’s space-related international ties are primarily with Western
states counters his inclusion of Australia into a space-related Asian region: Moltz (n 32) 160–165; Lele
also incorporates  the  Republic  of  China,  usually  referred  to  as  Taiwan,  when talking about  Asian
governments’ space programmes: Lele,  Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality? (n 32) 76–77. This
study does not address Taiwan because it is no UN member state.
93 Eg:  Shaurov  Dhar,  ‘Bangladesh  Space  Research  &  Remote  Sensing  Organization  (SPARRSO)’
(Presentation,  ETE  451  Case,  North  South  University,  Bangladesh)
<http://shaurov.weebly.com/uploads/2/3/8/7/2387470/presentation_on_sparrso.pdf>  accessed  8
October  2015;  ‘APSCO  Member  States’  (APSCO)  <http://apsco.int/AboutApsco.asp?
LinkNameW1=APSCO_Member_States&LinkCodeN=11> accessed 19 January 2015.
94 Eg:  Thomas  Djamaluddin,  ‘Indonesia  Country  Report’  (Presentation,  APRSAF-24,  Bengaluru,  16
November  2017)  <http://www.aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf24/data/day16/2_3_LAPAN.pdf>
accessed 13 March 2018.
95 Eg: Noordin Ahmad, ‘Country Report - Malaysia “Space Technology for Enhanced Governance and
Development”’  (Presentation,  APRSAF-24,  Bengaluru,  16  November  2017)
<http://www.aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf24/data/day16/2_8_MALAYSIA.pdf>  accessed  13
March 2018; ‘National Space Policy 2030: Driving the Space Sector in Malaysia’ (Coordinates, April
2017)  <http://mycoordinates.org/national-space-policy-2030-driving-the-space-sector-in-malaysia/>
accessed 14 May 2017.
96 Eg: Vandansambuu Batbayar, ‘Space Technology in Mongolia’ (Presentation, APRSAF-21, Tokyo, 4
December  2014)  <https://www.aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf21/pdf/program/plenary/
d3_1340_07_mongolia.pdf> accessed 25 November 2015; ‘APSCO Member States’ (n 93).
97 Eg: Ahmed Syed Bilal, ‘Space Activities in Pakistan’ (Presentation, APRSAF-21, Tokyo, 4 December
2014)  <https://www.aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf21/pdf/program/plenary/
d3_1340_08_pakistan.pdf> accessed 14 December 2015; ‘APSCO Member States’ (n 93).
98 Eg:  Raul  Sabularse,  ‘Philippine  Space  Development’  (Presentation,  APRSAF-24,  Bengaluru,  16
November  2017)
<http://www.aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf24/data/day16/2_9_PhilippineCountryReport.pdf>
accessed 13 March 2018.
99 Eg: Ammarin Pimnoo, ‘Thailand’s National Space Strategy 2017-2036’ (Presentation, APRSAF-24,
Bengaluru,  16  November  2017)
<http://www.aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf24/data/day16/3_2_GISTDA.pdf>  accessed  13  March
2018; ‘APSCO Member States’ (n 93).
100 Eg: Ali Baygeldi, ‘Satellite and Space Activities in Turkey’ (Presentation, APRSAF-23, Manila, 17
November  2016)  <http://www.aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf23/pdf/program/plenary/
AP23_D3_1330_CR-10_Turkey.pdf> accessed 13 March 2018; ‘APSCO Member States’ (n 93).
101 Eg: Dao Ngoc Chien, ‘Results of Implementation of National Strategy for Research and Application of
Space  Technology  up  to  2020 (2016-2017)’  (Presentation,  APRSAF-24,  Bangaluru,  16  November
2017)  <http://www.aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf24/data/day16/3_5_AP24_CountryReport.pdf>
accessed 13 March 2018.
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governments in the space sector as of 2017. These six governments presently appear to
have,  compared  to  the  information  on  the  governmental  space  programmes  of
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey
and Vietnam presented in  their  respective  footnotes  above,  the  most  ambitious  space
programmes and domestic access to leading space technology (development) capabilities
in Asia. Information on (the breadth of) the current space programmes of the Chinese,
Indian,  Iranian,  Japanese,  North Korean and South Korean governments  is  offered in
much detail throughout this study, especially in its Chapters 4-9.
Table 3: List of Asian governments with dedicated space programmes as of 2017
As of 2017
Preeminent Asian governments in the space sector
China India Iran
Japan North Korea South Korea
Other Asian governments with (somewhat verifiable) dedicated space programmes
Bangladesh Indonesia Malaysia
Mongolia Pakistan the Philippines
Thailand Turkey Vietnam
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4  People’s Republic of China (China)  
 4.1  Analytical considerations
Overall, this study can draw on a smorgasbord of publicly accessible Chinese and English
material,  including (translated)  domestic  political  and legal  documents,  concerning its
particular  evaluation of the Chinese government’s  current  space programme.  Notably,
this study’s search for and interpretation of such material has profited considerably from
the input of various renowned experts in the Chinese space sector during the author’s
semester-long research stay in China in 2015.102
However, there are also several challenges to the use of this material. One of this study’s
three main challenges is the fact that available English translations of domestic political
and legal documents are sometimes inaccurate. For example, the English versions of the
government’s space-specific white papers between 2000 and 2016103 continuously read
‘space industry’ in place of the original Chinese versions’ ‘ ’航天事业 . Yet, the actual
purport of ‘ ’  事业 is more that of a national level ‘undertaking’.104 The English word
‘industry’ does not necessarily cover that meaning. At the same time, the translation of
‘ ’ 产业 and ‘ ’ 工业 into ‘industry’ is appropriate.105 As such, this study refers to translated
primary material only whenever it sees no substantial difference to the Chinese original.
It points towards the latter whenever the available translation appears problematic.
The second main challenge is that Chinese politics, and thus many a domestic political
and legal document and statement, teems with phrases that stand in for more complex
political concepts. Section 4.4.1 outlines the most relevant of such phrases in the context
of this study to ensure reliable research results.
The  third  main  challenge  is  the  limited  breadth  of  official  information  about  the
undoubtedly  existent  military  side  of  the  government’s  current  space  programme.  It
necessitates a particularly careful interpretation of the available information in this regard
102 See also this study’s ‘Acknowledgements’ chapter. Any mistakes in this study are its author’s alone.
103 For more information on those white papers, see this study’s Section 4.2.
104 Based on information provided by Chinese experts in 2015. See also: ‘ ’  事业 (Oxford Dictionaries)
<https://premium.oxforddictionaries.com/translate/chinese-english/%E4%BA%8B%E4%B8%9A>
accessed 21 September 2018.
105 ‘ ’  产 业 (Oxford  Dictionaries)  <https://premium.oxforddictionaries.com/translate/chinese-english/
%E4%BA%A7%E4%B8%9A>  accessed  21  September  2018;  ‘ ’  工 业 (Oxford  Dictionaries)
<https://premium.oxforddictionaries.com/translate/chinese-english/%E5%B7%A5%E4%B8%9A>
accessed 21 September 2018.
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to avoid distorting findings on the government’s current space-related state preferences
and corresponding major measures.
 4.2  Main domestic political and legal documents
There  is  no  overarching  Chinese  national  space  law and  no  single  all-encompassing
government space policy and strategy document. Based on the accessed information, and
without  claiming  completeness,  this  study  considers  at  least  the  following  domestic
political  and  legal  documents  as  to  mainly  guide  the  Chinese  government’s  space
programme  as  of  2017.  Naturally,  their  known  content  deserves  special  attention
throughout this chapter.
At the centre is the ‘13th Five-Year National Economic and Social Development Plan of
the People’s Republic of China’106 (13th  Five-Year Plan). Adopted in March 2016 by the
National  People’s  Congress  (NPC),  which  constitutes  China’s  unicameral  national
legislature, this plan sets out the government’s main national development objectives and
related  essential  strategy elements  for  the next  five years.107 It  includes  references  to
national (aero)space-related industrial, scientific and technological development.108
More specialised political documents in place are, regardless of their potentially earlier
publication date, commonly implemented in line with the current five-year plan. While
writing,  the  most  prominent  and  presumably  most  influential  space-specific  political
documents  appear  to  be  the  ‘National  Medium-  and  Long-Term Satellite  Navigation
Industry Development Plan’109 (SNIDP) from 2013 and the ‘National Medium- and Long-
106 ‘  中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要 [13th Five-Year National Economic
and  Social  Development  Plan  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  Outline]’  (NDRC,  March  2016)
<http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/fzgh/ghwb/gjjh/201603/P020160318564052484043.pdf> accessed  21
September  2017;  for  an  unofficial  English  translation,  see:  Compilation  and  Translation  Bureau,
Central Committee of the CPC (tr), ‘The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of
the  People’s  Republic  of  China  (2016-2020)’  (NDRC)
<http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf>  accessed  21  September
2017.
107 For  a  general  analysis  of  this  plan,  see:  Katherine  Koleski,  ‘The  13th  Five-Year  Plan’
<https://www.uscc.gov/Research/13th-five-year-plan> accessed 4 December 2017.
108 For  example:  Compilation  and  Translation  Bureau,  Central  Committee  of  the  CPC  (n  106)  chs
22,23,49,52.
109 General Office of the SC, ‘  国务院办公厅关于印发国家卫星导航 产业中长期发展规划的通知
[Notice of the General  Office of the State Council on the Printing and Distribution of the National
Medium- and  Long-Term Satellite  Navigation  Industry  Development  Plan]’  (SC,  9  October  2013)
<http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-10/09/content_2502356.htm> accessed 4 December 2017.
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Term Civil Space Infrastructure Development Plan (2015-2025)’110 (CSIDP) from 2015.
Additionally, the government’s still  active ‘National Medium- and Long-Term Science
and Technology Development Plan (2006-2020)’111 (STDP) from 2006, ‘Made in China
2025’  action  plan112 from  2015  and  ‘13th  Five-Year  National  Strategic  Emerging
Industries  Development  Plan’113 from 2016  include  a  strong push  for,  among  others,
domestic space-related industrial and technological development.
Legislation-wise, Zhao states that ‘most of the rules governing space activities in China
are put down in form of departmental rules; thus, the regulatory regime in the space field
is at a relatively low level.’114 As such, they might be easily overturned, and their guiding
role within the government’s current space programme can be considered to be somewhat
limited. One of the two presently most prominent domestic space-related legal documents
was  initially  adopted  in  2001  under  the  title  ‘Administrative  Measures  for  the
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space’115. As its name suggests, it deals with
the registration of space objects. The other was initially adopted in 2002 under the title
‘Interim  Administrative  Measures  on  Permits  for  Civil  Space  Launch  Projects’116.  It
prescribes a licensing process for the launch of civil space objects.117
110 ‘国家民用空间基础设施中长期发展规划（2015-2025年）[National Medium- and Long-Term Civil
Space Infrastructure Development Plan (2015-2025)]’ (NDRC) <http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201510/
W020151029394768113250.pdf> accessed 21 September 2017.
111 ‘国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要（2006 2020━ 年） [National Medium- and Long-Term
Science  and  Technology  Development  Plan  Outline  (2006-2020)]’  (Ministry  of  Science  and
Technology  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China,  9  February  2006)
<http://www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/gjkjgh/200811/t20081129_65774.htm>  accessed  25
May 2015; for an unofficial English translation, see: ‘The National Medium- and Long-Term Program
for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020) An Outline’ (China International Science and
Technology Corporation) <http://www.cistc.gov.cn/oa/file/download.asp?id=6298> accessed 10 June
2015.
112 SC, ‘国务院关于印发《中国制造 2025  》的通知 [Notice of the State Council on Printing and
Distributing “Made in China 2025”]’  (SC,  8 May 2015) <http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-
05/19/content_9784.htm> accessed 4 December 2017.
113 SC, ‘ “ ”  国务院关于印发 十三五 国家战略性新兴产业发展规划的通知 [Notice of the State Council
on Printing and Distributing the “13th Five-Year” National Strategic Emerging Industries Development
Plan]’  (SC,  29  November  2016)
<http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/19/content_5150090.htm> accessed 4 December 2017.
114 Yun Zhao,  National Space Law in China. An Overview of the Current Situation and Outlook for the
Future (Brill Nijhoff 2015) 24.
115 For an unofficial English translation, see: Faculty of International Law of China University of Political
Science and Law and National Center for Remote Sensing, Air, and Space Law at the University of
Mississippi, ‘Chinese Law: Registration, Launching and Licensing Space Objects’ (2007) 33(2) Journal
of Space Law 437, 437–441.
116 For an unofficial English translation, see: ibid 442–457.
117 Zhao,  National Space Law in China (n 114) 38–42. These documents’ English titles follow here the
translations offered by Zhao.
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The government through the State Council Information Office (SCIO) published its first
space-specific white paper titled ‘ ’中国的航天 118, or ‘China’s Space Activities’119 in its
English version,  (CSA2000) in 2000. It  was followed by ‘2006 ’年中国的航天 120/
‘China’s Space Activities in 2006’121 (CSA2006), which was later replaced by ‘2011年中
’国的航天 122/‘China’s Space Activities in 2011’123 (CSA2011). Since 2016, ‘2016 中国
’的航天 124/‘China’s Space Activities in 2016’125 (CSA2016), and ‘中国北斗卫星导航系
’统 /‘China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System’126 (CBDS) have taken the place of the
government’s primary space-specific white papers. In contrast to how other researchers
sometimes  portray  them,  this  study  has  found  no  conclusive  evidence  that  these
documents,  or any other of the government’s white papers for that  matter,  have ever
constituted binding domestic political  or legal documents per se. Nonetheless, it  holds
that they can be treated as valuable sources for its specific evaluation of the government’s
current space programme. After all, CSA2016 explains: ‘To enable the world community
to better understand China’s space industry [sic!], we are publishing this white paper to
offer a brief introduction to the major achievements China has made in this field since
2011,  its  main  tasks  in  the  next  five  years,  and  its  international  exchanges  and
cooperation efforts.’ In particular,  all the white papers mentioned above seem, for the
most  part,  to  aim  at  presenting  the  essential  civil  aspects  determined  in  the  various
domestic space-related plans and regulations at the time of their respective publication.127
118 SCIO,  ‘ 《 中 国 的 航 天 》 ["China’s  Spaceflight"]’  (SCIO,  22  November  2000)
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2000/Document/307950/307950.htm> accessed 22 August 2015.
119 SCIO, ‘China’s Space Activities’ (China.org.cn, November 2000) <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/8/
index.htm> accessed 14 May 2015.
120 SCIO,  ‘《 2006  年中国的航天》 ["China’s  Spaceflight  in  2006"]’  (SCIO,  13  October  2006)
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2006/Document/307876/307876.htm> accessed 22 August 2015.
121 SCIO,  ‘China’s  Space  Activities  in  2006’  (China.org.cn,  October  2006)
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/183672.htm> accessed 18 May 2015.
122 SCIO, ‘《2011  年中国的航天》（全文） ["China’s Spaceflight in 2011" (Full Text)]’ (SCIO, 29
December 2011) <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/nd/2011/Document/1073255/1073255.htm> accessed 1
June 2015.
123 SCIO,  ‘China’s  Space  Activities  in  2011’  (China.org.cn,  29  December  2011)
<http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7145648.htm> accessed 3 May 2015.
124 SCIO, ‘《2016 中国的航天》白皮书（全文） ["China’s Spaceflight in 2016" White Paper (Full
Text)]’  (SCIO,  27  December  2016)
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1537007/1537007.htm> accessed 16 September 2017.
125 SCIO,  ‘Full  Text:  China’s  Space  Activities  in  2016’  (SCIO,  27  December  2016)
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/wz/Document/1537091/1537091.htm> accessed 18 September 2017.
126 SCIO, ‘  中国北斗卫星导航系统 China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System’ (SCIO, 16 June 2016)
<http://english.scio.gov.cn/2016-06/16/content_40535894.htm> accessed 16 September 2017. This link
provides both the Chinese and English document version.
127 For the citation,  see:  SCIO,  ‘CSA2016{eng}’  (n 125)  preamble;   based on the  Chinese  CSA2016
version, it should read ‘space undertakings’ instead of ‘space industry’ here: SCIO, ‘CSA2016{ch}’ (n
124)  前言 [preamble]; this study’s argument that the aforementioned white papers focus on the civil
side  of  the  government’s  space  programme  is  supported  by  Pollpeter  and  others’  conclusion  that
military aspects of the government’s space programme are usually not detailed in its space-specific
white papers:  Kevin Pollpeter  and others,  ‘China Dream, Space Dream. China’s Progress in Space
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 4.3  Basic domestic decision-making system
The domestic decision-making system behind the formulation and implementation of the
Chinese government’s present space programme is not known in all detail. As Aliberti
explains, there is a high-level of secrecy combined with complicating factors like ‘(a) the
existence  of  a  “Byzantine  maze”  of  bureaucratic  structures  that  involve  a  myriad  of
organisations,  as  well  as  countless  organisations  within  organisations;  (b)  the  general
complexity of the inner workings of China’s power structures and hierarchies;  (c) the
multiple  restructurings,  renaming,  and relocation  of  bureaucratic  offices  and institutes
that have occurred through the past 50 years in the Chinese space organisation; and (d)
the  continuous  expansion  of  space  governance  in  terms  of  the  creation  of  new
administrative entities  designed  to  respond  to  the  needs  of  new  programmes  and
missions.’ Even members within the system are not always aware of their exact position
within  it.128 Ultimately,  this  study  holds  that  knowledge  of  the  following  context
sufficiently aids its particular assessment of said programme.
At its core, China is an authoritarian one-party state in which the Communist Party of
China  (CPC),  the state,  including the  government,  and the  military  form a symbiotic
relationship.  More precisely,  the CPC and its  members  permeate and exercise control
over the state and military.129
In particular,  the General Secretary of the CPC’s Central  Committee has a substantial
influence on any major government programme. The office holder usually also fills the
highest position in the CPC’s most senior political decision-making body, namely first
ranked member of the party’s Politburo Standing Committee, as well as the positions of
Chairman of the CPC’s Central Military Commission and State President. Xi Jinping (习
近平) occupies all these offices after the conclusion of a transitional period between 2012
and 2013.130
Technologies  and  Implications  for  the  United  States’  (Report,  US-China  Economic  and  Security
Review  Commission  02  March  2015)  2  <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China
%20Dream%20Space%20Dream_Report.pdf> accessed 12 May 2015.
128 Marco Aliberti, When China Goes to the Moon... (Springer 2015) 8;  this assessment is supported by
some conclusions drawn in other papers,  eg: Juqian Li, ‘Progressing Towards New National Space
Law: Current  Legal  Status and Recent  Developments  in  Chinese  Space  Law and Its  Relevance  to
Pacific Rim Space Law and Activities’ (2009) 35(2) Journal of Space Law 439, 445–446; Shouping Li,
‘The Role of International Law in Chinese Space Law and Its Relevance to Pacific Rim Space Law and
Activities’ (2009) 35(2) Journal of Space Law 539, 548–549.
129 Aliberti (n 128) 8–9.
130 Susan V Lawrence, ‘China’s Political Institutions and Leaders in Charts’ (CRS Report for Congress
R43303, 12 November 2013) <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43303.pdf> accessed 18 June 2015.
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Besides the State President, other CPC-controlled state-related entities with a well-known
or assumed distinct influence on the formulation and implementation of the government’s
current space programme at least include the State Council (SC), which represents the
Chinese government; the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC); the
NPC;  the  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Information  Technology,  especially  through  the
subordinate  State  Administration  for  Science,  Technology  and  Industry  for  National
Defence (SASTIND); the Ministry of Science and Technology; the Ministry of Finance;
two  state-owned  conglomerates  called  China  Aerospace  Science  and  Technology
Corporation (commonly referred to as CASC) and China Aerospace Science and Industry
Corporation (commonly referred to as CASIC); the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS);
the China Meteorological Administration; and the China National Space Administration
(CNSA). Contrary to public perception, CNSA, founded in 2013 and hierarchically put
under SASTIND, is not a fully-fledged national space agency.131 It primarily fulfils two
functions. First, it is the government’s representative in the international space sector. For
example, it signs many of the government’s international space cooperation agreements
and administers international scientific and technical exchanges. Second, it is, presumably
through direct exchange with SASTIND, responsible for fostering China’s space industry
and technology development.  It  takes  part  in  setting  up and managing Chinese space
technology and industry policies, strategies and regulations.132
Finally, official information on the management of the China Manned Space Programme
(CMSP)133,  which follows a special  joint  command system and involves  the so-called
China Manned Space Engineering Office (CMSEO) that apparently is sometimes also
referred to as China Manned Space Agency (CMSA), and various findings in previous
studies suggest that, even though their particular influence is often hard to pinpoint, a
range of – ultimately CPC-connected – domestic military entities and personnel partake
131 Based on information provided by Chinese space experts in 2015 and in: Aliberti (n 128) 10-12,15-22;
Zhao, National Space Law in China (n 114) 26–35.
132 Based  on  information  in:  ‘  机 构 职 能 [Organisation  and  Function]’  (CNSA)
<http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n1081/n7469/n308501/index.html> accessed  19 February  2015;  Aliberti  (n
128) 11–12; Zhao, National Space Law in China (n 114) 28–30.
133 ‘China Space Station and Its Resources for International Cooperation’ (Handbook Ver 1.0, UNOOSA/
CMSA  28  May  2018)  1
<http://www.unoosa.org/documents/doc/psa/hsti/CSS_1stAO/CSS_1stAO_Handbook_2018.pdf>
accessed 23 July 2018; in Chinese called ‘ ’中国载人航天工程 : ‘  中国载人航天工程简介 [Brief
Overview  of  China  Manned  Space  Engineering]’  (CAS,  14  June  2013)
<http://www.cas.cn/zt/kjzt/zkyyzrht/gcjj/201306/t20130614_3865775.shtml> accessed 22 July 2018.
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considerably in the formulation and implementation of the government’s current space
programme.134
 4.4  Space-related state preferences
  4.4.1  Special political terminology
As already mentioned in Section 4.1, Chinese politics teems with phrases that stand in for
more complex political concepts. An understanding of the following phrases markedly
contributes to the assessment of the government’s current space-related state preferences.
   4.4.1.1  National rights and interests
According to  CSA2016, the protection  of  – no further  defined – ‘national  rights and
interests’  (‘ ’国家权益 )  is  one  purpose  behind  China’s  space  undertakings.135 It  is
reasonable  to  assume that  such interests  especially  encompass  the  government’s  core
national interests put forward in a white paper from 2011. These core national interests
are ‘state  sovereignty,  national  security,  territorial  integrity  and national  reunification,
China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and
the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development.’136 Based
on another white paper, national reunification usually means the return of Taiwan under
the full control of the People’s Republic of China.137 The reference to China’s political
system established by the Constitution presumably aims at securing the CPC’s sole rule
over China considering that the ‘Constitution of the People’s Republic of China’ points
out the CPC’s leadership role over the Chinese people.138
134 Based on information presented in: Aliberti (n 128) 13–15; Zhao, National Space Law in China (n 114)
30–31; ‘  中国载人航天工程组织管理 [China Manned Space Engineering Organisation Management]’
(China Manned Space,  September  2016)  <http://www.cmse.gov.cn/art/2015/8/2/art_24_11273.html>
accessed  21  September  2018;  ‘Management’  (China  Manned  Space)
<http://en.cmse.gov.cn/col/col71/index.html> accessed 21 September 2018; Kevin L Pollpeter, Michael
S Chase and Eric Heginbotham, ‘The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force and Its Implications
for  Chinese  Military  Space  Operations’  (Research  Report  RR-2058-AF,  RAND Corporation  2017)
<https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2000/RR2058/
RAND_RR2058.pdf> accessed 27 November 2017.
135 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch I; SCIO, ‘CSA2016{ch}’ (n 124) ch I.
136 SCIO,  ‘China’s  Peaceful  Development’  (China.org.cn,  6  September  2011)  ch  III
<http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7126562.htm> accessed 31 May 2015.
137 Taiwan Affairs Office of the SC and SCIO, ‘The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue(2000)’
(SCIO, February 2000) <http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/27/content_17613.htm> accessed
28 January 2018.
138 ‘Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (Full  Text after Amendment on March 14, 2004)’
(NPC)  preamble  <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm>  accessed  4
February 2015.
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   4.4.1.2  Chinese Dream and Space Dream
CSA2016 further names the ‘Chinese Dream’139 (‘ ’中国梦 ) as part of the vision guiding
the government’s current space undertakings.140 In a nutshell, this phrase, first introduced
at the highest political  level in a speech of President Xi in November 2012,141 stands,
depending on the translation of  ‘ ’中华民族伟大复兴 142, for ‘the great renewal of the
Chinese nation’143 or ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’144.  Ultimately,  this
renewal or rejuvenation involves to completely overcome China’s historical aberrations
in large parts of the 19th and 20th century and to lift it back into its previous rank of a
prosperous and one of the strongest and most influential powers in the world.145 Towards
that end, the government especially pursues the so-called ‘Two [consecutive] Centenary
Goals’ (‘“ ”两个一百年 ’奋斗目标 )146: ‘[1] To finish building a moderately prosperous
society in all respects by the time the CPC celebrates its centenary in 2021 and [2] to turn
the People’s Republic of China into a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong,
democratic147, culturally advanced, and harmonious by the time it celebrates its centenary
in  2049.’148 These  Two  Centenary  Goals  interlink  well  with  the  government’s
aforementioned  core  national  interests.  Most  prominently,  the  striving  for  increased
national  prosperity  and  strength  fits  the  core  national  interests  concerning  national
security and economic and social development.
The relevance  that  the  government  ascribes  to  its  space  programme in  achieving  the
Chinese Dream as outlined above becomes clear through President Xi’s determination
139 Sometimes also ‘China Dream’.
140 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch I; SCIO, ‘CSA2016{ch}’ (n 124) ch I.
141 ‘Background:  Connotations  of  Chinese  Dream’  (China  Daily,  5  March  2014)
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014npcandcppcc/2014-03/05/content_17324203.htm>  accessed
27 May 2015.
142  斌 [Bin]  李 [Li], ‘    习近平：承前启后 继往开来 继续朝着中华民族伟大复兴目标奋勇前进 [Xi
Jinping: Inherit the Past and Usher in the Future, Carry Forward the Revolutionary Cause and Forge
Ahead into the Future, Continue Forging Valiantly Ahead Toward the Chinese People’s Mighty Goal
of  Rejuvenation]’  (Xinhuanet,  29  November  2012)
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-11/29/c_113852724.htm> accessed 27 May 2015.
143 ‘Xi  Pledges  “Great  Renewal  of  Chinese  Nation”’  (Xinhuanet,  29  November  2012)
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-11/29/c_132008231.htm> accessed 27 May 2015.
144 ‘President  Xi’s  Worldwide  Diplomacy  Benefits  China,  the  World’  (SCIO,  6  January  2016)
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/32618/Document/1461004/1461004.htm> accessed 20 September 2017.
145 Based on information in:   李 [Li] (n 142); Pollpeter and others (n 127) 3–5; Benjamin Carlson, ‘The
World  According  to  Xi  Jinping’  (The  Atlantic,  21  September  2015)
<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/xi-jinping-china-book-chinese-dream/
406387/> accessed 24 October 2015.
146 While writing, this was the commonly used Chinese phrase for these goals. See, for example:  波 [Bo]
 梁 [Liang], ‘“ ”  两个一百年 奋斗目标是中华民族伟大复兴的重要里程碑 [The Two Centenary Goals
Are an Important Milestone for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation]’ (SCIO, 21 June 2017)
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/zhzc/10/Document/1555727/1555727.htm> accessed 12 December 2017.
147 As indicated by the reference to ‘socialist country’, it does not mean democracy in the Western image.
148 Compilation and Translation Bureau, Central Committee of the CPC (n 106) ch 2 (numbering added).
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that the pursuit of the ‘Space Dream’ (‘ ’航天梦 ) is an important component of turning
China into a strong country,149 and towards ‘realizing the Chinese people’s mighty dream
of national rejuvenation.’150 According to CSA2016’s Chinese version, the government
understands the Space Dream as to involve space exploration, the development of space
undertakings, and China’s transformation into a space power.151
   4.4.1.3  Comprehensive national power
All  four  Chinese CSA versions  refer  to  the build-up of  – as commonly  translated  in
Western academic publications – ‘comprehensive national power’152 (CNP; ‘ ’综合国力 )
as a purpose of Chinese space undertakings.153 Combining various researchers’ findings, a
state’s CNP consists of the entirety of a state’s hard and soft power capabilities, e.g. in
form of scientific and technological capabilities, that it can apply to achieve its domestic
and international objectives.154
  4.4.2  Socioeconomic state preferences
This  study concludes  that  the government’s  current  space-related  socioeconomic  state
preference is the advancement of China’s socioeconomic development.
For  one,  the  national  economic  and  social  development-oriented  13th Five-Year  Plan
addresses  national  (aero)space-related  industrial,  scientific  and  technological
development.155 Moreover,  the  government  declares  in  CSA2016 to  facilitate  Chinese
space undertakings ‘to meet the demands of economic[...] development, [...] and social
149  京荆 [Jingjing]  邓 [Deng], ‘  习近平同神舟十号航天员亲切通话 [Xi Jinping Cordially Communicates
with  Shenzhou  X  Astronauts]’  (  中 国 日 报 [China  Daily],  24  June  2013)
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/2013shenshi/2013-06/24/content_16653305.htm>  accessed  31
May 2015.
150 As cited in: Pollpeter and others (n 127) 7.
151 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{ch}’ (n 124) preamble. There it reads: ‘探索浩瀚宇宙，发展航天事业，建设航天
’强国，是我们不懈追求的航天梦。 .
152 Dean  Cheng,  ‘China’s  Space  Program  and  Comprehensive  National  Power’  (The  University  of
Nottingham, 28 October 2014) <https://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2014/10/28/chinas-
space-program-promotes-comprehensive-national-power/>  accessed  20  October  2015;  Pollpeter  and
others (n 127) 5–6.
153 SCIO, ‘CSA2000{ch}’ (n 118) ch I; SCIO, ‘CSA2006{ch}’ (n 120) ch I; SCIO, ‘CSA2011{ch}’ (n
122) ch I; SCIO, ‘CSA2016{ch}’ (n 124) ch I.
154 Based on information in: Pollpeter and others (n 127) 5–7; Dean Cheng, ‘Chinese Concepts of Space
Security’,  Handbook of  Space Security.  Policies,  Applications and Programs (Springer 2015) 432;
Wuttikorn Chuwattananurak, ‘China’s Political Stability and Comprehensive National Power: A Case
Study of the Conflict in Xinjiang’ (2014) 11(9) Journal of US-China Public Administration 721, 721–
726.
155 As already identified in this study’s Section 4.2.
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progress’, ‘improve the […] cultural levels of the Chinese people’, and ‘build China into
a space power in all respects, with the capabilities [...] to promote strong and sustained
economic  and social  development’.  Also,  the same white  paper  explains  that  China’s
space  undertakings  shall  ‘provide  strong  support  for  the  realization  of  the  Chinese
Dream’.156 As  indicated  in  Section  4.4.1.2,  the  Chinese  Dream  has  a  strong
socioeconomic connotation by incorporating the goal of building a moderately prosperous
Chinese society in all respects by 2021.
References  throughout  the  government’s  CSIDP157 combined  with  this  chapter’s
assessment  of  major  government-promoted  space-related  measures158 suggest  that  one
target area under this state preference is the development and application of space-related
capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-
areas for China. For example, this appears to include issues in such areas like agriculture,
climate change, disaster management, the environment, fishery, forestry, geology, health,
hydrology,  infrastructure,  land  use,  mapping  and  surveying,  meteorology,  natural
resources,  telecommunications  and  broadcasting  services,  transportation  and  urban
planning. The development and application of space-related capabilities and capacities to
support disaster management and tackle environmental topics is particularly reasonable
considering  that  China  is  prone  to  natural  disasters,159 and  has  encountered  several
environmental matters negatively affecting its socioeconomic status.160
Finally, the narrative presented throughout CSA2016 and CSIDP regarding the Chinese
space industry and the domestic and international space market allows arguing that three
more – and somewhat interlinked – target areas related to the space-related advancement
of  China’s  socioeconomic  development  are,  in  sum,  the  expansion  of  the  domestic
(private) space industry, the extension of the domestic space market, and the enhancement
of Chinese entities’ role in the international space market.161
156 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch I.
157 ‘国家民用空间基础设施中长期发展规划（2015-2025年）[National Medium- and Long-Term Civil
Space Infrastructure Development Plan (2015-2025)]’ (n 110).
158 See especially this study’s Sections 4.6.1-4.
159 ‘Disaster  Management’  (United  Nations  Development  Programme)
<http://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/overview.html>
accessed 22 April 2018.
160 Eleanor  Albert  and  Beina  Xu,  ‘China’s  Environmental  Crisis’  (Council  on  Foreign  Relations,  18
January  2016)  <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-environmental-crisis>  accessed  22  April
2018.
161 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) chs IV-V; ‘国家民用空间基础设施中长期发展规划（2015-2025
年）[National Medium- and Long-Term Civil Space Infrastructure Development Plan (2015-2025)]’ (n
110).
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  4.4.3  Political state preferences
The government does not highlight the pursuit of space-related political state preferences
in an immediately recognisable manner. Nonetheless, this study finds that they currently
exist in the form of securing the legitimacy of the CPC’s rule over all of China, as well as
advancing China’s international prestige and influence.
This  conclusion emerges  from the government’s  statements  in  CSA2016 that  China’s
space undertakings shall ‘provide strong support for the realization of the Chinese Dream
of the renewal of the Chinese nation’ and ‘protect China’s national rights and interests’.162
As explained in Sections 4.4.1.1-2, the Chinese Dream ultimately involves putting China
back into its previous rank as one of the strongest and most influential  powers in the
world, while the core national interests encompass, among others, a striving for upholding
the CPC’s control over China and achieving national reunification with Taiwan.
Additionally, Pollpeter and others have reasonably argued in their extensive analysis of
the  government’s  space  programme  around  2015,  which  already  falls  in  the  era  of
President Xi, that ‘the Chinese leadership believes that major powers have large space
programs,  and to be considered a major  power one must  have the trappings of a  big
power.  [...]  By  developing  a  robust  space  program  and  participating  in  high-profile
activities such as human space flight and lunar exploration, the CCP163 can demonstrate
that  it  is  the  best  provider  of  material  benefits  to  the  Chinese  people  and  the  best
organization  to  propel  China  to  its  rightful  place  in  world  affairs.  [… Also,]  China
pursues  cooperative  activities  for  a  number  of  reasons.  These  include  improving  its
international  position,  increasing  its  influence  among  less  developed  countries,  and
technology transfer.’164
Lastly,  Sections  4.6.6-8  identify  various  current  major  government-promoted  space-
related measures that can be (partially) explained on the basis of such state preferences. 
  4.4.4  National security state preferences
There are various indicators that safeguarding China’s national security constitutes the
government’s current space-related national security state preference.
162 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch I.
163 Abbreviation variation of CPC.
164 Pollpeter and others (n 127) 24.
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CSA2016  prominently  expounds  that  China’s  space  undertakings  shall  ‘meet  the
demands  of  […]  national  security’  and  establish  ‘capabilities  […]  to  effectively  and
reliably guarantee national security’. Also, they shall  help to ‘protect China’s national
rights and interests’,  whereby, as determined in Section 4.4.1.1, China’s core national
interests  comprise,  inter  alia,  national  security  and  such  related  elements  like  state
sovereignty and territorial integrity.165 Finally, such a state preference is likely because, as
introduced in Section 4.3, domestic military-related actors apparently play a role in the
formulation and implementation of the government’s current space programme.
Target  areas  under  this  state  preference  seem to  be  the  enhancement  of  the  Chinese
military’s strategic support system, the prevention of the weaponisation of and an arms
race in outer space, as well as the hedging against potential enemies’ use of their space
capabilities during armed conflict with China.
The target area of enhancing the Chinese military’s strategic support system is palpable
by this  study’s  finding that  several  current  major  government-promoted space-related
measures apparently have a military support-orientation.166
Concerning the two other target areas, CSA2016 explicitly states that China ‘opposes the
weaponization of or an arms race in outer space.’167 At the same time, Chinese decision-
makers are not naïve. The government’s military-related white paper from 2015 refers to
outer space as ‘a commanding height in international strategic competition’ and explains
that ‘China will keep abreast of the dynamics of outer space, deal with security threats
and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets to serve its national economic
and social development, and maintain outer space security.’168 In this regard, China shows
especially a hedging behaviour against potential enemies’ use of their space capabilities
during armed conflict with China. For one, the government’s space programme ‘does not
prohibit  “use of force” or the “threat of force” against objects  in space during armed
conflict.’  Moreover,  some observers  suggest  that  the  country  already  engages  in  the
development and ground storage of terrestrially-based counterspace systems, and displays
165 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch I.
166 See especially this study’s Sections 4.6.2-4.
167 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch I.
168 SCIO, ‘China’s Military Strategy’ (Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China,
May 2015) ch IV <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2014.htm> accessed 23 October 2015.
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an openness for the development and ground storage of space-based weapon systems.169
China  famously  tested  a  domestic,  terrestrially-based  anti-satellite  weapon  (ASAT)
system  against  an  old  Chinese  satellite  in  2007.170 Lastly,  China  and  Russia  may
prominently solicit  the adoption of the ‘Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of
Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects’171
(commonly known as PPWT) in the Conference on Disarmament. Yet, their last draft of
this treaty includes that a state’s right to self-defence in accordance with UN Charter art
51  is  not  affected  by  the  treaty,  which  ultimately  leaves  the  door  open  for  the
development  and use of  ground-based counterspace  systems and space-based weapon
systems in times of conflict.172
  4.4.5  Science and technology state preferences
The government’s current space-related science and technology state preference seems to
be the advancement  of China’s scientific  and technological  level  per se;  whereby the
reference to ‘per se’ indicates here more of a basic research and knowledge gathering
orientation.
The main reference point is CSA2016’s explanation that the government conducts space
undertakings  ‘to meet  the demands of […] scientific  and technological  development’,
‘improve the scientific […] levels of the Chinese people’, establish ‘the capabilities […]
to make scientific discovery and research at the cutting edge’ and ‘explore outer space
169 Based on information in: Pollpeter and others (n 127) 19; Sandra Erwin, ‘U.S. Intelligence: Russia and
China Will  Have “Operational” Anti-Satellite Weapons in a Few Years’  (SpaceNews,  14 February
2018)  <http://spacenews.com/u-s-intelligence-russia-and-china-will-have-operational-anti-satellite-
weapons-in-a-few-years/> accessed 26 June 2018; Harsh Vasani, ‘How China Is Weaponizing Outer
Space’ (The Diplomat, 19 January 2017) <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/how-china-is-weaponizing-
outer-space/> accessed 3 June 2018. Citation in first source. Due to the lack of official material on
Chinese counterspace and space-based weapon systems, these system are not discussed any further
under this chapter’s sections on major government-promoted space-related measures.
170 The government holds that the test was not aimed against any country and that it provided information
about the test to several foreign governments, including Japan: ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu
Jianchao’s Regular Press Conference on 23 January, 2007’ (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China
in  the  United  States  of  America,  24  January  2007)
<http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t291388.htm> accessed 23 October 2015.
171 A copy of the draft treaty as of 2014 is attached to: Conference on Disarmament ‘Letter dated 10 June
2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and the Permanent Representative
of  China  to  the  Conference  on  Disarmament  addressed  to  the  Acting  Secretary  General  of  the
Conference transmitting the updated Russian and Chinese texts of the draft treaty on prevention of the
placement  of  weapons in outer  space and of  the threat  or use of  force against  outer  space objects
(PPWT) introduced by the Russian Federation and China’ (12.06.2014) CD/1985.
172 Based on information in: Michael Listner and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ‘The 2014 PPWT: A New
Draft  but  with  the  Same  and  Different  Problems’  (The  Space  Review,  11  August  2014)
<http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2575/1> accessed 23 October 2015; Pollpeter  and others  (n
127) 19.
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and enhance understanding of the earth and the cosmos’.173 Furthermore, this study has
identified  some  current major  government-promoted  space-related  measures  that
(partially) fit the pursuit of such a state preference.174
  4.4.6  Autonomy-oriented state preferences
Two autonomy-oriented state preferences are arguably part of the government’s current
space programme. 
The  first  one  appears  to  be  to  ensure  the  stable  use  of  outer  space  for  China.  This
materialises  from CSA2016 stating that  the government  aims at  ensuring a  clean and
peaceful space environment and works on constructing and applying a stable and reliable
space infrastructure.175 Also,  the government’s  military-related white  paper from 2015
informs the reader that the country will ‘deal with security threats and challenges in […
the space] domain, and secure its space assets to serve its national economic and social
development,  and maintain outer space security.’176 Additionally,  this  study has found
some  current  major  government-promoted  space-related  measures  that  are  seemingly
directed towards serving the pursuit of such a state preference.177
The  second  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state  preference  encompasses  the
development  and  maintenance  of  the  domestic  human,  industrial,  scientific  and
technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level,
independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences.
This surfaces from the government’s declaration in CSA2016 that it seeks to ‘build China
into a space power in all respects’, to continuously enhance China’s capability to enter
and use outer space, and to ‘have an advanced and open [Chinese] space science and
technology industry’. The document further explains that the government’s present space
programme follows the principle of innovative and open development, which promotes
domestic innovation and self-reliance in the space sector. Besides that, CSA2016 calls for
China’s space undertakings to build up the country’s CNP. Considering the determination
of  CNP  in  Section  4.4.1.3,  this  latter  aspect  presumably  includes  a  striving  for  an
173 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch I.
174 See especially this study’s Sections 4.6.5-8.
175 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{ch}’ (n 124) ch I.
176 SCIO, ‘China’s Military Strategy’ (n 168) ch IV.
177 See especially this study’s Sections 4.6.1.2 and 4.6.9.
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improvement  of  the  different  domestic  space-related  hard  and soft  power  capabilities
available to the government in the pursuit of its various other (space-related) objectives.178
Lastly,  this state preference is somewhat discernable by this study unearthing that  the
government  currently  puts  more  emphasis  on  promoting  major  domestic  than  major
cooperative  space-related  measures,  including  with  regard  to  human  resource
development.179
 4.5  Basic pol. & leg. framework concerning IGO-based regional space cooperation
There are various indicators that the Chinese government is, in general, open to engaging
in  IGO-based  regional  space  cooperation,  including  with  the  other  preeminent  Asian
governments in the space sector.
Most prominently, CSA2016 puts forward that the Chinese government supports, among
others, bi- and multilateral space cooperation within common goals, as well as IGO-based
activities  promoting  the  development  of  Chinese  space  undertakings.  The  document
further  highlights  the  government’s  (continued)  interest  in  space-related  collaboration
through already entered IGOs like APSCO.180 No particular other government appears to
be excluded from that per se.
With a view on principles guiding the Chinese government’s current intergovernmental
space  cooperation,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  ‘Five  Principles  of  Peaceful
Coexistence’  play a role.  They officially  steer  the government’s international  politics.
Promoted since 1954, these principles encompass ‘[1] mutual respect for sovereignty and
territorial  integrity,  [2]  mutual  non-aggression,  [3]  non-interference  in  each  other’s
internal  affairs,  [4]  equality  and mutual  benefit,  and [5] peaceful  coexistence’.181 The
government’s ‘win-win strategy’ and its political concept of zhèngquè de yì lì guān (‘正
’确的义利观 ),  which does not translate well into English,  elucidate the principle of
equality and mutual benefit. Following the win-win strategy means ‘to abandon the zero-
sum mentality,  accommodate  the  other’s  interests  while  seeking  one’s  own,  promote
178 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch I.
179 See the findings throughout this study’s Section 4.6.
180 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{ch}’ (n 124) ch V.
181 ‘Xi’s Speech at “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” Anniversary’ (China.org.cn, 7 July 2014)
<http://www.china.org.cn/world/2014-07/07/content_32876905.htm> accessed  25 May 2015;  for  the
principles’ history, see: ‘China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence’ (Ministry
of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China)
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18053.shtml>
accessed 25 May 2015.
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common development while developing oneself, and continue to deepen the pattern of
shared  interests.’182 By  applying  the  zhèngquè  de  yì  lì  guān concept,  the  Chinese
government aims at upholding equality among partners, taking long-term perspectives,
and fostering common development and the rapid progress of developing countries.183
CSA2016 also adds that Chinese space undertakings shall take place ‘on the basis of [...]
peaceful use, inclusive development,  and actively carrying out international exchanges
and cooperation in space, committed to promoting the common progress of mankind’s
space undertakings and long-term sustainable development.’184 Moreover, the document
declares with a view to the main international space agreements that the Outer Space
Treaty185,  acceded  to  in  1983,186 and  the  Benefits  Declaration187 guide  China’s
international space cooperation.188 Somewhat overlapping with the zhèngquè de yì lì guān
concept, this declaration calls on states to pay special regards to the needs of developing
countries and countries with incipient space programmes.189 Besides that, China further
adheres  to  the  Rescue  Agreement190,  the  Liability  Convention191 and  the  Registration
Convention192, all acceded to in 1988.193 It has not joined the Moon Agreement194.
182 Hui  Lu,  ‘Signed  Article:  Innovations  in  China’s  Diplomatic  Theory  and  Practice  under  New
Conditions’  (Xinhuanet,  16  August  2013)
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/bilingual/2013-08/16/c_132636034.htm> accessed 4 June 2015.
183 ‘  正确的义利观 A  More  Balanced  Approach  to  Upholding  Principles  and  Pursuing  Interests’
(China.org.cn,  18  November  2014)
<http://www.china.org.cn/china/china_key_words/2014-11/18/content_34085512.htm>  accessed  4
June 2015.
184 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{ch}’ (n 124) ch I. There, it reads: ‘在。。。和平利用、包容发展基础上，积极开
’ 展航天国际交流与合作，致力于推进人类航天事业的共同进步和长期可持续发展。 The same
document’s ch V supports this argument.
185 Referring to the ‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’: ‘Space Law Treaties and Principles’
(UNOOSA)  <http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html>  accessed  13  October
2018.
186 ‘Treaty  Signatures’  (UNOOSA)  <http://www.unoosa.org/oosatdb/showTreatySignatures.do> accessed
23 March 2015.
187 Referring to the ‘The Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of
Developing Countries’: ‘Space Law Treaties and Principles’ (n 185).
188 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{ch}’ (n 124) ch V.
189 Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and
in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries, UNGA
Res 51/122 (13 December 1996).
190 Referring to the ‘Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space’: ‘Space Law Treaties and Principles’ (n 185).
191 Referring to the ‘Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects’: ibid.
192 Referring to the ‘Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space’: ibid.
193 Li, ‘Progressing Towards New National Space Law: Current Legal Status and Recent Developments in
Chinese Space Law and Its Relevance to Pacific Rim Space Law and Activities’ (n 128) 460–461; for
the dates, see: ‘Treaty Signatures’ (n 186).
194 Referring  to  the  ‘Agreement  Governing  the  Activities  of  States  on  the  Moon and Other  Celestial
Bodies’: ‘Space Law Treaties and Principles’ (n 185).
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Finally,  it  is notable here that Chinese decision-makers have set  up an export control
regime that might interfere with the government’s present potential for intergovernmental
collaboration in the development and use of space-related products with a possible dual-
use  quality  like  space  launch  systems.195 Prominent  documents  in  this  regard  are  the
‘Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Administration of Arms Export’196, its
related ‘Military Products Export Control List’197, and the ‘Regulations of the People’s
Republic  of  China  on  Export  Control  of  Missiles  and  Missile-related  Items  and
Technologies’198,  which  has  a  ‘Missiles  and  Missile-related  Items  and  Technologies
Export Control List’ annexed to it. However, this study ultimately abstains from a more
detailed description of this regime. After all, the government in an authoritarian one-party
state  like  China  has  almost  certainly  considerable  room to  manoeuvre  on  whether  to
enforce this regime regarding a (potential) intergovernmental cooperation mechanism.
 4.6  Major domestic and cooperative space-related measures
  4.6.1  APRSAF and APSCO
   4.6.1.1  APRSAF
The  participation  of  Chinese  government-related  (and  non-governmental)  entities  in
Japanese-led APRSAF, somewhat constituting a regional space cooperation regime, can
to  a  certain  degree  be  considered  a  current  major  Chinese  government-promoted
institutionalised  regional  cooperative  space-related  measure  (with  a  presumed  high
potential for) involving other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector.
While not representing all of the Chinese involvement in APRSAF, the primary specific
current  Chinese  government-promoted  cooperative  space-related  measure  within  this
regime appears to be the contribution to  Sentinel Asia. The latter’s participants aim at
advancing disaster management in the Asia-Pacific region through the joint application of
195 Zhao, National Space Law in China (n 114) 155–179.
196 For  an  unofficial  English  translation,  see:  ‘Regulations  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  on
Administration  of  Arms  Export’  (NPC)
<http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/14/content_1384262.htm>  accessed  26  January
2015.
197 The list is mentioned here: Zhao, National Space Law in China (n 114) 164.
198 For an unofficial English translation, see: ‘Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export
Control  of  Missiles  and  Missile-Related  Items  and  Technologies’  (NPC)
<http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/14/content_1384258.htm>  accessed  26  January
2015.
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space technology. Among the presently over 100 project team members are,  inter alia,
government-related entities from China, India, Japan and South Korea.199
As such, as well as considering the more detailed introduction of APRSAF in Section
7.6.1, the Chinese government’s engagement in this regime falls likely mainly into the
pursuit of its current space-related socioeconomic state preference, in particular the target
area of developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a
broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for China. 
Also, the Chinese government might see a Chinese involvement in APRSAF, and more
specifically  Sentinel Asia, as adding to the pursuit of its current space-related political
state preference of advancing China’s international prestige and influence. After all, other
–  especially  technology-wise  less  developed  –  participants  in  Sentinel  Asia might  be
grateful to the Chinese contribution to their disaster management, which might translate
into a better standing of China among them in general.
   4.6.1.2  APSCO
The  Chinese  government’s  current  main  institutionalised  regional  cooperative  space-
related measure (with a presumed high potential for) involving other preeminent Asian
governments in the space sector is APSCO, a regional space-specific IGO.
Briefly speaking, the Chinese government was one of the initial eight signatories200 of the
APSCO Convention on 28.10.2005. It ratified the  convention on 30.06.2006. By that,
China became one of the first five full member states201 when the convention went into
force on 12.10.2006. Nowadays, the organisation’s eight full members202 encompass two
of the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector, namely China and Iran, as well
as Bangladesh, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand and Turkey.203
Purpose-wise, the APSCO Convention suggests that its members have officially agreed to
cooperate for, ‘based on the principles of peaceful uses of outer space, mutual benefits
and  complementariness,  equal  consultations  and  development,  […]  effectively
199 For this and more information on APRSAF and Sentinel Asia, see this study’s Section 7.6.1.
200 Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand.
201 Bangladesh, China, Mongolia, Pakistan and Peru.
202 Indonesia remains only a signatory state. Instead, Turkey became the eight full member in 2011.
203 Zhang and others (n 17) 29.
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improv[ing] the capability of the Member States in space science, space technology and
their peaceful applications, and bring[ing] more socio-economic benefits to each of the
Member States’. The socioeconomic part seems to include especially the areas of disaster
management,  environmental  protection  and  the  development  of  competitive  national
space-related industries.204 Towards that end, the APSCO members have evidently agreed
to engage at least in collaboration concerning space technology and its applications, space
science research, education and training, exchange of scientists and technologists, Earth
observation (EO), satellite communications, satellite navigation and positioning, as well
as the creation of a central data bank for programme development and dissemination of
relevant  information regarding APSCO programmes and activities.  Also, the members
apparently aspire to involve their respective domestic industries in their APSCO-related
undertakings to the greatest possible extent.205
Within  this  context,  the  following  have  arguably  been  the  specific  major  Chinese
government-promoted cooperative space-related measures under APSCO since 2006:206
China provides data from – reportedly nine – domestically controlled EO satellites to
APSCO’s  Data Sharing Service Platform (DSSP) project. In short, DSSP supports the
sharing and application of remote sensing data among APSCO member states within the
organisation’s official purpose, e.g. to advance the members’ disaster management.207
Somewhat related to DSSP, and considered a key area of cooperation under the Chinese
government’s  current  space  programme,208 China  also  engages  considerably  in  the
APSCO Joint Small Multi-Mission Satellite Constellation (SMMS) project, which shall be
completed around 2022. The project’s core elements are to ‘construct a system of small
multi-mission  satellite  constellation  including  space  and  ground  segments  for  remote
sensing and integrated data collection; and realize multi-source data acquisition to meet
user requirements; enhance the capability for utilizing remote sensing and integrated data
204 APSCO Convention preamble,arts 5-6. Citation based on the preamble.
205 APSCO Convention arts 5-6.
206 They do not account for all specific measures so far proposed and implemented under APSCO.
207 Xunjin Li, ‘Realizing SPACE 2030 Through Multi-Lateral Cooperation’ (Presentation, UN/UAE-High
Level  Forum,  Dubai,  8  November  2017)  12–13
<http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/hlf/HLF2017/presentations/Day3/High_Level_Panel/1st/
Presentation4.pdf>  accessed  15  April  2018;  Manop  Aorpimai,  ‘APSCO  and  Its  GEO-Related
Activities’  (Presentation,  10th GEOSS Asia-Pacific  Symposium,  Hanoi,  18 September  2017)  6–10
<https://vnsc.org.vn/geoss-ap10/data/4%20Country%20Reports%2018.9/15.%20APSCO
%20Presentation.pdf> accessed 15 April 2018.
208 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
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collection to develop applications to meet user requirements, as well as conduct technical
exchanges, appropriate training and cooperation.’  This shall  involve the application of
some existing domestic  satellites  of  APSCO members,  as  well  as the  project-specific
development  of  additional  small-,  micro-  and  nano-satellites.  While  writing,  China
already  provides  remote  sensing  data  collected  by  the  Gaofen-1, -2 and  CBERS-4
satellites,  and allows for some use of its  ground station network. Further highlighting
China’s strong role in this project, APSCO and the China Earth Observation System and
Data Center of CNSA signed a contract on ‘Implementation of the system design and
definition  phase  (Phase  B)  of  APSCO  Joint  Small  Multi-Mission  Satellite  (SMMS)
Constellation Program’ on 27.11.2017.209
Besides that, the Chinese side takes on a significant role in the implementation of the
Asia-Pacific  Ground-Based  Optical  Space  Objects  Observation  System (APOSOS)
project. Notably, the National Astronomical Observatory of CAS hosts the APOSOS data
centre, and the Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics develops three
telescopes for the project to be installed in Iran, Pakistan and Peru. Overall, the project
shall support the APSCO members’ space situational awareness capability regarding the
detection, tracking and identification of space objects, e.g. satellites and debris.210
APSCO’s activity field of education and training relies substantially on the Chinese side
as  well.  For  example,  the  latter  sponsors  students  from  APSCO  member  states  in
participating  in  the APSCO-promoted Master’s  and PhD programmes.211 The APSCO
Education and Training Center was established at China’s Beihang University.212 Also,
the Chinese side has taken the lead of APSCO’s Student Small Satellite (SSS) project for
hands-on training of students and facilities in small satellite development. The project,
209 Based on information in: Li, ‘Realizing SPACE 2030 Through Multi-Lateral Cooperation’ (n 207) 33–
35; ‘The Signing Ceremony of Contract on SMMS Program between APSCO and CNSA’ (APSCO, 30
November 2017) <http://www.apsco.int/sitesearchOne.asp?ID=577> accessed 15 April 2018. Citation
based on the last link.
210 Based on information in: Lan Chen, ‘Chinese Space Quarterly Report January - March 2014’ (2014)
May 2014(12 Revised Version)  Go Taikonauts! 3,  6;  Li,  ‘Realizing SPACE 2030 Through Multi-
Lateral Cooperation’ (n 207) 21–24.
211 Li, ‘Realizing SPACE 2030 Through Multi-Lateral Cooperation’ (n 207) 39.
212 ‘APSCO Delegation’s Visit to Beihang University and the Opening Ceremony of APSCO Education
and  Training  Center  in  China’  (APSCO,  24  March  2014)  <http://apsco.int/NewsOne.asp?ID=322>
accessed 9 September 2015.
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which is introduced as a key area of cooperation under the Chinese government’s current
space programme,213 kicked-off in 2016.214
Combining and interpreting all that information, the Chinese government’s engagement
within APSCO can be considered to be especially directed towards serving the pursuit of
the following current space-related state preferences:
First, the government’s APSCO membership appears aimed at fostering the pursuit of its
current  space-related  socioeconomic  state  preference,  in  particular  the  target  areas  of
developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set
of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for China, as well as of expanding the domestic
(private) space industry.
Second, by taking into account its aforementioned strong involvement in certain APSCO-
specific  undertakings  and  its  significant  contributions  to  the  establishment  and
maintenance  of  the  APSCO’s  headquarters,215 the  Chinese  government  has  likely
recognised APSCO as a useful tool to bind the other APSCO members closer to China in
the space sector, hoping that this might ultimately also strengthen China’s international
prestige among and influence  over  them in general. This  is  coherent  with one of the
government’s current space-related political state preferences.
Third, the APOSOS project suits the pursuit of the government’s current space-related
autonomy-oriented state preference of ensuring the stable use of outer space for China.
Finally, since APSCO shall foster the joint improvement of capabilities in space science,
technology and their  peaceful  applications  and has already seen joint  educational  and
training  activities,  the  Chinese  government  presumably  sees  APSCO  further  as  an
instrument that can temporarily assist in the pursuit of its current space-related autonomy-
213 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
214 Based  on  information  in:  ‘APSCO Small  Student  Satellite  Project’  (APSCO,  21  November  2011)
<http://www.apsco.int/NewsOne.asp?ID=12>  accessed  16  September  2015;  ‘APSCO-SSS  Project’
(APSCO-SSS  Project)  <http://www.apsco-sss.com/index_en.cshtml>  accessed  19  April  2018;
‘Introduction’ (APSCO-SSS Project) <http://www.apsco-sss.com/introduction_en.cshtml> accessed 19
April 2018.
215 The Chinese government  donated and continues to host  the APSCO headquarters  in Beijing: ‘The
Headquarters  of  APSCO’  (APSCO)  <http://www.apsco.int/AboutApscosS.asp?
LinkNameW1=The_Structure_of_APSCO&LinkNameW2=The_Headquarters_of_APSCO&LinkCode
N3=1713&LinkCodeN=12> accessed 19 April 2017.
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oriented  state  preference  of  developing  and  maintaining  China’s  domestic  human,
industrial, scientific and technological capacities and capabilities necessary to engage, at
least on a basic level, independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences.
  4.6.2  Remote Sensing
   4.6.2.1  Major domestic measures
In  line  with  the  government’s  prioritisation  of  creating  an  independent  Chinese  civil
space infrastructure, the overarching major government-promoted domestic space-related
remote sensing measure is the development and application of a comprehensive Chinese-
controlled remote sensing satellite system offering (in the future global) low-, medium-
and high-spatial-resolution data of Earth based on a broad range of technologies,  e.g.
optical observation and synthetic-aperture radar. Without explicitly limiting it to them,
the main satellite series in this system apparently are China’s land, ocean and atmospheric
observation satellites series.216
On  a  more  specific  level,  the  major  government-promoted  domestic  –  or  at  least
domestically  controlled  –  remote  sensing  satellite  series  throughout  the  21st century
seemingly have,  while  partially  fitting the development  of the aforementioned remote
sensing satellite  system,  been so far  the  following series  (alphabetically,  and without
claiming completeness): Fengyun (风云),217 Gaofen (高分; primary series of the China
High-resolution Earth Observation System218, commonly known as CHEOS),219 Haiyang
(海洋),220 Huanjing (环境 ; primary series of China’s Small Satellites Constellation for
216 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) chs III-IV; ‘国家民用空间基础设施中长期发展规划（2015-2025
年）[National Medium- and Long-Term Civil Space Infrastructure Development Plan (2015-2025)]’ (n
110) 7–11.
217 Pollpeter  and  others  (n  127)  69–70;  ‘Satellites’  (China  Meteorological  Administration)
<http://www.cma.gov.cn/en2014/satellites/> accessed 31 August 2015.
218 The system is a major special project promoted under STDP: ‘The National Medium- and Long-Term
Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020) An Outline’ (n 111) 32.
219 ‘Gaofen (High Resolution)’ (China Space Report) <https://chinaspacereport.com/spacecraft/gaofen/>
accessed 21 November 2017.
220 Xingwei Jiang and Mingsen Lin, ‘Ocean Observation from Haiyang Satellites: 2012-2014’ in Hejun
Yin and others  (eds),  Space Science Activities in China. National Report  2012-2014 (CNCOSPAR
2014) 191,193,196-200 <http://english.nssc.cas.cn/ns/NU/201410/W020141016603625696274.pdf>.
64
Environmental and Disaster Monitoring and Forecasting),221 Kuaizhou (快舟),222 TanSat
(碳卫星),223 Tansuo (探索),224 Tianhui (天绘),225 Yaogan (遥感),226 Yunhai (云海),227 and
Ziyuan (资源).228
Altogether, these measures appear especially aimed at serving the pursuit of two current
space-related state preferences:
First,  the combination  of  information  presented  in  CSIDP229 and  the  footnotes  of  the
various  satellite  series  introduced  above suggests  that  most  measures  shall  foster  the
pursuit of the government’s space-related socioeconomic state preference, in particular
the target area of developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal
with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for China. This is evident by
references  to  the  measures’  application  in  such socioeconomically  relevant  areas  like
agriculture, climate  change,  disaster  management,  environmental  monitoring  and
protection,  forestry,  geology,  health,  hydrology,  land use,  infrastructure,  mapping and
surveying,  marine  observation,  meteorology,  natural  resources,  pollution  monitoring,
public security, transportation, and urban planning.
221 Based on information in: ‘  大事记 [Record of Major Events]’ (Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China,  3  April  2009)
<http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293877/n12221440/n12221472/12227839.html>  accessed  1
September 2015; You Zhou, ‘Small Satellite Constellation for Environment and  Disaster Monitoring
and  Forecasting   (SSCEDMF)’  (Presentation,  52nd  UNCOPUOS,  Vienna,  June  2009)
<http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/copuos2009/tech-12.pdf> accessed 21 November 2017.
222 ‘China  Launches  Satellite  to  Monitor  Natural  Disaster’  (CCTV,  25  September  2013)
<http://english.cntv.cn/20130925/103641.shtml> accessed 6 September 2015.
223 ‘China Launches TanSat to Study Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Processes’ (SpaceDaily, 28 December
2016)
<http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_launches_TanSat_to_study_atmospheric_carbon_dioxide_
processes_999.html> accessed 14 November 2017.
224 Brian Harvey, China in Space. The Great Leap Forward (Springer 2013) 202–204.
225 Based on information in:  ibid 203; ‘  天绘卫星遥感部 [Tianhui  Satellite  Remote Sensing Unit]’
(National  Remote  Sensing  Center  of  China)
<http://www.nrscc.gov.cn/nrscc/ywfb/sjyzhfwl/201404/t20140418_32640.html> accessed 6 September
2015; Pollpeter and others (n 127) 67–68.
226 ‘China  Launches  Yaogan-25  Remote  Sensing  Satellite’  (SC,  11  December  2014)
<http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2014/12/11/content_281475022380549.htm>  accessed  11  June
2015.
227 Andrew  Jones,  ‘China’s  Second  Launch  of  the  Week  Puts  Yunhai-1  into  Orbit’  (GBTIMES,  12
November  2016)  <https://gbtimes.com/chinas-second-launch-week-puts-yunhai-1-orbit>  accessed  20
November 2017.
228 Based on information in: ‘资源一号 02C  卫星 [Ziyuan-1-02C Satellite]’ (China Centre for Resources
Satellite  Data  and  Application,  25  July  2012)
<http://www.cresda.com/n16/n1130/n175275/175577.html> accessed 13 June 2015; ‘资源三号卫星介
 绍 [Ziyuan-3 Satellite Introduction]’ (China Centre for Resources Satellite Data and Application, 25
July 2012) <http://www.cresda.com/n16/n1130/n175290/175676.html> accessed 13 June 2015.
229 ‘国家民用空间基础设施中长期发展规划（2015-2025年）[National Medium- and Long-Term Civil
Space Infrastructure Development Plan (2015-2025)]’ (n 110) 6–9.
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Second,  there  are  indicators  that  these  measures  shall  strengthen  the  pursuit  of  the
government’s space-related national security state preference, in particular the target area
of  enhancing  the  Chinese  military’s  strategic  support  system.  For  one,  while  the
government has never officially declared a set of domestic remote sensing satellites to be
fully dedicated to national  security  objectives,  various authors argue that some of the
aforementioned satellite  series like  Haiyang,230 Yaogan231 and  Ziyuan232 (also) have an
application in this direction. Additionally, there is the well-known fact that space-derived
remote sensing data can serve military activities considerably. Lastly, such a direction is
likely due to the government promoting an integrated civil and military development in
space  technology,233 and  CSDIP mentioning  that  the  independent  Chinese  civil  space
infrastructure  shall,  despite  having the word ‘civil’  in  its  name,  contribute to  China’s
national security.234
   4.6.2.2  Major cooperative measures
There are various key areas of cooperation under the Chinese government’s present space
programme that concern the field of remote sensing.235 
Based on this  background and excluding measures falling primarily  under the already
introduced  APRSAF  and  APSCO,  this  study  has,  without  claiming  completeness,
identified these (more) specific current major government-promoted cooperative space-
related  remote sensing measures (with a presumed high potential  for)  involving other
preeminent Asian governments in the space sector:
China through CNSA is, alongside the space agencies of, among others, India, Japan and
South  Korea,  a  member  of  the  esteemed  ‘International  Charter  "Space  and  Major
Disasters"’ (International Disaster Charter). As the document’s name suggests, the charter
230 Jiang and Lin (n 220) 196.
231 Based  on information  in:  Dinaker  Peri,  ‘Yaogan Satellites  and  Chinese  ASBM Capability’  (2014)
Spring 2014 Scholar  Warrior  109;  S  Chandrashekar  and Soma Perumal,  ‘China’s  Constellation of
Yaogan Satellites & the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile – An Update’ (Report, International Strategic and
Security  Studies  Programme,  National  Institute  of  Advanced  Studies  02  January  2015)  10–12
<http://isssp.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Yaogan-and-ASBM-January-2015-Report.pdf>  accessed
11 June 2015; Pollpeter and others (n 127) 64.
232 Harvey (n 224) 185–187.
233 Lei  Wang,  ‘China  Names  Key  Areas  of  Military-Civilian  Integration’  (China  Global  Television
Network, 21 June 2017) <https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d41444d7751444e/share_p.html> accessed 23
January 2018.
234 ‘国家民用空间基础设施中长期发展规划（2015-2025年）[National Medium- and Long-Term Civil
Space Infrastructure Development Plan (2015-2025)]’ (n 110) 1.
235 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
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shall strengthen international disaster management activities. The Chinese side apparently
contributes  remote  sensing  data  from  at  least  three  satellites.236 Notably,  the  latter
encompass not only domestic satellites but also the China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite
(CBERS) series, which is jointly developed between China and Brazil.237
Chinese government-related entities engage in the Group on Earth Observations (GEO)
alongside India, Iran, Japan and South Korea,238 the United Nations Platform for Space-
based Information  for  Disaster  Management  and Emergency  Response (UN-SPIDER)
alongside  India,  Iran  and  South  Korea,239 as  well  as  the  World  Meteorological
Organization (WMO) alongside India, Iran, Japan, North Korea and South Korea.240
China  through  CNSA  has  put  forward  the  initiative  to  create  the  BRICS241 Remote
Sensing Satellite Constellation. In 2017, the space agencies of all members of the BRICS
association,  which  also  includes  India,  agreed  to  work  jointly  on  implementing  this
measure. For the first phase, the partners envision the setup of a virtual constellation for
remote sensing data sharing based on existing satellites.  A future second phase might
comprise  the  joint  creation  of  a  new satellite  constellation.  Reportedly,  all  that shall
support the strategic partnership among BRICS members, as well as their socioeconomic
development,  e.g.  in  such  areas  like  climate  change,  disasters  management,
environmental protection and the realisation of the so-called Sustainable Development
Goals242.243 The Chinese government’s current space programme even directly names the
overall constellation a key area of cooperation.244
236 ‘The International Charter Space and Major Disasters’ (The International Charter Space and Major
Disasters)  25  <https://disasterscharter.org/documents/10180/897997/Charter-Brochure.pdf/3d02801c-
8e36-4c3b-bde3-e94013a9409c> accessed 9 June 2018.
237 Based  on  information  in:  ‘CBERS  /  Ziyuan  1’  (China  Space  Report)
<https://chinaspacereport.com/spacecraft/cbers-ziyuan1/> accessed 26 January 2018; ‘The International
Charter Space and Major Disasters’ (n 236).
238 ‘Member List’ (GEO) <https://www.earthobservations.org/members.php> accessed 14 October 2018.
239 ‘China’  (UN-SPIDER  Knowledge  Portal)
<http://www.un-spider.org/network/national-focal-points/china> accessed 14 October 2018.
240 ‘Members’ (WMO) <https://public.wmo.int/en/about-us/members> accessed 14 October 2018.
241 Reference to an intergovernmental association formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
242 These goals have a strong socioeconomic orientation: ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ (UN) <https://
www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/> accessed 23 April 2018.
243 Based on information in: ‘SA Joins BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation’ (South African
National  Space  Agency,  3  July  2017)  <https://www.sansa.org.za/news/1701-sa-joins-brics-remote-
sensing-satellite-constellation> accessed 7 October 2017; Hui Jiang, ‘BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite
Constellation’  (Presentation,  UN/UAE-High  Level  Forum,  Dubai,  7  November  2017)
<http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/hlf/HLF2017/presentations/Day2/Session_7a/
1._Progress_of_BRICS_Remote_Sensing_Satellite_Constellation-dubai.pdf> accessed 1 July 2018.
244 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
67
The  Sino-Indian ‘2015-2020  Space  Cooperation  Outline  between  the  Indian  Space
Research  Organisation  of  the  Republic  of  India  and  the  China  National  Space
Administration  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China’  (Sino-Indian  Space  Cooperation
Outline 2015) from 15.05.2015, which is linked to the ‘Memorandum of Understanding
between Indian Space Research Organisation and China National Space Administration
on  Cooperation  in  the  Peaceful  Use  of  Outer  Space’  from  18.09.2014,  indicates  a
potential  for (further) Sino-Indian collaboration in space-related remote sensing.  More
precisely, the two parties apparently consider collaboration on satellite data sharing for
emergency responses during major disasters; satellite data-related collaboration regarding
weather forecasting, tropical storm events and climate change studies; other reciprocal
data  sharing  and exchange;  reception  of  each others’  data  by their  respective  ground
stations; cross-calibration of data; cooperation regarding new EO science payloads; and
information sharing and exchange of expertise in EO applications, e.g. for agriculture,
environmental  monitoring  and  protection,  disaster  management  and  water  resources.
Moreover,  they  want  to  discuss  the  effective  application  of  a  virtual  constellation
involving  remote  sensing  satellites.245 The  latter  is  likely  a  reference  to  the
aforementioned BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation.
China’s  proposed  construction  of  the  Belt  and  Road  Initiative  Space  Information
Corridor (BRISIC),  another  directly  named  key  area  for  cooperation  under  the
government’s current space programme,246 covers, among others, a Chinese interest in
international cooperation regarding space-related remote sensing, presumably including
with some other preeminent  Asian governments in the space sector.  In particular,  the
development  of  BRISIC  seems  to  be  aimed  at  setting  up  a  better  interaction  and
application of the currently available and upcoming (public and private) remote sensing,
communications  and  broadcasting,  and navigation  satellites  of  the  participants  of  the
China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)247 in establishing and maintaining BRI’s
so-called  modern land-based ‘Silk  Road Economic  Belt’  and sea-based ‘21st-Century
245 For a copy of this outline and the information presented above, see: ‘2015-2020 Space Cooperation
Outline  between  the  Indian  Space  Research  Organisation  of  the  Republic  of  India  and  the  China
National  Space  Administration  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China’  (Ministry  of  External  Affairs,
Government  of India) <http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/CH15B2096.pdf> accessed 9
October 2017. This study was unable to obtain a copy of the MoU from 2014.
246 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
247 BRI encompasses the creation of a modern land-based ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and sea-based ‘21st-
Century  Maritime  Silk  Road’.  So  far,  the  regional  scope  has  only  be  very  loosely  determined.
Ultimately, it can cover any country that the Chinese government wants to include.
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Maritime Silk Road’. It is not necessarily a call for the joint development and application
of dedicated new satellite systems, even though related activities are not excluded.248
In sum, except in the case of BRISIC, the Chinese government’s interest and involvement
in these cooperative measures seems to be primarily oriented towards serving the pursuit
of  its  space-related  socioeconomic  state  preference,  in  particular  the  target  area  of
developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set
of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for China. Regarding BRISIC, the cooperation
focus  appears  to  be  on  supporting  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  space-related
socioeconomic target area of enhancing Chinese entities’ role in the international space
market.  After  all,  BRI,  while  remaining  loosely  defined,  shall  ultimately  help  to
strengthen China’s economic interaction with and the general economic development of
the Asian region and some other parts of the world.249 
Besides that, it is likely that the Chinese government hopes that the cooperative measures
mentioned  above  also  somewhat  aid,  e.g.  by  other  states  benefiting  from  Chinese
contributions,  the  pursuit  of  its  space-related  political  state  preference  of  advancing
China’s international prestige and influence with its respective partners.
  4.6.3  Communications and broadcasting
   4.6.3.1  Major domestic measures
Within the context of the  independent Chinese civil space infrastructure priority,250 the
current overarching major government-promoted domestic space-related communications
and broadcasting measure is the establishment of ‘a comprehensive [Chinese-controlled
satellite-based]  system  capable  of  providing  broadband  communications,  fixed
communications,  direct-broadcast  television,  mobile  communications  and  mobile
multimedia broadcast services.’ In the future, it shall reach global coverage.251
248 Regarding BRISIC, see: SASTIND and NDRC, ‘ “ ”  加快推进 一带一路 空间信息走廊 建设与应用的
 指导意见 [Guidance for Accelerating the “Belt and Road” Spatial Information Corridor Construction
and  Application]’  (NDRC,  22  October  2016)
<http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbqt/201611/t20161123_827548.html> accessed 23 April 2018; SCIO,
‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V; regarding BRI, see:  ‘Full Text: Action Plan on the Belt and Road
Initiative’  (SC,  30  March  2015)
<http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm>  accessed  25
April 2016.
249 ‘Full Text: Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative’ (n 248).
250 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
251 ibid ch III.
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On  a  more  specific  level,  prominent  government-promoted  domestic(ally  controlled)
communications and broadcasting satellite series in the 21st century, which presumably
(partially)  correspond  to  the  creation  of  the  aforementioned  communications  and
broadcasting  satellite  system,  seem  to  have  comprised  so  far  the  following  series
(alphabetically, and without claiming completeness): Fenghuo (烽火), Shentong (神通),
Tiantong (天通), Xinnuo252 (鑫诺; dubbed SinoSat), Yatai (亚太; dubbed ApStar), Yazhou
(亚洲 ; dubbed AsiaSat),  Zhongwei253 (中卫 ; dubbed ChinaStar) and Zhongxing (中星 ;
dubbed ChinaSat).
Notably,  even though more  and more  are  domestic  products,  it  is,  in  contrast  to  the
China’s  remote  sensing  and navigation  satellite  series,  quite  common for  satellites  in
several of the series above to be purchased or leased from abroad.254 Also, many satellites
in several of these series are operated by Chinese entities based on business models while
meeting public needs.255 As far as this study was able to ascertain, the country’s most
important  communications  and  broadcasting  satellite  operators  currently  are  China
Satellite  Communications  Co.  Ltd.,  APT  Satellite  Co.  Ltd.  and  Asia  Satellite
Telecommunications  Co.  Ltd.  To  refer  to  their  satellites  as  government-promoted
measures  is  fair  because  these  operators  are,  despite  their  commercial  appearance,
ultimately directly or indirectly linked to the Chinese state, in particular to state-owned
conglomerates.  While  writing,  the  Chinese  communications  and broadcasting  satellite
system already covers the Asian region, including the Middle East, as well as Oceania
and some other parts of the world.256
252 Later incorporated into Zhongxing series.
253 Later incorporated into Zhongxing series.
254 Based  on  information  in:  Harvey  (n  224)  142-147,162-168;  ‘  中 国通 信卫 星列 表 [China’s
Communications Satellite List]’ (CGWIC, 31 December 2013) <http://cn.cgwic.com/In-OrbitDelivery/
CommunicationsSatellite/DFHList.html> accessed 9 September 2015; Pollpeter and others (n 127) 74;
Tomasz Nowakowski, ‘China Conducts Surprise Launch of Its First Tiantong-1 Satellite’ (SpaceFlight
Insider,  6  August  2016)  <http://www.spaceflightinsider.com/organizations/china-national-space-
administration/china-conducts-surprise-launch-first-tiantong-1-satellite/> accessed 29 November 2017;
‘“ ”  中 星 卫 星 ["Zhongxing"  Satellites]’  (  中 国 航 天 科 普 网 Spacemore,  22  March  2016)
<http://www.spacemore.com.cn/Article/Detail?id=514> accessed 1 July 2018; ‘China Launches First
Mobile  Telecom  Satellite’  (Xinhuanet,  6  August  2016)  <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-
08/06/c_135567667.htm> accessed 29 November 2017; ‘Fenghuo and Shentong’ (China Space Report,
14  June  2016)  <https://chinaspacereport.com/spacecraft/fenghuo-shentong/>  accessed  11  November
2017;  ‘  卫 星 资 源 [Satellite  Resources]’  (China  Satellite  Communications  Co.  Ltd.)
<http://www.chinasatcom.com/n782704/index.html>  accessed  9  September  2015;  ‘Fleets’  (AsiaSat)
<https://www.asiasat.com/technology/satellite-fleet>  accessed  10  July  2018;  ‘Fleets  –  APSTAR’
(ApStar) <http://www.apstar.com/en/apstar-fleet/> accessed 10 July 2018.
255 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch III.
256 Based on information in: Weimin Hao, ‘Briefing on China’s Satellite Communications Progress and
Future’ (2013) 10(10) China Communications vi, vi–vii; Harvey (n 224) 162–163; Pollpeter and others
(n  127)  74;  ‘Company  Profile’  (China  Satellite  Communications  Co.  Ltd.)
<http://english.csat.spacechina.com/n931656/n931661/index.html> accessed 12 July 2018; ‘Company
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Overall,  the  available  material  suggests  that,  altogether,  the  following  current  space-
related state preferences underlie the measures above:
First,  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  current  space-related  socioeconomic  state
preference, including all related target areas, is palpable by the government allowing for
the  operation  of  many  domestic(ally  controlled)  communications  and  broadcasting
satellites based on business models and having them cover domestic and foreign markets.
Moreover, several of the satellite series above and the comprehensive Chinese-controlled
communications  and  broadcasting  satellite  system  as  a  whole  shall  serve  various
socioeconomically relevant areas like agriculture, personal and business communications,
disaster management, the marine and petroleum industry, radio and television services,
tele-education, telemedicine and transportation.257
Second, there are signs for the pursuit of the government’s current space-related national
security state preference, especially regarding the target area of  enhancing the Chinese
military’s strategic space support system. For example, the Fenghuo, Shentong, Tiantong
and Zhongxing series have apparently seen some or even a strong application concerning
that target area.258 Additionally, even though exact data is hard to come by in the Chinese
case, communications and broadcasting satellites are well-known to support,  inter alia,
military  command and control.  Finally,  such a direction  is  likely  considering that,  as
already introduced in Section 4.6.2.1, the independent Chinese civil space infrastructure
shall aid China’s national security and the government promotes an integrated civil and
military development in space technology.
Third, this study deems it reasonable to assume that the government currently promotes
its  major  domestic  space-related communications  and broadcasting measures  partly  to
foster  the  pursuit  of  its  two  space-related  political  state  preferences  of  securing  the
legitimacy  of  the  CPC’s  rule  over  all  of  China  and  advancing  China’s  international
Profile’  (APT Satellite  Co.  Ltd.)  <http://www.apstar.com/en/about-apstar/>  accessed  12  July  2018;
‘About Us’ (Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd.) <https://www.asiasat.com/aboutus> accessed
12 July 2018.
257 Based on information in: SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch II; ‘国家民用空间基础设施中长期发展
规划（2015-2025 年） [National Medium- and Long-Term Civil Space Infrastructure Development
Plan (2015-2025)]’ (n 110) 11–12.
258 Based on information in: Harvey (n 224) 146–147; Pollpeter and others (n 127) 7-8,12,74; Andrew
Jones,  ‘China  Launches  Zhongxing-1C  Military  Satellite  to  Geostationary  Orbit’  (GBTIMES,  9
December  2015)  <https://gbtimes.com/china-launches-zhongxing-1c-military-satellite-geostationary-
orbit> accessed 14 November 2017; Nowakowski (n 254).
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prestige and influence. After all, the government is surely aware that communications and
broadcasting  satellites  allow spreading its  message  to  all  citizens  across  China’s  vast
territory, as well as to Chinese communities and other audiences abroad quite easily.
   4.6.3.2  Tianlian – a special domestic measure
A special  current major  government-promoted domestic  space-related communications
measure that differs from the measures outlined in the previous section is the domestic
development and application of the Tianlian (天链) series. Tianlian satellites shall form a
system with global  network  operation  providing data  relay,  measurement  and control
services for Chinese human spaceflight undertakings, data relay services for Chinese(-
controlled) remote sensing-related resources satellites in medium- and low-Earth orbit,
and measurement and control support for Chinese space launches.259
As such, the Tianlian series is likely aimed at aiding the pursuit of the particular space-
related state preferences underlying the other measures to which it shall provide services.
   4.6.3.3  Major cooperative measures
A few key areas of cooperation under the government’s present space programme appear
to concern the field of communications and broadcasting.260
Within this context,  and excluding APRSAF and APSCO-related measures, this  study
has,  without  claiming  completeness,  identified  these  (more)  specific  current  major
government-promoted  cooperative  space-related  communications  and  broadcasting
measures  (with  a  presumed  high  potential  for)  involving  other  preeminent  Asian
governments in the space sector:
China is, alongside,  for example,  India,  Iran, Japan, North Korea and South Korea,  a
member  state  of  the  International  Telecommunication  Union  (ITU).  The  latter  is  a
specialised UN agency that engages primarily in global radio spectrum and satellite orbit
allocation,  development  of  technical  standards  and  improvement  of  underserved
259 Stephen Clark, ‘China Launches Data Relay Satellite for Future Space Station Crews’ (Spaceflight
Now, 22 November 2016) <https://spaceflightnow.com/2016/11/22/china-launches-data-relay-satellite-
for-future-space-station-crews/> accessed 19 November 2017. The resources satellites referred to here
presumably belong primarily to the Ziyuan series. Ziyuan (资源) translates into ‘natural resources’.
260 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
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communities’ access to information and telecommunications technologies.261 Since ITU
shall bring order into the use of space in the field of communications and broadcasting,
the Chinese government’s participation presumably is, for the most part, directed towards
serving the pursuit of each and every current state preference underlying its space-related
communications and broadcasting measures.
The construction of BRISIC incorporates a Chinese interest in international cooperation
regarding  space-related  communications  and broadcasting,  presumably  including  with
other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector.  The construction of BRISIC
appears especially directed towards setting up a better interaction and application of the
currently available and upcoming (public and private) remote sensing, communications
and broadcasting, and navigation satellites of the participants of BRI in establishing and
maintaining  BRI’s  modern  land-based  Silk  Road  Economic  Belt  and sea-based  21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road. It is not necessarily a call for the joint development and
application  of  dedicated  new satellite  systems,  even  though  related  activities  are  not
excluded. In the end, all that likely aims at supporting the pursuit of the government’s
space-related  socioeconomic  target  area  of  enhancing  Chinese  entities’  role  in  the
international space market.262
A notable potential future major – somewhat government-promoted – cooperative space-
related communications and broadcasting measure is the development of Iran’s National
Communications  Satellite.  Reportedly,  a  Chinese  entity  (presumably  the  government-
related CGWIC) already competes for the commercial contract to build this high-profile
satellite for Iran.263 The Chinese government’s interest in this contract likely falls within
its  space-related socioeconomic  target  area  of improving Chinese entities’  role  in the
international space market.
261 Based  on  information  in:  ‘List  of  Member  States’  (ITU)
<https://www.itu.int/online/mm/scripts/gensel8> accessed 14 October 2018; ‘Overview’ (ITU) <https://
www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/overview.aspx> accessed 2 July 2018.
262 For more information on BRISIC and this argumentation, see this study’s Section 4.6.2.2.
263 ‘Four Countries Interested in Building Iran’s National Communication Satellite’ (SpaceWatch Middle
East,  5  October  2016)  <https://spacewatchme.com/2016/10/four-countries-interested-building-irans-
national-communication-satellite/> accessed 16 February 2018.
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  4.6.4  Navigation
   4.6.4.1  Major domestic measures
The construction of the  BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), which had its first
development  phase  approved  in  1994,264 is  the  current  main  government-promoted
domestic space-related navigation measure. It seems to be also one of the three primary
components  of  the  independent  Chinese  civil  space  infrastructure  system  that  the
government has given a development priority under its present space programme.265
To  be  completed  by  2020,  BDS  shall  ultimately  consist  of  a  constellation  of  35
domestically developed and controlled satellites and a related set of ground facilities. It
shall  offer  ‘all-time,  all-weather and high-accuracy positioning,  navigation  and timing
services to global users.’ It already provides services to China since 2000, and to the
Asia-Pacific region since 2012.266 The estimated allocated budget from 1994 to 2020 is
around ¥56-66 billion ($9-10.5 billion).267
Overall,  this  study recognises  the  following  current  space-related  state  preferences  to
underlie BDS:
First,  there  is  the  obvious  pursuit  of  the  government’s  current  space-related
socioeconomic state preference,  likely encompassing all  related target areas. After all,
CBDS  suggests  that  BDS  shall  serve,  among  others,  China’s  ‘economic  and  social
development.’268 In  particular,  BDS’s  application  is  thought  to  support  areas  like
agriculture,  disaster  management,  exploration,  fishery,  forestry,  hydrology,  land
resources, mapping and surveying, production, power dispatching, transportation, water
conservation and weather forecasting.269 Wilson further concludes that, in the context of
BDS,  the  government  wants  to  ‘build  a  [comprehensive  Chinese]  commercial
downstream satellite  navigation  industry  to  take  advantage  of  the  quickly  expanding
264 SCIO, ‘CBDS’ (n 126) ch II.
265 Based on information in: ‘国家民用空间基础设施中长期发展规划（2015-2025 年） [National
Medium- and Long-Term Civil Space Infrastructure Development Plan (2015-2025)]’ (n 110); SCIO,
‘CBDS’ (n 126); SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch III.
266 SCIO, ‘CBDS’ (n 126) preface,chs I-II. Citation in preface.
267 Pollpeter and others (n 127) 42–43.
268 SCIO, ‘CBDS’ (n 126) preface.
269 Based on information in: SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch II; SCIO, ‘CBDS’ (n 126) preface,chs
I,IV.
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market.’ The expected total output of China’s navigation services sector by 2020 is ¥400
billion (ca. $58 billion).270
Second, there is the pursuit of the government’s current space-related national security
state  preference.  As  CBDS  indicates,  BDS  shall  bolster  ‘the  country’s  national
security’.271 Target  area-wise,  BDS  appears  to  be  especially  aimed  at  enhancing  the
Chinese military’s strategic space support system. For example, the system can reduce the
Chinese  military’s  overall  navigational  dependence  on  the  US-controlled  Global
Positioning  System (GPS)  and  improve Chinese  weapon  guidance  systems.  Some
researchers even hold that ‘Beidou is fundamentally a military-run program with civilian
applications.’272 In support of this national security narrative, it shall be reiterated here
that  Section  4.6.2.1 has  already put  forward that  the independent  Chinese civil  space
infrastructure  supposedly  shall benefit  China’s  national  security  and  the  government
promotes an integrated civil and military development in space technology.
Third,  this  study further  contends that  the  Chinese  government  likely  considers  BDS
useful for the pursuit of its current space-related political state preferences of securing the
legitimacy of the CPC’s rule over all of China, as well as advancing China’s international
prestige and influence. The government is surely aware that  BDS, as one of only four
global navigation satellite systems for the foreseeable future, is an excellent measure to
showcase China’s rise towards an internationally leading technological power under the
guidance of the CPC to the domestic and the international audience alike. Moreover, by
linking other states to BDS, China might be able to improve its influence over such states
and its clout in international institutions relating to satellite navigation.273
   4.6.4.2  Major cooperative measures
A few key areas of cooperation under the government’s present space programme seem to
(somewhat) concern the field of space-related navigation.274 Regarding BDS in particular,
CBDS points  out  that the  government  promotes  international  engagement  of  relevant
270 Jordan Wilson, ‘China’s Alternative to GPS and Its Implication for the United States’ (Report, US-
China Economic and Security Review Commission 05 January 2017) 2,6 <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China's%20Alternative%20to%20GPS%20and
%20Implications%20for%20the%20United%20States.pdf> accessed 15 December 2017. Citation on 2.
271 SCIO, ‘CBDS’ (n 126) preface.
272 Based on information in: Pollpeter and others (n 127) vii,71,73. Citation on 71; Wilson (n 270) 2,5-6.
273 Wilson also sees an international prestige and influence motivation to partly underlie the construction
of BDS: Wilson (n 270) 2,6,9.
274 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
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Chinese  parties  in  pertinent  multilateral  settings,  academic  exchanges,  education  and
training, and satellite  applications. Also, the government apparently seeks international
coordination  of  BDS-related  frequencies  and  orbital  slots,  ratification  of  BDS  by
international standards, as well as the improvement of compatibility and interoperability
between BDS and foreign navigation satellite systems.275
Within this context,  and excluding APRSAF and APSCO-related measures, this  study
has,  without  claiming  completeness,  found  these  (more)  specific  current  major
government-promoted cooperative space-related navigation measures (with a presumed
high potential for) involving preeminent Asian governments in the space sector:
Iranian  Electronics  Industries  (also  known as  SAIran),  a  wholly-owned subsidiary  of
Iran’s Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL),276 and an unnamed
Chinese entity – that presumably has the blessing of its government due to the latter’s
substantial  involvement  in  BDS’s  development  –  signed  a  Memorandum  of
Understanding (MoU) in October 2015 to establish BDS ground stations and a BDS data
centre in Iran.277 Without much data upon which to draw, this study assumes that this
MoU falls on the Chinese side partly into the pursuit of the government’s current space-
related  socioeconomic,  national  security  and  political  state  preferences.  For  one,  the
activities covered in the MoU might help to enhance the (future) role of Chinese entities
in the Iranian  navigation  satellite  market,  and consequently  these entities’  role  in  the
international space market. The Chinese military’s strategic space support system might
also profit in accuracy, range, and resilience from BDS ground stations outside of China.
Finally,  the  MoU’s  implementation  might  benefit  the  advancement  of  China’s
international prestige and influence. After all, access to BDS reduces Iran’s navigational
dependence on the (disliked) American GPS but, at the same time, increases the country’s
link to and navigational dependence on China.
275 SCIO, ‘CBDS’ (n 126) preface,chs I,V.
276 ‘Iran Electronics Industries (IEI)’ (Iran Watch, 18 January 2018) <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-
entities/iran-electronics-industries-iei> accessed 9 October 2018.
277 ‘Chinese BeiDou BDS to Transfer  Satellite  Tech.  to  Iran’  (Mehr News Agency,  18 October 2015)
<http://en.mehrnews.com/news/111132/Chinese-BeiDou-BDS-to-transfer-satellite-tech-to-Iran>
accessed 14 October 2017.
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The Sino-Indian Space Cooperation Outline 2015 indicates that the two sides want to
discuss cooperation in the application, interoperability and signal compatibility of each
others’ navigation satellite systems.278
The construction of BRISIC incorporates a Chinese interest in international cooperation
regarding space-related navigation,  presumably including with other preeminent  Asian
governments in the space sector. The construction of BRISIC seems especially oriented
towards  setting  up  a  better  interaction  and application  of  the  presently  available  and
upcoming (public  and private)  remote sensing,  communications and broadcasting,  and
navigation  satellites  of  the  participants  of  BRI in  establishing  and maintaining  BRI’s
modern land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and sea-based 21st-Century Maritime Silk
Road.  Again,  it  is  not  necessarily  a call  for the joint  development  and application  of
dedicated  new  satellite  systems,  even  though  related  activities  are  not  excluded.
Ultimately, all that likely aims at supporting the pursuit of the government’s space-related
socioeconomic target area of enhancing Chinese entities’ role in the international space
market.279
  4.6.5  Science and technology research
   4.6.5.1  Major domestic measures
Science and technology research measures have received a more and more prominent
place in the government’s space programme over the past two decades.280 According to
CSA2016, the government  currently  promotes at  least  the development  of technology
experiment satellites, new electric propulsion technology, laser communications and new-
generation communications satellite platforms. Moreover, it fosters the development of
in-orbit servicing and maintenance systems for spacecraft, as well as the execution of in-
orbit  experiments  on  new  theories,  technologies  and  products.  Also,  it  wants  to
‘implement a series of new space science satellite programs, establish a series of space
278 ‘2015-2020  Space  Cooperation  Outline  between  the  Indian  Space  Research  Organisation  of  the
Republic of India and the China National Space Administration of the People’s Republic of China’ (n
245).
279 For more information on BRISIC and this argumentation, see this study’s Section 4.6.2.2.
280 Based on the range of projects promoted throughout the various CSAs: SCIO, ‘CSA2000{eng}’ (n
119); SCIO, ‘CSA2006{eng}’ (n 121); SCIO, ‘CSA2011{eng}’ (n 123); SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n
125);  additionally,  see:  ‘Strategic  Priority  Program  on  Space  Science’  (NSSC)
<http://english.nssc.cas.cn/missions/FM/> accessed 20 November 2017; also, STDP calls for research
on  the  ‘formation  and  evolution  of  black  holes  and  diverse  celestial  bodies  and  structures’:  ‘The
National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020) An
Outline’ (n 111) 41.
77
science  satellites  featuring  sustainable  development,  and  reinforce  basic  application
research.’281 Notably,  CAS  has  later  published  a  (non-binding)  document  proposing
various space science missions for 2016-2030 that seem to build upon the topics above.282
With this in mind, this study has identified the following spacecraft (series) to constitute
the  specific  major  (mostly)283 domestic  space-related  science  and technology research
measures that have been continued or commenced under the government’s current space
programme (alphabetically, and without claiming completeness):  Chuangxin (创新 ),284
Dark Matter Particle Explorer (DAMPE),285 Fengniao (蜂鸟),286 Hard X-ray Modulation
Telescope (HXMT),287 Quantum  Experiments  at  Space  Scale (QUESS;  also  dubbed:
Micius (墨子号 )),288 Shijian (实践 ),289 Xinyan  (新验 ),290 X-ray Pulsar  Navigation
Satellite-1 (commonly referred to as XPNAV-1),291 and  Zheda Pixing (浙大皮星 ).292
Additionally,  the government  has apparently also already signed off on the upcoming
development  of  the  following  five  (mostly)  domestic  space-related  science  and
technology  research  missions:  Advanced  Space-borne  Solar  Observatory (commonly
referred to as ASO-S), Einstein-Probe, Gravitational Wave Electromagnetic Counterpart
All-sky  Monitor (commonly  referred  to  as  GECAM),  Magnetosphere-Ionosphere-
281 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch III.
282  季 [Ji]  吴 [Wu] and others, ‘2016-2030  年中国空间科学发展规划建议 [Prospect for Chinese Space
Science in 2016-2030]’ (2015) 30(6)  中国科学院院刊 [Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences] 707.
283 Various  spacecraft  (series)  introduced  here  have  seen  some  collaboration  with  foreign  partners,
especially DAMPE and QUESS. This study has decided to treat them primarily as major government-
promoted  domestic  space-related  science  and  technology  research  measures  due  to  the  involved
Chinese entities’ strong leadership role and the fact that the mission proposals emerged domestically.
284 Pollpeter and others (n 127) 77.
285 Based on information in: ‘Strategic Priority Program on Space Science’ (n 280); Jane Qiu, ‘China’s
Quest to Become a Space Science Superpower’ (2017) 547 Nature 394.
286 Pollpeter and others (n 127) 276.
287 ‘Strategic Priority Program on Space Science’ (n 280).
288 Based on information in: ‘China Launches Quantum-Enabled Satellite Micius’ (BBC, 16 August 2016)
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-37091833>  accessed  19  November  2017;  ‘Strategic
Priority Program on Space Science’ (n 280); Qiu (n 285).
289 Based on information in: Pollpeter and others (n 127) 77–78; ‘Strategic Priority Program on Space
Science’ (n 280).
290 Based on information in: ‘  新技术验证卫星在轨两周年 [New Technology Verification Satellite in
Orbit for Two Years]’ (  中国空间技术研究院 China Academy of Space Technology, 19 December
2014) <http://www.cast.cn/CastCn/Show.asp?ArticleID=48044> accessed 7 September 2015; Pollpeter
and others (n 127) 76.
291 Andrew Jones, ‘China’s Launches X-Ray Pulsar Navigation Satellite and First Commercial  Science
Probe’ (GBTIMES, 10 November 2016) <https://gbtimes.com/chinas-launches-x-ray-pulsar-navigation-
satellite-and-first-commercial-science-probe> accessed 20 November 2017.
292 Based on information in: ‘浙大皮星一号 A  诞生记 [Zheda Picosat-1A Birth Record]’ (浙江大学
[Zhejiang University], 7 October 2010) <http://www.news.zju.edu.cn/news.php?id=31243> accessed 6
September 2015; Pollpeter and others (n 127) 77.
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Thermosphere Coupling Exploration (commonly referred to as MIT), and  Water Cycle
Observation Mission (commonly referred to as WCOM).293
Altogether,  the available  information allows arguing that  the measures above publicly
aim  at  serving  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  current  space-related  science  and
technology state preference of advancing China’s scientific and technological level per se.
For example, the information points towards such measures’ implementation to further
China’s  capabilities  and capacities  in  and the  understanding of  areas  like  astronomy,
astrophysics, biology, the terrestrial water cycle system, life sciences, medicine, material
research, microgravity studies, space weather research, communications satellite platform
technology, electric propulsion technology, in-orbit servicing and maintenance systems
for spacecraft, laser communications, pulsar X-ray radiation-based navigation, quantum
communications and other aspects of quantum science, and remote sensing technology.294
However, at the same time, it needs to be noted here that the government presumably
promotes  such measures also with an eye to their  potential  future contribution to the
pursuit of other space-related state preferences. For example, Pollpeter and others refer to
speculations that the Chinese military has a hand in Shijian missions,295 indicating that the
latter might have some national security orientation. Chen suggests that reliable quantum
communications technology, as tested through QUESS, has great economic and military
potential.296 Moreover, attempts to understand space weather better, which is well-known
to  interfere  with spacecraft  in  orbit, fit  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  space-related
autonomy-oriented state preference of ensuring the stable use of outer space for China.
293 Based  on  information  in:  Chi  Wang,  ‘Latest  Development  of  Space  Science  Programs  of  China’
(Presentation, 54th UNCOPUOS STSC, Vienna, 2 February 2017) <http://www.unoosa.org/documents/
pdf/copuos/stsc/2017/tech-26E.pdf> accessed 20 November 2017; Deyana Goh, ‘China to Launch at
Least  6  Scientific  Spacecraft  by  2021’  (SpaceTech  Asia,  25  April  2018)
<http://www.spacetechasia.com/china-to-launch-at-least-6-scientific-spacecraft-by-2021/> accessed 19
July 2018.
294 Based on information presented in the respective footnotes of the various spacecraft (series) introduced
above, as well as the information on the Chinese space-related science and technology measures in:
SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch III.
295 Pollpeter and others (n 127) 77–78.
296 Stephen Chen, ‘How Quantum Satellite Launch Is Helping China Develop a Communications System
That  “Cannot  Be  Hacked”’  (South  China  Morning  Post,  12  June  2017)
<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2004560/how-quantum-satellite-launch-helping-china-
develop-communications-system> accessed 19 November 2017.
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   4.6.5.2  Major cooperative measures
A few key areas of cooperation under the government’s current space programme seem to
(somewhat) relate to the field of science and technology research.297 
However,  excluding  APRSAF  and  APSCO-related  measures,  (more)  specific  major
government-promoted  cooperative  space-related  science  and  technology  research
measures  (with  a  presumed  high  potential  for)  involving  other  preeminent  Asian
governments in the space sector appear to be still sparse:
In particular, it is the Sino-Indian Space Cooperation Outline 2015 that mentions that the
two  sides  consider  cooperation  in  astronomical  observation  and  cross-calibration
regarding China’s HXMT and India’s ASTROSAT mission. Furthermore, they apparently
want  to  discuss  collaboration  concerning  deep  space  exploration-related  missions,
instruments and individual technology.298
Without  much  information  upon  which  to  draw,  this  study  thinks  that  the  Chinese
government might hope that such cooperation can, to some extent, foster the pursuit of its
current space-related science and technology state preference and its current space-related
political state preferences of advancing China’s international prestige and influence.
  4.6.6  Human spaceflight
   4.6.6.1  Major domestic measures
Throughout the 21st century, the government has included human spaceflight as a segment
of  its  overall  space  programme.299 The  current  major  government-promoted  domestic
human spaceflight measures take place primarily under the government’s CMSP, which
was approved in general on 21.09.1992 under the code name Project 921 (‘921 ’工程 )300
297 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
298 ‘2015-2020  Space  Cooperation  Outline  between  the  Indian  Space  Research  Organisation  of  the
Republic of India and the China National Space Administration of the People’s Republic of China’ (n
245).
299 As indicated by the human spaceflight measures outlined in: SCIO, ‘CSA2000{eng}’ (n 119) ch III;
SCIO,  ‘CSA2006{eng}’  (n  121)  ch  III;  SCIO,  ‘CSA2011{eng}’  (n  123)  ch  III;  SCIO,
‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch III.
300 ‘  中国载人航天工程简介 [Brief Overview of China Manned Space Engineering]’ (n 133).
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and is nowadays often colloquially termed  Shenzhou Programme301 in reference to the
Chinese Shenzhou (神舟; Divine Vessel) spacecraft used for crewed flights.302 
Presently,  CMSP calls  for  the implementation  of three consecutive  strategic  steps.  In
short,  the  first  strategic  step  aims  at  launching  a  crewed  spaceship,  the  second  at
launching and crewing a spacelab, and the third at setting up and crewing a fully-fledged
space station.303 Regarding CMSP’s future strategic elements, Chinese entities reportedly
deliberate on a twenty-year lunar and interplanetary exploration strategy that might, inter
alia, call for a human lunar landing.304
CMSP’s  first  two  strategic  steps  have  already  been  implemented  successfully.  Most
prominently,  the  Shenzhou-V mission  put  China’s  first  taikonaut into  space  in  2003.
China launched its first spacelab,  Tiangong-I  (天宫一号 ;  Heavenly Palace-I), in 2011,
and crewed it the first time in 2013. China further launched and crewed Tiangong-II, the
successor  spacelab,  in  2016.  While  writing,  the  government  promotes  the  full
implementation of CMSP’s third strategic step by around 2022. An important measure
towards that end was the successful test of the  Tianzhou (天舟 ; Heavenly Ship)  cargo
freighter spacecraft series in 2017.305 Arguably, all (named and unnamed) major measures
under  CMSP  so  far  deserve  the  ‘domestic’  attribute  because  they  were  or  still  are
primarily domestically developed and controlled.306
Overall, (the domestic side of) CMSP seems to be directed towards serving the pursuit of
the government’s following current space-related state preferences:
301 Dan  Zhang,  ‘Shenzhou-10:  A  New  Mission’  (CCTV,  31  March  2013)
<http://english.cntv.cn/program/newsupdate/20130331/103047.shtml> accessed 22 July 2018.
302 Pollpeter and others (n 127) 46–47.
303 Based on information in: ‘CMSP’ (CMSE) <http://en.cmse.gov.cn/list.php?catid=42> accessed 8 May
2015; ‘China Space Station and Its Resources for International Cooperation’ (n 133) 1.
304 Andrew Jones, ‘China Aims for Pole Position in Lunar Exploration’ (GBTIMES,  14 October 2016)
<https://gbtimes.com/china-aims-pole-position-lunar-exploration> accessed 9 November 2017.
305 Based  on  information  in:  ‘Missions’  (China  Manned  Space)
<http://en.cmse.gov.cn/col/col81/index.html>  accessed  23  July  2018;  Harvey  (n  224)  271–305;
Pollpeter  and  others  (n  127)  45–53;  SCIO,  ‘CSA2016{eng}’  (n  125);  ‘SCIO Briefing  on  China’s
Tiangong  2  and  Shenzhou  11  Manned  Space  Mission’  (China.org.cn,  19  November  2016)
<http://china.org.cn/china/2016-11/19/content_39742416.htm>  accessed  8  November  2017;  Stephen
Clark, ‘China’s Tianzhou 1 Supply Vehicle Re-Enters Atmosphere’ (Spaceflight Now, 22 September
2017) <https://spaceflightnow.com/2017/09/22/chinas-tianzhou-1-supply-vehicle-re-enters-atmosphere/
> accessed 8 November 2017; Andrew Jones, ‘Tianhe: A Look at the Core Module of the Chinese
Space Station’ (GBTIMES,  30 January 2018) <https://gbtimes.com/tianhe-a-look-at-the-core-module-
of-the-chinese-space-station>  accessed  23  July  2018;  ‘China  Space  Station  and  Its  Resources  for
International Cooperation’ (n 133) 2–8.
306 As indicated in: ‘China Space Station and Its Resources for International Cooperation’ (n 133) 2–8;
Jones, ‘Tianhe: A Look at the Core Module of the Chinese Space Station’ (n 305).
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First, CMSP-specific measures fit the pursuit of the government’s space-related political
state preferences of securing the legitimacy of the CPC’s rule over all of China, as well as
advancing China’s international prestige and influence. For example, STDP states that
human spaceflight and other major science and technology achievements ‘have greatly
enhanced the nation’s comprehensive national strength [CNP], uplifted its international
position, and inspired the whole nation.’307 In 2011, then-State President Hu Jintao (胡锦
涛) also contended that ‘the CPC leadership and the socialist system provided a "political
advantage"  for  the progress  of the country’s  manned space program.’308 Besides that,
Stokes and Cheng reasonably argue that ‘[m]anned spaceflights  are an internationally
recognized symbol of progress and wealth, and China has made considerable efforts over
the  past  two decades  to  send humans  into  space  as  a  powerful  icon of  international
prestige and national pride.’309 Johnson-Freese concludes that the government uses the
Shenzhou programme to increase the Chinese people’s national pride and the one party-
based government’s legitimacy, as well as to popularise the perception of a China rising
towards a regional and international top position.310 Finally, Handberg and Li find that
China’s first crewed space mission in 2003 has put China visibly on par with previous
achievements of such (former) world powers like the USA and the Soviet Union, and
strengthened the perception that the country surpassed other potent regional states like
India and Japan in space.311
Second,  CMSP-specific  measures  appear  to  support  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s
space-related science and technology state preference of advancing China’s scientific and
technological level per se, whereby there might be some additional intended spillover into
the pursuit of some of its other space-related state preferences. After all, various missions
under  CMSP have encompassed or might  in  the future cover  science and technology
research  activities  fostering  China’s  progress  in  such  areas  like  aerospace  medicine,
astronomy and (astro)physics, biotechnology, disaster management, ecology, education,
307 ‘The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-
2020) An Outline’ (n 111) 9.
308 ‘China  Celebrates  Success  of  Space  Docking  Mission’  (Xinhuanet,  16  December  2011)
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2011-12/16/c_131309987.htm> accessed 27 June 2015.
309 Mark A Stokes and Dean Cheng, ‘China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. Interests’
(Report,  US-China  Economic  and  Security  Review  Commission  24  April  2012)  25
<http://project2049.net/documents/uscc_china-space-program-report_april-2012.pdf>  accessed  9
February 2015.
310 Joan Johnson-Freese, ‘China’s Manned Space Program. What Is That All About?’ (2002) 6(2) Harvard
Asia Pacific Review 25, 26.
311 Roger Handberg and Zhen Li,  Chinese Space Policy. A Study in Domestic and International Politics
(Routledge 2007) 127-130,144.
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the  environment,  EO  and  geoscience  (including  Earth  weather  monitoring),  Earth
resources, food security, human health, life science, human spaceflight (including human
space exploration), materials science, microgravity science, (sustainable) social progress,
space technology, and space weather monitoring and forecasting.312 In this regard,  the
educational and space weather-related activities also arguably somewhat fit the pursuit of
the  government’s two  current  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state  preferences.  The
disaster management-, ecology-, environment-, food security-, health-, medicine-, social
progress- and remote sensing-related activities further conform, to some extent,  to the
pursuit of the government’s current socioeconomic state preference-related target area of
developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set
of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for China.
Third, there is a sign that the government hopes that, in the long run, Chinese human
spaceflight undertakings assist the pursuit of its space industry and market-related target
areas under its space-related socioeconomic state preference. For one, a joint Sino-UN
document  mentions  that  science  and  technology  research  results  derived  from
experiments using the Chinese space station ‘will be shared and transferred to promote
industrial progress, providing new momentum for the sustained and healthy development
of China’s national economy.’313
Interestingly, the military involvement in the management and administration of CMSP314
does  not  warrant  the  interpretation  that  the  programme’s  implementation  serves  the
pursuit  of  the  government’s  space-related  national  security  state  preference.  At  most,
some missions so far might have included ‘limited, experimental military payloads.’315
   4.6.6.2  Major cooperative measures
CSA2016 introduces the construction and use of China’s spacelabs and space station as a
key area of cooperation under the government’s current space programme.316 Based on
this background, the Chinese government through CMSA has, on a more specific level,
later declared a willingness to offer international partners, without excluding any other
312 ‘China Space Station and Its Resources for International Cooperation’ (n 133) 2-3,8-9,11-12.
313 ibid 8.
314 As already argued in this study’s Section 4.3.
315 Lan Chen, ‘Is the Chinese Manned Space Program a Military Program?’ (The Space Review, 30 March
2009) <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1340/1> accessed 19 November 2017.
316 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{ch}’ (n 124) ch V.
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state per se, the opportunity to collaborate with China within CMSP’s scope ‘in different
areas including space science research,[ especially by utilising the Chinese space station,
as well as] astronaut selection, training and flight, and manned space technology and its
applications.’317 Notably,  there is no evidence that the Chinese  government is open to
relinquishing its  general  domestic  control  over (the development  and use of)  Chinese
human spaceflight capabilities and capacities concerning any of the topics above.
As  far  as  this  study  was  able  to  ascertain,  only  one  (more)  specific  current  major
government-promoted  cooperative  human  spaceflight  measure  (with  a  presumed  high
potential  for)  involving preeminent  Asian governments  in the space sector  appears  to
have evolved within this overall context by now:
More precisely, the government through CMSA has entered into a framework agreement
with the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in 2016 ‘to enable
United  Nations  Member  States,  particularly  developing  countries,  to  conduct  space
experiments  on-board  China’s  [upcoming]  space  station,  as  well  as  to  provide  flight
opportunities for astronauts and payload engineers.’318
Lacking  detailed  information,  this  study  contemplates  that  the  following  two  current
space-related state preferences might underlie the entering of this framework agreement
on the Chinese government’s side:
First, the Chinese government might anticipate that specified cooperative measures under
this  framework  add  to  the  pursuit  of  its  space-related  political  state  preference  of
advancing China’s international prestige and influence.  After all,  China presents other
states – at least within the near future – with a viable alternative to the International Space
Station (ISS) to launch their citizens to a permanent space station and to conduct space
science research onboard such a facility. It is likely that this improves China’s standing
with such states. In particular, states with conflictual relations with ISS project partners
might be grateful to finally have an option to engage in such undertakings. Reportedly,
317 ‘China Space Station and Its Resources for International Cooperation’ (n 133) 3,27-28. Citation on 27.
318 ‘United  Nations  and  China  Agree  to  Increased  Space  Cooperation’  (UNOOSA,  16  June  2016)
<http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/informationfor/media/2016-unis-os-468.html>  accessed  5  October
2017.
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Iran has already entered discussions with China regarding the potential of sending Iranian
astronauts to the upcoming Chinese space station.319
Second,  the pursuit  of  the  government’s  current  space-related  science  and technology
state  preference  might  benefit  from results  obtained  from  others’  space  experiments
onboard China’s space station.
  4.6.7  Lunar exploration
   4.6.7.1  Major domestic measures
The current major government-promoted domestic lunar exploration measures take all
place under the government’s China Lunar Exploration Programme (CLEP; ‘中国探月
’工程 ), first approved in 2004 and colloquially referred to as Chang’e Programme (‘嫦娥
’工程 ).320 Similar to CMSP, the government has always treated CLEP as a segment of its
overall space programme.321
Presently, CLEP entails the implementation of three consecutive strategic steps. The first
step mainly aims at orbiting a satellite around the Moon, the second at achieving a soft-
landing of a rover on the lunar surface, and the third at returning a lunar sample safely
back to Earth.322 Concerning the time after, the government reportedly works on a twenty-
year lunar and interplanetary exploration strategy that might,  among others, propose a
manned lunar landing, the robotic exploration of lunar poles, in-situ resource utilisation
and technology demonstration.323
By the end of 2017, the government has already successfully implemented CLEP’s first
two  strategic  steps,  especially  through  the  Chang’e-1,  Chang’e-2,  Chang’e-3,  which
319 ‘Iran  Abandons  Its  Human  Spaceflight  Ambitions’  (SpaceWatch  Middle  East,  2  June  2017)
<https://spacewatchme.com/2017/06/iran-abandons-human-spaceflight-ambitions/>  accessed  16
February 2018. However, these discussions might (so far) take place outside of the CMSA-UNOOSA
framework agreement.
320 Based on information in: ‘ “ ” “ ” 中国嫦娥工程的 大三步 和 小三步 [China’s Chang’e Programme’s
“Three Large Steps” and “Three Small Steps”]’ (  中国新闻网 [China News Service], 1 December
2013)  <http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2013/12-01/5565595.shtml>  accessed  14  May  2015;  ‘China
Lunar  Exploration  Programme’  (China  Space  Report)
<https://chinaspacereport.com/programmes/china-lunar-exploration/> accessed 26 January 2018.
321 As indicated by the lunar exploration measures outlined in: SCIO, ‘CSA2006{eng}’ (n 121) ch III;
SCIO, ‘CSA2011{eng}’ (n 123) ch III; SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch III.
322 ‘  我国月球探测工程的发展规划 [China’s Lunar Exploration Project’s Development Plan]’ (CNSA, 18
May 2011) <http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n1081/n7499/n314807/n330895/331346.html> accessed 15 May
2015.
323 Jones, ‘China Aims for Pole Position in Lunar Exploration’ (n 304).
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included  the  Yutu lunar  rover,  and  Chang’e-5-T1 missions.  While  writing,  the
government  promotes  the  implementation of the measures,  particularly the  Chang’e-5
mission, pertinent to achieve the third strategic step by 2019. Before that, the government
also wants to attempt the world’s first soft landing on the lunar far-side with the Chang’e-
4 mission by the end of 2018. So far, all (named and unnamed) major measures under
CLEP can be  considered  domestic  measures  because  they  were  or  are  still  primarily
domestically developed and controlled. If any, foreign involvement has been limited.324
In sum, (the domestic side of) CLEP appears to be directed towards serving the pursuit of
the following current space-related state preferences:
First,  observers agree that the pursuit  of the government’s space-related political  state
preferences is central to CLEP.325 This is reasonable considering that only a few countries
have ever  engaged in lunar  exploration.  The prestige and influence-related  arguments
presented in the context of CMSP make sense here as well.326
Second,  there  is  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  current  space-related  science  and
technology state preference. After all, STDP lists the Chinese lunar probe as one of the
government’s  major  special  projects  to  foster  China’s  scientific  and  technological
progress.327 Moreover, various CLEP-related missions have contributed to lunar and other
fields  of  space  science.328 Also, the  implementation  of  CLEP  has  reportedly  led  to
domestic  breakthroughs in key technologies  and technological  progress on topics like
324 Based on information in: Harvey (n 224) 315–325; Pollpeter and others (n 127) 55–60; Joel Raupe,
‘Chang’e-5  T1  Service  Module  Completes  Orbital  Tests’  (Lunar  Networks,  9  February  2015)
<http://lunarnetworks.blogspot.com/2015/02/change-5-t1-service-module-completes.html> accessed 17
May 2015; SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) chs II-III; Jones, ‘China Aims for Pole Position in Lunar
Exploration’ (n 304); Andrew Jones, ‘Ten Years Ago China Began Its Long March to the Moon – and
Its  Plans  Are  Evolving’  (GBTIMES,  27  October  2017)  <https://gbtimes.com/ten-years-ago-china-
began-its-long-march-to-the-moon-and-its-plans-are-evolving>  accessed  9  November  2017;  Nola
Taylor  Redd,  ‘Chang’e-4:  Visiting  the  Far  Side  of  the  Moon’  (Space.com,  25  May  2018)
<https://www.space.com/40715-change-4-mission.html> accessed 30 June 2018.
325 For example: ‘Jade Rabbit Moon Rover Landing Marks New Leap for China’ (The Hindu Business
Line,  13  December  2013)  <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/science/jade-rabbit-moon-
rover-landing-marks-new-leap-for-china/article5455188.ece>  accessed  18  May  2015;  Pollpeter  and
others (n 127) v,24,54.
326 For the arguments presented in the context of CMSP, see this study’s Section 4.6.6.1.
327 ‘The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-
2020) An Outline’ (n 111) 10-11,32-33.
328 Lin Xu and Ziyuan Ouyang, ‘Scientific Progress in China’s Lunar Exploration Program’ in Hejun Yin
and others (eds),  Space Science Activities in China. National Report 2012-2014 (CNCOSPAR 2014)
<http://english.nssc.cas.cn/ns/NU/201410/W020141016603613596668.pdf>.
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‘carrier  rockets,  deep  space  communication[s],  remote  control,  artificial  intelligence,
robotics, new materials and new energy[...].’329
Third, there are indicators that the government’s space industry and market-related target
areas under its current space-related socioeconomic state preference might, in the near
future,  become  an  additional  driving  factor  behind  its  promotion  of  CLEP-related
measures. The government is apparently willing to involve private companies in lunar
exploration  to  ‘break  the  monopoly  in  the  space  field,  accelerate  technological
innovation,  reduce  the  government’s  investment  and  improve  efficiency.’330 Some
Chinese scientist further deliberate the industrial exploitation of lunar resources.331
   4.6.7.2  Major cooperative measures
According to CSA2016, the Chinese government  is  open to engaging in  international
cooperation regarding lunar exploration.332
However, this study has merely been able to identify one (more) specific engagement that
somewhat falls under the category of a current major government-promoted cooperative
lunar  exploration  measure  (with  a  presumed  high  potential  for)  involving  other
preeminent Asian governments in the space sector:
In short, the parties to the Sino-Indian Space Cooperation Outline 2015 seemingly agreed
to  consider  ‘jointly  carry[ing]  out  studies  on  the  scientific  objectives  of  lunar
exploration’,  and  to  deliberate  on  collaboration  on  payload  development  and
piggybacking of payloads or instruments regarding China’s Chang’e-4 lunar mission.333
Having been unable to obtain much data in this regard, this study thinks that the Chinese
government might believe that all the above can aid the pursuit of its current space-related
329 Ningzhu  Zhu,  ‘China  Explores  Moon  for  Science,  Technology  Advancement’  (Xinhuanet,  16
December  2013)  <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/16/c_132971550.htm>  accessed
24 June 2015.
330 Lei  Zhao,  ‘Private  Companies  Asked  to  Join  Moon  Program’  (China  Daily,  17  March  2015)
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-03/17/content_19828198.htm> accessed 26 June 2015.
331 Pollpeter and others (n 127) 54.
332 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
333 ‘2015-2020  Space  Cooperation  Outline  between  the  Indian  Space  Research  Organisation  of  the
Republic of India and the China National Space Administration of the People’s Republic of China’ (n
245).
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science and technology state preference, as well as its current space-related political state
preference of advancing China’s international prestige and influence.
  4.6.8  Exploration of other celestial bodies
   4.6.8.1  Major domestic measures
The Chinese government’s first attempt in Mars exploration was its participation in the
failed  Russia-led Phobos-Grunt mission  from  2011.334 Afterwards,  the  Chinese
government  decided  to  implement  a  primarily  domestically  developed  and  controlled
Mars mission,  with a launch date around 2020. This mission shall  include an orbiter,
lander and rover. Besides that, the government presently also promotes initial studies on
future  Chinese  projects  involving  the  retrieval  of  a  Mars  sample,  the  exploration  of
asteroids and the Jovian system and planetary flyby exploration.
On the one hand, the available information suggests that these current(ly studied) major
government-promoted  domestic  measures  regarding  the  exploration  of  other  celestial
bodies  than the  Moon presumably  aim at  supporting  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s
current space-related science and technology state preference.  For example,  they shall
help  to  understand  the  evolution  of  the  solar  system  and  assist  in  the  search  for
extraterrestrial  life.  In  particular,  the Mars  mission’s  specific  tasks  reportedly  are  the
generation of data on the planet’s atmosphere, environment, inner structure, morphology,
and water and ice distribution, as well as the search for signs of life.335
On the other hand, the measures above shall arguably further bolster the pursuit of the
government’s current space-related political state preferences. For example, the Chinese
rover shall arrive on Mars in 2021, which coincides with the 100th anniversary of the
CPC’s  foundation  and the  deadline  for  the  Chinese  Dream’s  first  Centenary  Goal.336
Moreover, China would become the first Asian state with a rover on Mars. As such, it
would – finally  – outperform India in planetary exploration other than the Moon and
334 Harvey (n 224) 330–335.
335 Based on information in:  Andrew Jones,  ‘China Unveils  Its  Mars  2020 Probe and Science Goals’
(GBTIMES,  23  August  2016)  <https://gbtimes.com/china-unveils-its-mars-2020-probe-and-science-
goals> accessed 19 November 2017; SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch III.
336 ‘Mars  Exploration  Mission’  (China  Space  Report)  <https://chinaspacereport.com/spacecraft/mars-
mission/> accessed 19 November 2017.
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presumably  outshine  India’s  international  acclaim for  the  first  successful  Asian  Mars
orbiter mission in 2014.337
   4.6.8.2  Major cooperative measures
CSA2016 indicates that the Chinese government deems cooperation in Mars and other
deep space exploration a key area of cooperation under its current space programme.338
Yet, as of 2017, this study has found no evidence for the government’s current promotion
of  a  major  cooperative  measure  in  this  regard (with  a  presumed  high  potential  for)
involving other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector.
  4.6.9  Stable use of outer space
   4.6.9.1  Major domestic measures
The Chinese government  promotes various major domestic measures under its current
space programme that seem to be primarily directed towards fostering the pursuit of its
space-related autonomy-oriented state preference of ensuring the stable use of outer space
for China.
For example, it  engages in increasing the protection of Chinese spacecraft,  as well as
enhancing China’s near-earth object  (including space debris)  monitoring facilities  and
related  early  warning  and  emergency  response  platform  and  online  service  system.
Presumably linked to that, the government further wants to extend China’s space debris
database, improve its related data-sharing model, as well as upgrade its  standardisation
system for space debris, other near-earth objects and space climate.339 Additionally, the
government  might  want  to  advance  its  already  established  initial  domestic  regulatory
regime addressing the space debris issue.340
337 Binglin Chen, ‘China’s First Mission to Mars Will Be Hugely Ambitious and Be a Chance to “Outshine
India”,  Says  Beijing’s  Chief  Space  Scientist’  (South  China  Morning  Post,  19  January  2016)
<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/1902837/chinas-first-mission-mars-will-be-hugely-
ambitious-and-be-chance> accessed 19 November 2017.
338 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
339 ibid ch III.
340 Based on information in: Li, ‘The Role of International Law in Chinese Space Law and Its Relevance
to Pacific Rim Space Law and Activities’ (n 128) 545–547; Zhao, National Space Law in China (n 114)
205–227.
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Besides that, the test of the domestic Aolong-1 (遨龙一号) satellite in 2016 also indicates
that  the government  wants to promote the development  and implementation of active
space debris removal technology. Reportedly, the satellite has a robotic arm to help with
de-orbiting other satellites. Notably, despite  Aolong-1’s potential utility to attack other
state’s satellites, this study has found no solid evidence that the mission was conducted in
the pursuit of the government’s current space-related national security state preference.341
   4.6.9.2  Major cooperative measures
The government names the areas of space weather, as well as space debris monitoring,
early warning, mitigation and protection, as key areas of cooperation under its current
space programme.342
Yet, excluding APRSAF and APSCO-related measures, this study has, without claiming
completeness, only found one activity that arguably constitutes a (more) specific current
major government-promoted cooperative measure in this regard (with a presumed high
potential for) involving other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector:
This is CNSA’s participation in the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
(IADC). The latter involves, inter alia, also the space agencies of India, Japan and South
Korea.343
  4.6.10  Launchers
   4.6.10.1  Major domestic measures
One part of the current major government-promoted domestic measures in the field of
space launchers is the domestic maintenance and enhancement of the four main space
launching sites on Chinese soil.
Another part is the continued domestic development and use of China’s main launcher
family called  Changzheng (CZ;长征 )  – which in English publications is, following the
341 Morris  Jones,  ‘Chinese  Space  Garbageman  Is  Not  a  Weapon’  (SpaceDaily,  28  June  2016)
<http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Chinese_Space_Garbageman_is_not_a_Weapon_999.html>
accessed 19 April 2018.
342 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
343 Based  on  information  in:  ‘Inter-Agency  Space  Debris  Coordination  Committee’  (IADC)
<http://www.iadc-online.org/> accessed 9 September 2015; SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
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literal translation of Changzheng, also often referred to as Long March (LM) –, as well as
the quite newly established and commercially-oriented Chinese launcher family called
Kuaizhou (KZ;快舟 ; Speedy Vessel). Ultimately, the domestic development and launch
of both these launcher families involve various government-related entities.
A third part, which likely interlinks to a large degree with the previous two parts, is the
domestic development of ‘medium-lift launch vehicles which are non-toxic and pollution-
free’,  the  domestic  development  of  a  ‘new-generation  launch  vehicle  family’,  the
enhancement of Chinese launcher reliability, and domestic research into technologies for
heavy-lift launch vehicles, low-cost launch vehicles, a new upper stage and a reusable
space transportation system to low Earth orbit (LEO).
As the fourth and last part,  the government apparently also promotes the creation of a
broader  Chinese  commercial  space  launch service  industry,  including  through private
launch providers.344
The following current space-related state preferences arguably drive these measures:
First,  there is the pursuit  of the government’s current space-related autonomy-oriented
state preference of developing and maintaining the domestic human, industrial, scientific
and technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level,
independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences. After all, there is no
autonomous  implementation  of  the  government’s  other  domestic  space  undertakings
possible without domestic launch capabilities and capacities.
Second,  there  is  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  space-related  socioeconomic  state
preference, especially regarding the space industry and market-related target areas. For
one, as mentioned above, the government apparently promotes the creation of a broader
344 Based on information in: Pollpeter and others (n 127) 78–86; SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) chs II-
IV.  Citations  in  ch  III;  ‘Kuai  Zhou  (Fast  Vessel)’  (China  Space  Report,  22  May  2016)
<https://chinaspacereport.com/launch-vehicles/kuaizhou/>  accessed  19  April  2018;  Stephen  Clark,
‘Kuaizhou  Rocket  Lifts  off  on  First  Commercial  Mission’  (Spaceflight  Now,  9  January  2017)
<https://spaceflightnow.com/2017/01/09/kuaizhou-rocket-lifts-off-on-first-commercial-mission/>
accessed 1 July 2018; Andrew Jones,  ‘Chinese Commercial  Rocket Company Secures  1.2bn Yuan
Investment,  Multiple  Launches  Set  for  2018’  (GBTIMES,  19  December  2017)
<https://gbtimes.com/chinese-commercial-rocket-company-secures-12bn-yuan-investment-multiple-
launches-set-for-2018> accessed 26 July 2018; ‘Chang Zheng Data Sheet’ (Space Launch Report, 9
October 2018) <http://www.spacelaunchreport.com/cz.html> accessed 10 October 2018.
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Chinese  commercial  space  launch  service  industry,  including  through  private  launch
providers.  Also,  the  KZ  launcher  family  has  a  commercial  orientation.  Moreover,
CGWIC has  been  (solely)  authorised  by  the  Chinese  government  to  provide,  among
others, commercial launch services to domestic and foreign customers using China’s CZ/
LM launcher family.345
Third, it is reasonable to assume that the measures above shall add to the pursuit of the
government’s two current space-related political state preferences. After all, there are still
only a limited number of states, especially in the Asian region, with a broad range of
domestic  launching  capabilities  and  capacities.  The  domestic  maintenance  and
enhancement of such capabilities and capacities can function as a very visible reminder to
the Chinese people that the CPC brings them great technological  progress, and to the
international community that China rises and is on its way to becoming one of the world’s
technological powerhouses.
   4.6.10.2  Major cooperative measures
CSA2016 suggests that the Chinese government is currently open to entering cooperation
in the areas of launcher and carrier services, space TT&C support, as well as import and
export  of  and technical  cooperation  regarding sub-systems,  spare parts  and electronic
components of launch vehicles.346
Ultimately, this study has, without claiming completeness, only come across one activity
that  might  be  referred  to  as  a  (more)  specific  current  major  government-promoted
cooperative measure in the field of space launchers (with a presumed high potential for)
involving other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector:
In short,  the parties of the Sino-Indian Space Cooperation Outline 2015 seem to have
agreed  to  consider  ‘[c]ooperation  on  providing  launch  services  for  satellites  as  co-
passengers’. However, considering that the leading entity on each side has a commercial
345 Based  on  information  in:  ‘Company  Profile’  (CGWIC)  <http://www.cgwic.com/About/index.html>
accessed  21  November  2017;  ‘Space  Transportation’  (CGWIC)
<http://www.cgwic.com/Launchservice/LM2C.html> accessed 26 July 2018.
346 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
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orientation, such cooperation might in the end always be more of a commercial exchange
than real intergovernmental collaboration.347
Consequently, the pursuit of the Chinese government’s space-related socioeconomic state
preference, in particular the international market-related target area, might play a central
role in this regard.
  4.6.11  Human resources
   4.6.11.1  Major domestic measures
CSA2016 states that under the government’s current space programme ‘[t]he mechanisms
related to the training, assessment, flow of and incentives for professional personnel are
being  improved  in  an  effort  to  form a  well-structured  contingent  of  highly  qualified
personnel in the course of construction of important projects and major programs, which
consists  of  strategic  scientists,  leading  researchers  and  technicians,  entrepreneurs  and
high-caliber professionals, as well as experts in international cooperation.’348 As such, it is
no surprise that a simple online search in Chinese and English presents every researcher
with  a  broad selection  of  current  major  government-promoted  domestic  space-related
measures  concerning the development  of  space-related human resources  in China.  To
name just  one  element,  there  are  several  Chinese  universities  offering  education  and
training in areas ranging from astronautics to space law.349
Overall,  these measures seem to primarily  fit  the pursuit  of the government’s  current
space-related  autonomy-oriented  state  preference  of  developing  and  maintaining  the
domestic  human,  industrial,  scientific  and  technological  capabilities  and  capacities
necessary to engage, at least on a basic level, independently in the pursuit of other space-
related  state  preferences.  The  autonomous  implementation  of  domestic  space
undertakings rests on access to the relevant experts within the country.
347 ‘2015-2020  Space  Cooperation  Outline  between  the  Indian  Space  Research  Organisation  of  the
Republic of India and the China National Space Administration of the People’s Republic of China’ (n
245).
348 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch IV.
349 For example: ‘   北京航空航天大学 宇航学院 Beihang University School of Astronautics’ (Beihang
University  School  of  Astronautics)  <http://www.sa.buaa.edu.cn/>  accessed  1 July  2018;  ‘School  of
Law’  (Beijing  Institute  of  Technology,  30  October  2016)
<http://english.bit.edu.cn/ensite/law/about/lawlaw/index.htm> accessed 1 July 2018.
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   4.6.11.2  Major cooperative measures
The  government’s  current  space  programme  apparently  incorporates  the  exchange  of
personnel and joint training activities as key areas of cooperation.350
Yet, excluding APRSAF and APSCO-related measures, the (more) specific current major
government-promoted  cooperative  space-related  human  resources  measures (with  a
presumed high potential for) involving other preeminent Asian governments in the space
sector seem so far, and without claiming completeness, to only encompass the following:
Based on the Sino-Indian Space Cooperation Outline 2015, the two sides want to engage
in training and exchange of experts in space science, technology and application, as well
as in improving the interaction between the China-based RCSSTEAP and the India-based
CSSTEAP351 in terms of curricula and teachers.352
RCSSTEAP, established in 2014, is a UN-affiliated centre hosted at Beihang University
in China. It covers joint science and technology-related training and education in a wide
range of activity fields in the space sector among its ten member states, namely Algeria,
Argentina,  Bangladesh,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  China,  Indonesia,  Pakistan,  Peru  and
Venezuela.353 As  far  as  this  study  has  been  able  to  ascertain,  RCSSTEAP  does  not
prohibit the joining of other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector per se.
Lacking  detailed  information,  this  study  thinks  that  the  Chinese  government  might
consider the measures above as somewhat beneficial to the pursuit of its following two
current space-related state preferences:
First, the government might see them as a way to temporarily aid the pursuit of its current
space-related  autonomy-oriented  state  preference  of  developing  and  maintaining  the
domestic  human,  industrial,  scientific  and  technological  capabilities  and  capacities
necessary to engage, at least on a basic level, independently in the pursuit of other space-
related state preferences.
350 SCIO, ‘CSA2016{eng}’ (n 125) ch V.
351 For more information on CSSTEAP, see this study’s Section 5.6.11.2.
352 ‘2015-2020  Space  Cooperation  Outline  between  the  Indian  Space  Research  Organisation  of  the
Republic of India and the China National Space Administration of the People’s Republic of China’ (n
245).
353 ‘Introduction’ (RCSSTEAP) <http://www.rcssteap.org/Article/lists/category/27.html> accessed 19 April
2018.
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Second, it is not out of the question that the Chinese government hopes that by offering
space-related  education  and training  opportunities  to  other  states,  the latter  might  see
China in a more positive light and become more dependent on China. As such, this can
foster  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  space-related  political  state  preference  of
advancing China’s international prestige and influence.
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5  Republic of India (India)  
 5.1  Analytical considerations
This  study’s  main  challenge  in  its  particular  assessment  of  the  Indian  government’s
current  space  programme is  that,  while  this  programme seems to be quite  broad,  the
government appears to have only drafted and published a few domestic space-specific
political and legal documents. Moreover, those that exist are rather limited in their scope.
As such, this study looks at a plethora of material addressing aspects of the government’s
current space programme to achieve plausible findings concerning its primary research
interest.  It  is helpful  that English is  in common usage by the Indian government  and
Indian researchers.
 5.2  Main domestic political and legal documents
As of 2017, no overarching Indian national space law354 or all-encompassing government
space policy document has been adopted.355 Without claiming completeness, this study
finds based on the available material that at least the following domestic political and
legal documents strongly guide the Indian government’s current space programme. Their
known content warrants special attention throughout this chapter.
Until it ran its course on 31.03.2017,356 the ‘12th Five-Year Plan’, which was the last of the
government’s Five-Year Plans developed by a now dissolved Planning Commission,357
determined  many  core  elements  of  the  government’s  space  programme.358 Nowadays
354 The strongest attempt for the development of an overarching national space law has so far been ISRO’s
draft  of a  ‘Space  Activities  Bill’.  Published in November  2017, ISRO has sought  comments from
stakeholders and the public. Since it has remained only a draft in 2017, this study has not included it
into its analysis. For the bill draft, see: ‘Seeking Comments on Draft “Space Activities Bill, 2017” from
the  Stake  Holders/Public  -Regarding.’  (ISRO,  21  November  2017)
<https://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/files/seeking_comments_on_draft_space_activities_bill201710.p
df> accessed 16 January 2018.
355 See  also:  Kiran  Krishnan  Nair,  ‘The  Challenge  of  Indian  National  Space  Policy’  (2016)  14(2–3)
Astropolitics 177.
356 ‘Vision, Strategy and Three Year Action Agenda of NITI Aayog’ (GKTODAY, 24 December 2017)
<https://academy.gktoday.in/article/vision-strategy-and-three-year-action-agenda-of-niti-aayog/>
accessed 8 January 2018.
357 ‘The End of Five-Year Plans: All You Need to Know about This Big Policy Change’ (The Economic
Times,  13  April  2017)  <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/the-end-of-five-
year-plans-all-you-need-to-know-about-this-big-policy-change/articleshow/58162236.cms>  accessed
16 January 2018.
358 For the space-related part of this plan, see: Planning Commission, Government of India, Twelfth Five
Year Plan (2012–2017) Faster,  More Inclusive and Sustainable Growth,  vol  I  (SAGE Publications
India  PvT  Ltd  2013)  264–268
<http://planningcommission.gov.in/plans/planrel/12thplan/pdf/12fyp_vol1.pdf>  accessed  8  January
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however,  the  National  Institution  for  Transforming  India  (NITI  Aayog),  created  on
01.01.2015 as the government’s primary political  think tank and chaired by the Prime
Minister, is tasked to provide major guidance for government programmes, whereby it
needs to be noted that its publications have no legal force or immediate effect on budget
allocation.359 Presently, NITI Aayog’s most relevant assignment is the drafting of three
interacting,  flexible  policy  and  strategy  documents  outlining  general  objectives  and
strategies for India’s national development over the next 15 years. At the centre shall be
the – by the end of 2017 not yet finalised – long-term ‘Fifteen Year Vision’ ranging until
2031-32360. The vision’s medium-term realisation in the next seven years shall be led by a
– by the end of 2017 also not yet finalised – ‘Seven Year Strategy’. Finally, the vision’s
short-term realisation  is  based  on an  already  developed  ‘Three  Year  Action  Agenda’
running  from  2017-2020.361 Presumably,  the  government’s  current  and  future  space
programme  shall  follow  these  documents’  direction.  After  all,  the  agenda  already
addresses, at least to a very limited degree, space-related matters.362
The most prominent domestic space-specific documents currently in play supposedly are
the  government’s  ‘Frame-work  for  Satellite  Communication  Policy’  (Satcom  Policy)
from 1997,363 and  the  ‘Remote  Sensing Data  Policy’  (RSDP) from 2011.364 They are
complemented  by regulatory documents  detailing the Satcom Policy’s  implementation
procedure and determining Indian satellite registration issues.365  Besides that, this study
2018.
359 ‘Overview’  (NITI  Aayog,  Government  of  India)  <http://niti.gov.in/content/overview>  accessed  8
January 2018.
360 Arvind Panagariya, ‘India 2031-32: Vision, Strategy and Action Agenda’ (Presentation, NITI Aayog,
Government  of  India,  New  Delhi,  23  April  2017)
<http://www.niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/new_initiatives/Revised_Presentation.pdf>  accessed  8
January 2018.
361 Based on information in: ‘Vision, Strategy and Three Year Action Agenda of NITI Aayog’ (n 356);
NITI Aayog, Government of India, India Three Year Action Agenda 2017-18 to 2019-20 (NITI Aayog,
Government of India 2017) i,181 <http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/coop/India_ActionAgenda.pdf>
accessed 8 January 2018.
362 NITI Aayog, Government of India (n 361) 32,86-87,104,106,109-110.
363 For a copy the policy, see: ‘Satcom Policy’ (ISRO) <https://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/files/article-
files/indias-space-policy-0/satcom-policy.pdf> accessed 16 December 2017.
364 For  a  copy  the  policy,  see:  ‘Remote  Sensing  Data  Policy  (RSDP  –  2011)’  (ISRO)
<https://www.isro.gov.in/indias-space-policy-0> accessed 16 December 2017.
365 For  copies  of  these  regulatory  documents,  see:  ‘The  Norms,  Guidelines  and  Procedures  for
Implementation  of  the  Policy  Frame-Work  for  Satellite  Communications  in  India’  (ISRO)
<https://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/files/article-files/indias-space-policy-0/satcom-ngp.pdf>
accessed  16  December  2017;  ‘Guidelines  for  INSAT/GSAT  Capacity  Reservation’  (ISRO)
<https://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/files/dos_guidelines_for_insat-gsat_capacity_reservation_-
_release_2.pdf>  accessed  16  December  2017;  ‘INSAT/GSAT  Capacity  Request  Format  (ICRF)’
(ISRO) <https://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/files/icrf_format_-_release_2_-_04092017.pdf> accessed
16 December 2017; ‘Application Format and Guidelines for Registering an Indian Satellite System’
(ISRO)  <https://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/files/article-files/node/6116/caiss-
6_application_format_08-07-2016.pdf> accessed 16 December 2017.
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has found references to domestic space-specific policies and strategies dealing with, for
example,  industry  participation,  commercialisation,  international  cooperation,  human
resource development, technology transfer and intellectual property.366
 5.3  Basic domestic decision-making system
The basic domestic decision-making system behind the formulation and implementation
of the Indian government’s present space programme is no secret. For the purpose of this
study, it is sufficient to be aware of the following elements.
The  primary  entities  determining  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  the
government’s  current  space  programme  are  the  Space  Commission  under  the  Prime
Minister,  the Department  of Space (DOS),  both established in June 1972, three more
government-related  space-specific  committees  and  the  Indian  Space  Research
Organisation (ISRO). First established in August 1969, the latter is under the control of
DOS since September 1972 and constitutes India’s national space agency.
In short, the inter-ministerial Space Commission, consisting of the DOS Chairman, other
high-level government members, e.g. the Finance Secretary and the Foreign Secretary, as
well  as  several  top  experts  in  the  field,367 ‘formulates  the  policies  and  oversees  the
implementation  of  the  Indian  space  programme  to  promote  the  development  and
application  of  space  science  and  technology  for  the  socio-economic  benefit  of  the
country.’ Under this commission, DOS is mainly responsible for ‘promoting development
and application of space science and technology to assist in all-round development of the
nation.’368 Interlinked  with  these  institutions,  the  three  national  level  space-specific
committees (INSAT Coordination Committee; Planning Committee on National Natural
Resources  Management  System;  Advisory  Committee  on  Space  Sciences)  focus  on
coordinating the creation of user-oriented Indian space capabilities and applications in the
366 Based on information in: Malay Adhikari, ‘India’s Role in the Legal Regulation of Private Actors in
Space’ (2016) 14(2–3) Astropolitics 203, 211. Adhikari further presents a long list of other domestic
but less space-specific regulations that potentially have an affect on private space actors in India. They
don’t need to be included in this study; PG Diwakar, ‘Indian Space Programme: Achievements and
Plans’  (Presentation,  APRSAF-24,  Bengaluru,  16  November  2017)
<https://aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf24/data/day16/2_2_India.pdf> accessed 16 December 2017.
367 ‘Space  Commission’  (ISRO)  <https://www.isro.gov.in/about-isro/space-commission>  accessed  14
January 2018.
368 ‘Department of Space and ISRO HQ’ (ISRO) <https://www.isro.gov.in/about-isro/department-of-space-
and-isro-hq> accessed 14 January 2018.
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fields  of  communications,  remote  sensing  and  space  sciences.369 Technical
implementation  of  the  government-approved  space  undertakings  mostly  takes  place
through ISRO, including its specialised subordinate institutions and facilities like Vikram
Sarabhai Space Centre, National Remote Sensing Centre, ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and
Command Network, Indian Institute of Remote Sensing, and various autonomous bodies
connected with DOS.370 Notably, in September 1992, the government further established
Antrix Corporation Limited (Antrix), a wholly government-owned company under the
administrative control of DOS. It acts as ISRO’s commercial and marketing arm.371
 5.4  Space-related state preferences
  5.4.1  Socioeconomic state preferences
The government’s current space-related socioeconomic state preference appears to be the
advancement of India’s socioeconomic development.
Vikram Sarabhai,  the founding father of India’s space programme, stipulated early on
‘that if we are to play a meaningful role nationally, and in the community of nations, we
must be second to none in the application of advanced technologies to the real problems
of man and society.’372 The present government seemingly builds on that. A government
press release at the end of 2015, at which point current Prime Minister Modi has already
assumed  office,  explained  point-blank  that  a  ‘primary  objective  of  the  Indian  Space
Programme/Mission  is  [...]  to  execute  programmes/missions  for  the  socio-economic
development of the country’.373 Indian space policy expert Lele also concluded in 2016
that,  ‘[i]n  India’s  case,  space-program  development  is  primarily  for  socioeconomic
reasons.’374 Adding to that, such a direction of the government’s current space programme
is plausible considering that NITI Aayog’s Fifteen Year Vision, which shall guide India’s
369 Based  on information  in:  K Kasturirangan,  ‘India’s  Space  Enterprise  -  A Case  Study in  Strategic
Thinking and Planning’ in JHA Raghbendra (ed), The First Ten K R Narayanan Orations: Essays by
Eminent Persons on the Rapidly Transforming Indian Economy (ANU E Press 2006) 194; ‘Department
of Space and ISRO HQ’ (n 368).
370 ‘Department of Space and ISRO HQ’ (n 368).
371 Based  on  information  in:  ‘Antrix  Corporation  Limited’  (ISRO)
<https://www.isro.gov.in/about-isro/antrix-corporation-limited>  accessed  14  January  2018;  ‘Antrix
Corporation Limited’ (Antrix) <http://www.antrix.co.in/> accessed 14 January 2018.
372 ‘Dr.  Vikram Ambalal  Sarabhai  (1963-1971)’  (ISRO)  <https://www.isro.gov.in/about-isro/dr-vikram-
ambalal-sarabhai-1963-1971> accessed 23 April 2018.
373 ‘Indian  Space  Programme’  (Press  Information  Bureau,  Government  of  India,  2  December  2015)
<http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=132224> accessed 23 April 2018.
374 Ajey Lele, ‘Power Dynamics of India’s Space Program’ (2016) 14(2–3) Astropolitics 120, 131.
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overall  national  development  and related  undertakings  until  the  early  2030s,  shall  be
coherent with Prime Minister Modi’s following, and to a great part socioeconomically
oriented statement: ‘By 2031-2032, we must transform India into a prosperous, highly
educated,  healthy,  secure, corruption-free,  energy-abundant,  environmentally clean and
globally influential nation.’375 Moreover, this vision shall apparently be aligned with the
UN Sustainable  Development  Goals376 that  have a strong socioeconomic  tendency.  In
short,  they encompass ‘a set of goals to  end poverty,  protect the planet and  ensure
prosperity for all […].’377
One target area under this state preference arguably is the development and application of
space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set of socioeconomically
relevant issue-areas for India. This results, in particular,  from this study’s findings on
current major government-promoted space-related measures. There apparently are various
measures addressing issues in such socioeconomically relevant areas like agriculture, the
climate,  coastal  management,  disaster management,  the environment,  fishery, forestry,
health, mapping, meteorology, natural resources, rural development, telecommunications
and broadcasting services, transportation, urban planning and water management.378
Besides that, three more – and somewhat interlinked – target areas relating to the space-
related advancement of India’s socioeconomic development arguably are the expansion of
the domestic (private) space industry’s involvement in the government-promoted space-
related upstream sector,  and, to a limited degree,  the extension of the domestic space
market and the enhancement of Indian entities’ role in the international space market in
both the upstream and downstream sector. This emerges from the following narrative.
The strengthening of the domestic (private) space industry, domestic space market and
the Indian footprint in the international space market have received much attention from
Indian space-related academics  and professionals  in  recent  years,  not  least  due to  the
world-wide emergence of and socioeconomic opportunities associated with NewSpace
375 Panagariya (n 360).
376 ‘Vision, Strategy and Three Year Action Agenda of NITI Aayog’ (n 356).
377 ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ (n 242) (bold words as in source).
378 See especially this study’s Sections 5.6.1-4.
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actors.379 However, the government has not introduced any holistic plan or engaged in a
clearly structured approach in this regard.
Nonetheless,  there  are  some  references  indicating  that  the  government  pushes  for
increased  involvement  of  the  domestic  (private)  space  industry  in  the  assembly,
integration  and  testing  of  the  government-promoted  Polar  Satellite  Launch  Vehicle
(PSLV) series, as well as in the development and construction of government-promoted
satellite systems that, as shown in the upcoming sections, have a strong socioeconomic
orientation. Also, the government seems to consider the privatisation of PSLV operations
by 2020, yet while still involving wholly government-owned Antrix.380
Combining this  upstream aspect  with the already existing industry and market-related
provisions in the context of the government’s Satcom Policy and RSDP,381 the content of
NITI Aayog’s Three Year Action Agenda and Antrix’s assigned tasks, it surfaces that the
government presumably further strives at this time for some limited expansion of India’s
domestic space market and Indian entities’ role in the international space market in both
the  upstream382 and  downstream383 sector.  For  example,  according  to  the  Three  Year
Action Agenda, ISRO and other domestic institutions shall over the next few years ‘pilot
5 partnership agreements with private institutions to ensure dissemination of some […
commercially  viable,  cutting  edge]  technologies  into the society.’384 Antrix’s  assigned
tasks  encompass  ‘a) Provisioning  of  communication  satellite  transponders  to  various
379 For example: Narayan Prasad Nagendra, ‘Industry Participation and India’s Space Program: Current
Trends  and  Perspectives  for  the  Future’  (2016)  14(2–3)  Astropolitics  237;  Ashok  Gubbi
Venkateshmurthy  and  Narayan  Prasad  Nagendra,  ‘India’s  Space  Legislation:  The  Private  Sector
Speaks’ (2016) 14(2–3) Astropolitics 224; Adhikari (n 366); Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Narayan
Prasad (eds),  Space India 2.0. Commerce, Policy,  Security and Governance Perspectives (Observer
Research  Foundation  2017)
<https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Space2.0_Final_24Feb.pdf>  accessed  12
December 2017.
380 Based on information in: Prasad Nagendra (n 379). See especially 239-242; Narayan Prasad, ‘Space 2.0
India:  Leapfrogging Indian Space  Commerce’  in Rajeswari  Pillai  Rajagopalan and Narayan Prasad
(eds),  Space India 2.0. Commerce, Policy, Security and Governance Perspectives (Observer Research
Foundation 2017).  See especially 2-6;  ‘Traditional  Space and NewSpace Industry in India:  Current
Outlook and Perspectives for the Future’ in Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Narayan Prasad (eds),
Space  India  2.0.  Commerce,  Policy,  Security  and  Governance  Perspectives (Observer  Research
Foundation 2017). See especially 12-17; Chethan Kumar, ‘In First Major Contract, Isro Lets Industry
Make 27 Satellites’ (The Times of India, 18 July 2018) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/in-
1st-major-contract-isro-lets-industry-make-27-satellites/articleshow/65043079.cms>  accessed  21
August 2018.
381 For links to the Satcom Policy, RSDP and related regulations see this study’s Section 5.2.
382 Apparently especially regarding the launching business and by technology transfers to private actors.
383 Apparently  especially  in  the  fields  of  space-related  remote  sensing  and  communications  and
broadcasting.
384 NITI Aayog, Government of India (n 361) 109–110.
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users,  b) Providing launch services for customer satellites,  c)  Marketing of data from
Indian and foreign remote sensing satellites,  d)  Building and marketing of satellites as
well as satellite sub-systems, e) Establishing ground infrastructure for space applications,
and f) Mission support services for satellites.’385
  5.4.2  Political state preferences
This study holds that one of the government’s two current space-related political state
preferences is the advancement of India’s international prestige and influence.
Various  researchers  have  already  reasonably  argued  towards  or  concluded  that  the
government has used its modern national space programme to improve the international
perception of India’s power and to increase its international influence.386 Moreover, the
advancement  of  India’s  international  prestige  and  influence  makes  for  a  reasonable
(partial) explanation for the implementation of some current major government-promoted
space-related measures.387
One target  area  under this  state  preference appears  to  be the advancement  of  India’s
international  prestige  and  influence  in  its  direct  neighbourhood  in  South  Asia.
Presumably somewhat interlinked with that, another related target area seems to be the
counterbalancing  of  China’s  striving  for  influence  in  the  Asian  region.388 Notably,
Goswami even argued in  2017 that  in  Asia  a  ‘race  for  regional  diplomatic  influence
between India and China, utilizing their outer space capabilities, has only just started.’389
The  second  current  space-related  political  state  preference  that  this  study  takes  into
account at least tentatively is the increase of public support for the democratically elected
Indian government.
385 ‘About Us’ (Antrix) <http://www.antrix.co.in/about-us> accessed 21 August 2018 (bold numbering as
in source).
386 Based on information in: Lele,  ‘Power Dynamics of India’s Space Program’ (n 374) 125; Narayan
Reddy, ‘Exploring Space as an Instrument in India’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’ in Vidya Sagar
Rajagopalan and Narayan Prasad (eds), Space India 2.0. Commerce, Policy, Security and Governance
Perspectives (Observer  Research  Foundation  2017)  169-170,174;  Namrata  Goswami,  ‘China  and
India’s  Diplomatic  Space  Race’  (The  Diplomat,  12  May  2017)
<https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/china-and-indias-diplomatic-space-race/> accessed 23 April 2018.
387 See especially this study’s Sections 5.6.7-8.
388 As indicated in this study’s Section 5.6.3.2.
389 Goswami (n 386).
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After all, while lacking hard evidence on which to draw, it is a plausible assumption that
any democratically  elected Indian government is  aware that successfully implemented
space  undertakings,  especially  technologically  complex  ones  (e.g.  a  Mars  orbiter
mission),  allow presenting itself  to its  people as the driver  of national  progress.  This
might translate into higher support for the government among the Indian people.
  5.4.3  National security state preferences
So far, the government has seldom linked its space programme to national security in
public. According to Lele, ‘[t]here is no specific document like a white paper, doctrine or
policy  paper  providing  the  rationale  behind  India’s  defence-specific  investments  in
space.’390 Yet, there are strong indicators  that the national security state preference of
safeguarding India’s national security, including up to three target areas, underlies the
government’s current space programme.
Two of these target areas seem to be the enhancement of the Indian military’s strategic
support system, as well as the prevention of the weaponisation of and an arms race in
outer space. Additionally, some signs point towards the presence of the third target area
of hedging against potential enemies’ use of their space capabilities during armed conflict
with  India.  However,  this  study  has  decided  to  consider  the  latter  target  area  only
tentatively in its final assessment. There is still a lack of solid evidence for its existence,
e.g. in the form of visible activities or an official confirmation by the government.
All this emerges from the following narrative.
First, this  study has identified several current major government-promoted space-related
measures  that  (partially)  appear  to  serve  India’s  military,391 and  consequently  the
country’s national security. According to Reddy, ISRO’s acknowledgement in 2016 that
images derived from its CARTOSAT series aided the Indian military ‘highlighted, for the
first time, its role in India’s national security.’392
390 Ajay Lele, ‘India’s Strategic Space Programme: From Apprehensive Beginner to Ardent Operator’ in
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Narayan Prasad (eds),  Space India 2.0. Commerce, Policy, Security
and Governance Perspectives (Observer Research Foundation 2017).
391 See especially this study’s Sections 5.6.2-4.
392 Vidya  Sagar  Reddy,  ‘ISRO’s  Commitment  to  India’s  National  Security’  (The  Space  Review,  31
October  2016)  <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3092/1>  accessed  23  April  2018.  Citation
based on first link; that Reddy refers to the CARTOSAT series in his article becomes clear through this
news report: Chethan Kumar, ‘Surgical Strikes: First Major Use of Cartosat Images for Army’ (The
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Second, an  Indian  government  representative  has  publicly  reiterated  the  country’s
national security-related position in early 2018 that it opposes the weaponisation of outer
space, and ‘supports collective efforts to strengthen the safety and security of space-based
assets’.  Moreover,  she  stated  that,  ‘[w]hile  transparency  and  confidence-  building
measures are important  in themselves,  we believe that they cannot be a substitute for
concluding substantive legal measures to ensure the prevention of an arms race in outer
space, which should continue to be a priority for the international community’.393
Third, the Indian government, military and research community seem generally aware of
other states’ space-related capabilities’ potential to support their military activities during
a  conflict  with  India,  as  well  as  the  potential  for  a  future  military  contest  in  space.
However,  this  study  was  unable  to  determine  how  much  of  a  priority  the  Indian
government  presently  gives  to  addressing  these  topics  properly.  The  chief  of  India’s
Defence Research and Development Organisation may have declared in 2012 ‘that India
has all  the building blocks in  place to integrate  an anti-satellite  weapon to neutralize
hostile  satellites  in low earth and polar  orbits.’  Yet,  so far,  there has been no Indian
ASAT test  proving  that  the  government  is  serious  about  it.394 In  2008,  then-Defence
Minister Antony also announced the establishment of an Integrated Space Cell under the
Integrated  Defence  Staff  Headquarters  to  address  threats  against  Indian  space  assets,
while  referring  to,  e.g.,  the  development  of  counterspace  systems  in  India’s
neighbourhood.395 But the information available to this study has offered no proof that
this follows a coherent government-approved strategy and has seen much governmental
attention since.
Times of India, 30 September 2016) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Surgical-Strikes-First-
major-use-of-Cartosat-images-for-Army/articleshow/54596113.cms> accessed 25 August 2018.
393 ‘Opposed  to  “Weaponisation”  of  Outer  Space:  India to  UN’ (The Economic  Times,  4  April  2018)
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/opposed-to-weaponisation-of-outer-space-india-
to-un/articleshow/63607905.cms> accessed 22 August 2018.
394 Based on information in: Harsh Vasani, ‘India’s Anti-Satellite Weapons’ (The Diplomat, 14 June 2016)
<https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/indias-anti-satellite-weapons/>  accessed  12  December  2016;
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ‘India Needs a More Determined Military Space Policy’ (2016) IV(1)
Space Alert 2; Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Narayan Prasad Nagendra,  ‘Creation of a Defence
Space Agency: A New Chapter in Exploring India’s Space Security’ (Observer Research Foundation,
23  February  2017)  <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/creation-of-a-defence-space-agency-a-
new-chapter-in-exploring-indias-space-security/> accessed 22 August 2017; Rajaram Nagappa, ‘Space
Security  in  India’  in  Kai-Uwe  Schrogl  and  others  (eds),  Handbook  of  Space  Security.  Policies,
Applications and Programs (Springer 2015) 461–464. Citation based on first link.
395 Based on information in: Pillai Rajagopalan (n 394) 3; Nagappa (n 394) 462; Sudha Ramachandran,
‘India  Goes  to  War  in  Space’  (Asia  Times  Online,  18  June  2008)
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JF18Df01.html> accessed 8 June 2018.
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  5.4.4  Science and technology state preferences
The government’s current space-related science and technology state preference arguably
is  the  advancement  of  India’s  scientific  and  technological  level  per  se;  whereby  the
reference to ‘per se’ indicates here more of a basic research and knowledge gathering
orientation.
ISRO indicates this with its declared engagement in ‘research in areas like astronomy,
astrophysics,  planetary  and  earth  sciences,  atmospheric  sciences  and  theoretical
physics.’396 Moreover,  this  study has found some current  major  government-promoted
space-related measures that seem to be (partially) directed towards the pursuit of such a
state preference.397
At the same time, it shall be noted at this point that the Indian government’s actual pursuit
of  this  state  preference  appears  to  still  subsist  in  a  limited  fashion.  The  identifiable
number and scope of current major government-promoted space-related measures serving
the  pursuit  of  this  state  preference  seemingly  are  rather  limited  within  the  Indian
government’s  overall  space  programme,  as  well  as  in  comparison to  the pursuit  of  a
similar state preference in the Chinese and Japanese cases.398
  5.4.5  Autonomy-oriented state preferences
There  are  signs  that  the  government  currently  pursues  two  space-related  autonomy-
oriented state preferences.
The first one appears to be to ensure the stable use of outer space for India. After all,
based on a presentation by an ISRO representative in 2016, ISRO seems to be aware of
the dangers emanating from space debris and a more and more congested outer space for
Indian space activities. As such, it has decided to engage in measures to reduce space
debris resulting from its space undertakings and to improve space situational awareness,
including through international coordination.399 Section 5.6.9 introduces – at least as far
396 ‘Space Science & Exploration’ (ISRO) <https://www.isro.gov.in/spacecraft/space-science-exploration>
accessed 23 April 2018.
397 See especially this study’s Sections 5.6.5 and 5.6.7-8.
398 Compare especially the findings on these governments’  current  major government-promoted space-
related measures in this study’s Sections 4.6, 5.6 and 7.6.
399 Based on information in: MV Dhekane, ‘Indian Space Programme Ensuring Stable Use of Outer Space’
(Presentation, International Symposium on Ensuring Stable Use of Outer Space, Tokyo, 04.03 2016)
<http://www.jsforum.or.jp/stableuse/2016/pdf/13.%20Dhekane.pdf>  accessed  23  April  2018;  ‘How
Isro  Is  Safeguarding  India’s  Space  Assets  in  Orbit’  (The  Times  of  India,  23  June  2017)
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as the available information has allowed for it – the current major government-promoted
measures in this regard.
The government’s second space-related autonomy-oriented state preference arguably is
the  development  and  maintenance  of  the  domestic  human,  industrial,  scientific  and
technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level,
independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences.
One indicator  is  the government’s  statement  in 2015 that  a ‘primary objective of the
Indian  Space  Programme/Mission  is  to  achieve  self-reliance  in  Space  Technology’.400
Another  is  ISRO  slowly  increasing  its  engagement  with  domestic  private  actors  to
improve India’s capacity in meeting the growing demand for space services.401 Finally,
this state preference is somewhat evident by this study illustrating that  the government
presently  puts  more  emphasis  on  promoting  major  domestic  than  major  cooperative
space-related measures.402
 5.5  Basic pol. & leg. framework concerning IGO-based regional space cooperation
Lacking a comprehensive national space law or policy document, it is no surprise that this
study has not found much definite information about the Indian government’s current
basic political and legal framework concerning IGO-based regional space cooperation.
Based on the accessed material, the Indian government seems not to have actively striven
towards entering IGO-based regional space cooperation in recent years. At the same time,
there  are  indicators  that  the  Indian  government  excludes  a  more  institutionalised
collaboration  with  other  Asian  governments,  including  the  other  preeminent  Asian
governments in the space sector, not completely. For example,  India hosts CSSTEAP,
which  counts,  inter  alia,  Iran,  North  Korea  and South  Korea  among  its  members  as
well.403 Furthermore,  Indian government-related (as well as non-governmental entities)
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/how-isro-is-safeguarding-indias-space-assets-in-orbit/
articleshow/59278126.cms> accessed 23 April 2018.
400 ‘Indian Space Programme’ (n 373).
401 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ‘What’s Next for India’s Space Program?’ (The Diplomat, 20 January
2018)  <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/whats-next-for-indias-space-program/>  accessed  23  April
2018. See also this study’s Section 5.4.1’s determination that the government seeks to strengthen and
expand the domestic (private) space industry’s involvement in the government-promoted space-related
upstream sector.
402 See the findings throughout this study’s Section 5.6.
403 ‘Background’ (CSSTEAP) <http://www.cssteap.org/background> accessed 10 January 2018.
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have participated in APRSAF,404 which has also seen the involvement of, among others,
Chinese, Japanese and South Korean government-related entities.405
Concerning  the  set  of  principles  guiding  the  Indian  government’s  current
intergovernmental  space  cooperation,  it  can  be,  at  a  minimum,  argued  that  this
government  follows,  similar  to  the  other  preeminent  Asian governments  in  the  space
sector,  the  principles  outlined  in  the  main  international  space  agreements.  More
specifically,  India  has  ratified  the  Outer  Space  Treaty,  the  Rescue  Agreement,  the
Liability Convention and the Registration Convention. Additionally, and in contrast to all
other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector, it has signed (but never ratified)
the Moon Agreement.406
Lastly, it is notable here that India is a partner of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) alongside, among others, Japan and South Korea.407 In short, ‘MTCR, [which
primarily  rests  upon voluntary  adherence,]  seeks  to  limit  the risks  of  proliferation  of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by controlling exports of goods and technologies
that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such
weapons. In this context, the Regime places particular focus on rockets and unmanned
aerial vehicles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300
km and on equipment, software, and technology for such systems.’408 If it strictly abides
by this regime, the Indian government thus probably has only a limited current potential
to engage cooperatively with non-partners of MTCR like China, Iran and North Korea in
the field of space launcher development.
 5.6  Major domestic and cooperative space-related measures
  5.6.1  APRSAF
The  participation  of  Indian  government-related  (and  non-governmental)  entities  in
Japanese-led APRSAF can be somewhat considered a current major Indian government-
404 ‘REPUBLIC  OF  INDIA’  (APRSAF)  <https://www.aprsaf.org/participants/countries/india.php>
accessed 10 January 2018.
405 ‘Countries  and  Regions’  (APRSAF)  <https://www.aprsaf.org/participants/>  accessed  27  September
2018.
406 UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee) ‘Status of International Agreements relating to activities in outer
space as at 1 January 2018’ (9 April 2018) A/AC.105/C.2/2018/CRP.3 6.
407 ‘MTCR Partners’ (MTCR) <http://mtcr.info/partners/> accessed 13 October 2018.
408 ‘Frequently  Asked  Questions  (FAQs)’  (MTCR)  <http://mtcr.info/frequently-asked-questions-faqs/>
accessed 13 October 2018.
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promoted institutionalised regional cooperative space-related measure (with a presumed
high potential for) involving other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector.
The primary specific  Indian government-promoted cooperative  space-related  measures
under APRSAF in recent years appear to have been contributions to  Sentinel Asia and
Regional Readiness Review For Key Climate Missions (Climate R³).409
Within  Sentinel Asia, which is directed towards advancing disaster management in the
Asia-Pacific  region  and  also  involves  contributions  from,  among  others,  Chinese,
Japanese and South Korean government-related (and non-governmental) entities, India is
a  Data  providing  Node,  Capacity  building  Node  and  User  Node.  For  example,  it
responded  to  emergency  requests  by,  among  others,  Bangladesh,  Indonesia,  Japan,
Pakistan and Vietnam in 2015.410
Climate  R³,  which  is  already  completed,  had  among  its  participants  –  presumably
somewhat  government-approved  –  entities  from  India,  Japan  and  South  Korea.  It
focussed on  determining the ability of APRSAF-involved countries and institutions to
benefit from certain upcoming climate-related satellite missions.411
Similar to the Chinese case, the data above as well as the more detailed introduction of
APRSAF in Section 7.6.1 suggest that the Indian government’s engagement in APRSAF
is seemingly oriented to support the pursuit of its current space-related socioeconomic
state preference,  in particular the target area of developing and applying space-related
capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-
areas for India.
409 For more information on APRSAF and these two specific measures, see this study’s Section 7.6.1.
410 Based on information presented in this study’s Section 7.6.1 and in: ‘Bilateral Cooperation in the Field
of  Science  &  Technology  between  India  and  Japan’  (Embassy  of  India,  Tokyo,  Japan)
<https://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/jp/st_cooperation_jp.html>  accessed  12  July  2017;  ‘JPT
Members’  (Sentinel  Asia)
<https://sentinel.tksc.jaxa.jp/sentinel2/MB_HTML/JPTMember/JPTMember.htm>  accessed  29  July
2016;  ‘S&T  Cooperation’  (Embassy  of  India,  Tokyo,  Japan,  December  2016)
<https://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/st_cooperation.html#> accessed 12 July 2017.
411 Based on the information presented in this study’s Section 7.6.1 and in: ‘Twentieth Session of the Asia-
Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF-20) Climate R3 (Regional Readiness Review for Key




Moreover, it is not out of the question that the Indian government considers participation
in APRSAF, in particular in  Sentinel Asia, as a way to add to the pursuit of its current
space-related  political  state  preference  of  advancing India’s  international  prestige  and
influence. Arguably, other – especially technology-wise less developed – participants in
Sentinel Asia might be thankful for the Indian contribution to their disaster management,
which might improve India’s status among them.
Finally, and due to an apparently broader involvement in APRSAF initiatives than the
Chinese government,  the Indian government  might recognise APRSAF as temporarily
advantageous  to  the  pursuit  of  its  current  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state
preference of developing and maintaining India’s domestic human, industrial, scientific
and technological capacities and capabilities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level,
independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences. After all, APRSAF
is  open to the participation  of governmental  and non-governmental  entities,  including
regional  companies,  universities  and research institutes,  shall  involve the exchange of
information and opinions on space programmes and has seen its plenary meeting hosted
by India in 2007 and 2017.412
  5.6.2  Remote Sensing
   5.6.2.1  Major domestic measures
The development and application of a comprehensive domestic(ally controlled) remote
sensing  satellite  system  appears  to  be  the  overarching  major  domestic  space-related
remote sensing measure under the government’s current space programme.
Since the launch of its first experimental remote sensing satellite,  Bhaskara-1, in 1979,
ISRO has set up a wide, primarily domestically controlled constellation of remote sensing
satellites  involving  various  imaging  techniques  and covering  low,  medium and  high-
resolution imaging capabilities. On a more specific note, most satellites have fallen under
the domestically developed CARTOSAT, OCEANSAT, RESOURCESAT, RISAT and
SCATSAT  series.  Additionally,  as  introduced  under  Section  5.6.3,  there  are  several
domestic communications and broadcasting-oriented satellites that include some remote
sensing capabilities (INSAT-3A, Kalpana-1, INSAT-3D and -3DR) but are officially part
412 Based  on  information  in  this  study’s  Section  7.6.1  and  in:  ‘About  APRSAF’  (APRSAF)
<https://www.aprsaf.org/about/> accessed 14 October 2018.
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of India’s communications and broadcasting satellite system.413 Overall, the government-
promoted operational remote sensing system has encompassed 17 satellites by November
2017.414 Looking ahead, the government seems to be especially interested in developing
and  adding  satellite-based  high-resolution,  hyperspectral,  TIR,  L&S,  SAR  and  geo-
imaging capabilities.415 A prominent development project of ISRO in this regard is the
Geo Imaging Satellite (GISAT) for disaster management support.416
Altogether, these measures appear to mainly serve the pursuit of two current space-related
state preferences:
First,  there  is  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  space-related  socioeconomic  state
preference, especially  regarding the target area of developing and applying the  space-
related capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant
issue-areas for India. After all, the satellites shall be applied in such socioeconomically
relevant  areas  like  agriculture,  business  activities,  cartography,  coastal  management,
climate and environment, decentralised planning and governance, disaster management,
fishery,  forestry,  housing,  (groundwater)  mapping,  natural  land  and  water  resources,
livelihood security, natural resource management, ocean state forecasting, postal services,
rural development, urban planning, water management and weather forecasting.417
Second,  there  is  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  space-related  national  security  state
preference, especially the target area of enhancing the Indian military’s strategic support
system. For example, there are indicators that the majority of the specific remote sensing
satellites (13 by June 2017, e.g. from the CARTOSAT and RISAT series) further aids the
Indian military by providing it with reconnaissance of the region.418 Notably, there is no
reliable  reference  that  India  has  a  purely  dedicated  military  satellite  among  its  17
operational satellites.
413 ‘Earth Observation Satellites’ (ISRO) <https://www.isro.gov.in/spacecraft/earth-observation-satellites>
accessed  5  January  2018;  ‘List  of  Earth  Observation  Satellites’  (ISRO)
<https://www.isro.gov.in/spacecraft/list-of-earth-observation-satellites> accessed 5 January 2018.
414 Diwakar (n 366).
415 ibid.
416 Planning Commission, Government of India (n 358) 277.
417 Based on information in: ibid 266–267; Diwakar (n 366); ‘Earth Observation Satellites’ (n 413).
418 Surendra Singh, ‘Military Using 13 Satellites to Keep Eye on Foes’ (The Times of India, 26 June 2017)
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/military-using-13-satellites-to-keep-eye-on-foes/
articleshow/59314610.cms> accessed 18 February 2018.
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   5.6.2.2  Major cooperative measures
Without claiming completeness,  and excluding APRSAF-related measures,  the current
major government-promoted cooperative space-related measures (with a presumed high
potential for) involving preeminent Asian governments in the space sector arguably take
place in the following context:
India through ISRO contributes, alongside the space agencies of, among others, China,
Japan  and  South  Korea,  remote  sensing  data  from  several  domestic(ally  controlled)
satellites to the International Disaster Charter.419
Indian government-related entities engage in GEO alongside China, Iran, Japan and South
Korea,420 UN-SPIDER  alongside  China,  Iran  and  South  Korea,421 as  well  as  WMO
alongside China, Iran, Japan, North Korea and South Korea.422
As already introduced in the China chapter, the Sino-Indian Space Cooperation Outline
2015,  which  is  linked  to  a  Sino-Indian  MoU  from  2014,  includes  the  potential  for
(further)  collaboration  in  space-related  remote  sensing.  Apparently,  the  two  parties
consider especially collaboration on satellite data sharing for emergency responses during
major disasters; satellite data-related collaboration regarding weather forecasting, tropical
storm events  and climate  change studies;  other reciprocal  data  sharing and exchange;
reception of each others’ data by their  respective ground stations;  cross-calibration of
data;  cooperation  regarding  new  EO  science  payloads;  and  information  sharing  and
exchange of expertise in EO applications, e.g. for agriculture, environmental monitoring
and  protection,  disaster  management  and water  resources.  Furthermore,  they  want  to
discuss  the  effective  application  of  a  virtual  constellation  involving  remote  sensing
satellites,  which  is  likely  a  reference  to  the  multilateral  socioeconomically-oriented
BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation project including, among others, the space
agencies of China and India. The project might in a second phase cover the joint creation
of a new satellite constellation.423
419 ‘The International Charter Space and Major Disasters’ (n 236) 17.
420 ‘Member List’ (n 238).
421 ‘India’  (UN-SPIDER  Knowledge  Portal)
<http://www.un-spider.org/network/national-focal-points/india> accessed 14 October 2018.
422 ‘Members’ (n 240).
423 For this and more information on the outline and the BRICS-specific project, see this study’s Section
4.6.2.2.
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The  Indian-Japanese  ‘Memorandum  of  Understanding  between  the  Indian  Space
Research  Organisation  (ISRO) and the  Japan Aerospace  Exploration  Agency (JAXA)
concerning cooperation in the field of outer space’ (Indian-Japanese MoU 2016), signed
on 11.11.2016,  promotes, among others, (further) Indian-Japanese collaboration in EO
applications, presumably especially to reap socioeconomic benefits.424
The  Indian-South  Korean  ‘Memorandum  of  Understanding  Between  Indian  Space
Research Organization And Korea Aerospace Research Institute For Cooperation in the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ (Indian-South Korean MoU 2010), presumably signed in
2010,  indicates  that  the two parties  are  open to  exchanging information  and entering
discussions for (further) cooperation in, inter alia, remote sensing and its application.425
Overall, the available information allows suggesting that the Indian government’s interest
and involvement in these cooperative measures are mainly directed towards serving the
pursuit of its current space-related socioeconomic state preference, especially the target
area of developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a
broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for India.
On  a  more  tentative  note,  the  Indian  government  might  additionally  hope  that  the
cooperative measures introduced above somewhat support, e.g. by India contributing to
others’ disaster management, the pursuit of its space-related political state preference of
advancing India’s international prestige and influence with its respective partners.
424 ‘Memorandum of  Understanding between  the  Indian Space  Research  Organisation (ISRO) and the
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space’
(Ministry  of  External  Affairs,  Government  of  India)
<http://mea.gov.in/images/attach/MoU_ISRO_JAXA_Japan.pdf> accessed 12 July 2017.
425 For  a  copy  of  the  MoU,  see:  ‘Memorandum  of  Understanding  Between  Indian  Space  Research
Organization And Korea Aerospace Research Institute For Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space’ (Ministry of Education, Republic of Korea) 2 <http://www.moe.go.kr/boardCnts/fileDown.do?
m=03&s=english&fileSeq=a6cc09b914ffa01c132e1bfd92fb8c6c>. Even though it is a word document,
its content is likely correct since it is made available on the homepage of the South Korean Ministry of
Education;  apparently,  the  MoU  was  signed  in  2010:  ‘India–Republic  of  Korea  Joint  Statement:
Towards a Strategic Partnership’ (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 25 January 2010)
<http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/3301/IndiaRepublic+of+Korea+Joint+Statement+Towa
rds+a+Strategic+Partnership> accessed  11 January 2018; also,  there seems to be an ‘Implementing
Agreement  Between The Indian Space Research Organization And The Korea Aerospace Research
Institute  For  Cooperation  In  The  Peaceful  Uses  Of  Outer  Space’  connected  to  the  MoU:  ‘India-
Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Expansion of the Strategic Partnership’ (Ministry of External
Affairs,  Government  of  India,  16  January  2014)
<http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/22752> accessed 8 January 2018. However, this
study was unable to access this document.
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  5.6.3  Communications and broadcasting
   5.6.3.1  Major domestic measures
The development and application of a broad domestic(ally controlled) communications
and  broadcasting  satellite  system  is  the  current  overall  major  government-promoted
domestic space-related communications and broadcasting measure.
While  writing,  the  most  important  part  of  this  overall  system is  the  India  National
Satellite (INSAT) system. The latter constitutes a multi-agency, multi-purpose satellite
system  developed  through  a  joint  venture  of  India’s  DOS,  Department  of
Telecommunications,  Department  of  Science  and  Technology  and  the  Ministry  of
Information and Broadcasting. It is managed by the INSAT Coordination Committee. It
consists  of  domestically  developed  satellites  (15  operational  satellites  by  November
2017)426 but can also include transponders leased from foreign satellite systems. With the
exception of the Kalpana-1 satellite (originally: METSAT), the INSAT system’s satellites
have usually born the designator INSAT or GSAT. GSAT-9 is further known as  South
Asia Satellite427 for reasons explained under Section 5.6.3.2. By now, the INSAT system
has developed into one of the largest communications and broadcasting satellite systems
in the Asia-Pacific region, whereby it needs to be noted that some of the satellites also
have  remote  sensing  technology  added  to  them.428 For  the  future,  the  government
apparently  wants  to  especially  work  towards  improving  the  capability  of  India’s
communications  and  broadcasting  satellite  system  in  fields  like  DTH,  HTS,  optical
communication, space-to-space communication and global communications.429
Two space-related state preferences seem to drive these measures for the most part:
First, the INSAT system shall serve the pursuit of the government’s current space-related
socioeconomic  state  preference,  including all  related  target  areas.  For example,  ISRO
introduces  the  system’s  application  for  such  socioeconomically  relevant  areas  like
‘telecommunications,  television  broadcasting,  satellite  newsgathering,  societal
426 Diwakar (n 366).
427 ibid.
428 Based on information in: ‘The Norms, Guidelines and Procedures for Implementation of the Policy
Frame-Work for Satellite Communications in India’ (n 365) 1–2; ‘Communication Satellites’ (ISRO)
<https://www.isro.gov.in/spacecraft/communication-satellites> accessed  24 December  2017;  ‘List  of
Communication  Satellites’  (ISRO)  <https://www.isro.gov.in/spacecraft/list-of-communication-
satellites> accessed 23 December 2017. HAMSAT was never part of the system.
429 Diwakar (n 366).
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applications, weather forecasting, disaster warning and Search and Rescue operations.’430
Also, the Satcom Policy aims at offering the INSAT infrastructure ‘to a larger segment of
the economy and population […]. Encouraging the private sector investment in the space
industry in India and attracting foreign investments in this area are other specific goals.’431
Besides that, the INSAT system apparently aids the pursuit of the government’s current
space-related national security state preference, especially the target area of enhancing the
Indian  military’s  strategic  support  system.  For  example,  a  government  regulatory
document  determines  the Indian Ministry of Defence  and Indian security  agencies  as
major  users  of  INSAT  capacities.432 The  Indian  Navy  uses  GSAT-7  for  real-time
communications.433
   5.6.3.2  Major cooperative measures
As  far  as  this  study  was  able  to  ascertain,  the  current  major  government-promoted
cooperative space-related communications and broadcasting measures (with a presumed
high  potential  for)  involving  preeminent  Asian  governments  in  the  space  sector
encompass the following:
The Indian-Japanese MoU 2016 promotes cooperation in the application of satellite-based
communications, presumably especially to reap socioeconomic benefits.434
The  Indian-South  Korean  MoU  2010  holds  that  the  two  sides  want  to  exchange
information  and  enter  discussions  for  cooperation,  among  others,  in  the  field  of
communications.435
With  no  more  detailed  information  upon  which  to  draw,  it  is  likely  that  the  Indian
government  engages  in  these  measures  primarily  in  the  pursuit  of  its  space-related
socioeconomic state preference, in particular the target area of developing and applying
430 ‘Communication Satellites’ (n 428).
431 ‘Satcom Policy’ (n 363) 1.
432 ‘The Norms, Guidelines and Procedures for Implementation of the Policy Frame-Work for Satellite
Communications in India’ (n 365) 2–3.
433 Singh (n 418).
434 ‘Memorandum of  Understanding between  the  Indian Space  Research  Organisation (ISRO) and the
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space’ (n
424).
435 ‘Memorandum of Understanding Between Indian Space Research Organization And Korea Aerospace
Research Institute For Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ (n 425) art 2.
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space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set of socioeconomically
relevant issue-areas for India.
Also, but only tentatively,  it  can be considered that the Indian government hopes that
these measures somewhat serve the pursuit of its space-related political state preference
of advancing India’s international prestige and influence (with Japan and South Korea).
Besides that, it shall not be forgotten here that India is, alongside all the other preeminent
Asian governments in the space sector, a member state of ITU. Similar to the Chinese
case, this shall presumably aid the pursuit of all space-related state preferences underlying
the Indian government’s space-related communications and broadcasting measures.436
Even though the project is no cooperative measure as searched for within this study, it is
reasonable  to  introduce  the  so-called  South  Asia  Satellite (or  GSAT-9),  launched  on
05.05.2017  onboard  an  Indian  launcher,437 at  this  point  because  this  adds  to  the
understanding of the Indian government’s space-related political state preferences.
Indian  Prime Minister  Modi  initially  proposed the  development  of  a  communications
satellite for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 2014.438
At  first,  this  was  welcomed  by  all  SAARC  members  (Bangladesh,  Bhutan,  India,
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka). Subsequently, the Indian government declared to
develop and implement the project and cover the related costs.439 Reportedly, the latter
range in the area of 450 crore ($70 million). The other project members needed only to₹
establish their own ground infrastructure, whereas India is willing to provide assistance
for that as well.440 However, after Pakistan ultimately decided to opt out from the project,
India had to take the project out of the SAARC context and rebranded the satellite into
436 For more information, see this study’s Section 4.6.3.3.
437 ‘GSLV Successfully Launches South Asia Satellite’ (ISRO) <https://www.isro.gov.in/update/05-may-
2017/gslv-successfully-launches-south-asia-satellite> accessed 6 January 2018.
438 ‘Modi’s  Space  Diplomacy  Puts  India  into  New  Orbit’  (The  Times  of  India,  30  April  2017)
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/modis-space-diplomacy-puts-india-into-new-orbit/
articleshow/58442281.cms> accessed 7 January 2018.
439 Ajey  Lele,  ‘India  Launches  a  South  Asia  Satellite’  (The  Space  Review,  8  May  2017)
<http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3233/1> accessed 7 January 2018.
440 ‘What Is South Asia Satellite: India’s 235-Crore Gift to Neighbours’ (₹ The Indian Express, 30 April
2017)  <http://indianexpress.com/article/what-is/what-is-south-asia-satellite-indias-%e2%82%b9235-
crore-gift-to-neighbours-4634421/> accessed 7 January 2018.
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the South Asian Satellite.441 In the end, India has decided to grant each partner access to at
least one of the satellite’s twelve Ku-band transponders.
In  terms  of  space-related  state  preferences  underlying  the  Indian  government’s
development of this satellite, the official statements point towards the pursuit of its space-
related  socioeconomic  state  preference,  especially  the  target  area  of  developing  and
applying  space-related  capabilities  and  capacities  to  deal  with  a  broad  set  of
socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for India. After all, the multi-purpose satellite is
thought  to  serve  the  partners’  in  such  socioeconomically  relevant  areas  like  disaster
management, natural resource mapping, tele-education, telemedicine, telecommunication,
television broadcasting and weather forecasting.442 Modi further declared that this Indian
gift shall foster growth and prosperity in South Asia and among its more than one-and-a-
half billion people.443
Yet, the Indian government likely also wants to employ this satellite to foster the pursuit
of its space-related political state preference of advancing India’s international prestige
and influence. In particular, considering President Modi’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy,
the specific user states of the South Asian Satellite, as well as some reasonable references
in two (news) articles, it  is possible to infer that the government is most interested in
441 Pakistan  wanted  India  to  make  the  satellite  project  a  real  cooperative  effort  within  the  SAARC
framework.  Presumably, Pakistan hoped by that  to reduce India’s  political  gains by presenting the
satellite as an ‘invaluable gift’ to its neighbours and, being less advanced in satellite development,
improve  its  technological  capabilities  by  the  cooperation  with  India.  Observers  further  note  that
Pakistan might have feared Indian espionage and tense relations between the two states in the past
years. All based on information in: ‘How Pakistan Responded to India’s Successful Launch of South
Asian  GSAT-9  Satellite’  (The  Indian  Express,  6  May  2017)
<http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-successfully-launches-gsat-9-satellite-how-pakistan-
responded-4642889/> accessed 7 January 2018 ; ‘SAARC Satellite to Be Launched on May 5’ (The
Hindu,  1  May  2017)  <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/isro-to-launch-south-asia-satellite-on-
may-5/article18332816.ece> accessed 7 January 2018; Lele, ‘India Launches a South Asia Satellite’ (n
439).
442 ‘Modi’s Space Diplomacy Puts India into New Orbit’ (n 438). Concerning some states’ considerations,
see:  Vidya  Sagar  Reddy  Avuthu,  ‘Improving  Space  Cooperation  among  South  Asian  Countries’
(Observer  Research  Foundation,  28  March  2016)  <http://www.orfonline.org/research/improving-
space-cooperation-among-south-asian-countries/> accessed  7 January 2018; Lele,  ‘India Launches a
South Asia Satellite’ (n 439).
443 ‘Opening Remarks of the Prime Minister at the Video Conference with Heads of Government from
South Asian Nations to Mark the Launch of the South Asia Satellite  (May 5, 2017)’  (Ministry of
External  Affairs,  Government  of  India,  5  May  2017)
<http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/28441/opening+remarks+of+the+prime+minister+at+t
he+video+conference+with+heads+of+government+from+south+asian+nations+to+mark+the+launch+
of+the+south+asia+satellite+may+5+2017> accessed 7 January 2018.
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using this satellite to advance its prestige and influence in its direct neighbourhood in the
South Asian region, and to counter China’s influence in India’s neighbourhood.444
  5.6.4  Navigation
   5.6.4.1  Major domestic measures
The  Indian  government’s  current  space  programme  incorporates  two  major  domestic
space-related navigation measures.
One  is  the  development  and maintenance  of  GPS Aided  Geo Augmented  Navigation
(GAGAN),  a  Satellite  Based  Augmentation  System (SBAS)  set  up  by  ISRO and  the
Airport Authority of India. It is the world’s fourth regional SBAS and, after Japan, the
second  operated  by  an  Asian  state.  In  short,  it  consists  of  navigation  technology
integrated into – currently – three Indian INSAT-related satellites (GSAT-8,-10,-15)445
and various ground facilities. It is interoperable with other international SBAS systems
and supports, in particular, civil aviation and air traffic management in India’s airspace
and  across  the  region.446 Furthermore,  it  shall  support  Indian  defence  and  security
activities,  its  telecommunications  industry,  its  transportation  sector  and  personal  user
applications.447 According  to  the  government’s  ‘National  Civil  Aviation  Policy’  from
2016, all aircraft registered in India have to be GAGAN-enabled by 01.01.2019.448
Based on the application areas, it is reasonable to assume that GAGAN shall, on the one
hand, serve the pursuit  of the government’s  current space-related socioeconomic state
preferences, especially regarding the target area of developing and applying space-related
444 Based on information in: ‘Modi’s Space Diplomacy Puts India into New Orbit’ (n 438); Shounak Set,
‘India’s  Regional  Diplomacy  Reaches  Outer  Space’  (Carnegie  India,  3  July  2017)
<https://carnegieindia.org/2017/07/03/india-s-regional-diplomacy-reaches-outer-space-pub-71402>
accessed 23 April 2018; For more information on the Neighbourhood First Policy and India’s striving
for countering China’s influence in its region, see also the following two links: Dhruva Jaishankar,
‘India’s Five Foreign Policy Goals: Great Strides, Steep Challenges’ (The Wire, 26 May 2016) <https://
thewire.in/38708/indias-five-foreign-policy-goals-great-strides-steep-challenges/>  accessed  8  January
2018;  Christian  Wagner  and  Siddharth  Tripathi,  ‘Indiens  Antwort  Auf  Die  Chinesische
Seidenstraßeninitiative [India’s Response to the Chinese Silk Road Initiative]’ (2018) January 2018(01)
SWP-Aktuell 1.
445 ‘List of Communication Satellites’ (n 428).
446 Based on information in:  ‘Satellite  Navigation’ (ISRO)  <https://www.isro.gov.in/spacecraft/satellite-
navigation>  accessed  23  December  2017;  ‘GAGAN  -  GPS  Aided  GEO  Augumented  Navigation’
(ISAC, 21 April 2016) <http://www.isac.gov.in/navigation/gagan.jsp> accessed 5 January 2018.
447 ‘GAGAN - GPS Aided GEO Augumented Navigation’ (n 446).




capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-
areas  for  India.  On  the  other  hand,  it  shall  presumably  support  the  pursuit  of  the
government’s national security state preference, in particular the target area of enhancing
the Indian military’s strategic support system.
The  government’s  second  major  domestic  space-related  navigation  measure  is  the
development  and  maintenance  of  the  domestic  Indian  Regional  Navigation  Satellite
System (IRNSS),  which  Prime  Minister  Modi  christened  Navigation  with  Indian
Constellation (NavIC) in 2016. Reportedly, it has a total price tag of 1,420 crore (ca.₹
$224m).449 The  first  IRNSS satellite  was  launched  in  2013.  By the  end of  2017,  the
constellation consisted of seven satellites (IRNSS-1A,-1B,-1C,-1D,-1E,-1F,-1G; IRNSS-
1H suffered a launch failure in August 2017) and relevant ground segments. Overall, the
system offers positioning, navigation and timing services in India and some parts of the
Asian region (currently with a primary service area up to 1500km from the Indian border)
through a publicly  available  service and a  restricted,  encrypted service for authorised
users.450 Public market access with an accuracy better  than GPS shall  be available by
early 2018.451
Overall, NavIC appears to be primarily linked to the pursuit of the government’s current
space-related socioeconomic and national security state preferences. On the military side,
the particular target area presumably is the enhancement of the Indian military’s strategic
support  system.  On the  socioeconomic  side,  the  particular  target  areas  are  likely  the
development and application of space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a
broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for India, as well as the extension of
the  domestic  space  market  and  the  enhancement  of  Indian  entities’  role  in  the
international space market in both the upstream and downstream sector. After all, a major
reason for the investment into IRNSS was India’s experience during the Kargil War with
Pakistan  in  1999  when  the  Indian  military  was  denied  GPS  data  from  the  USA.
Domestically  operated NavIC gives the Indian military but  also civil  and commercial
449 Based on information in: Planning Commission, Government of India (n 358) 266; Surendra Singh,
‘Get Ready! India’s Own GPS Set to Hit the Market Early next Year’ (The Times of India, 28 May
2017)  <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/science/get-ready-indias-own-gps-set-to-hit-the-
market-early-next-year/articleshow/58876680.cms> accessed 6 January 2018.
450 Based on information in: ‘Satellite Navigation’ (n 446); ‘Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System
(IRNSS) : NavIC’ (ISRO) <https://www.isro.gov.in/irnss-programme> accessed 6 January 2018; ‘List
of  Navigation  Satellites’  (ISRO)  <https://www.isro.gov.in/spacecraft/list-of-navigation-satellites>
accessed 6 January 2018.
451 Singh (n 449).
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users  in  the  country  access  to  navigation,  positioning  and  timing  capabilities
independently from others, thus making Indian civil,  commercial  and military services
more  reliable  and  less  susceptible  to  international  pressure  in  crises  situations.452
Moreover, particular service areas covered by NavIC might be such socioeconomic and
militarily  relevant  areas  like  aerial,  marine  and  terrestrial  navigation,  disaster
management, mapping, tracking and transport.453 The restricted service might further aid
the Indian military’s missile systems.454
   5.6.4.2  Major cooperative measures
Without  claiming  completeness,  this  study  has  found  the  following  current  major
government-promoted cooperative navigation measures (with a presumed high potential
for) involving preeminent Asian governments in the space sector:
The Sino-Indian  Space Cooperation Outline 2015 determines that the two sides want to
discuss  cooperation  in  application,  interoperability  and  signal  compatibility  of  each
others’ navigation satellite systems.455
The Indian-Japanese MoU 2016 promotes cooperation in the application of satellite-based
navigation, presumably especially to reap socioeconomic benefits.456
The  Indian-South  Korean  MoU  2010  holds  that  the  two  sides  want  to  exchange
information and enter discussions for cooperation in, inter alia, the field of navigation.457
In particular, they seem to engage in collaboration to establish interoperability between
the Indian GAGAN and the Korea Augmentation Satellite System (KASS), as well as to
share their experience in using their respective system.458
452 Based on information in:  Ishan Srivastava,  ‘How Kargil  Spurred  India to Design Own GPS’ (The
Times of India, 5 April 2014) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/science/How-Kargil-spurred-
India-to-design-own-GPS/articleshow/33254691.cms> accessed 6 January 2018; Singh (n 449).
453 ‘Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) : NavIC’ (n 450).
454 Singh (n 449).
455 ‘2015-2020  Space  Cooperation  Outline  between  the  Indian  Space  Research  Organisation  of  the
Republic of India and the China National Space Administration of the People’s Republic of China’ (n
245).
456 ‘Memorandum of  Understanding between  the  Indian Space  Research  Organisation (ISRO) and the
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space’ (n
424).
457 ‘Memorandum of Understanding Between Indian Space Research Organization And Korea Aerospace
Research Institute For Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ (n 425) art 2.
458 ‘India - Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Special Strategic Partnership (May 18, 2015)’ (Ministry
of External Affairs, Government of India, 18 May 2015) <http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?
dtl/25261/India__Republic_of_Korea_Joint_Statement_for_Special_Strategic_Partnership_May_18_20
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With  little  information  available,  the  Indian  government  likely  sees  these  measures
primarily  serving  the  pursuit  of  its  space-related  socioeconomic  state  preference,
especially  the  target  area  of  developing  and  applying  space-related  capabilities  and
capacities to deal with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for India. 
Moreover, the Indian government presumably considers that these measures can aid the
pursuit  of its space-related political  state preference of advancing India’s international
prestige and influence (with China, Japan and South Korea).
  5.6.5  Science and technology research
   5.6.5.1  Major domestic measures
So far,  there have been only a limited number of major  Indian government-promoted
domestic space-related science and technology research measures outside of the lunar and
planetary exploration missions.459
The  most  prominent  measure  in  recent  years  was  the  launch  of  ASTROSAT for
astronomical  research  in  September  2015.460 For  the  next  few years,  the  government
further invests in  Aditya L1,  a mission focussing on the observation of the sun (to be
launched around 2019-2020),461 and XpoSAT, a project to study cosmic radiation.462
They  mostly  fit  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  current  space-related  science  and
technology state preference of advancing India’s scientific and technological level per se.
   5.6.5.2  Major cooperative measures
Without  claiming  completeness,  the  major  government-promoted  cooperative  space-
related science and technology research measures (with a presumed high potential for)
15> accessed 11 January 2018. For more information on KASS, see this study’s Section 9.6.4.
459 Based  on  information  in:  ‘Experimental  Satellites’  (ISRO)
<https://www.isro.gov.in/spacecraft/experimental-satellites>  accessed  31  December  2017;  ‘List  of
Scientific  and  Exploration  Spacecraft’  (ISRO)  <https://www.isro.gov.in/spacecraft/list-of-scientific-
and-exploration-spacecraft> accessed 31 December 2017.
460 ‘AstroSat MISSION’ (ISRO) <https://www.isro.gov.in/astrosat-0> accessed 18 February 2018.
461 ‘Aditya - L1 First Indian Mission to Study the Sun’ (ISRO) <https://www.isro.gov.in/aditya-l1-first-
indian-mission-to-study-sun> accessed 18 February 2018.
462 Chelsea Gohd, ‘India’s First-Ever Moon Mission to Launch in 2018’ (Futurism, 2 December 2017)
<https://futurism.com/india-land-moon-rover-2018/> accessed 18 February 2018.
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involving  preeminent  Asian  governments  in  the  space  sector  presumably  take  place
within India’s MoUs with China, Japan and South Korea.
The Sino-Indian Space Cooperation Outline 2015 explains that the two sides think about
cooperation in astronomical observation and cross-calibration regarding China’s HXMT
and India’s ASTROSAT mission, as well as discuss collaboration concerning deep space
exploration-related missions, instruments and individual technology.463
The Indian-Japanese MoU 2016 promotes cooperation in space exploration and science,
as well as research and development regarding space systems and technology. This is
likely  primarily  directed  towards  creating  scientific  benefits,  including  to  understand
outer space better.464 Notably, the Indian and Japanese space agencies already entered into
an agreement for cooperation on space x-ray observations in 2007.465
The  Indian-South  Korean  MoU  2010  holds  that  the  two  sides  want  to  exchange
information and enter discussions for cooperation in, among others, the field of space
science.466
Overall, these measures appear to especially suit the pursuit of the Indian government’s
current space-related science and technology state preference.
However, it is not out of the question that the Indian government considers them also
useful in the pursuit of its space-related political state preference of advancing India’s
international prestige and influence (with China, Japan and South Korea).
463 ‘2015-2020  Space  Cooperation  Outline  between  the  Indian  Space  Research  Organisation  of  the
Republic of India and the China National Space Administration of the People’s Republic of China’ (n
245).
464 ‘Memorandum of  Understanding between  the  Indian Space  Research  Organisation (ISRO) and the
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space’ (n
424) preamble,arts 2-3.
465 ‘Joint Statement On the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership between
India  and  Japan’  (Ministry  of  External  Affairs,  Government  of  India,  22  August  2007)
<http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5885/Joint+Statement+On+the+Roadmap+for+New+D
imensions+to+the+Strategic+and+Global+Partnership+between+India+and+Japan>  accessed  13
January 2018.
466 ‘India - Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Special Strategic Partnership (May 18, 2015)’ (n 458);
‘Memorandum of Understanding Between Indian Space Research Organization And Korea Aerospace
Research Institute For Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ (n 425) art 2.
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  5.6.6  Human spaceflight
According to ISRO Chairman A.S. Kiran Kumar, human spaceflight is no priority under
the government’s space programme as of 2017 and has only received limited funding.
However, it is notable that ISRO has already engaged in the domestic development of a
space flight suit, an environmentally controlled manned chamber, crew module re-entry,
space  capsule  recovery  and  pad-aborts  during  launches.467 Also,  the  GSLV-MK  III
launcher,  which  is  still  under  development,  might  be  capable  to  support  autonomous
Indian  launches  of  human  space  missions  if  the  government  decides  to  give  human
spaceflight more attention.468
Within  the  available  data,  the  most  likely  state  preferences  underlying  the  (future)
development  of  domestic  human  spaceflight  capabilities  are  the  Indian  government’s
current space-related political state preferences. After all, only a few countries conduct
human spaceflight.  As such,  Indian human spaceflight  capabilities  might  increase  the
domestic standing of the democratically elected Indian government, as well as India’s
international prestige and influence.
  5.6.7  Lunar exploration
   5.6.7.1  Major domestic measures
A  major  domestic  measure  under  the  government’s  current  space  programme  is  the
preparation of a second Indian lunar exploration mission.
Approved  by  the  government  in  November  2003,  ISRO  launched  India’s  first  lunar
exploration mission on 22.10.2008 onboard a domestic PSLV C-11. The Chandrayaan-1
mission, despite merely functioning ten out of the 24 scheduled months,469 achieved most
of its scientific objectives and contributed to the chemical, mineralogical and geological
research of the Moon. A major outcome was the detection of water molecules on the
lunar surface.470
467 ‘“Satellites  Are  Our  Priority  Now,  Not  Human  Space  Flight”’  (Outlook,  24  July  2017)
<https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/satellites-are-our-priority-now-not-human-space-flight/
299103> accessed 3 January 2018.
468 ‘ISRO Readying GSLV-Mk III for Human Space Flight: Kasturirangan’ (The Economic Times, 9 June
2017)  <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/science/isro-readying-gslv-mk-iii-for-human-
space-flight-kasturirangan/articleshow/59071917.cms> accessed 4 January 2018.
469 Pallava  Bagla,  ‘India  Moon  Mission  Is  “Mixed  Success”’  (BBC,  31  August  2009)
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8230230.stm> accessed 31 December 2017.
470 Based on information in: ‘Chandrayaan-1’ (ISRO) <https://www.isro.gov.in/Spacecraft/chandrayaan-1>
accessed  31 December  2017;  ‘CHANDRAYAAN India’s  First  Lunar  Exploration Mission’ (ISRO)
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A second mission that was already promoted throughout the government’s previous 11 th
and  12th Five-Year  Plan  is  now  on  its  way.471 Presumably  launched  in  2018,  the
Chandrayaan-2 mission,  will  be  a  completely indigenous  Indian  space  science
undertaking involving an orbiter, lander and rover. The rover shall be deployed on the
surface through a soft landing manoeuvre. The mission shall support scientific research
on ‘lunar topography, mineralogy, elemental abundance, lunar exosphere and signatures
of hydroxyl and water-ice.’472
Overall,  these measures  appear  to  be especially  aimed at  fostering  the pursuit  of  the
government’s current space-related science and technology state preference.
However, there are various indicators that the domestic lunar programme further involves
the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  space-related  political  state  preferences  of  advancing
India’s international prestige and influence, as well as of increasing public support for the
democratically  elected  government.  After  all,  with  the  Chandrayaan-1 mission,  India
became the first nation to successfully orbit a spacecraft around the Moon and send an
impactor to the surface during its maiden lunar mission. The impactor also carried an
Indian flag, making the country the first Asian state and the fourth party overall (after the
USA, the Soviet Union and ESA) to put its flag to the Moon. Finally, India surely hoped
to gain international recognition for opening its mission for international payloads. In the
end, Chandrayaan-1 included five Indian and six foreign scientific payloads from Europe
and the USA.473
   5.6.7.2  Major cooperative measures
Without  claiming  completeness,  the  current  major  government-promoted  cooperative
space-related lunar exploration measures (with a presumed high potential for) involving
preeminent Asian governments in the space sector appear to consist of the following:
<https://www.isro.gov.in/pslv-c11-chandrayaan-1>  accessed  31  December  2017;  ‘Results  from
Chandrayaan-1  Mission’  (Vikram  Sarabhai  Space  Centre)
<http://www.vssc.gov.in/VSSC_V4/index.php/chandrayaan-1/55-science/1005-chandrayaan-1mission>
accessed 2 January 2018; Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality? (n 32) 64,163.
471 Planning Commission, Government of India (n 358) 268.
472 ‘GSLV-F10/Chandrayaan-2  Mission’  (ISRO)  <https://www.isro.gov.in/gslv-f10-chandrayaan-2-
mission> accessed 18 January 2018.
473 Bagla, ‘India Moon Mission Is “Mixed Success”’ (n 469).
123
The  two  parties  to  the Sino-Indian  Space  Cooperation  Outline  2015  have  agreed  to
consider ‘ jointly carry[ing] out studies on the scientific objectives of lunar exploration’,
and to deliberate on collaboration on payload development and piggybacking of payloads
or instruments regarding China’s Chang’e-4 lunar mission.474
There  seems  to  be  a  South  Korean-Indian  agreement  involving  the  sharing  of  lunar
surface and radiation data gathered by the Indian Chandrayaan-1 mission.475
The Indian-Japanese MoU 2016 promotes cooperation on space exploration and science,
as  well  as  research  and  development  regarding  space  systems  and  technology  for
presumably scientific purposes and to better the understanding of outer space.476 Evidence
that this includes lunar exploration is the announcement of the Japanese and Indian space
agencies that they commenced discussions about a joint mission to explore the lunar polar
regions  for  water.  Mission  results  might  be  important  for  the  development  of  future
human lunar habitations. Their mission proposal may be finalised around early 2019.477
These  measures  fit  the pursuit  of  the  government’s  current  space-related  science  and
technology state preference.
Moreover, the Indian-Japanese discussion for cooperation might be further guided by the
Indian and Japanese governments political desire to address China’s regional rise.478 This
suits the pursuit of the Indian government’s political  state preference of advancing its
international  prestige  and  influence,  especially  the  target  area  of  counterbalancing
China’s striving for influence in the Asian region.
474 ‘2015-2020  Space  Cooperation  Outline  between  the  Indian  Space  Research  Organisation  of  the
Republic of India and the China National Space Administration of the People’s Republic of China’ (n
245).
475 ‘India - Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Special Strategic Partnership (May 18, 2015)’ (n 458).
476 ‘Memorandum of  Understanding between  the  Indian Space  Research  Organisation (ISRO) and the
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space’ (n
424) preamble,arts 2-3.
477 Robin Harding and Amy Kazmin, ‘India and Japan Prepare Joint Mission to the Moon’ (Financial
Times,  4  January  2018)  <https://www.ft.com/content/e1556a6c-e6ef-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da>
accessed 13 January 2018.
478 ibid.
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  5.6.8  Exploration of other celestial bodies
   5.6.8.1  Major domestic measures
The government’s current space programme includes the exploration of Mars and maybe
Venus as major cooperative space-related measures regarding the exploration of other
celestial bodies than the Moon.
Announced  by  former  Prime  Minister  Manmohan  Singh  in  August  2012,479 India
launched its first spacecraft to Mars, dubbed Mars Orbiter Mission or Mangalyaan,480 on
05.11.2013 onboard a domestic PLSV-C25. The spacecraft  arrived in Martian orbit in
2014. Its scientific tasks have encompassed observing the Martian surface and studying
the Martian atmosphere, in particular by scanning for methane.481
The development of a second Mars exploration mission, including the landing of a lander
and maybe even a rover on Martian soil around 2021-2022, is in the planning stage. Some
scientific hardware in this regard might be developed with French help. Adding to that,
ISRO reportedly deliberates on a future Venus exploration mission.482
Besides the apparent contribution of all these missions to the pursuit of the government’s
current science and technology state preference,  observers argue that there is a strong
national  and  international  prestige  element  behind something  like  a  Mars  mission.  It
allows showcasing Indian technological prowess to the world and especially to the Asian
region. The Mangalyaan mission made India the first Asian state to successfully send a
spacecraft into Martian orbit and only the fourth space actor to do so overall.  What is
more, India is the sole state to achieve this feat with its first attempt.483 As such, the major
479 Pallava Bagla, ‘The Mars Milestone - India Takes a Giant Interplanetary Leap Ahead of China’ (New
Delhi Television, 24 September 2014) <https://www.ndtv.com/blog/the-mars-milestone-india-takes-a-
giant-interplanetary-leap-ahead-of-china-670088> accessed 3 January 2018.
480 Andrew  Jones,  ‘India  at  Mars:  MOM’s  the  Word’  (GBTIMES,  25  September  2014)
<https://gbtimes.com/india-mars-moms-word> accessed 3 January 2018.
481 Based on information in: ‘India’s Mars Orbiter Mission Completes 3 Years in Orbit’ (The Economic
Times,  25 September 2017) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/science/indias-mars-orbiter-
mission-completes-3-years-in-orbit/articleshow/60830412.cms>  accessed  2  January  2018;  ‘Mars
Orbiter  Mission  Spacecraft’  (ISRO)  <https://www.isro.gov.in/Spacecraft/mars-orbiter-mission-
spacecraft> accessed 2 January 2018.
482 Pallava Bagla, ‘India Eyes a Return to Mars and a First Run at Venus’ (American Association for the
Advancement  of  Science,  17  February  2017)  <http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/02/india-eyes-
return-mars-and-first-run-venus> accessed 18 February 2018.
483 Based  on  information  in:  Jones,  ‘India  at  Mars:  MOM’s  the  Word’  (n  480);  Bagla,  ‘The  Mars
Milestone - India Takes a Giant Interplanetary Leap Ahead of China’ (n 479).
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domestic measures introduced above presumably have an additional  strong orientation
towards serving the government’s current two space-related political state preferences.
   5.6.8.2  Major cooperative measures
There  are  opportunities  for  major  government-promoted  cooperative  space-related
measures (with a presumed high potential for) involving preeminent Asian governments
in the space sector  regarding the exploration  of  other  celestial  bodies than the  Moon
based on the space exploration references in India’s respective agreements with China
and Japan.484 Yet, this study was unable to identify clear steps in this direction as of 2017.
Overall, any (future) steps in this direction might serve the pursuit of the government’s
current science and technology state preference, as well as its two current space-related
political state preferences.
  5.6.9  Stable use of outer space
   5.6.9.1  Major domestic measures
ISRO seems to be aware of the dangers of space debris and a more and more congested
outer space. It has already taken some major domestic measures to reduce space debris
resulting from its space undertakings and to improve space situational  awareness, and
thus  to  foster  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state
preference of ensuring the stable use of outer space for India. Most prominently,  ISRO
established  the  Multi-Object  Tracking  Radar. In  operation  since  2015,  its  main  task
appears to be the tracking of space debris.485
   5.6.9.2  Major cooperative measures
This study has found only one current major government-promoted cooperative space-
related  measure  (with  a  presumed  high  potential  for)  involving  preeminent  Asian
governments  in the  space sector  that  is  primarily  aimed at  serving  the pursuit  of  the
484 ‘2015-2020  Space  Cooperation  Outline  between  the  Indian  Space  Research  Organisation  of  the
Republic of India and the China National Space Administration of the People’s Republic of China’ (n
245); ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and
the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space’
(n 424).
485 Dhekane (n 399); ‘How Isro Is Safeguarding India’s Space Assets in Orbit’ (n 399).
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government’s  autonomy-oriented  state  preference  of  ensuring  the  stable  use  of  outer
space for India.
More specifically,  ISRO participates in IADC that involves,  inter alia,  also the space
agencies of China, Japan and South Korea.486
On a less specific note, and offering a potential for future regional cooperation in this
field,  the Indian and Japanese governments  are reportedly committed  to cooperate  on
safeguarding the global commons, including outer space.487
  5.6.10  Launchers
   5.6.10.1  Major domestic measures
The Indian government’s current major domestic launcher measures are the maintenance
and  further  enhancement  of  the two  domestic  launcher  families,  namely  PSLV  and
Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV), as well as of the relevant facilities,
including two operational launch pads on Indian soil.488 The (future) development focus is
on  semi-cryogenic  engine  technology,  air-to-space  launch  technology  and  the
development of a modular launch vehicle, a small satellite launch vehicle and a reusable
launch vehicle. India especially wants to reduce the costs of domestic space launches.489
Various space-related state preferences seem to underlie these measures:
First, these measures fall into the pursuit of the government’s space-related autonomy-
oriented state preference of developing and maintaining the domestic human, industrial,
scientific and technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a
basic level, independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences. After all,
the autonomous implementation of the government’s other domestic space undertakings
depends on domestic launch capabilities and capacities.
486 ‘Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee’ (n 343).
487 ‘Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working
Together  for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World(December 12, 2015)’
(Ministry  of  External  Affairs,  Government  of  India,  12  December  2015)
<http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26176/Joint_Statement_on_India_and_Japan_Vis
ion_2025_Special_Strategic_and_Global_Partnership_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperity_
of_the_IndoPacific_R> accessed 22 July 2017.
488 ‘Launchers’ (ISRO) <https://www.isro.gov.in/launchers> accessed 18 February 2018.
489 Diwakar (n 366).
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Second, these measures appear directed towards fostering the pursuit of the government’s
space-related socioeconomic state preference, especially the space industry and market-
related target areas. As mentioned in Section 5.4.1, the government pushes for increased
involvement  of the domestic  (private)  space industry in the assembly,  integration and
testing  of  the  government-promoted  PSLV  launchers,  as  well  as  considers  the
privatisation of PSLV operations by 2020, yet while still involving wholly government-
owned Antrix.  Moreover,  Antrix  already  offers  space  launch  services  using  domestic
launchers to domestic and foreign customers.
Third, these measures shall presumably add to the pursuit of the government’s two space-
related political state preferences. After all, there are still only six Asian states, namely
those chosen in this study, with domestic launching capabilities and capacities. As such,
Indian launching capabilities and capacities can help to improve the domestic standing of
the  democratically  elected  Indian  government,  as  well  as  to  showcase  India’s
(technological) rise to the international community.
   5.6.10.2  Major cooperative measures
This  study  has  found  only  two  instances  for  current  major  government-promoted
cooperative  launcher  measures  (with  a  presumed  high  potential  for)  involving  other
preeminent Asian governments in the space sector:
The parties to the Sino-Indian Space Cooperation Outline 2015 have agreed to consider
‘[c]ooperation on providing launch services for satellites as co-passengers’. Yet, since the
leading entity on each side has a commercial orientation, such collaboration might in the
end always be more of a commercial exchange.490
India  and South Korea  apparently  agree  that  there  might  be a  potential  for  technical
cooperation in satellite launching.491 However, the Indian side seems to focus here as well
on  declaring  a  commercial  availability  of  its  launching  services  for  South  Korean
satellites.492
490 ‘2015-2020  Space  Cooperation  Outline  between  the  Indian  Space  Research  Organisation  of  the
Republic of India and the China National Space Administration of the People’s Republic of China’ (n
245).
491 ‘India - Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Special Strategic Partnership (May 18, 2015)’ (n 458).
492 ‘India- Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Expansion of the Strategic Partnership’ (n 425).
128
Overall, the available information allows suggesting that these cooperative measures are
especially aimed at improving the Indian government’s space-related socioeconomic state
preference, in particular the international market-related target area.
  5.6.11  Human resources
   5.6.11.1  Major domestic measures
The government promotes a variety of major domestic space-related measures to develop
human resources in the Indian space sector. For example, there are several Indian entities,
most  prominently  the  Indian  Institute  of  Space  Science  and  Technology,  offering
education and training in a wide range of space-specific activity fields.493
Without question, such measures mostly aid the pursuit of the government’s space-related
autonomy-oriented state preference of developing and maintaining the domestic human,
industrial, scientific and technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at
least on a basic level, independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences.
The independent implementation of national space undertakings is impossible without the
government’s domestic access to relevant experts.
   5.6.11.2  Major cooperative measures
The  major  government-promoted  cooperative  space-related  human  resources-specific
measures  (with  a  presumed  high  potential  for)  involving  other  preeminent  Asian
governments in the space sector seem to encompass at least the following:
First of all, there is CSSTEAP, a UN-affiliated centre established in 1995 in Bengaluru,
India.  It offers joint training and education in a variety of activity  fields in the space
sector among its member states, which, besides India, encompass three more preeminent
Asian governments in the space sector, namely Iran, North Korea and South Korea, as
well  as  the  states  of  Bangladesh,  Indonesia,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Malaysia,
Mongolia, Myanmar, Naru, Nepal, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand
493 For  example,  see:  ‘About  Us’  (Indian  Institute  of  Space  Science  and  Technology)
<https://www.iist.ac.in/aboutus/institute> accessed 11 October 2018; ‘Education and Training’ (Vikram
Sarabhai  Space  Centre)  <http://isrohq.vssc.gov.in/VSSC_V4/index.php/education-training> accessed
11  October  2018;  ‘Centre  for  Air  and  Space  Law’  (Nalsar  University  of  Law)
<https://nalsar.ac.in/centre-air-and-space-law> accessed 11 October 2018.
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and Uzbekistan.494 Notably,  while  not a  member, the Japanese side supported ISRO’s
initiative in establishing CCSTEAP in India.495
Second,  based  on  the  Sino-Indian  Space  Cooperation  Outline  2015,  the  two  sides
consider engaging in training and exchange of experts in space science, technology and
application.  Moreover,  they  want  to  improve  the  interaction  between  the  India-based
CSSTEAP and the China-based RCSSTEAP496 in terms of curricula and teachers.497
Third,  the  Indian-Japanese  MoU  2016  promotes  the  exchange  of  personnel,  joint
organisation of workshops and training programmes regarding the two sides’ cooperative
undertakings.498
Fourth, the Indian-South Korean MoU 2010 has them exchange information and enter
discussions concerning personnel exchange.499
Similar to the Chinese case, the Indian government presumably considers these measures
as a temporarily useful tool in the pursuit of its current space-related autonomy-oriented
state preference of developing and maintaining the domestic human, industrial, scientific
and technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level,
independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences.
However, it is very reasonable to assume that the Indian government also hopes to profit
from these measures, e.g.  by offering space-related education and training opportunities
to other states, in the pursuit of its space-related political state preference of  advancing
India’s international prestige and influence with its respective partners.
494 ‘Background’ (n 403).
495 ‘Bilateral Cooperation in the Field of Science & Technology between India and Japan’ (n 410).
496 For more information on RCSSTEAP, see this study’s Section 4.6.11.2.
497 ‘2015-2020  Space  Cooperation  Outline  between  the  Indian  Space  Research  Organisation  of  the
Republic of India and the China National Space Administration of the People’s Republic of China’ (n
245).
498 ‘Memorandum of  Understanding between  the  Indian Space  Research  Organisation (ISRO) and the
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space’ (n
424) art 3.
499 ‘Memorandum of Understanding Between Indian Space Research Organization And Korea Aerospace
Research Institute For Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ (n 425) art 2.
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6  Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran)  
 6.1  Analytical considerations
This study’s two main challenges in its particular analysis of the Iranian government’s
current  space  programme  are  as  follows:  Iranian  space-related  political  and  legal
documents are, with a few exceptions, not publicly  available in an (unofficial) English
translation.  Furthermore,  and  somewhat  coherent  with  what  some  observers  have
experienced  before,500 it  is  not  always  easy  to  ascertain  whether  information  on  the
government’s  space  programme  presented  in  foreign  media  articles  and  the  English
academic literature is reliable or based on misunderstandings or even hearsay.
Consequently, this study cautiously consults a wide range of English material addressing
aspects  of  the  government’s  current  space  programme  to  achieve  robust  findings
concerning its primary research interest. Due to his first-hand knowledge of the Iranian
space  sector,  Tarikhi’s  book on Iranian space endeavours  until  around 2015 is  given
special attention in this regard.501 Additionally, this study has profited immensely from
Iranian space law expert Younes Hosseini’s input. In 2015, he graciously informed this
study’s  author  about  the  content  of  several  domestic  space-related  political  and legal
documents that are only publicly available in their Farsi original.502
 6.2  Main domestic political and legal documents
Without claiming completeness, this study concludes based on the accessed material and
the input of Mr Hosseini that, at a minimum,  the following domestic political and legal
documents  firmly guide  the  Iranian  government’s  space  programme  as  of  2017.
Naturally, their known substance merits special consideration throughout this chapter.
Despite  lacking  a  direct  reference  to  the  space  sector,  ‘Iran’s  Twenty-year  Vision
Decree’503 (Vision Decree) can be deemed pivotal here. Issued by Iran’s Supreme Leader
500 For example: Brian Harvey, Henk HF Smid and Théo Pirard, Emerging Space Powers. The New Space
Programs of Asia, the Middle East, and South America (Springer 2010) xiv,285; John B Sheldon, ‘A
Really  Hard  Case:  Iranian  Space  Ambitions  and  the  Prospects  for  U.S.  Engagement’  (2006)  4(2)
Astropolitics 229, 230–231.
501 Parviz Tarikhi, The Iranian Space Endeavor. Ambitions and Reality (Springer 2015). His book needs to
be also treated with some caution because he had a problematic relationship with or did not agree with
activities by certain officials. For example, see ix-xii,209-226,271-284.
502 See also this study’s ‘Acknowledgements’ chapter. Any mistakes in this study are its author’s alone.
503 For an unofficial English translation, see: Tarikhi (n 501) 118.
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Ali Khamenei in 2002 after consultation with the Expediency Discernment Council, an
influential  advisory  body,  and being  implemented  since  2005,  this  document  decrees
Iran’s overall national development goals over the next 20 years. Such goals pertain to
any government  programme, and thus surely also its  space programme.504 The Vision
Decree’s  implementation  strategy  apparently  involves  Iran  to  ‘gain  access  to  new
technologies including nanotechnology, biotechnology, information and communication
technology, environmental technology, and aerospace and nuclear technology.’505 
In terms of more space-specific political documents, the government has reportedly set
out two consecutive ten-year space programmes within the timeframe of and presumably
in line with the Vision Decree. The first covered 2006-2015. The second and currently
active ten-year space programme runs from 2016 to 2025.506 Notably, these programmes
seem to be somewhat interlinked with the government’s five-year development plans.507
The  ‘Comprehensive  Document  Regarding  Iranian  Aerospace’  (2013  Aerospace
Document) from 08.01.2013, prepared by the country’s high-level Supreme Council of
the Cultural  Revolution and passed under the direction of the ‘Iranian Comprehensive
Scientific Plan’, probably continues to be relevant within the government’s present space
programme. This study has at least not come across any evidence that suggests otherwise.
In  short,  this  document  pushes  for  the  development  and  expansion  of  the  Iranian
aerospace industry and technology.508
Iran has had no overarching national space law by 2017. Instead, as far as this study was
able to ascertain, the most relevant domestic legal documents with a direct connection to
the government’s current space programme are the ‘Law for Tasks and Authorisation of
504 Based on information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015. Similarly indicated in: ibid 117–118.
505 ibid 117; see also: Harvey, Smid and Pirard (n 500) 271.
506 Based on information in: ‘Iran National Space Administration Announced Its Programs’ (INSA, 10 July
2016)
<http://en.insa.ir/news/news/16057/Iran+National+Space+Administration+announced+its+programs>
accessed 14 February 2018; ‘200 Technologies Required in the Aviation Field of the Country Will Be
Developed’  (National  Foundation  of  Elites,  24  December  2017)  <http://insf.org/index.aspx?
siteid=38&pageid=7442&newsview=30086> accessed 5 April 2018. This study was unable to obtain
English translations of these documents.
507 As indicated regarding the fourth and fifth such plan in: Harvey, Smid and Pirard (n 500) 271; Tarikhi
(n 501) 117. This study was unable to obtain an English translation of the currently active Sixth Five-
Year Development Plan ranging until 2021.
508 Based on information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015. This study was unable to obtain an English
translation of this document. For the original version, see: ‘ كشور »     هوافضاي توسعه جامع سند «مصوبه
[Comprehensive  Document  Regarding  Iranian  Aerospace]’
<http://www.iranculture.org/fa/simpleView.aspx?provID=1846> accessed 14 July 2015.
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the  Ministry  of  Communications  and  Information  Technology’509 (MCIT  Law)  from
2003, the ‘Statute of the Iranian Space Agency’510 (ISA Statute), first adopted in 2005 and
revised  in  2008,  and  the  ‘Letter  of  the  President  to  his  Deputy  on  Scientific  and
Technology Matters’511 (2014 Presidential Letter) from 01.12.2014.
 6.3  Basic domestic decision-making system
This study was unable to unearth an English publication delivering a full picture of the
basic domestic decision-making system behind the formulation and implementation of the
Iranian government’s present space programme. This is no surprise because the Iranian
political system per se is highly complex and not particularly transparent to outsiders. It
incorporates  Islamic  theocratic  and  democratic  republican  characteristics.  It  has
somewhat  parallel  institutions,  involves  elected  and  appointed  government  officials,
knows  a  Supreme  Leader  and  a  President,  and  experiences  factionalism  and  strong
informal networks.512 Also, Iranian space-related professionals and academics themselves
acknowledge that domestic political and legal developments over the past decade have
created  vague  or  overlapping  responsibilities  amongst  several  Iranian  space-related
entities.513 In  the  end,  this  study  holds  that  the  following  knowledge  suffices  for  its
particular assessment of the government’s present space programme.514
509 Based on information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015. This study was unable to obtain an English
translation of this law. For the original  version, see:  ‘ فناوری        و ارتباطات وزارت اختیارات و وظایف قانون
The Law for Tasks and Authorisations of the Ministry of Communications and Information] اطالعات




%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA> accessed 14 July 2015. Arts 8,9 seem to be of
particular relevance here.
510 For a copy of the original version and an unofficial English translation of the ISA Statute as of 2005
and 2008, see: Tarikhi (n 501) 237–245.
511 Based on information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015. This study was unable to obtain an English
translation of this document. For the original version, see: ‘[Letter of the President to His Deputy on
Scientific  and  Technology  Matters]’  (Tabnak)
<http://cdn.tabnak.ir/files/fa/news/1393/10/22/461252_468.jpg> accessed 16 July 2015.
512 David E Thaler and Alireza Nader, ‘Deep-Seated Entanglements The Web of Iranian Leadership Can
Be  Negotiated,  Not  Unraveled’  (2010)  Spring  2010  RAND  Review
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/rand-review/issues/spring2010/iran.html>  accessed  15
February 2018.
513 Based on information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015 and in Tarikhi’s writings: Tarikhi (n 501) 125-
126,129,131-132;  Parviz  Tarikhi,  ‘Guest  Blogger  Parviz  Tarikhi:  Is  There  a  Need for  New Space
Law?’  (Res  Communis,  9  November  2008)  <https://rescommunis.wordpress.com/2008/11/09/guest-
blogger-parviz-tarikhi-is-there-a-need-for-new-space-law/>  accessed  17  July  2015.  The  Iranian
government’s continued implementation of a variety of space undertakings over the past few decades
suggests  that,  even  though a  more  streamlined  decision-making  process  might  have  improved the
overall efficiency, it has always found ways in practice to resolve such issues or to work around them.
514 For some additional information about other but presumably less dominant actors in the Iranian space
sector than those introduced below, see: Tarikhi (n 501).
133
One of the two top-tier domestic institutions behind the formulation and implementation
of the government’s present space programme appears to be the Space Supreme Council
(SSC) under the Iranian President. Established in accordance with MCIT Law, it ‘shall
seek  to  apply  space  technologies  for  peaceful  uses  in  space  and protect  the  national
interests  and  the  sustainable  exploitation  of  space  science  and  technologies  for  the
economic,  cultural,  scientific  and technical development  of the country.’ It formulates
policies on space technology development and application, approves mid- and long-term
programmes, fosters private and cooperative sector collaboration for the efficient use of
space,  provides  guidance  for  international  cooperation,  works  out  Iran’s  international
space-related  positions,  and  strengthens  coordination  among  relevant  domestic  space-
related entities.515 Its primary members are the Iranian President, the Ministers heading
the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT), the Ministry of
Science,  Research,  and  Technology, MODAFL,  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  the
Ministry  of  Industry,  Mines  and  Trade  and  the  Ministry  of  Roads  and  Urban
Development, as well as the Director of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and
the President of  the Iranian Space Agency (ISA). The latter is also Deputy Minister of
MCIT  and  functions  as  the  Secretary  of  SSC.  Besides  that,  SSC  can  allow  the
participation of a selected group of observers and advisors.516 This group might include
military-related personnel, e.g. from the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps that is known
to be involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme.517 With the 2014 Presidential Letter,
the Iranian President put the responsibility of administrating SSC sessions in the hands of
his Deputy on Scientific and Technology Matters.518
Additionally, the 2014 Presidential Letter called for the foundation of a national space
centre  that  supports  the  government’s  space-related  policy-making,  planning,
coordination  and  supervision.519 As  far  as  this  study  was  able  to  ascertain,  the  Iran
National Space Administration (INSA) has taken on this centre’s role and become the
second top-tier domestic institutions behind the formulation and implementation of the
government’s present space programme alongside SSC. After all,  its English webpage
515 Based on information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015 and in: ibid 120–121. Citation on 120. Tarikhi
speaks of long-term and short-term programmes. According to Mr Hosseini, it should read ‘mid-term’
instead of ‘short-term’.
516 ibid 121.
517 Based on information in: Lee Kass, ‘Iran’s Space Program: The Next Genie In A Bottle?’ (2006) 10(3)
The Middle East Review of International Affairs 15, 15,17; Gopalaswamy Bharath and Harsh V Pant,
‘The Strategic Dimension of Iran’s Leap into Space’ (2008) 2(1) Journal of Defence Studies 122, 123.
518 Information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015.
519 Information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015.
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introduces it as an institution affiliated with the Presidential  Deputy mentioned in the
letter. Indicating some overlap with SSC’s tasks, the webpage describes INSA’s general
tasks  as  contributing  to  the  development  of  Iran’s  space  technology  and  application
capabilities, especially to bolster the country’s national power, wealth and quality of life;
strengthening  the  domestic  science  and  industry  relationship  in  the  field  of  space
technology and applications; commercially developing space technology achievements in
Iran;  raising  public  awareness  and  establishing  a  culture  of  space  technology  and
application development in Iran; and enhancing Iran’s science,  technology, innovation
and international communication regarding space technology and applications.520
INSA  should  not  be  confused  with ISA.  The  latter  is  the  government’s  –  officially
civilian – space agency. First established in 2004, ISA received full organisational status
with  the  adoption  of  the  ISA  Statute  in  2005.521 It  is  currently  an  MCIT-affiliated
institution  with  legal  personality  and  financial  independence.522 While,  as  mentioned
above, the ISA President is a member of the policy-making SSC, the agency’s primary
role is actually on the implementation side. Its broad range of responsibilities includes,
among others, contributing to the development and application of Iranian space launchers
and space-related communications and remote sensing technology, setting up other space
programme-relevant  domestic  facilities,  and  promoting  pertinent  international
cooperation.523 Notably,  with  Tarikhi  pointing  out  that  persons  related  to  Iran’s  non-
civilian sector have held influential positions in ISA since its establishment, the agency
likely goes in practice beyond its ascribed civilian status and also relates to Iran’s military
security sector.524
 6.4  Space-related state preferences
  6.4.1  Socioeconomic state preferences
Several  indicators  allow  concluding  that  the  government’s  current  space-related
socioeconomic state preference is the advancement of Iran’s socioeconomic development.
520 ‘About INSA’ (INSA) <http://en.insa.ir/page/about+insa> accessed 13 February 2018.
521 Tarikhi (n 501) 31,237-241.
522 ibid 241–245. See especially MCIT Law art 9 in combination with ISA Statute (as of 2008) art 2.
523 ibid  31,241-243.  See  especially  ISA  Statute  (as  of  2008)  art  3;  some  tasks  are  also  outlined  in:
International Astronautical Federation (2015) 2/2015 International Astronautical Federation News 21
<http://www.iafastro.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/IAF_NL-June2015.pdf>  accessed  1  August
2015. The latter further mentions a reorganisation of ISA’s relationship with some ministries.
524 Tarikhi (n 501) 123–134.
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Section 6.3 has already pointed out that important domestic space-related entities like
SSC and INSA are partially directed towards bolstering Iran’s economic development,
national wealth and quality of life. Also, INSA Chairman Manouchehr Manteghi referred
in 2016 to space technology as to be able to take on a key role in Iran’s economic growth
and social development.525 He further mentioned that the government’s space programme
for 2016-2025 focuses on the ‘development of space-based services for the society’526 and
the  ‘use  of  space  achievements  in  different  economic  sections’.527 Additionally,  the
government’s 2013 Aerospace Document links Iran’s aerospace-related development to
wealth  generation.528 Finally,  such a  state  preference  is  plausible  considering  that  the
Vision Decree wants Iran to achieve a high welfare, social security, nutrition security and
safety status, as well as a top economic rank in South-West Asia by 2025.529
At least three target areas seem to exist under this state preference.
First  of all,  this  chapter’s  findings  on the current  major  government-promoted space-
related  measures,  especially  in  Sections  6.6.1-3,  suggest  that  one  target  area  is  the
development and application of space-related capacities and capabilities to deal with a
broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for Iran. For example, some measures
appear, in general terms, to cover issues in such areas like agriculture, biotechnology, the
climate  (e.g.  by  references  to  atmospheric  studies  and  greenhouse  gas  emission
monitoring),  disaster  management,  energy,  the environment,  forestry,  geology,  health,
land  use,  mapping  and  surveying,  meteorology,  natural  resources,  oceanography,
telecommunications and broadcasting, transportation, and urban development.
The  second  socioeconomically-oriented  target  area  of  expanding  the  domestic  non-
governmental space industry materialises from the 2013 Aerospace Document’s call to
prioritise the non-governmental sector in Iranian space undertakings and its support for
the development and privatisation of an Iranian science-based space industry.530
525 ‘Systematic Satellite Launching Will Be Implemented in the Country Starting 2016’ (INSA, 10 July
2016)
<http://en.insa.ir/news/news/16059/Systematic+satellite+launching+will+be+implemented+in+the+cou
ntry+starting+2016> accessed 16 February 2018.
526 ‘Iran National Space Administration Announced Its Programs’ (n 506).
527 ‘The  Second  Ten-Year  Space  Program  of  the  Country  Was  Compiled’  (INSA,  15  June  2016)
<http://en.insa.ir/news/news/15845/The+Second+Ten-
Year+Space+Program+of+the+Country+Was+Compiled> accessed 13 February 2018.
528 Information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015.
529 Tarikhi (n 501) 118.
530 Information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015.
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Finally, INSA’s tasks outlined in Section 6.3 allow arguing that there is the third target
area of extending the domestic commercialisation of space technology.
  6.4.2  Political state preferences
There are signs that the government currently pursues two space-related political  state
preferences.  One is to increase the Iranian people’s national pride and support for the
authoritarian political system. The other is to advance Iran’s international prestige and
influence.
The first one emerges from the Vision Decree setting out the national development goal
of increasing the Iranian people’s national pride,531 while INSA Chairman Manteghi holds
that acquiring space technology can serve national pride in Iran.532 Moreover, the Vision
Decree puts forth the national development goal of ensuring regime stability,533 whereby
it is reasonable to assume that the political leadership considers successfully implemented
government-promoted  space  missions  as  useful  to  create  a  favourable  view  of  and
consequently to  increase support  for the country’s  authoritarian  political  system (with
theological  and  democratic  elements)  amongst  the  Iranian  people.  For  example,  the
government referred to the successful domestic Omid communications satellite project as
a result of the Supreme Leader’s leadership. The launch of Omid was also scheduled to
take place during the celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution.534
Furthermore,  the  Iranian  President  and  the  Minister  of  MODAFL  took  part  at  the
unveiling of the domestic remote sensing satellites Rasad and Fajr in 2011,535 while the
launch date of domestic remote sensing satellites Navid and Fajr fell into the celebrations
marking the 33rd and 36th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution, respectively.536
531 Tarikhi (n 501) 118.
532 ‘Systematic Satellite Launching Will Be Implemented in the Country Starting 2016’ (n 525).
533 Tarikhi (n 501) 118.
534 Based on information in: Robert C Harding,  Space Policy in Developing Countries. The Search for
Security and Development  on the Final Frontier (Routledge 2013) 131–132; ‘Iran’s  Omid Satellite
Launched into Orbit’ (Tehran Times, 4 February 2009) <http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_view.asp?
code=188488> accessed 10 August 2015; Tarikhi (n 501) 173.
535 Based on information in: ‘Iran Unveils New Satellites and Rocket’ (Tehran Times, 8 February 2011)
<http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=235389> accessed 13 August 2015; ‘Iran Shows
Off  Space  Hardware  [Tehran  Times]’  (SpaceNews,  1  October  2011)  <http://spacenews.com/iran-
shows-space-hardware-tehran-times/> accessed 13 August 2015.
536 Based  on  information  in:  ‘Iran  Launches  New  Home-Made  Satellite  into  Orbit’  (SpaceDaily,  10
February  2012)
<http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Iran_Launches_New_Home_Made_Satellite_into_Orbit_999.html
> accessed 12 August 2015; ‘Iran Launches Fourth Satellite into Orbit’ (SpaceDaily, 9 February 2015)
<http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Iran_launches_fourth_satellite_into_orbit_999.html>  accessed  12
August 2015.
137
The  second  space-related  political  state  preference  of  advancing  Iran’s  international
prestige and influence is, for one, somewhat signified by the launch of Iranian satellites
onboard of domestic  space  launchers  between 2011 and January 2016 despite  United
Nations  Security  Council  (UNSC) sanctions  determining that  Iran shall  not undertake
launches using ballistic missile technology.537 It is not farfetched to interpret this space-
related defiance of international sanctions as a deliberate governmental display of Iran as
an independently powerful state on the world stage in an attempt to increase its prestige
and  influence  in  a  challenging  international  environment.  Adding  to  that,  the  2013
Aerospace  Document  puts  forward  the  arguably  international  prestige  and  influence-
oriented goal of Iran attaining the regional first place in the conquest of space.538 In 2016,
INSA Chairman Manteghi further mentioned the undoubtedly prestigious goal that Iran
wants to be a top ten space-faring nation in the world by 2025.539
Notably,  these  two  latter  goals  not  only  underline  the  striving  for  the  space-related
advancement of Iran’s international prestige and influence but they appear to constitute
also target areas of this second space-related political state preference. In terms of the
regional  scope referred to  by the goal  of Iran attaining  the regional  first  place in the
conquest of space, this study deems a look into the Vision Decree as helpful. According
to this decree, Iran shall become an evermore influential state in the Islamic world and a
leader  in  science  and  technology  matters  in  South-West  Asia,  whereby  the  latter
apparently  covers  the  Middle  East  and  neighbouring  states,  Central  Asia  and  the
Caucasus region.540
  6.4.3  National security state preferences
This  study  argues  that  the  government’s  current  space-related  national  security  state
preference is the safeguarding of Iran’s national security.
First,  there  is  the  Vision  Decree’s  call  for  an  Iran that  is  ‘[s]ecure,  independent  and
powerful  with  a  defense  system  based  on  holistic  prevention[...]’.541 Second,  INSA
Chairman Manteghi mentioned in 2016 that space technology can serve Iran’s security
537 For more information on these sanctions, see this study’s Section 6.5.
538 Information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015.
539 ‘Iran National Space Administration Announced Its Programs’ (n 506).
540 Tarikhi (n 501) 118.
541 ibid.
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development.542 Third,  the  2013 Aerospace  Document  refers  to  a  role  of  the  Iranian
aerospace sector concerning the country’s national security status.543 Fourth, a national
security-orientation  of  the  Iranian  government’s  space  programme is  indicated  by,  as
mentioned in Section 6.3, MODAFL and other military-related personnel’s linkage to
SSC and non-civilians having filled influential positions at ISA.
This study’s findings on the involvement of military-related entities in the development
and  its  assumptions  about  military  support  applications  of  some  major  government-
promoted space-related measures suggest that one target area under this state preference
is the enhancement of the Iranian military’s strategic support system.544
A second related target area that this study wants to take into account at least tentatively
is  the  establishment  of  efficient  domestic  long-range (nuclear-armed)  ballistic  missile
strike  capabilities.  After  all,  the  Iranian  use  of  domestic  space launches  to  foster  the
development  of such capabilities  is  a  concern raised by,  e.g.,  the USA.545 As Nadimi
explains,  a  space  launch  vehicle  ‘incorporates  many  common  technologies  with
intercontinental  ballistic  missiles  (ICBMs),  and  a[n  Iranian]  Simorgh-type  ballistic
missile  is  estimated  by rocket  engineers  to have a  7,500-kilometer  range with a  700-
kilogram  warhead.’546 Similarly,  Hildreth  and  Jabbari  hold  that  ‘ICBMs  share  many
similar technologies and processes inherent in a space launch program[...].’547 However,
except  for  Iranian  space  launchers  presumably  having somewhat  evolved from Iran’s
Shahab ballistic missile family,548 this study has, other than in the North Korean case,549
been ultimately unable to draw a robust connection between the Iranian government’s
present investments into domestic space launchers and a current development of domestic
long-range  (nuclear-armed)  ballistic  missile  strike  capabilities.  Future  research  might
542 ‘Systematic Satellite Launching Will Be Implemented in the Country Starting 2016’ (n 525).
543 Information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015.
544 See especially this study’s Sections 6.6.2-4.
545 ‘U.S.  Says  Iran  Rocket  Test  Breaches  U.N.  Resolution’  (Reuters,  27  July  2017)
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-satellite/iran-successfully-tests-space-launch-vehicle-state-tv-
idUSKBN1AC1YY> accessed  3 September 2018;  Steven A Hildreth and Cyrus A Jabbari,  ‘Iran’s
Ballistic  Missile  and  Space  Launch  Programs’  (CRS  In  Focus  IF10938,  2018)  2
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IF10938.pdf> accessed 3 September 2018.
546 Farzin Nadimi, ‘Iran’s Space Program Emerges from Dormancy’ (The Washington Institute, 1 August
2017)  <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-space-program-emerges-from-
dormancy> accessed 14 April 2018.
547 Hildreth and Jabbari (n 545) 2.
548 See especially this study’s Section 6.6.9.
549 See especially this study’s Section 8.4.5.
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have better information available to clarify the existence of this state preference beyond
the ‘tentative’ status.
In support of its findings regarding the Iranian government’s other space-related state
preferences,  this  study  further  wants  to  add  here  that  it  is  short-sighted  to  try  to
understand this government’s current space programme merely from a ballistic missile
development perspective. As Hildreth and Jabbari’s argue in their analysis of the Iranian
ballistic missile and space launch programme around 2018, ‘many years ago Iran outlined
a long-term dedicated space launch effort (that has since slowed considerably) that is not
simply a cover for ICBM development. In addition, no country has developed an ICBM
from its space launch technology base; space launch programs have generally developed
from  military  ballistic  missile  programs.’550 Lastly,  renowned  ballistic  missile  expert
Schiller  has found in the context  of the DPRK’s  Unha-3 rocket  that  this  deliberately
deployed  North  Korean  space  launcher  has  specifications  that  limit  its  overall
contribution to the development of domestic long-range ballistic missile capabilities.551
The same is likely true for Iran’s dedicated space launchers considering that they put
several satellites into orbit successfully.
  6.4.4  Science and technology state preferences
The government’s current space programme appears to include the pursuit of the science
and technology state preference of advancing Iran’s scientific and technological level per
se;  whereby  the  reference  to  ‘per  se’  indicates  here  more  of  a  basic  research  and
knowledge gathering orientation.
One indicator is that, as introduced in Section 6.3, SSC shall exploit space science and
technology for, among others, Iran’s scientific and technical development. Another one is
that the 2013 Aerospace Document puts forward the goal of improving the knowledge
about  the  world  and  the  skies.552 Also,  ISA’s  ‘tasks  and  authorizations’  apparently
include, among others, ‘[r]easearching, design[ing], manufactur[ing], and launch[ing] of
[…]  scientific  and  research  satellites[...]’,  ‘[p]lan[ing]  to  conduct  and  develop  the
peaceful uses of outer space, celestial bodies, astronomy and space technology[...]’, as
550 Hildreth and Jabbari (n 545) 2.
551 See especially this study’s Section 8.4.5.
552 Information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015.
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well  as  ‘[s]tudy[ing],  research[ing],  develop[ing]  technologies  and apply[ing]  specific
education in the development of space science and technologies.’553
At the same time, it shall be noted here that the Iranian government’s actual pursuit of
this state preference appears to still subsist in a limited fashion. The main reason for this
verdict is that this study has been unable to identify a current undertaking involving the
Iranian  government  that  deserves  to  be  called  a  major  government-promoted  space-
related measure regarding the pursuit of such a state preference. (Complex) space-related
scientific and technological development seems to be mostly part of the pursuit of other
space-related state preferences.
  6.4.5  Autonomy-oriented state preferences
The  government’s  present  space  programme seems to  incorporate  the  pursuit  of  two
autonomy-oriented state preferences.
The first one apparently is to ensure the stable use of outer space for Iran. This primarily
emerges  from this  study’s  identification  of  some major  government-promoted  space-
related measures that are arguably directed towards serving the pursuit of such a state
preference.554
The  second  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state  preference  seemingly  is  the
development  and  maintenance  of  the  domestic  human,  industrial,  scientific  and
technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level,
independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences.
The argumentative foundation is the 2013 Aerospace Document stipulating the use of
internal  capabilities  to  the  greatest  extent  possible  in  conducting  Iranian  space
endeavours.  Moreover,  and  as  already  mentioned  before,  the  document  calls  for  the
prioritisation of the non-governmental sector in Iranian space undertakings and supports
the  development  and privatisation  of  a  science-based  space  industry.555 According  to
INSA Chairman Manteghi, the government’s space programme between 2006-2015 also
already involved ‘to develop the space infrastructures so that we become able to use these
553 Tarikhi (n 501) 241–242. See especially ISA Statute (as of 2008) art 3.
554 See especially this study’s Section 6.6.1 and 6.6.8.
555 Information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015.
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infrastructures for developing technologies for designing and producing different types of
satellites, launchers and ground bases for sending and receiving satellites’ information.’
He further stated that the government wants satellite launchers to be designed locally.556
Besides  that,  and  as  described  in  Section  6.3,  INSA’s  general  tasks  include,  among
others, the raising of public awareness and establishing a culture of space technology and
application development in Iran, as well as the enhancement of Iran’s science, technology
and  innovation  regarding  space  technology  and  applications.  Additionally,  this  state
preference is somewhat evident by this study determining that the government currently
puts more emphasis on promoting major domestic than major cooperative space-related
measures.557 Finally, the start of the Iran-critical Trump Presidency in the USA in January
2017 and the US government’s subsequent unilateral withdrawal from the international
agreement  regarding  the  lift  of  UNSC  sanctions  against  Iran  has  made  the  Iranian
government  likely  even more  aware  of  the  necessity  to  develop  and maintain  robust
domestically  controlled  space  capabilities  and  capacities  to  guarantee  its  continued
utilisation of outer space. As introduced in the next section, these sanctions can interfere
with the country’s potential to partake in international space cooperation.558
 6.5  Basic pol. & leg. framework concerning IGO-based regional space cooperation
The Iranian  government  currently  appears  receptive  to  engage in  IGO-based regional
space cooperation.  Most prominently,  Iran through ISA has already joined two space-
specific IGOs with a regional focus, namely APSCO559 and ISNET560, as a full member.
Besides that, it is also a member of CSSTEAP. By 2017, Iran has shown no indication
that  it  wants  to  relinquish  any of  these  memberships.  Instead,  a  statement  by  INSA
Chairman Manteghi in 2016 even highlights a government interest for better cooperation
through APSCO.561
556 ‘The Second Ten-Year Space Program of the Country Was Compiled’ (n 527).
557 See the findings throughout this study’s Section 6.6.
558 On the US decision, see: Kevin Liptak and Nicole Gaouette, ‘Trump Withdraws from Iran Nuclear
Deal,  Isolating  Him  Further  from  World’  (CNN,  9  May  2018)
<https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/08/politics/donald-trump-iran-deal-announcement-decision/
index.html> accessed 29 May 2018. For more information on these sanctions, see Section 6.5.
559 For more information on Iran’s membership in APSCO, see this study’s Section 6.6.1.
560 Since it does not involve any other preeminent Asian government in the space sector, ISNET does not
receive special attention in this study. For detailed information about this IGO, see: ‘About ISNET’ (n
29).
561 ‘Sanctions Have Had Two Contrasting Impacts on the Countrys Space Technology’ (INSA,  10 July
2016)
<http://en.insa.ir/news/news/16058/Sanctions+have+had+two+contrasting+impacts+on+the+countrys+
space+technology+> accessed 16 February 2018.
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Regarding the principles governing the Iranian government’s current intergovernmental
space cooperation, the 2013 Aerospace Document indicates that the government deems it
important that cooperation leads to mutual benefit. Also, the government considers space
resources  a  common  good  of  humanity  that  needs  to  be  utilised  under  a  just  legal
system.562
Additionally,  the  principles  outlined  in  the  main  international  space  agreements
presumably are, similar to the other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector,
active  when  it  comes  to  the  Iranian  government’s  current  intergovernmental  space
cooperation. Iran signed the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, signed the Rescue Agreement in
1968 and ratified it in 1970, signed the Liability Convention in 1972 and ratified it in
1974, as well  as signed the Registration Convention in 1975.563 Notably,  even though
these signatures and ratifications occurred during the pre-revolutionary Shah era, and two
of  these  documents  are  only  signed  and  not  ratified,  no  post-revolutionary  Iranian
government seems to have declared them to be void.
What  complicates  the  Iranian  government’s  current  (potential  to  engage  in)
intergovernmental space cooperation from a legal and political perspective the most is the
present status of the UNSC sanctions imposed on the country since 2006.
More specifically, based on an international agreement from 2015 that came into effect on
16.01.2016, these sanctions should have been lifted within specific timeframes and under
certain conditions.564 However, the US government under President Trump announced in
May 2018, after various statements throughout 2017 already suggesting such a decision,
that it unilaterally withdraws from this agreement.565 In the end, this situation likely limits
562 Information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015.
563 Based  on  information  in:  ‘United  Nations  Treaty  Series  Online  Collection’  (UNTC)
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/UNTSOnline.aspx?id=1>  accessed  23  March  2015;  ‘UK  Depositary
Status List: Agreement on the Return of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched  into  Outer  Space’
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
269992/11._Rescue_of_Astronauts_1968_Status_List.docx> accessed 5 August 2015; ‘UK Depositary
Status  List:  Convention  on  International  Liability  for  Damage  Caused  by  Space  Objects’
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
336893/10._Damage_caused_by_Space_Objects__1972__Status_List.pdf> accessed 5 August 2015.
564 An assessment of the international  agreement  is provided here:  Kenneth Katzman,  ‘Iran Sanctions’
(CRS Report for Congress RS20871, 2018) <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf> accessed 15
February 2018. See especially p39.
565 Liptak and Gaouette (n 558).
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other states’ acceptance of Iran as an intergovernmental space cooperation partner in the
development and application of space launchers and satellites.
After all, while other states might be open for space cooperation and want to keep word
regarding the abolishment of the UNSC sanctions on paper, they might, in practice, have
to continue to abide by the (space-related stipulations of) these sanctions against Iran or
risk getting into trouble with the USA, the world’s most powerful state. Most relevant in
terms of outer space,  and although Iran has never  considered the UNSC sanctions  to
rightfully cover its space programme as the various domestic space launches since 2006
showcase,566 UNSC Resolution 1929 from 09.06.2010 stipulates: ‘Iran shall not undertake
any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including
launches  using  ballistic  missile  technology,  and  that  States  shall  take  all  necessary
measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to
such  activities[...]’.567 This  provision  can  reasonably  be  interpreted  to  include
engagements  towards domestic and cooperative development and use of Iranian space
launchers and satellites.568
In  contrast  to  that,  under  Paragraph  3  of  Annex  B  to  UNSC Resolution  2231  from
20.07.2015  that  is  the  primary  UNSC  document  linked  to  the  implementation  of
aforementioned international agreement from 2015, other states (would) have to deal with
much fewer restrictions in partnering with Iran on space launcher and satellite-related
issues.  There,  it  merely  reads  in  a  non-binding  fashion:  ‘Iran  is  called  upon  not  to
undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering
nuclear  weapons,  including launches  using such ballistic  missile  technology,  until  the
date eight years years after the JCPOA Adoption Day [(16.01.2016)] or until the date on
which  the  IAEA  submits  a  report  confirming  the  Broader  Conclusion,  whichever  is
earlier.’569
In sum, the Iranian government’s current potential  to engage in space cooperation on
space  launcher  and  satellite-related  topics  with  other  governments,  including  the
566 See the various Iranian satellite missions between 2006 and 2016 introduced in the upcoming sections,
as well as the information in: ‘Sanctions Have Had Two Contrasting Impacts on the Countrys Space
Technology’ (n 561).
567 UNSC Res 1929 (9 June 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1929.
568 Traditional  space  launchers  commonly  use  ballistic  missile-related  technology.  Also,  satellites
capabilities and capacities can, for example, help with target selection and missile guidance.
569 UNSC Res 2231 (20 July 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2231.
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preeminent  Asian governments  in  the space sector,  ultimately  depends on the latter’s
respective interpretation of the UNSC sanctions, as well as their respective willingness to
cross the USA and abide by the international agreement from 2015. So far, China and
India seem to have at least opted not to count (certain) satellite-related undertakings with
Iran to fall under the UNSC sanctions, as evidenced by the Sino-Iranian activities within
APSCO since 2006 and Iran’s participation in the India-based CSSTEAP.
 6.6  Major domestic and cooperative space-related measures
  6.6.1  APSCO
APSCO is  the  Iranian  government’s  current  main  institutionalised  cooperative  space-
related measure  (with a presumed high potential for) involving other preeminent Asian
governments in the space sector.
The Iranian government was one of the initial eight signatories of the APSCO Convention
on 28.10.2005. It ratified the convention on 28.11.2006, which made it APSCO’s sixth
full  member  state.  Nowadays,  APSCO  has  eight  full  members,  including  one  other
preeminent Asian government in the space sector, namely China.570 
In short, APSCO’s official purpose covers capability building of its members in space
science, space technology and their peaceful applications, as well as the advancement of
its members’ socioeconomic development. The latter part appears to include especially
the  areas  of  disaster  management,  environmental  protection  and  the  development  of
competitive national space-related industries.571
Overall,  but  without  claiming  completeness,  the  specific  major  Iranian  government-
promoted cooperative  space-related  measures under APSCO since 2006 seem to have
encompassed the following:
Reportedly, Iran leads three joint activities on earthquakes, landslides and droughts within
the  Framework  for  Researches  on  Application  of  Space  Technology  for  Disaster
Monitoring in the APSCO Member States project.572
570 Zhang and others (n 17) 29.
571 For more information, see this study’s Section 4.6.1.2.
572 Aorpimai (n 207) slide 13.
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Iran  and Mongolia  have  introduced the  idea for  an  APSCO Geo-Telecommunications
Satellite Project in 2010.573 Yet, the project apparently has not taken off as of 2017. At
least one potential application area was identified as telemedicine.574
Iran plans to become more active regarding APSCO’s DSSP project that, while probably
depending  strongly  on  the  Chinese  side’s  contributions,  supports  the  sharing  and
application  of  remote  sensing  data  among  the  APSCO  member  states  within  the
organisation’s official purpose, e.g. for disaster management.575
Iran participates in the SMMS project. The latter shall, for example, involve contributions
from APSCO members’ existing domestic satellites and the project-specific development
of additional, small-, micro- and nano-satellites. Notably, China already plays a strong
role in this regard.576
While the Chinese side presumably is the key actor, Iran has agreed to host a telescope
for  the  APOSOS project  and  become  an  Observation  and  Training  Node  within  the
project since 2016.577
Iran partakes in APSCO’s joint educational and training activities as well, whereby the
latter likely depends heavily on the contributions from the Chinese side. For example, a
number  of  Iranian  students  have  participated  in  APSCO-promoted  Master  and  PhD
programmes.578 Moreover, Iran engages, e.g. through the Amir Kabir and Khajeh Nassir
573 Zhang and others (n 17) 127–129.
574 ‘The Third Expert Group Meeting on the Feasibility Study of APSCO’ (APSCO, 27 February 2014)
<http://apsco.int/NewsOne.asp?ID=317> accessed 7 September 2015.
575 Based on information in: ‘Iran Plans to Join 2 APSCO Projects’ (Financial Tribune,  18 September
2017)  <https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-sci-tech/72519/iran-plans-to-join-2-apsco-
projects> accessed 15 October 2017; Li, ‘Realizing SPACE 2030 Through Multi-Lateral Cooperation’
(n 207) slides  12-13;  Aorpimai  (n 207) slides 6-10. For additional  information on DSSP,  see this
study’s Section 4.6.1.2.
576 Based on information in:  Li,  ‘Realizing SPACE 2030 Through Multi-Lateral  Cooperation’ (n 207)
slides 33-35; ‘Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation Site Visit to Iran for SMMS Programme’
(SpaceWatch  Middle  East,  11  May  2017)  <https://spacewatchme.com/2017/05/asia-pacific-space-
cooperation-organisation-site-visit-iran-smms-programme/>  accessed  13  July  2017;  ‘The  Signing
Ceremony  of  Contract  on  SMMS Program  between  APSCO  and  CNSA’  (n  209).  For  additional
information on SMMS, see this study’s Section 4.6.1.2.
577 Based on information in:  Li,  ‘Realizing SPACE 2030 Through Multi-Lateral  Cooperation’ (n 207)
slides 21-24; ‘Successful Installation of the Third APOSOS Telescope in Iran’ (APSCO, 12 January
2017) <http://apsco.int/sitesearchOne.asp?ID=511> accessed 15 April 2017. For additional information
on APOSOS, see this study’s Section 4.6.1.2.
578 Li, ‘Realizing SPACE 2030 Through Multi-Lateral Cooperation’ (n 207) slide 39.
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Universities, in APSCO’s SSS project for hands-on training of students and facilities in
small satellite development.579
In sum, the combination and interpretation of the information presented above and on
APSCO  under  Section  4.6.1.2  allows  concluding  that  the  Iranian  government’s
engagement  within  APSCO presumably  serves  especially  the  pursuit  of  its  following
current space-related state preferences:
First, the government’s participation in APSCO is somewhat in line with the pursuit of its
current  space-related  socioeconomic  state  preference,  in  particular  the  target  areas  of
developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set
of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for Iran, as well as of expanding the domestic
non-governmental space industry.
Second, the APOSOS project fits the pursuit of the government’s current space-related
autonomy-oriented state preference of ensuring the stable use of outer space for Iran.
Third,  since  APSCO shall  encompass  the  joint  improvement  of  capabilities  in  space
science, technology and their peaceful applications and has already seen joint educational
and training activities, the Iranian government presumably considers the organisation as
temporarily  useful  for  the  pursuit  of  its  current  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state
preference of developing and maintaining Iran’s domestic human, industrial,  scientific
and technological capacities and capabilities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level,
independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences.
Fourth,  and  corresponding  to  one  of  its  space-related  political  state  preferences,  the
Iranian government might hope that its contributions within APSCO help to some degree
to advance its international prestige among and influence over other APSCO members. 
579 Based on information in: ‘Positive Impacts of APSCO Chairmanship: Dr. Bahrami’ (MCIT, 4 October
2017)  <http%3a%2f%2fwww.ict.gov.ir%2fen%2fnews%2f25403%2fPositive-Impacts-of-APSCO-
Chairmanship-Dr-Bahrami>  accessed  15  April  2018;  Li,  ‘Realizing  SPACE 2030  Through  Multi-
Lateral  Cooperation’  (n  207)  slides  38,41;  ‘APSCO Small  Student  Satellite  Project’  (n  214).  For
additional information on such educational and training activities, see this study’s Section 4.6.1.2.
147
  6.6.2  Remote Sensing
   6.6.2.1  Major domestic measures
According to INSA, the Iranian government’s current space programme for 2016-2025
concentrates, inter alia, on further developing and applying domestic – maybe primarily
small  –580 mensural581 satellites.582 In this  regard,  specific  major  government-promoted
domestic  space-related  remote  sensing  measures in  the  pipeline  by  the  end  of  2017
apparently cover, without claiming completeness, the following:
First, there is microsatellite Amir Kabir, also called AUTSAT. Developed with a budget
of around $10 million by the Amir Kabir University of Technology in collaboration with
ISA, it shall have a resolution of around 80m and support Iran’s disaster management
within its 3-5 year mission.583
Second,  there is  microsatellite  Zafar (Triumph).  Developed by the Iran University  of
Science and Technology, it shall have a resolution of around 80m and serve areas like
meteorology, river topography and water border demarcation.584
Third, and similarly within a $10 million budget, the Sharif University of Technology and
ISA develop the microsatellite Doosti (Friendship). Apparently previously referred to as
SharifSat or SUTSat, it shall have a resolution of fewer than 10 meters.585 No specific
application areas are known.
Fourth, the government promotes the development of the 150kg small satellite Soha, ‘an
electro-optical  remote  sensing satellite  with  a  resolution  of  15 metres,  a  considerable
580 As indicated in: ‘Systematic Satellite Launching Will Be Implemented in the Country Starting 2016’ (n
525).
581 Considering the many remarks to remote sensing in Iranian source material and the various Iranian
remote sensing satellite missions, ‘mensural’ presumably refers to remote sensing.
582 ‘The Second Ten-Year Space Program of the Country Was Compiled’ (n 527).
583 Based on information in: Tarikhi (n 501) 185; Natalie Fuchs, ‘Iran Space Agency Provides Update on
Status  of  Satellites  at  World  Space  Week  Event’  (SpaceWatch  Middle  East,  26  October  2017)
<https://spacewatchme.com/2017/10/iran-space-agency-provides-update-status-satellites-world-space-
week-event/> accessed 15 February 2018.
584 Based on information in: Tarikhi (n 501) 187; Fuchs (n 583).
585 Based on information in: Tarikhi (n 501) 185; ‘Vaezi Announces Launch of Three Iranian Satellites by
2018’  (SpaceWatch  Middle  East,  26  December  2016)  <https://spacewatchme.com/2016/12/vaezi-
announces-launch-three-iranian-satellites-2018/> accessed 15 February 2018; Fuchs (n 583).
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improvement compared to previous Iranian remote sensing satellites that had resolutions
in the hundreds of metres.’586
Fifth,  this  study has  found that  Tadbir (Wisdom),  a  follow-up satellite  project  to  the
previously launched microsatellite Navid and developed by the same institutions but with
a more advanced imaging capability, awaits its launch.587
Sixth,  a consortium of Iranian universities  reportedly works on a no further specified
remote sensing satellite called Pars-1 and potentially a later Pars-2 mission.588
Previous  to  them,  the  specific  major  government-promoted  domestic  remote  sensing
measures seem to have encompassed at least the following four satellite projects:
The first one was microsatellite Rasad (Observation). Developed by MCIT together with
the Malek Ashtar Technical University, which is apparently affiliated with MODAFL,
Rasad was put into space on 15.06.2011 onboard a domestic  Safir launcher. Its 21 day-
mission included technology testing and Earth imaging for disaster management, water
border demarcation, river topography and meteorology. Despite the link to MODAFL, the
satellite likely had no particular military use due to its low 150m imaging resolution.589
The second one was microsatellite  Navid-e Elm-o Sanat (often just:  Navid;  Promise of
Science and Industry), jointly developed by ISA and the Iran University of Science and
Technology within a $10 million budget. It was launched on 03.02.2012 via a domestic
Safir launcher.  Its  two  months-mission  involved  testing  of  EO  equipment  and  a
586 Based on information in: ‘Iran Adds Soha Remote Sensing Satellite to List of Imminent Launches’
(SpaceWatch Middle East, 31 May 2017) <https://spacewatchme.com/2017/05/iran-adds-soha-remote-
sensing-satellite-list-imminent-launches/>  accessed  15  February  2018;  ‘Iran  to  Launch
Communications  Satellite  by  2021’  (Mehr  News  Agency,  9  October  2017)
<https://en.mehrnews.com/news/128459/Iran-to-launch-communications-satellite-by-2021>  accessed
15 February 2018. Citation based on the first link.
587 Based on information in: ‘Iran’s Tadbir Imaging Satellite Ready for Launch’ (SpaceWatch Middle East,
23 November 2016) <https://spacewatchme.com/2016/11/irans-tadbir-imaging-satellite-ready-launch/>
accessed 15 February 2018; ‘Iran to Launch New Satellite into Space Soon’ (Fars News Agency, 7
January  2014)  <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13921017000229>  accessed  22  July
2015. More information on Navid is presented further below.
588 Based on information in: Tarikhi (n 501) 189; Fuchs (n 583).
589 Based on information in: ‘Iran Unveils New Satellites and Rocket’ (n 535); ‘Iran Shows Off Space
Hardware [Tehran Times]’ (n 535); Tarikhi (n 501) 183–184.
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telecommunication  link,  collecting  weather  data  and  contributing  to  Iran’s  disaster
management.590
The third  domestic  remote  sensing satellite  launched was microsatellite  Fajr (Dawn).
Developed by SAIran and Aerospace Industries Organisation, both of which are entities
affiliated  to  Iran’s  military  complex,  and  put  successfully  into  orbit  on  02.02.2015
onboard a domestic Safir launcher, Fajr was supposed to function for about 1.5 years.591
However,  it  presumably  lasted  only  about  a  month.592 Despite  the  involvement  of
military-related entities in its development, its low 500-1000m resolution image quality
makes it unlikely that it would have contributed much to Iran’s military capabilities.593
Mehdi Sarvi from SAIran even claimed officially  that  the satellite  served no military
purpose.  Instead,  he  pointed  out  Fajr’s  application  in  such  areas  like  agriculture,
meteorology, roads, sea monitoring and shipping.594
On 27.07.2017, Iran attempted but failed595 to put its fourth remote sensing satellite called
Tolou (Sunrise)  into  orbit  onboard  a  domestic  Simorgh launcher.596 Developed  by
military-related SAIran for an 18-months mission, the available information indicates that
this  microsatellite’s  ‘imagery  products  [… should  have  been]  used  for  synoptic  land
mapping, monitoring of water bodies and environmental disasters, agricultural areas and
forests, urban distribution, and cloud coverage.’ On the national security front, the plan
might have been to apply it for signal intelligence gathering.597 Iran’s previous Defence
590 Based on information in: ‘Report: Iran Unveils Self-Made Satellite Navigation System’ (Haaretz, 31
May  2012)  <http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/report-iran-unveils-self-made-satellite-
navigation-system-1.433673> accessed 13 August 2015; Tarikhi (n 501) 184–185.
591 Based on information in: ‘Iran Launches Fourth Satellite into Orbit’ (n 536);  ‘Iran’s  National Fajr
Satellite  Transmits  Data  to  Stations  on  Earth’  (PressTV,  2  February  2015)
<http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/02/02/395835/Iran-satellite-transmits-data-to-earth>  accessed  22
July  2015;  Tarikhi  (n  501)  186–187.  For  the  military  connection  of  the  Aerospace  Industries
Organisation,  see:  ‘Aerospace  Industries  Organization  (AIO)’  (Iran  Watch,  17  March  2010)
<http://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/aerospace-industries-organization-aio>  accessed  15
February 2018.
592 Norbert  Brügge,  ‘Safir-1A/B  IRILV’  (www.b14643.de)
<http://www.b14643.de/Spacerockets_1/Rest_World/Safir-1B-IRILV/Description/Text.htm>  accessed
13 August 2015.
593 Tarikhi (n 501) 186.
594 ‘Fajr  Satellite  Serves  No  Military  Purpose’  (SpaceDaily,  5  February  2015)
<http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Fajr_satellite_serves_no_military_purpose_999.html> accessed 12
August 2015.
595 Nadimi (n 546).
596 ‘Iran Launches Simorgh Satellite Carrier from Imam Khomeini Space Center’ (Mehr News Agency, 28
July  2017)  <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/126769/Iran-launches-Simorgh-satellite-carrier-from-
Imam-Khomeini-Space> accessed 15 February 2018.
597 Tarikhi (n 501) 185–186.
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Minister Ahmad Vahidi referring to  Tolou as a reconnaissance satellite strengthens the
argument that it might have had some planned national security purpose.598
Altogether, the combination of information presented in the context of these previous and
upcoming remote sensing satellite missions, on the INSA webpage and by Tarikhi allows
arguing  that  major  government-promoted  domestic  space-related  remote  sensing
measures are somewhat aimed at aiding the pursuit of the government’s current space-
related socioeconomic state preference of advancing Iran’s socioeconomic development,
especially  the  target  area  of  developing  and  applying space-related  capabilities  and
capacities to deal with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for Iran. For
example, the government has apparently used or wants to use its domestic remote sensing
capabilities and capacities to address issues in such socioeconomically relevant areas like
agriculture,  archaeology,  atmospheric  studies,  biotechnology,  cadaster  and  real  estate
registry, civil engineering, coastal zone management, disaster management, energy and
natural resources, environmental monitoring and studies, forestry, geographic information
systems, geology, greenhouse gas emission and air pollution monitoring, land use and
surveying, meteorology, oceanography, roads and transportation, shipping, water border
demarcation, water studies, wildlife monitoring and urban development.599
Even though there is no hard evidence for the pursuit of the government’s current space-
related  national  security  state  preference  through  the  various  measures  above,  it  is
reasonable to take such a direction into account here as well. The connection of some
major  government-promoted  domestic  remote  sensing  satellite  projects  with  Iranian
military-related entities cannot be denied. Moreover, it is common to many governments,
including such other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector like China, India,
Japan and South  Korea,  to  develop  and apply  domestic  remote  sensing  satellites  for
national security purposes. In particular, such satellites can serve the pursuit of the Iranian
government’s space-related national security-oriented target area of enhancing the Iranian
military’s strategic support system.
598 ‘Iran  and  Israel  Plan  New  Satellites’  (UPI,  2  February  2010)
<http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2010/02/02/Iran-and-Israel-plan-new-
satellites/30381265135400/> accessed 24 July 2015.
599 Based on information presented in the context of the various domestic space-related remote sensing
satellite  measures  above  and  in:  Tarikhi  (n  501)  87,160;  ‘Systematic  Satellite  Launching  Will  Be
Implemented in the Country Starting 2016’ (n 525); ‘Some Massive Projects in Space Field to Be
Executed through Creating a Network of Knowledge-Based Companies’ (INSA, 22 November 2016)
<http://en.insa.ir/news/news/19560/Some+Massive+Projects+in+Space+Field+to+Be+Executed+throu
gh+Creating+a+Network+of+Knowledge-Based+Companies> accessed 16 February 2018.
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   6.6.2.2  Major cooperative measures
Excluding the already discussed Iranian participation in APSCO, this study has, without
claiming  completeness,  only  found a  few measures  that  somewhat  fit  the  status  of  a
current major government-promoted cooperative space-related remote sensing measure
(with a presumed high potential for) involving other preeminent Asian governments in
the space sector.
More  specifically,  Iranian  government-related  entities  apparently  engage  in  GEO
alongside China, India, Japan and South Korea,600 UN-SPIDER alongside China, India
and South Korea,601 and WMO alongside China, India, Japan, North Korea and South
Korea.602
In terms of state preferences, these measures are likely for the most part oriented towards
serving the pursuit  of the  government’s  space-related  socioeconomic  state  preference,
especially  the  target  area  of  developing  and  applying  space-related  capabilities  and
capacities to deal with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for Iran.
Also,  it  cannot  be  ruled  out  that  the  Iranian  government  might  believe  that  such
cooperative  measures  support,  e.g.  by others  profiting  from Iranian  contributions,  the
pursuit  of  its  current  space-related  political  state  preference  of  advancing  Iran’s
international prestige and influence with its respective partners.
  6.6.3  Communications and broadcasting
   6.6.3.1  Major domestic measures
There are various national satellite communication ground stations in Iran and there is a
nationwide network of ground hubs and terminals connected to these stations. Currently,
Iranian  entities  use  a  mix  of  foreign  and  Iranian-owned  satellites  to  provide
communications and broadcasting services to the Iranian people and across the world,
whereby  the  Iranian  dependence  on  international  satellite  networks  remains  high.
Prominent  Iranian  providers  of  internal  and  external  communication  services  are  the
600 ‘Member List’ (n 238).
601 ‘Islamic Republic of Iran Regional Support Office’ (UN-SPIDER) <http://www.un-spider.org/network/
regional-support-offices/islamic-republic-iran-regional-support-office> accessed 18 August 2015.
602 ‘Members’ (n 240).
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Telecommunication Company of Iran, a subordinate to MCIT and tasked to develop and
manage Iran’s communication infrastructure, as well as IRIB.603
Based on this background, the Iranian government’s current major domestic space-related
communications and broadcasting measure apparently is the development and application
of more and better domestic telecommunications satellite capabilities and capacities.604
By 2017, more specific measures in this regard are, for example, the development and
application of the – presumably geostationary – communications satellites Iransat-1/-2/-
3. Reportedly, their launch shall take in the 2020s. The decision to opt for the  Iransats
instead  a  continuation  of  the  previously  promoted  Zohreh communications  and
broadcasting satellite  system605 might  be the  Iransats comparably  lower price tag and
shorter  development  time.606 It  is  likely  of the essence for  the Iranian government  to
become less dependent from foreign providers as quickly as possible considering that
IRIB experienced a loss of access to several international satellites between 2012 and
2014 due to decisions of the USA and the EU to punish Iran for alleged satellite jamming
activities and an alleged broadcast content that violated human rights.607
603 Tarikhi (n 501) 101–104.
604 ‘The Second Ten-Year Space Program of the Country Was Compiled’ (n 527).
605 For more information on the by now cancelled Zohreh system, see: Tarikhi (n 501) 104–106; Harvey,
Smid and Pirard (n 500) 256–257; ‘Regime Gives up on Russia for Zohreh Satellite’ (Iran Times, 14
October  2010)  <http://iran-times.com/regime-gives-up-on-russia-for-zohreh-satellite/>  accessed  20
July 2015.
606 Combined  information  in:  Mryam  Mousavi  Moayed,  ‘NAHID-1  Satellite’  (Presentation,  55th
UNCOPUOS  STSC,  Vienna,  7  February  2018)
<http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/stsc/2018/tech-32E.pdf>  accessed  13  April  2018;
Tarikhi  (n 501)  189;  ‘Iran  Plans  to  Launch 3 Telecom Satellites  in  5 Years:  ISA’  (Press  TV,  19
February  2013)  <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/02/19/289770/iran-to-launch-3-telecom-satellites/>
accessed 19 August 2015; S Isayev and T Jafarov, ‘Iran to Launch Own Communications Satellite into
Space’ (Trend News Agency,  8 April 2013) <http://en.trend.az/iran/2136853.html> accessed 22 July
2015.
607 For the full story, see: Peter B de Selding, ‘Broadcasters Call for ITU Action on Satellite Jamming’
(SpaceNews, 9 December 2011) <http://spacenews.com/broadcasters-call-itu-action-satellite-jamming/
> accessed 8 August 2015; Paul Sonne and Farnaz Fassihi, ‘In Skies Over Iran, a Battle for Control of
Satellite  TV’  (WSJ,  27  December  2011)
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203501304577088380199787036>  accessed  9
August 2015; Golnaz Esfandiari, ‘Who Is Behind Iran’s “Dangerous” Satellite Jamming?’ (Radio Free
Europe / Radio Liberty, 23 August 2012) <http://www.rferl.org/content/satellite-jamming-dangerous-
health-iran/24686214.html> accessed 8 August 2015; Peter B de Selding, ‘Sanctions Prompt Eutelsat
To  Drop  Iranian  TV  Channels’  (SpaceNews,  23  October  2012)  <http://spacenews.com/sanctions-
prompt-eutelsat-drop-iranian-tv-channels/>  accessed  8  August  2015;  Golnaz  Esfandiari,  ‘Denying
Involvement,  Iran  Vows  to  Investigate  Jamming  of  Foreign  Media’  (VOA,  5  April  2014)
<http://www.voanews.com/content/denying-involvement-iran-vows-to-investigate-jamming-of-foreign-
media/1893676.html> accessed 8 August 2015.
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Other specific major government-promoted domestic space-related communications and
broadcasting measures are the domestic development and application of the Nahid-1 and
-2 satellites. Both shall be completed by the early 2020s and be put into LEO. Nahid-1
shall  be  an experimental  telecommunication  microsatellite  that  includes  folding  solar
panels. Nahid-2 is so far only referred to as a telecommunications microsatellite.608
Adding to that,  there is  the indigenous development  of  Mesbah-2,  a data storage and
forward communications satellite with a potential reach from Iran to the European and
American  region,  as  well  as  potentially  involving  some  added  navigation-related
technology.609 It appears to be a successor mission to the by now scrapped Mesbah project
that  was  based  on  a  collaboration  between  Iranian  entities  and  an  Italian  enterprise.
Without going into much detail here, the cooperation fell victim to the UNSC sanctions
against Iran.610
This study was unable to determine whether the government’s current space programme
still  includes  the  development  of  the  domestic  communications  satellite  Sina-2.611
Presumably,  it  would  be  the  successor  mission  to  previous  Iranian  communications
satellite Sina-1 that was the first Iran-owned satellite in orbit. With an overall price tag of
around  $15  million,  the  Iranian  government  procured  microsatellite  Sina-1  from  a
Russian company to bridge the delay – at that time due to technical problems – in the
development  of  the  Mesbah communications  satellite.  Launched  by  Russia  on
27.10.2005,  Sina-1  has  contributed  to  Iran’s  communications  capabilities,  helped  to
improve  the  Iranian  expertise  in  tracking  and  telemetry,  as  well  as  included  some
additional remote sensing capabilities potentially – and supporting the argument in the
‘remote  sensing’  section  above – serving Iran  in  such areas  like  agriculture,  disaster
608 Combined information in: Moayed (n 606); Tarikhi (n 501) 189; ‘Iran Position Nine on World Satellite
Record Launch: Space Official’ (Islamic Republic News Agency, 7 February 2018) <http://www.irna.ir/
en/News/82823862/>  accessed  16  February  2018;  ‘Iran  Space  Agency  to  Build  Communication
Satellite’  (Financial  Tribune,  30  January  2017)
<https://financialtribune.com/articles/sci-tech/58471/iran-space-agency-to-build-communication-
satellite> accessed 16 February 2018.
609 Tarikhi (n 501) 187; ‘Iran Negotiating with Italy for the Return of Mesbah Satellite’ (SpaceWatch
Middle East,  7 June 2016) <https://spacewatchme.com/2016/06/iran-negotiating-italy-return-mesbah-
satellite/> accessed 16 February 2018.
610 For this and further background information, see: ‘Iran Negotiating with Italy for the Return of Mesbah
Satellite’  (n  609);  ‘Mesbah Satellite  to  Go to Space  Museum’ (Mehr  News Agency,  2  July  2017)
<https://en.mehrnews.com/news/126269/Mesbah-satellite-to-go-to-space-museum>  accessed  16
February 2018.
611 Tarikhi (n 501) 190.
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management and natural resources.612 National security applications of the remote sensing
element were unlikely because the satellite’s reported 250m multispectral scanning mode
resolution and 50m panchromatic mode resolution are of little military use.613
Besides Sina-1, the other previous Iranian satellite project in this field was Omid (Hope).
Put into orbit on 02.02.2009 onboard a domestic Safir-2 launcher, this experimental data
storage and forward communications  satellite  with a price tag of around $0.5 million
constituted  Iran’s  first  domestically  manufactured  – by military-related  SAIran – and
launched satellite. It has further made Iran the ninth member of the elite group of states,
and the first new one in the 21st century, with the domestic capability to manufacture and
launch its own satellites.614
Arguably, the pursuit of the three state preferences is at the centre of its present (specific)
major domestic space-related communications and broadcasting measures.
This  study  finds  that  the  available  information  points  towards  the  government’s
development  and  use  of  communications  and  broadcasting  satellite  capabilities  and
capacities  in  such socioeconomically  relevant  areas  like domestic  communication  and
broadcasting services, internet connectivity, connectivity of remote areas to the rest of the
country, disaster management, tele-education and telemedicine.615 It fits the pursuit of the
government’s space-related socioeconomic state preference, especially the target area of
developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set
of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for Iran.
The government has never highlighted that its current space-related national security state
preference  is  an  important  driver  of  the  satellite  projects  outlined  above.  However,
considering  that  other  preeminent  Asian  governments  in  the  space  sector  like  China,
India, Japan and South Korea use domestic communications and broadcasting satellites
regarding  their  respective  national  security  state  preference-related  target  area  of
enhancing the domestic  military’s strategic  support system, it makes it very likely that
Iran will want to do the same.
612 ibid  108–109;  ‘First  Iranian  Satellite  Launched’  (BBC,  27  October  2005)
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4381436.stm> accessed 20 July 2015.
613 Harvey, Smid and Pirard (n 500) 272–273; Sheldon (n 500) 232.
614 Tarikhi (n 501) 175–180.
615 ibid 101–104.
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Besides  that,  the  argument  can  be  made  that  more  and  improved  domestic
communications  and  broadcasting  satellite  capabilities  and  capacities  put  the  Iranian
government in a better position in its soft power conflict with the Western and Gulf Arab
states.616 The government can use such domestic capabilities and capacities to distribute
its worldview on the international level more sustainably, without the fear of being shut
out by foreign providers. This is coherent with the government’s current space-related
political state preference of advancing Iran’s international prestige and influence.
   6.6.3.2  Major cooperative measures
Excluding  the  already  introduced  APSCO-related  measures,  the  Iranian  government
appears  to  promote  only  two  measures  that  can  be  somewhat  considered  a  major
cooperative  space-related  communications  and  broadcasting  measure  (with  a  high
potential for) involving other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector.
More specifically, the Iranian government reportedly wants to commercially procure a
special geostationary communications satellite called National Communications Satellite
from a foreign company. While writing, it seems to deliberate on contract proposals from
entities from China,  France,  Russia, and South Korea.617 The underlying space-related
state preferences are unknown.
Besides that, Iran is, alongside all the other preeminent Asian governments in the space
sector, a member state of ITU. This shall presumably aid the pursuit of all space-related
state preferences underlying the Iranian government’s space-related communications and
broadcasting measures.618
616 ‘Iran  Space  Agency  Applies  for  Five  Geostationary  Orbital  Slots  for  Ka-  and  Ku-Band
Communications  Satellites’  (SpaceWatch  Middle  East,  14  March  2017)
<https://spacewatchme.com/2017/03/iran-space-agency-applies-five-geostationary-orbital-slots-ka-ku-
band-communications-satellites/> accessed 16 February 2018.
617 ibid.
618 For more information, see this study’s Section 4.6.3.3.
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  6.6.4  Navigation
   6.6.4.1  Major domestic measures
Even  though INSA head  Manteghi  mentioned  in  2016 that  the  government’s  current
space programme includes the design and development of Iranian positioning satellites,619
this study has found no evidence that such a major domestic measure has commenced.
   6.6.4.2  Major cooperative measures
The  accessible  information  allows  arguing  that  the  major  government-promoted  –
apparently cooperative – space-related navigation measure is to improve the accuracy of
satellite  navigation  in  Iran  through application  of  globally  and  regionally  available
navigation  satellite  systems.620 In  this  regard,  the  Iranian  government  seems to prefer
China’s BDS. Reportedly, SAIran has already entered into an MoU in October 2015 with
the Chinese side in which they agreed to develop the use of BDS in Iran and to establish
BDS ground stations and a BDS data centre in the country. Iran’s focus on the Chinese
system is reasonable. Not only has Iran already a working space-related relationship with
China through APSCO but China has apparently also agreed to provide Iran even with
access to the high-precision BDS services, which the USA has denied Iran regarding the
use of GPS. Moreover, BDS covers the blind spots of the American GPS in Iran.621
In terms of state preferences, this study concludes that Iran’s collaboration regarding the
use of BDS might be, on the one hand, aimed at serving the government’s current space-
related national security state preference, with a focus on the target areas of enhancing the
Iranian military’s strategic support system. Stable access to – especially high precision –
navigation  services  can  make  the  use  of,  e.g.,  Iranian  missiles  and  uncrewed  aerial
vehicles more effective.622
On the other hand, the Iranian government presumably wants to also have access to a
stable and precise satellite navigation services for the pursuit of its current space-related
socioeconomic  state  preference,  probably  especially  regarding  the  target  area  of
developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set
619 ‘The Second Ten-Year Space Program of the Country Was Compiled’ (n 527).
620 ‘Systematic Satellite Launching Will Be Implemented in the Country Starting 2016’ (n 525).
621 ‘Chinese BeiDou BDS to Transfer Satellite Tech. to Iran’ (n 277).
622 ‘Iran and China Defence and Intelligence Cooperation: The Space Dimension’ (SpaceWatch Middle
East,  28 November  2016) <https://spacewatchme.com/2016/11/irans-growing-dependency-on-chinas-
beidou-satellite-navigation/> accessed 14 October 2017.
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of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for Iran. After all, the current space programme
reportedly  considers  the  use  of  space  achievements  in  different  economic  sections  a
central objective.623 Moreover, other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector
arguably see navigation satellites contributing to their socioeconomic development.
  6.6.5  Science and technology research
This study was unable to identify any current measure that deserves to be referred to as a
dedicated  major  government-promoted  space-related  domestic  or  cooperative  space-
related science and technology research measure.
At most, the past years seem to have seen some government-promoted sounding rocket
missions to study the ionosphere, the atmosphere and microgravity effects,624 as well as
some  government-promoted  astronomical  research.625 Other  government-promoted
science and technology research appears  to  have been so far  strongly linked to  other
major government-promoted measures.
  6.6.6  Human spaceflight
   6.6.6.1  Major domestic measures
Not least due to a reference of INSA head Manteghi in 2016 that Iran’s space programme
involves ‘sending  living  creatures  to  space’,626 this  study  holds  that  the  Iranian
government’s  current  space  programme  for  2016-2025  includes  the  major  domestic
space-related  measure  of  developing  Iranian  human  spaceflight  capabilities  and
conducting a first Iranian human spaceflight. 
After all, ISA announced in 2005 that Iran will develop its own crewed spacecraft and
space laboratory.627 In 2008, then-ISA President Reza Taghipour Anvari added that Iran
has a ten-year programme for a first  Iranian human spaceflight.628 According to then-
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2010, the feat of putting the first Iranian into
623 ‘The Second Ten-Year Space Program of the Country Was Compiled’ (n 527).
624 Tarikhi (n 501) 148–150; Harvey, Smid and Pirard (n 500) 277.
625 Tarikhi (n 501) 148–150.
626 ‘The Second Ten-Year Space Program of the Country Was Compiled’ (n 527).
627 Tarikhi (n 501) 205.
628 Dudi  Cohen,  ‘“First  Iranian  in  Space  within  Decade”’  (Ynetnews,  20  August  2008)
<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3585540,00.html> accessed 23 July 2015.
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space  should  be  accomplished  by  2019,629 while  then-ISA  President  Hamid  Fazeli
explained a year later that the relevant development steps commenced having an Iranian
enter outer space by around 2021.630 Other statements between 2013 and 2015 further
suggested that Iran wanted to conduct the first manned sub-orbital flight around 2016-
2018.631 Notably, ISA’s deputy head announced in June 2017, while referring to the high
estimated  programme  costs  ranging  around  $15-20  billion  over  15  years,  that  the
government cancelled Iran’s human spaceflight programme.632 However, the head of the
country’s  Astronautics  Research  Institute  declared  only  a  few  months  later  that  the
Iranian government continues with its human spaceflight endeavour.
Ultimately, as far as this study was able to ascertain, the current space programme still
encompasses a suborbital and an orbital phase, but the feat shall now be achieved as late
as  2025.  Related  test  missions  might  involve  the  launch  of  robots  and  other  living
creatures.633 Previous prominent development steps in this context seem to have been the
launch  of  an  empty  bio-capsule  up  to  an  altitude  of  135km  in  March  2011  and  a
suborbital flight of a monkey in January 2013.634 Also, Iran presented a mock-up of a self-
engineered one-person spacecraft in February 2015.635
Considering  that  the  pursuit  of  current  space-related  political  state  preferences  is  an
aspect of, e.g., the Chinese government’s space programme, this study assumes that the
pursuit of the Iranian government’s two political  space-related state preferences is the
most likely motivational factor behind all the above. One needs to just take into account
that no Muslim nation and only a few states overall have ever successfully conducted
domestic human spaceflight. As such, the government can be quite hopeful that its human
spaceflight  feat  will  increase  the  Iranian  people’s  national  pride  and  support  for  the
629 ‘Iran Aims to Send Man into Space by 2019’ (BBC, 23 July 2010) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-10747390> accessed 23 July 2015.
630 Tarikhi (n 501) 205.
631 ‘Iran  to  Conduct  Manned  Space  Mission  by  2018,  Official  Says’  (NTI,  5  February  2013)
<http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/iran-conduct-manned-space-mission-2018-official/>  accessed  21  July
2015; ‘Too Ambitious to Be True? Iran Plans to Send Humans to Space by 2016’ (SpaceDaily, 2 March
2015)
<http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Too_Ambitious_to_be_True_Iran_Plans_to_Send_Humans_to_Sp
ace_by_2016_999.html> accessed 21 July 2015.
632 ‘Iran Abandons Its Human Spaceflight Ambitions’ (n 319).
633 Natalie Fuchs, ‘Iran Reconsiders Human Spaceflight Policy, Seeks to Send Humans to Space by 2025’
(SpaceWatch Middle East, 20 September 2017) <https://spacewatchme.com/2017/09/iran-reconsiders-
human-spaceflight-policy-seeks-send-humans-space-2025/> accessed 16 February 2018.
634 Tarikhi (n 501) 142–143.
635 ‘Iran  Unveils  Mock-Up  of  Manned  Spacecraft’  (Tasnim  News  Agency,  17  February  2015)
<http://www.tasnimnews.com/English/Home/Single/657512> accessed 14 August 2015.
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authoritarian  political  system,  as  well  as  advance  Iran’s  international  prestige  and
influence. Fitting its related target areas, the government will also be in a strong position
to claim to have attained the regional (Muslim/Middle Eastern) first place in the conquest
of space and to be a top ten spacefaring state worldwide.
   6.6.6.2  Major cooperative measures
There  appears  to  be  no  current  major  government-promoted  cooperative  human
spaceflight  measure  (with  a  presumed  high potential  for)  involving  other  preeminent
Asian governments in the space sector.
Nonetheless,  it  seems open to some collaboration in this regard. The 2013 Aerospace
Document  includes  a  reference  to  an  Iranian  engagement  in  human  spaceflight,
potentially  based  on  cooperation  with  the  Islamic  world  and  other  international
cooperation.636 Also, Iran has reportedly entered preliminary talks for collaboration with a
Russian  space  company  to  support  its  human  spaceflight  programme’s  progress.637
Moreover, Iran has apparently begun preliminary discussions with China regarding the
potential to have Iranian astronauts sent to the upcoming Chinese space station.638
Overall, it is reasonable to assume that the Iranian government expects such collaboration
to  aid  the  pursuit  of  is  current  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state  preference  of
developing and maintaining the domestic human, industrial, scientific and technological
capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level, independently in
(human spaceflight and) the (related) pursuit of other space-related state preferences. 
Moreover, an Iranian astronaut onboard a Chinese space station might somewhat add to
the pursuit of government’s current space-related political state preferences since there
has never been a purely Iranian astronaut before639 and only a limited number of people
fulfil the requirements for astronaut training in general.
636 Information provided by Mr Hosseini in 2015.
637 Fuchs (n 633).
638 ‘Iran Abandons Its Human Spaceflight Ambitions’ (n 319).
639 Previously, there only was a US-Iranian citizen residing and working in the USA who went to space.
Her  name  is  Anousheh  Ansari:  (Iran  Chamber  Society)
<http://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/aansari/anousheh_ansari.php> accessed 3 September 2018.
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  6.6.7  Exploration of celestial bodies, including the Moon
There is no robust indicator that the government currently promotes a major domestic or
cooperative measure regarding the exploration of celestial bodies, including the Moon.
  6.6.8  Stable use of outer space
   6.6.8.1  Major domestic measures
A current major government-promoted domestic measure that appears to be linked to the
pursuit of the government’s current space-related autonomy-oriented state preference of
ensuring a stable use of outer space for Iran is the development and application of the
Nasir-1 satellite. The project reportedly commenced around 2012. Once up, the satellite
shall help to establish an independent Iranian capability for locating satellites and satellite
carriers in orbit. Notably, according to INSA, Nasir-1 might be additionally employed to
achieve more precise positioning of aircraft, ships and missiles.640
The second major government-promoted domestic measure related to ensuring the stable
use of outer space for Iran is the setup of an orbital debris team in ISA’s Astronautics
Research  Institute  (previously:  Aerospace  Research  Institute).  It  apparently  addresses
issues like categorisation and regulative aspects.641
   6.6.8.2  Major cooperative measures
Outside of the already introduced APSCO-related measures, this study was unable to find
any current major government-promoted cooperative measure regarding the pursuit of the
government’s space-related autonomy-oriented state preference of ensuring a stable use
of outer space for Iran (with a presumed high potential for) involving other preeminent
Asian governments in the space sector.
640 Combined information in: Tarikhi (n 501) 187; ‘Report: Iran Unveils Self-Made Satellite Navigation
System’ (n 590); ‘The Software Simulation of Star Finder System of Nasir 1 Was Designed’ (INSA, 20
June  2016)
<http://en.insa.ir/news/news/15847/The+Software+Simulation+of+Star+Finder+System+of+Nasir+1+
Was+Designed> accessed 16 February 2018.
641 Harvey, Smid and Pirard (n 500) 268–269; Tarikhi (n 501) 140–141.
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  6.6.9  Launchers
   6.6.9.1  Major domestic measures
Without a doubt, access to various domestic space launcher capabilities and capacities is a
long-standing major government-promoted domestic  space-related measure. Statements
by INSA head Manteghi in 2016 underline this.642
In short, Iran’s launcher workhorse is the  Safir (Envoy) launcher family. It presumably
has somewhat evolved from Iran’s Shahab ballistic missile family, which, in turn, might
have links  to  North Korean643 or  Pakistani644 ballistic  missile  technology.  The  Safir-1
series can put a payload of 100kg into an orbit with a perigee of 250km and an apogee of
around 500km. It was a Safir-1 that sent Omid, the first domestically developed satellite,
into  orbit  in  2009.  The  upgraded  Safir-1B series  has  a  capability  of  putting  a  60kg
payload  into  an  elliptical  orbit  of  300-450km.  A  newly  added  and  more  powerful
domestic space launcher is the Simorgh (Phoenix) series. Reportedly, it can lift a 250kg
satellite into an orbit of 500km. Its first, but reportedly failed satellite mission took place
in July 2017 with the launch of domestically developed remote sensing satellite Tolou.
Tarikhi further mentions two more Iranian launcher series, namely Ghoghnoos and Sarir,
that seem to be under development but this study was unable to ascertain more detailed
information about them. Considering the various Iranian geostationary satellite projects,
one of them might ultimately be a geostationary launcher series.645
Iran’s main space launch facility is the Imam Khomeini Space Center, which opened in
2017. It appears to be the renamed but extended version of the Semnan Space Center that
initially opened in 2008.646
Regarding  underlying  state  preferences,  Section  6.4.3  indicates  that  enhancing  the
domestic  launcher  development  capability  might  contribute  to the  target  area  of
establishing  efficient  domestic  long-range  (nuclear-armed)  ballistic  missile  strike
capabilities  under  the  government’s  current  space-related  national  security  state
642 ‘The Second Ten-Year Space Program of the Country Was Compiled’ (n 527).
643 Harvey, Smid and Pirard (n 500) 286, 294; Harding (n 534) 130.
644 Sheldon (n 500) 237.
645 Tarikhi  (n  501)  191–197;  ‘Iran  Launches  Simorgh  Satellite  Carrier  from  Imam  Khomeini  Space
Center’ (n 596); Nadimi (n 546).
646 ‘Imam Khomeini  Space  Center’  (NTI,  2  November  2017)  <http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/313/>
accessed 14 April 2018.
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preference.  However,  the exact  degree of this  interlinkage,  if  any, is unknown at  this
point in time.
Since  only  a  small  elite  group  of  states  has  domestic  satellite  launch  capabilities,
especially  in  the  direct  Iranian  neighbourhood,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the
government sees access to and thus the enhancement of domestic launcher capabilities
and capacities  additionally  contributing  to  the pursuit  of  its  current  two space-related
political  state  preferences.  Without  robust  launching  capabilities  and  capacities,  the
Iranian government would have trouble to address its related target areas of attaining the
regional first place in the conquest of space and, by 2025, becoming a top ten space-
faring state in the world.
Access to and the enhancement of domestic launcher capabilities and capacities are, of
course, further necessary for the implementation of many of the aforementioned major
government-promoted  measures  in  the  field  of  remote  sensing,  communications  and
broadcasting, human spaceflight and the stable use of outer space. As such, the domestic
launcher-related  measures  above  are  a  considerable  segment  in  the  pursuit  of  the
government’s current space-related autonomy-oriented state preference of developing and
maintaining the domestic human, industrial, scientific and technological capabilities and
capacities necessary to engage primarily autonomously in the pursuit of the other space-
related state preferences.
   6.6.9.2  Major cooperative measures
This  study  has  found  no  clear  evidence  for  a  current  major  government-promoted
cooperative space launcher measure.
However, the Iranian government seems open to engaging in cooperation in this field. For
example,  in 2008, then-ISA President Reza Taghipour promised that Iran ‘is ready to
launch satellites of friendly Islamic countries into space[...]’.647 Also, as mentioned above,
Iran has presumably previously cooperated with states like North Korea and Pakistan in
the development of its launchers. It might have even received foreign support, e.g. from
647 Parisa Hafezi,  ‘Iran Ready to Put Muslim Countries’  Satellite in Orbit’ (Reuters,  18 August 2008)
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/08/18/us-iran-satellite-muslims-idUSLI72158420080818>
accessed 15 August 2015.
163
North Korea, in the setting up a domestic space launch centre.648 Finally, the government
is  reportedly  ready  to  enter  into  international  cooperation  with  developed  countries
concerning the launch of Iranian satellites  for various  functions,  including specialised
geostationary (communication) satellites.649
  6.6.10  Human resources
   6.6.10.1  Major domestic measures
It is hard to pinpoint major domestic space-related human resources measures promoted
by the Iranian government within the available English literature.
However, as outlined in the previous sections, there has been progress in developing and
applying various domestic space launcher and satellite capabilities and capacities as well
as  making first  successful  steps  towards developing a  domestic  spacecraft  for  human
spaceflight in the past decade despite UNSC sanctions being in place. This showcases
that the government regards domestic space-related education and training in these fields
and the pursuit of any of the related space-related state preferences significant. Due to
their  involvement  in the implementation of various domestic  satellite  projects,  Iranian
universities and research centres seem to play a particular role for the domestic space-
related human capacity building.650 Tarikhi introduces a smorgasbord of domestic entities
and activities related to domestic space-related capacity building, even in, as this study
argues,  such  less  essential  fields  in  the  government’s  current  space  programme  like
astronomy.651 
   6.6.10.2  Major cooperative measures
Excluding  the  already  introduced  APSCO-related  measures,  the  major  government-
promoted human resources-specific measure (with a high potential for) involving other
648 Nadimi (n 546).
649 Combined information in: ‘Transfer of Necessary Technologies Will Be Carried out to Manufacture
Domestic  Satellites.’  (INSA,  2  June  2017)
<http://en.insa.ir/news/news/21394/Transfer+of+necessary+technologies+will+be+carried+out+to+ma
nufacture+domestic+satellites.+> accessed 16 February 2018; ‘Systematic Satellite Launching Will Be
Implemented in the Country Starting 2016’ (n 525).
650 See especially this study’s Sections 6.6.2-3.
651 Tarikhi (n 501) 45–76.
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preeminent Asian governments in the space sector is the Iranian participation in  space-
related education and training offered by CSSTEAP.652
The  Iranian  government  likely  considers  this  participation  primarily  as  a  temporarily
useful tool in the pursuit of its current space-related autonomy-oriented state preference
of  developing  and  maintaining  the  domestic  human,  industrial,  scientific  and
technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level,
independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences.
  6.6.11  Unspecified satellite projects
For the sake of completion,  it  shall  be stated here that  Tarikhi’s  book refers to three
unspecified Iranian satellite projects, namely ZS4, Saar (Starling) and Muhammad-1. The
latter might be a joint project between Muslim states.653 This study found no information
on their status within the government’s current space programme.
652 ‘Governing  Board’  (CSSTEAP)  <http://www.cssteap.org/governing-board>  accessed  27  September
2018; Tarikhi states: ‘To extend existing knowledge, Iranian space specialists regularly participate in
courses [...] offered by other regional or international bodies such as the United Nations regional Centre
for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTE-AP)[...].’ Tarikhi (n 501)
51–53.
653 Tarikhi (n 501) 189–190.
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7  Japan  
 7.1  Analytical considerations
At  first  glance,  this  study’s  key  challenge  in  its  particular  analysis  of  the  Japanese
government’s  current  space  programme  is  that  several  of  the  present  main  domestic
space-specific  legal  documents  and  all  of  the  present  main  domestic  space-specific
political documents are not publicly accessible in full (unofficial) English translations.
However, because there is a smorgasbord of other English material addressing aspects of
the  government’s  current  space  programme  available,  it  is  nonetheless  very  much
possible to arrive at adequate findings regarding this study’s primary research interest.
Notably, this study’s search for and interpretation of such material has greatly benefited
from the  input  of  various  renowned experts  in  the  Japanese  space  sector  during  the
author’s three-weeks-long research stay in Japan in 2016.654
 7.2  Main domestic political and legal documents
Without claiming completeness, this study ascertains based on the available material that
at  least  the  following  domestic  political  and  legal  documents  significantly  guide  the
Japanese government’s space programme as of 2017. Their known content merits special
attention throughout this chapter.
At the centre is the ‘Basic Space Law’655 (BSL) from 2008, which constitutes Japan’s
principal national space law. BSL stipulates that the government shall formulate a ‘Basic
Space  Plan’  (BSP)  that,  while  remaining  in  line  with  BSL  provisions,  outlines  the
government’s main policy regarding the development and use of outer space, as well as
related adequate implementation measures. By 2017, the government has adopted three
consecutive  BSPs. The 1st BSP656 dates back to 2009 and the 2nd BSP657 to  2013. On
654 See also this study’s ‘Acknowledgements’ chapter. Any mistakes in this study are its author’s alone.
655 For  an  unofficial  English  translation,  see:  ‘Basic  Space  Law  (Law  No.43  of  2008)’  (JAXA)
<http://stage.tksc.jaxa.jp/spacelaw/country/japan/27A-1.E.pdf> accessed 10 July 2016. If not specified
otherwise, future references to BSL are to this translation.
656 For an unofficial English translation, see: SHSD, ‘Basic Plan for Space Policy – Wisdom of Japan
Moves Space – June 2, 2009’ (Cabinet Public Relations Office, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of
Japan) <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/basic_plan.pdf> accessed 8 May 2017.
657 For  an  unofficial  English  translation,  see:  SHSD,  ‘Basic  Plan  on Space  Policy  January  25,  2013’
(Cabinet Office, Government Of Japan) <http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/plan/plan-eng.pdf> accessed 13
August 2014.
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09.01.2015, the government under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who came into office in
December 2012,658 adopted the currently active 3rd BSP.659
The government’s decision to create a new BSP only two years after the adoption of the
2nd BSP followed, on the one hand, from the necessity to address perceived changes in
Japan’s  security  environment  and  to  factor  in  the  increasing  relevance  of  space  for
national security. Connected with that, the government also wanted to interlock its space
programme with the country’s first660 ‘National Security Strategy’661 (NSS).662 Adopted on
17.12.2013,  NSS  shall  steer  Japan’s  security  sector  for  the  next  ten  years.  It
acknowledges an important role of outer space.663 On the other hand, the government set
up the 3rd BSP specifically to recover and bolster Japan’s space-related industrial base.
The government determined that the previous two BSPs’ respective timeframes of five
years with a ten-year outlook were too short for the domestic space industry to develop
properly.664 Apparently, the 3rd BSP now ‘sufficiently reflects the new national security
policy shown in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and is a long-term and concrete
public investment plan for [the] next 10 years foreseeing [the] coming 20 years, thereby
maintaining  and  strengthening  Japan’s  industrial  basis  through  improvement  of
foreseeability of industrial investment.’665
Supposedly in support of this development of the domestic space-related industrial base,
the  government  additionally  published  the  ‘Space  Industry  Vision  2030’  in  2017.
Reportedly, this vision fits Prime Minister Abe’s ‘Japan Revitalisation Strategy 2016’.666
658 Nancy Gibbs and Hannah Beech, ‘The Patriot: Shinzo Abe Speaks to TIME’ (Time, 17 April 2014)
<http://time.com/65673/shinzo-abe-japan-interview/> accessed 8 May 2017.
659 This study was unable to obtain an English translation of the 3rd BSP. However,  it  can draw on a
government representative’s detailed English presentation of this plan’s content and related first revised
implementation  schedule  as  of  08.12.2015:  Yoshinori  Komiya,  ‘Basic  Plan  on  Space  Policy
Implementation Schedule (Revised FY2015)’  (Presentation,  ONSP, Cabinet  Office,  Government  of
Japan,  3  March  2016)  <http://www.jsforum.or.jp/stableuse/pdf/6.%20DG_Komiya.pdf>  accessed  23
May 2016.
660 ‘Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan on Adoption of the “National Security Strategy
(NSS)”’  (Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Japan,  17  December  2013)
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000141.html> accessed 25 May 2017.
661 For an unofficial English translation, see: ‘National Security Strategy December 17, 2013 (Provisional
Translation)’  (Cabinet  Secretariat,  Government  of  Japan)
<http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf> accessed 23 May 2016.
662 Komiya (n 659) 4.
663 ‘National Security Strategy December 17, 2013 (Provisional Translation)’ (n 661) 1–2.
664 Komiya (n 659) 4–5; concerning the previous two BSPs’ respective timeframes, see: SHSD (n 656) 4;
and the ‘Outline of Basic Plan on Space Policy’ attached to: SHSD (n 657).
665 Komiya (n 659) 5.
666 Kazuto Suzuki, ‘Japanese Space Industrial Policy in Transition’ (2017) 3(13) ROOM 42, 44. This study
was unable to obtain an English translation of this vision.
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In  addition  to  BSL,  other  highly  relevant  domestic  space-related  legal  documents
currently  are  the  ‘Act  concerning  Ensuring  Adequate  Handling  of  Satellite  Remote
Sensing Data’ (Remote Sensing Data Act) and the ‘Act concerning launch and control of
satellites’  (Space Activities  Act),  which were both promulgated in November 2016.667
They are,  to  a large part,  also directed towards strengthening the development  of the
Japanese  space  industry.668 Moreover,  there  is  the  ‘Law Concerning Japan Aerospace
Exploration  Agency’669 (JAXA  Law),  first  enacted  in  2002  and  revised  in  2012.  It
establishes  and  regulates  the  Japan  Aerospace  Exploration  Agency670 (JAXA),  which
constitutes Japan’s national space agency.
Ultimately, other – but here not further discussed – domestic space-related political and
legal documents presumably connect to and specify certain aspects of the key domestic
space-related political and legal documents identified above.671
 7.3  Basic domestic decision-making system
There is much English material discussing aspects of the basic domestic decision-making
system behind the formulation and implementation of the Japanese government’s current
space programme. In sum, knowledge of the following context sufficiently serves this
study’s particular assessment of the said programme.
The  highest  decision-making  body  is  the  Strategic  Headquarters  for  Space
Development672 (SHSD). In short, SHSD, established within the Cabinet of Japan under
667 This study was unable to obtain English translations of these acts, but information about their content is
presented in some other available English material. There are different translations for these two acts’
titles.  This  study  uses  the  English  titles  provided  by  a  government  representative  in:  Koji  Hara,
‘Current Status of Japan’s Space Policy and Development of Legal Frameworks’ (Presentation, 56th
UNCOPUOS  LSC,  Vienna,  6  April  2017)
<http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/lsc/2017/tech-09.pdf> accessed 21 March 2018; for the
promulgation dates and a different translation of these acts’ titles, see: Sayuri Umeda, ‘Japan: Two
Outer  Space-Related  Laws  Enacted’  (The  Library  of  Congress,  19  December  2016)
<//www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/japan-two-outer-space-related-laws-enacted/>  accessed  21
March 2018.
668 Based on information in:  Hara  (n 667);  Setsuko Aoki,  ‘New Law Aims to Expand Japan’s  Space
Business’ (Nippon, 3 March 2017) <https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00294/> accessed 27 March
2018.
669 For  an  unofficial  translation,  see:  ‘[Unofficial  Provisional  Translation]  Law  Concerning  Japan
Aerospace Exploration Agency (Law Number 161 of 13th December 2002) Revised: June 27, 2012,
Law Number 35’ (JAXA) <http://stage.tksc.jaxa.jp/spacelaw/country/japan/27A-5.E.pdf> accessed 10
July 2016. If not specified otherwise, future references to the JAXA Law are to this translation.
670 Section 7.3 provides some more information on JAXA.
671 As indicated by, for example, JAXA Law art 19.
672 This entity is often referred to as ‘Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy’ in other studies. However,
based on the information provided by Japanese space experts in 2016, the term ‘Strategic Headquarters
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the chairmanship of the Prime Minister and encompassing a membership mirroring the
Cabinet, is responsible for BSP’s formulation and the promotion of its implementation.673
SHSD receives assistance in its tasks from the National Space Policy Secretariat (NSPS;
previously known as  Office of National Space Policy (ONSP)).674 Pursuant to Anan’s
account, ONSP’s – and thus now supposedly NSPS’s – positions are usually filled by
secondments from JAXA and various ministries, primarily Japan’s Ministry of Education,
Culture,  Sports,  Science  and Technology  (MEXT),  Ministry  of  Economy,  Trade  and
Industry, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and Ministry of Defence. In
particular,  ONSP/NSPS apparently ‘plans, drafts, and coordinates affairs based on the
fundamental  policies  for  the  comprehensive  and  systematic  promotion  of  space
development  and use.’  For example,  this  involves communicating budget priorities  to
relevant  ministries,  coordinating  the  government’s  space  strategy  throughout  the
ministries and promoting space development and use and related measures not under the
jurisdiction of other ministers. ONSP/NSPS can further take part in pertinent negotiations
with foreign entities together with relevant ministries and JAXA, whereby the Cabinet
Office  and  Japan’s  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  conduct  the  diplomacy-related  part.
Besides  that,  ONSP/NSPS  might  also  engage  in  ‘[m]aintenance  and  management  of
satellites, referring satellites,  and equipment installed in satellites specified by Cabinet
Order to be for public and official use in diversified fields, and facilities or equipment
necessary  for  their  operation  […].’  Lastly,  ONSP’s/NSPS’s  responsibilities  seemingly
allow  the  Cabinet  Office  to  officially  manage  Japan’s  multi-purpose  Quasi-Zenith
Satellite  System675 (QZSS).  In  practice,  however,  ONSP/NSPS  apparently  does  not
operate  QZSS but mainly authorises QZSS-related ‘Private Finance Initiative’676 (PFI)
contracts and supervises the contractors.
In addition to that, there is the Committee on National Space Policy (CNSP) that consists
of up to nine space experts from, among others, academia and the industry. It functions as
an advisory board to SHSD and ONSP/NSPS in their respective tasks. CNSP may, for
for Space Development’ might be more precise.
673 For this and more information on SHSD, see especially BSL arts 24-30.
674 Keiichi  Anan,  ‘Administrative  Reform of  Japanese  Policy  Structures  in  2012’ (2013)  29(3)  Space
Policy 210, 212. Based on the information provided by Japanese space experts, ONSP was originally
established in the Cabinet Office in 2012. By 01.04.2016, the start date of Japan’s Fiscal Year 2016, the
government has restructured ONSP, without touching its general role and membership, into NSPS.
675 For more information on QZSS, see this study’s Section 7.6.4.
676 For more information on PFIs in Japan, see: Jean Heilman Grier, ‘PPPs #3: Japan’s Private Finance
Initiative’ (Djaghe LLC, 31 August 2015) <http://trade.djaghe.com/?p=1628> accessed 17 June 2017.
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example,  investigate  and  consult  on  the  government’s  space  policy  and  budgetary
priorities upon request by the prime minister. It may further formulate recommendations
and opinions to the prime minister and his ministers on space matters.677 Even though
SHSD and ONSP/NSPS are not legally bound to follow CNSP’s input, they are known to
value it.678
Administrative matters related to SHSD seem to fall ordinarily under the purview of the
Cabinet Secretariat.679 Also, due to its general function concerning national intelligence
matters,  the  latter  is  apparently  involved  in  the  management  of  Japan’s  Intelligence
Gathering Satellite680 (IGS) constellation.681
Arguably, the National Security Council within the Cabinet has some relevance to the
development  of the government’s current  space programme since it  is responsible for
NSS,682 which, as explained in Section 7.2, links to the formulation of the 3rd BSP.
The  space-related  role  of  government  ministries  encompasses  not  only  the
aforementioned  involvement  of  Cabinet  ministers  in  SHSD  and  the  provision  of
secondments to ONSP/NSPS, but ministries and their competent ministers also appear to
have to plan, draft and implement space-related strategies coherent with the current BSP
version within their ministerial responsibilities and allocated budget priorities.683
Established  pursuant  to  the  ‘Incorporated  Administrative  Agency  General  Provisions
Law’ and JAXA Law, JAXA primarily is, despite its secondments to the space policy and
strategy-focused  ONSP/NSPS,  an  implementation-oriented  national  space  agency.684
Initially constituted as an incorporated administrative agency on 01.10.2003 by a merger
of the National Space Development Agency, the National Aerospace Laboratory of Japan,
677 Anan  (n  674)  212–213.  Based  on  the  information  provided  by  a  Japanese  space  expert,  CNSP
membership was increased from seven to nine in August 2016.
678 Information provided by Japanese space experts in 2016.
679 BSL art 32.
680 For more information on the IGS constellation, see this study’s Section 7.6.2.
681 Anan (n 674) 212.
682 For more information on this council, see: ‘Defense of Japan 2014’ (Japan Ministry of Defense) 125–
127  <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_2-2-1_web_1031.pdf>  accessed  22
June 2017.
683 See the provisions in BSL and JAXA Law, as well as the information in: Anan (n 674) 213.
684 Based on information in JAXA Law arts 2,4,18 and: Naoki Okumura, ‘To Become a National Research
and  Development  Agency’  (JAXA,  April  2015)  <http://global.jaxa.jp/about/president/>  accessed  30
May 2016.
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and the Institute  of Space and Aeronautical  Science,685 it  is  officially  designated as a
National  Research  and  Development  Agency  since  01.04.2015.686 MEXT  is  the
competent  ministry  in  charge  of  JAXA.  Other  ministries,  the  prime  minister  and his
ministers are involved with JAXA as explicitly prescribed to them.687
 7.4  Space-related state preferences
  7.4.1  Socioeconomic state preferences
This  study  argues  that  the  government’s  current  space-related  socioeconomic  state
preference is the advancement of Japan’s socioeconomic development. Additionally,  it
concludes that there seem to be four target areas under this state preference. These are the
expansion of the domestic (private) space industry, the extension of the domestic space
market, the enhancement of the Japanese space industry’s role in the international space
market, and the development and application of space-related capabilities and capacities
to deal  with a  broad set  of socioeconomically  relevant  issue-areas for Japan.  All  this
develops from the following narrative.
Overall, the government puts forward three civil goals in its presently active 3rd BSP:
• utilising outer space for realising a safe and affluent society;
• utilising outer space for dealing with global challenges; and
• building new domestic space-related industries.688
With no official definition in its accessed material, this study ultimately interprets the first
civil goal of utilising outer space for realising a safe and affluent society as to stand for
the  space-related  socioeconomic  state  preference  of  advancing  Japan’s  socioeconomic
development.  This  interpretation  also  holds  up  to  BSL’s  partial  stipulation  that  the
government shall engage in space development and use ‘in order to improve the lives of
the citizenry’, ‘to ensure a safe and secure society’ and ‘to mitigate […] poverty’.689
685 Based on information in JAXA Law art 3 and supplemental provisions, as well as in: ‘Introduction of
JAXA’ (JAXA) <http://global.jaxa.jp/about/jaxa/> accessed 30 May 2016; ‘New JAXA Philosophy and
Corporate  Slogan’  (JAXA,  9  October  2013)
<http://global.jaxa.jp/press/2013/10/20131009_jaxa_e.html> accessed 1 August 2016.
686 Based  on  information  in:  Okumura  (n  684);  ‘JAXA  History’  (JAXA)
<http://global.jaxa.jp/about/history/> accessed 30 May 2016.
687 Based on information in JAXA Law art 26 and: Anan (n 674) 213.
688 Komiya (n 659) 5; JAXA’s English homepage also introduces JAXA’s management philosophy as to
incorporate: ‘To realize a safe and affluent society using space and the sky.’ See: ‘JAXA Philosophy /
Code of Conduct’ (JAXA) <http://global.jaxa.jp/about/philosophy/> accessed 13 June 2017.
689 BSL art 3.
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The second civil goal of utilising outer space for dealing with global challenges seems to
be a segment of the government’s space-related socioeconomic state preference. After all,
global challenges that the government apparently deems currently highly prevalent and
threatening to the country, as well as to the international community as a whole, are those
related to the socioeconomically relevant areas of ‘energy, environment, food and natural
disasters’.690 The utilisation of outer space to increase Japan’s capabilities for disaster
management and for tackling environmental issues makes especially sense. Japan is prone
to natural disasters like earthquakes. The great earthquake in 2011 negatively affected the
country’s economy, energy security and human safety. It left thousands dead, destroyed
domestic infrastructure and buildings and led to a nuclear catastrophe.691 A government
plan from 2015 also shows that the government is aware that climate change negatively
affects Japan’s socioeconomic status on a broad level.692 Combining this second civil goal
under  the  3rd BSP with  BSL’s  stipulation  that  the government  shall  engage in  space
development  and  use  ‘to  mitigate  disasters,  poverty  and  various  other  threats  to  the
survival  and lives  of  humankind[…]’,693 as  well  as  with this  study’s  findings  on  the
socioeconomic orientation of various current major government-promoted space-related
measures,694 it is ultimately reasonable to conclude the following here: the government’s
current  space-related  socioeconomic  state  preference  includes  the  target  area  of
developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set
of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for Japan.
The other three – and somewhat interlinked – target areas of expanding the domestic
(private)  space  industry,  extending  the  domestic  space  market,  and  enhancing  the
Japanese  industry’s  role  in  the  international  space  market  finally  emerge  from  the
existence  of  the  government’s  third  present  BSP-specific  civil  goal  of  building  new
domestic  space-related  industries  and  the  following  narrative  regarding  its  (planned)
space-related industry and market engagement.
690 Komiya (n 659) 5.
691 Based on information in: ‘Information on Disaster Risk Reduction of the Member Countries’ (Asian
Disaster Reduction Center) <http://www.adrc.asia/nationinformation.php?NationCode=392> accessed
25 April 2017; Will Ripley, Junko Ogura and James Griffiths, ‘Fukushima: Five Years after Japan’s
Worst  Nuclear  Disaster’  (CNN,  11  March  2016)  <http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/08/asia/fukushima-
five-year-anniversary/index.html> accessed 9 May 2017.
692 ‘National  Plan  for  Adaptation  to  the  Impacts  of  Climate  Change’  (Ministry  of  Environment,
Government  of  Japan,  27  November  2015)  <https://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/cc/nationalplan151127-
2.pdf> accessed 12 May 2017.
693 BSL art 3.
694 See especially this study’s Sections 7.6.1-4. For example, there appear to be measures focussing on
issues  in  such  areas  like  agriculture,  climate  change,  disaster  management,  construction,  the
environment, energy, fishery, forestry, infrastructure, meteorology and transportation.
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In short, the government appears to be aware that the expansion of the domestic (private)
space industry, including through the building of new domestic space-related industries,
offers a potential to reinvigorate Japan’s since the 1990s stagnating and sometimes even
shrinking economy.695 Reportedly, the government even set out in the course of the 3 rd
BSP ‘to boost the value of Japan’s space industry to ¥5 trillion [$42 billion] over the next
decade.’696 In the context of its Space Industry Vision 2030 from 2017, which originated
in a CNSP subcommittee, the government seems to have dialled back a bit but still aims
at  ‘doubling  its  space  market  to  about  2.4  trillion  yen  ($21.1  billion)  by  the  early
2030s.’697 Towards that end, the government apparently gives particular importance to the
reduction of the domestic space industry’s extreme dependency from government demand
(reportedly standing at over 90% around 2017). It further wants to support a shift – but of
course not a full departure – from the domestic space industry’s previous focus on space
hardware  research  and  development  to  this  industry’s  emphasis  on  establishing
(domestically  and internationally)  marketable  space hardware and software capacities.
Based on the available information, the hardware component might presumably involve
the  (future)  development  and  marketisation  of  internationally  competitive  launcher,
debris  removal,  space  solar  power  and  satellite  remote  sensing,  communications  and
positioning  technologies.  The  software  component  might  involve  the  creation  and
domestic  and  international  commercialisation  of  space-based  data,  as  well  as  the
development  and  marketisation  of  domestically  and  internationally  competitive  user-
oriented  products  and services  using  –  among  others,  certain  government-provided  –
space-based data.698
A look into BSL also supports the space industry and market-specific conclusions above.
This law wants the government to undertake space development and use ‘to strengthen
the  technical  capabilities  and  international  competitiveness  of  the  space  industry  and
695 Based  on  information  in:  Deyana  Goh,  ‘Japan  Looks  to  Space  Industry  to  Stimulate  Stagnant
Economy’ (SpaceTech Asia,  1 February 2018) <http://www.spacetechasia.com/japan-looks-to-space-
industry-to-stimulate-stagnant-economy/> accessed  24 March  2018;  Keith Breene,  ‘Why Is Japan’s
Economy  Shrinking?’  (World  Economic  Forum,  16  February  2016)
<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/02/why-is-japans-economy-shrinking/>  accessed  25  April
2017.
696 ‘Abe Approves New Space Policy with Profit, Security in Mind’ (The Japan Times, 9 January 2015)
<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/09/national/new-space-policy-focuses-security-science>
accessed 20 July 2017.
697 Based on information in: ‘Japan Aims to Double Its Space Market to $21bn by 2030s’ (Nikkei Asian
Review,  12  May  2017)  <http://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Trends/Japan-aims-to-double-its-space-
market-to-21bn-by-2030s> accessed 14 June 2017; Suzuki (n 666) 44–45. Citation based on first link.
698 Based on information in: Goh (n 695); ‘Japan Aims to Double Its Space Market to $21bn by 2030s’ (n
697); Suzuki (n 666); Komiya (n 659) 65–70.
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other industries of Japan, thereby contributing to the advancement of the industries of
Japan, by the positive and systematic promotion of Space Development and Use as well
as smooth privatization of the results of the research and development with regard to
Space Development and Use.’699
  7.4.2  Political state preferences
This study contends that one of the government’s currently pursued space-related political
state preferences is the advancement of Japan’s international prestige and influence.
It  surfaces  from BSL’s general  stipulation  that  the government  shall  engage in  space
development  and  use  ‘to  play  a  positive  role  and  contribute  to  advancing  national
interests in international society, through positively promoting international cooperation
and diplomacy with regard to Space Development and Use.’700 Moreover, the presently
active  3rd BSP,  which  bases  on  BSL provisions,  reportedly  publicly  incorporates  the
position that ‘we will engage in space development to directly utilize it for our nation’s
diplomatic and security policies[...].’701 Since this study has found no hard evidence to the
contrary, this position presumably includes the previously outlined international prestige
and influence-oriented  stance  in  the  1st BSP that  Japanese space-related  (cooperative)
contributions  to  the  international  community,  e.g.  in  disaster  management  and  space
science,  ‘are  diplomatic  assets  which  enhance  Japan’s  international  leverage  and
presence, as well as a source of its soft power. It is important for Japan to utilize this kind
of power as a tool for diplomacy to assert itself in the international society.’702 Lastly, this
study wants to point out that the striving to advance Japan’s international prestige and
influence provides a plausible (partial) explanation for the existence of various current
major government-promoted space-related measures.703
Similar to the Indian case and also lacking clear-cut evidence, a second current space-
related political state preference that this study has decided to take into account at least
tentatively  is  the  increase  of  public  support  for  the  democratically  elected  Japanese
government.
699 BSL art 4.
700 BSL art 6.
701 ‘Abe Approves New Space Policy with Profit, Security in Mind’ (n 696).
702 SHSD (n 656) 8–10. Citation on 9.
703 See especially this study’s Sections 7.6.6-7.
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It  is not farfetched to assume that any democratically  elected Japanese government  is
aware  that  successfully  implemented  space  undertakings,  especially  technologically
complex ones (e.g. an asteroid mission), allow presenting itself to its people as the driver
of national progress. This might translate into higher support for the government among
the Japanese people.
  7.4.3  National security state preferences
Safeguarding Japan’s national security is the national security state preference underlying
the government’s current space programme.
This is apparent by, as introduced in Section 7.2, the government’s adoption of the 3rd
BSP to address, inter alia, its perceived changes in Japan’s security environment and to
factor in the increasing relevance of space for national security. In particular, the 3 rd BSP
shall interlock with the government’s NSS. Notably, all this is also in line with BSL’s call
upon the government to undertake space development and use, among others, ‘to ensure
international peace and security; and to increase the national security of Japan’.704
This state preference includes at least two – interconnected – target areas. Two more can
be taken into account tentatively.
The  first  evident  target  area  is  the  enhancement  of  the  Japanese  military’s  strategic
support system. It emerges from the 3rd BSP’s directly mentioned space security goal of
utilising outer space to strengthen Japan’s security capabilities.705 Moreover, a look into
NSS suggests that the government presently aims, with a special view on supporting the
operation of Japanese armed forces, at advancing Japan’s space-related capabilities for
information  gathering,  surveillance,  maritime  domain  awareness,  military
communications and security-relevant navigation, positioning and timing services.706
The second definite target area  is the improvement of the US-Japanese alliance, with a
focus  on  furthering  their  military  deterrence  and  response  capabilities.  This  surfaces
similarly from a space security goal under the 3rd BSP, namely the goal of strengthening
the US-Japanese alliance  through space cooperation.707 Japan’s fixation on amplifying
704 BSL art 3.
705 Komiya (n 659) 5.
706 ‘National Security Strategy December 17, 2013 (Provisional Translation)’ (n 661) 9,19-20.
707 Komiya (n 659) 5.
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this alliance is highly reasonable. As laid out in the NSS, the two parties are already allies
for over 60 years, and the Japanese government perceives their alliance generally as a
cornerstone of Japan’s security and a positive influence on regional peace, stability and
prosperity.708 Concerning the alliance’s space element, it appears from the deliberations of
Kallender  and  Hughes  that  the  Japanese  government  currently  sees  an  increased
development of domestic space-related military support capabilities, which links to the
first target area, and their collaborative integration with respective US capabilities within
the US-Japanese alliance as important steps to mitigate a potential abandonment of Japan
by  the  USA  in  the  security  sector,  as  well  as  to  increase  their  alliance’s  military
strength.709 According to the NSS, the Japanese government has a particular interest in
engaging with the USA regarding the latter aspect in such a way that it bolsters their
military deterrence and response capabilities.710
This study’s evaluation of current major government-promoted space-related measures
introduces various examples, especially in the form of satellite projects, that display and
consequently foster the above conclusions about the existence of these two target areas.711
Notably,  a  look  into  NSS  indicates  that  the  Japanese  government  has  in  all  of  that
especially the activities of three of the other preeminent Asian governments in the space
sector, namely China, Iran and North Korea, on its national security radar.712
The third and fourth target area under the Japanese government’s national security state
preference that this  study has decided to take into account at  least  tentatively are the
prevention of the weaponisation of and an arms race in outer space, as well as the hedging
against  potential  enemies’  use  of  their  space  capabilities  during  armed  conflict  with
Japan. After all, the available information offers some pointers for the existence of such
target areas, but it is not clear enough to draw a definite conclusion about them yet. For
example,  Nobushige Takamizawa,  the  Japanese  ambassador  to  the  Conference  on
708 ‘National Security Strategy December 17, 2013 (Provisional Translation)’ (n 661) 20–23.
709 Paul Kallender and Christopher W Hughes, ‘Hiding in Plain Sight? Japan’s Militarization of Space and
Challenges to the Yoshida Doctrine’ [2018] Asian Security 1, 4,8-9,12-14.
710 ‘National Security Strategy December 17, 2013 (Provisional Translation)’ (n 661) 22.
711 See especially Sections 7.6.2-4; the overall argument is supported by the findings in: Kallender and
Hughes (n 709) 5-12,19(Endnote 1).
712 ‘National Security Strategy December 17, 2013 (Provisional Translation)’ (n 661) 6-8,11-13; regarding
the concerns about China see also: Paul Kallender-Umezu, ‘Japan Boosts Space Spending In Support of
Security  Focus’ (SpaceNews,  2 February 2015) <http://spacenews.com/japan-boosts-space-spending-
in-support-of-security-focus/> accessed 20 July 2017; the effect of North Korean and Chinese activities
is also referred to in: Kallender and Hughes (n 709) 8–9.
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Disarmament stated in 2017: ‘Japan reaffirms the importance of enhancing the rule of law
in  outer  space  and  will  continue  working  with  other  nations  to  that  end.  In  this
connection,  we reiterate  the need to  implement  principles  of  responsible  behavior  for
outer space activities, which could be an important step for international rule-making. In
particular, we encourage all states to refrain from any action which brings about, directly
or indirectly, damage or destruction of space objects. We thus continue to express our
concerns about the development of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) capability. With regard
to the idea of preventing an arms race in outer space,  which we support in principle,
Japan’s outer space activities have always been peaceful in nature and this will continue.
We have participated in substantive discussions on the Prevention of an Arms Race in
Outer Space (PAROS) within the CD, including the Way Ahead Working Group that was
established this year.’713 Additionally,  Nakasuka has, within the context of Japan’s 3rd
BSP,  concluded  that,  ‘[b]y  working  for  the  resilience  of  [its]  space  systems  and
promoting the creation of international rules concerning the utilization of space, Japan
will  prevent  any  abnormal  change  in  outer  space  from  adversely  affecting  Japan’s
security and civilian use of outer space and secure the stable utilization of outer space.’714
Future  research  might  have  access  to  better  information  and  be  able  to  clarify  the
existence of these two target areas beyond reproach.
  7.4.4  Science and technology state preferences
This study holds on the basis of various indicators that the government’s current space-
related science and technology state preference is the advancement of Japan’s scientific
and technological level per se; whereby the reference to ‘per se’ indicates here more of a
basic research and knowledge gathering orientation.
First, BSL stipulates that the government shall engage in space development and use ‘to
contribute  to  the  realization  of  the  aspirations  of  humankind and the development  of
human society,  by promoting  state-of-the-art  Space  Development  and Use as  well  as
713 ‘Statement by Nobushige Takamizawa, Ambassador of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, at the
First  Committee  of  the 72nd Session of  the General  Assembly -  Thematic  Debate:  Outer  Space  -
October  17,  2017,  New  York’  (21  October  2017)  2
<http://www.disarm.emb-japan.go.jp/files/000300878.pdf> accessed 29 August 2018.
714 Shinichi Nakasuka, ‘The Current Status and Review of Japan’s Space Security Policy Seen in the Basic
Plan on Space Policy and Subsequent Discussions’ (National Institute for Defense Studies International
Symposium on Security Affairs  ‘Space Security:  Trends and Challenges’,  Hotel  Chinzanso Tokyo,
Japan,  30  November  2015)  4–5  <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2015/E-
10.pdf> accessed 2 April 2018. Citation on 4.
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advancing space science in  consideration  of the fact that  the aggregate  knowledge of
space is an intellectual asset of humankind.’715 Second, and somewhat coherent with that,
the 3rd BSP’s implementation schedule as of 08.12.2015 promotes measures related to
space science and exploration to enhance humankind’s intellectual property.716 Third, this
study identifies several current major government-promoted space-related measures that
(partially) fit the pursuit of such a state preference.717
  7.4.5  Autonomy-oriented state preferences
The government currently appears to pursue two space-related autonomy-oriented state
preferences.
The first one is to ensure the stable use of outer space for Japan. The government’s 3 rd
BSP directly states it as a policy goal.718 Also, Section 7.6.8 shows that the government
currently  engages  in  some  major  space-related  measures  that  apparently  are  directed
towards serving the pursuit of such a state preference. The relevance that the government
gives to the latter is obvious by a look into NSS. The document presents the stable use of
outer  space  to  be  pertinent  to  Japan’s  national  security  and  economy,  as  well  as  its
people’s lives.719 Particular factors that the government seems to worried about are the
congestion of space by space assets of a growing number of actors, the increasing amount
of space debris, as well as the threat to Japanese space assets and the space environment
stemming from other states’ development of counterspace weapons.720
The  second  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state  preference  is  the  development  and
maintenance of the domestic human, industrial, scientific and technological capabilities
and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level, independently in the pursuit
of  other  space-related  state  preferences.  The  argumentative  starting  point  is  BSL
stipulating  that  ‘it  is  important  for  the  State  to  have  the  capability  to  independently
develop, launch, track, and operate artificial satellites, etc.’721 Moreover, the 3rd BSP sets
out  to  maintain  and  strengthen  Japan’s  space-related  industrial,  scientific  and
715 BSL art 5.
716 Komiya (n 659) 59–60.
717 See especially this study’s Sections 7.6.5-7.
718 Komiya (n 659) 5.
719 ‘National Security Strategy December 17, 2013 (Provisional Translation)’ (n 661) 19.
720 Based  on  information  in:  Komiya  (n  659)  5;  ‘National  Security  Strategy  December  17,  2013
(Provisional Translation)’ (n 661) 9.
721 BSL art 15.
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technological basis. Statements in the context of the 3rd BSP read that Japan’s ‘[i]ndustrial
basis is essential for conducting space activities autonomously’ and that there previously
were ‘[i]nsufficient [Japanese] efforts of R&D in use of space for security purpose and of
making the most of outcomes of R&D in civil space areas for industrial vitalization.’722
NSS further notes that technological development is vital for Japan’s national security,
economic strength and capability to deal with global issues.723 Lastly, this state preference
is somewhat palpable by this study determining that  the government presently puts in
most activity fields more emphasis on promoting major domestic than major cooperative
space-related measures.724
 7.5  Basic pol. & leg. framework concerning IGO-based regional space cooperation
This study has found no evidence that the Japanese government has taken any steps under
its  current  space  programme  to  establish  or  enter  an  IGO-based  regional  space
cooperation  mechanism  involving  other  preeminent  Asian  governments  in  the  space
sector. Yet, such a collaboration potential is not excluded either. For example, the BSL
provisions apparently allow for IGO-based space cooperation in general.725 Moreover, the
participation of Japanese government-related (as well  as non-governmental)  entities in
APRSAF,726 which has also seen an involvement of, among others, Chinese, Indian and
South Korean government-related entities,727 suggests a willingness on the Japanese side
to engage within regional institutions with other preeminent Asian governments in the
space sector. Notably,  a Japanese membership in APSCO presumably failed so far not
least  due  to  strained  Sino-Japanese  political  relations  and  a  Japanese  perception  that
APSCO is too dominated by and dependent on China.728
In terms of principles guiding Japan’s current intergovernmental space cooperation, BSL
appears to provide the most explicit input. It stipulates that Japanese space undertakings
need to be coherent with international space-related agreements ratified by Japan, as well
as the principle of pacifism enshrined in the Constitution of Japan.729 Similar to the other
722 Komiya (n 659) 5.
723 ‘National Security Strategy December 17, 2013 (Provisional Translation)’ (n 661) 19–20.
724 See the findings throughout this study’s Section 7.6.
725 BSL arts 6,19.
726 ‘JAPAN’  (APRSAF)  <https://www.aprsaf.org/participants/countries/japan.php>  accessed  13  October
2018.
727 ‘Countries and Regions’ (n 405).
728 Author’s discussions with Japanese space experts in 2016.
729 BSL art 2.
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preeminent Asian governments in the space sector, Japan is party to four of the five main
international space agreements. It signed and ratified the Outer Space Treaty in 1967.730
In 1983, it further acceded to the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, and the
Registration Convention.731 Japan has not entered the Moon Agreement. Regarding the
pacifism  prerequisite,  the  Japanese  government  nowadays  subscribes  to  the  non-
aggressive interpretation of peaceful purposes in the case of outer space.732
Finally,  it  shall  not be forgotten here that Japan, alongside such states like India and
South Korea, is an MTCR partner.733 As such, the Japanese government, if it takes its
MTCR participation seriously, presumably has only a limited current potential to engage
cooperatively with non-partners of MTCR like China, Iran and North Korea in the field of
space launcher development.
 7.6  Major domestic and cooperative space-related measures
  7.6.1  APRSAF
The  Japanese  government’s  current  main  institutionalised  regional  cooperative  space-
related measure (with a presumed high potential for) involving other preeminent Asian
governments in the space sector is APRSAF.
Established in 1993 and led by Japan, APRSAF is no IGO. Instead, its overall framework
allows arguing that it somewhat crosses the line towards ‘an open and flexible’734 regional
space  cooperation  regime.  Its  current  central  features  are  its  executive  committee,  its
730 ‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including  the  Moon  and  Other  Celestial  Bodies’  (U.S.  Department  of  State)
<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm> accessed 20 July 2017.
731 ‘UK Depositary Status List: Agreement on the Return of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space’ (n 563); ‘UK Depositary Status List: Convention on
International  Liability for  Damage Caused by Space  Objects’  (n  563);  ‘Depositary:  Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space’ (UN, 20 July 2017) <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIV-1&chapter=24> accessed 20 July 2017.
732 Setsuko  Aoki,  ‘National  Space  Laws  of  Japan:  Today  and  Tomorrow’  (Presentation,  United
Nations/China/APSCO  Workshop  on  Space  Law  ‘The  Role  of  National  Space  Legislation  in
Strengthening the Rule of Law’, Beijing, 18 November 2014) slides 21,23,26 <http://www.unoosa.org/
documents/pdf/spacelaw/activities/2014/pres10E.pdf> accessed 18 February 2018; Yasuaki Hashimoto,
‘Japanese Space Security Policy and Utilization’ (National Institute for Defense Studies International
Symposium on Security Affairs ‘Space Security: Trends and Challenges’, Hotel Chinzanso, Tokyo, 30
November  2015)  1–4  <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2015/E-05.pdf>
accessed 2 April 2018.
733 ‘MTCR Partners’ (n 407). For more information on MTCR, see this study’s Section 5.5.
734 ‘Principles  of  APRSAF’  (APRSAF)  <http://www.aprsaf.org/about/pdf/Principles.pdf>  accessed  19
August 2014.
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annual conference-like plenary meeting, which is by now the largest annual space-related
event  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region,  its  working  groups  (on  space  application,  space
technology,   space  environment  utilisation  and  space  education)  and  its  initiatives.735
Participation, which is on a strictly voluntary basis, is open to governmental and non-
governmental entities. More precisely, APRSAF allows for the participation of ‘agencies
involved in space science, technology and its applications and governmental bodies, as
well  as  companies,  universities  and research  institutes  in  the  region of  Asia  and the
Pacific  and  international  organizations.’  Furthermore,  ‘[a]gencies  involved  in  space
science, technology and its applications and organizations based outside the region that
support  the  objectives  of  APRSAF  may  also  participate  in  APRSAF  meetings  and
activities.’  In the context  of  its  study,  it  is  important  to  note that  APRSAF has seen
participation by, among others, Chinese, Indian, Japanese and South Korean government-
related (and non-governmental) entities.
Purpose and activity-wise, APRSAF promotes the exchange of information and opinions
on  space  programmes,  space  resources  as  well  as  applications  of  space  science  and
technology among space-related agencies and international organisations in the region.
Moreover, it supports the identification of common interests among regional space actors
and the establishment of mutually beneficial cooperative measures in the pursuit of such
interests. The most emphasised purpose and related activity field are the endorsement of
joint  measures  in  space  technology  and its  application  for  sustainable  socioeconomic
development in the Asia-Pacific region, apparently including environmental protection.736
While these do not represent all APRSAF-linked measures involving Japan, this study has
found that  Sentinel Asia,  Space Applications for Environment (SAFE),  Asian Beneficial
Collaboration through “Kibo” Utilisation (Kibo-ABC) and Climate R³ have constituted
the most important specific major Japanese government-promoted cooperative measures
under APRSAF in recent years:
Sentinel Asia, initially set up in 2005 and continuously managed by the Japanese side, is
directed  towards  advancing disaster  management,  especially  for  the  mitigation  of  the
735 Based on information in:  ‘About  APRSAF’ (n 412);  APRSAF Task Force,  ‘Asia-Pacific  Regional
Space  Agency  Forum  (APRSAF)  Task  Force  Final  Report’  (Final  Report,  APRSAF  2013)
<http://www.aprsaf.org/about/pdf/TF_Report_(Final-13Dec12).pdf>  accessed  25  July  2016.  The
plenary meeting did not take place in 1995, 2002 and 2009, but was organised twice in 2004 and 2010.
736 Based on information in: ‘Principles of APRSAF’ (n 734); ‘Countries and Regions’ (n 405). Citations
in first link.
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number of human casualties and social and economic losses, in the Asia-Pacific region
through application of space technology, e.g. remote sensing satellites.737 Sentinel Asia’s
currently over 100 governmental,  non-governmental and international  institution-based
joint  project  team  members  include,  among  others,  government-related  entities  from
China, India, Japan and South Korea.738
SAFE, initially established in 2008 by a proposal from the Japanese side, focuses on the
study of environmental changes and the development of practical solutions through space
technology  and  data  application.  Notably,  there  seems  to  have  been  no  particular
involvement  of  government-related  entities  from  any  of  the  other  preeminent  Asian
governments in the space sector.739
Kibo-ABC, formally proposed in 2011 with the blessing of the Japanese government as
the owner of the ISS’s Japanese Experiment Module “Kibo”, fosters the utilisation of the
said  module  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region.  The  utilisation  for  educational  and scientific
endeavours appears to have dominated so far. Kibo-ABC members are, among others, the
national space agencies of Japan and South Korea.740
Climate R³, adopted in 2011, has been already completed by 2017. Its primary purpose
was ‘to determine the ability of APRSAF countries and institutions to benefit from the
data and information which will be provided by selected climate-related satellite missions
in coming years.’ Among the many participants were – considering the topic presumably
somewhat government-approved – entities from, e.g., India, Japan and South Korea.741
737 Based on information in: ‘About Sentinel Asia’ (Sentinel Asia) <https://sentinel.tksc.jaxa.jp/sentinel2/
MB_HTML/About/About.htm> accessed 29 July 2016; ‘Sentinel-Asia: Disaster Management Support
System In The Asia-Pacific Region’ (APRSAF) <http://aprsaf.org/initiatives/sentinel_asia/> accessed
29 July 2016.
738 ‘JPT Members’ (n 410).
739 Based  on  information  in:  ‘SAFE:  Space  Applications  For  Environment’  (APRSAF)
<http://aprsaf.org/initiatives/safe/> accessed 29 July 2016; ‘About SAFE’ (Earth Observation Research
Center, JAXA, March 2016) <http://www.eorc.jaxa.jp/SAFE/about/> accessed 30 July 2016; ‘History’
(Earth  Observation  Research  Center,  JAXA,  March  2016)
<http://www.eorc.jaxa.jp/SAFE/about/history/> accessed 26 March 2018.
740 Based on information in:  ‘Kibo-ABC (Asian Beneficial  Collaboration through “Kibo” Utilization)’
(APRSAF) <http://aprsaf.org/initiatives/kibo_abc/> accessed 26 March 2018; ‘Terms of Reference for
the Initiative of Asian Beneficial Collaboration through “Kibo” Utilization (Kibo-ABC)’ (APRSAF) 1
<http://aprsaf.org/initiatives/kibo_abc/pdf/Kibo-ABC_TOR.pdf> accessed 30 July 2016.
741 ‘Twentieth  Session  of  the  Asia-Pacific  Regional  Space  Agency  Forum  (APRSAF-20)  Climate  R3
(Regional Readiness Review for Key Climate Missions) Proposed Outline’ (n 411). Citation on 1.
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Overall,  this  study  derives  from all  that  information  that  the  Japanese  government’s
engagement  within  APRSAF  is  arguably  primarily  directed  towards  supporting  the
pursuit of the following space-related state preferences:
First, and quite obviously, the Japanese government seems to employ APRSAF to foster
the  pursuit  of  its  current  space-related  socioeconomic  state  preference,  especially  the
target area of developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal
with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for Japan.
Second,  the  proposed  exchange  of  information  and  opinions  on,  among  others,
applications of space science and technology among APRSAF participants as well as the
inclusion  of  scientific  endeavours  within  Kibo-ABC  suggests  that  the  Japanese
government considers APRSAF an option to add to the pursuit of its current space-related
science and technology state preference.
Third, Japan’s leadership role in APRSAF and Japanese entities’ strong involvement in
various APRSAF-specific undertakings allow concluding that the Japanese government
sees this regime as a valuable instrument to increase its space-related linkage with other
APRSAF  participants,  believing  that  it  might  help  to  advance  Japan’s  international
prestige among and influence over them in general. This suits one of the government’s
current space-related political state preferences.
Fourth,  the  Japanese  government  likely  considers  APRSAF as  a  mechanism that  can
temporarily  support  the  pursuit  of  its  current  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state
preference of developing and maintaining Japan’s domestic human, industrial, scientific
and technological capacities and capabilities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level,
independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences. The combination of
Japan’s continued leadership role in APRSAF, the latter’s openness to the participation of
governmental and non-governmental entities, including regional companies, universities
and research institutes, as well as the proposed exchange of information and opinions on
space programmes within this regime at least indicates such a direction.
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  7.6.2  Remote sensing
   7.6.2.1  Major domestic measures
Currently, the overarching major Japanese government-promoted domestic space-related
remote  sensing  measure  arguably  is  the  continuous  development  and  application  of
various domestic(ally controlled) remote sensing satellite series.
Besides the satellites belonging to the IGS constellation that is introduced in more detail
further below, the specific major government-promoted domestic remote sensing satellite
series in the 21st century seemingly have been the  Advanced Land Observing Satellite
(ALOS) series,742 the Global Change Observation Mission (commonly known as GCOM)
series,743 the  Greenhouse  Gases  Observing  Satellite (commonly  known  as  GOSAT)
series744 and the Himawari series.745
742 Based on information in: ‘Advanced Land Observing Satellite-2 (ALOS-2) DAICHI-2’ (JAXA, April
2014)  <http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/alos2/pdf/daichi2_e.pdf>  accessed  1  May  2017;  Komiya  (n
659)  6,9,23-24;  ‘Advanced  Land  Observing  Satellite-2  “DAICHI-2”  (ALOS-2)’  (JAXA)
<http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/alos2/> accessed  1 May 2017;  ‘About  Advanced  Optical  Satellite’
(JAXA)  <http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/alos3/>  accessed  25  March  2018;  ‘Japan  Aerospace
Exploration  Agency  (JAXA)’  (International  Charter  Space  &  Major  Disasters)
<https://disasterscharter.org/web/guest/charter-members/jaxa>  accessed  30  March  2018;  ‘Satellite
Programs  Observation  Satellites’  (Mitsubishi  Electric  Corporation)
<http://www.mitsubishielectric.com/bu/space/satellite/observation/> accessed 16 May 2017.
743 Based on information in: Komiya (n 659) 6,9,31-32; ‘GCOM-W: Global Change Observation Mission -
Water “SHIZUKU”’ (JAXA) <http://global.jaxa.jp/activity/pr/brochure/files/sat25.pdf> accessed 2 May
2017;  ‘Global  Change  Observation  Mission  -  Water  “SHIZUKU”  (GCOM-W)’  (JAXA)
<http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/gcom_w/>  accessed  2  May  2017;  ‘GCOM-C:  Global  Change
Observation  Mission-Climate’  (JAXA)  <http://global.jaxa.jp/activity/pr/brochure/files/sat30.pdf>
accessed  2  May  2017;  ‘Global  Change  Observation  Mission  -  Climate  (GCOM-C)’  (JAXA)
<http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/gcom_c/> accessed 2 May 2017.
744 Based on information in: Akimasa Sumi, ‘President’s Greeting The Past, Present and Future of the
GOSAT  Mission’  (National  Institute  for  Environmental  Studies,  Summer  2015)
<http://www.gosat.nies.go.jp/en/about.html>  accessed  28  April  2017;  ‘Global  Greenhouse  Gas
Observation by Satellite GOSAT Project’ (Pamphlet (7th edn), Satellite Observation Center, National
Institute  for  Environmental  Studies  July  2016)
<http://www.gosat.nies.go.jp/eng/GOSAT_pamphlet_en.pdf>  accessed  28  April  2017;  ‘GOSAT-2
Project at the National Institute for Environmental Studies’ (Pamphlet, Satellite Observation Center,
National Institute for Environmental Studies September 2016) <http://www.gosat-2.nies.go.jp/uploads//
GOSAT-2_en_v2.3.pdf>  accessed  28  April  2017;  ‘The  Global  Observing  System  for  Climate:
Implementation  Needs’  (Implementation  Plan  GCOS-200  (GOOS-214),  GCOS  Secretariat,  World
Meteorological Organization 2016) 95 <https://library.wmo.int/opac/doc_num.php?explnum_id=3417>
accessed 28 April 2017; Komiya (n 659) 6,9,29-30; ‘Satellite Programs Observation Satellites’ (n 742).
745 Based on information in:  Kotaro Bessho and others,  ‘An Introduction to Himawari-8/9 — Japan’s
New-Generation Geostationary Meteorological Satellites’ (2016) 94(2) Journal of the Meteorological
Society  of  Japan  151;  Caleb  Henry,  ‘Japan  Launches  Himawari-9  Weather  Satellite  Into  Orbit’
(Space.com,  3  November  2016)  <http://www.space.com/34603-japan-launches-himawari-9-weather-
satellite.html> accessed 27 April 2017; Komiya (n 659) 6,9,27-28; ‘About Us’ (Japan Meteorological
Agency)  <http://www.jma-net.go.jp/msc/en/remark/greeting.html>  accessed  26  April  2017;  ‘JMA
Geostationary  Meteorological  Satellite  System  for  Himawari-8/9’  (Japan  Meteorological  Agency)
<http://www.jma-net.go.jp/msc/en/general/system/system89/index.html>  accessed  26  April  2017;
‘Products  and  Library’  (Japan  Meteorological  Agency)
<http://www.data.jma.go.jp/mscweb/en/product/index.html> accessed 27 April  2017. The series  is  a
continuation of Japan’s GMS and MTSA series.
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Based on the  information  presented  in  the  footnotes  of  the  respective  satellite  series
above,  these series  appear  to  be primarily  aimed at  serving the government’s  current
space-related socioeconomic state preference, especially the target area of developing and
applying  space-related  capabilities  and  capacities  to  deal  with  a  broad  set  of
socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for Japan. For example, these series shall assist in
dealing  with  issues  related  to  such  socioeconomically  relevant  areas  like  agriculture,
climate  change,  disaster  management,  the  environment,  energy,  fishery,  forestry,
industry,  infrastructure,  meteorology  (including  weather  analysis,  forecasting  and
monitoring), shipping, solar power, transport, wildfires and yellow dust.
A  different  story  is  the  IGS  constellation,  supposedly  implemented  under  the
responsibility  of  the  Cabinet  Secretariat.  In  short,  this  specific  major  government-
promoted domestic space-related remote sensing measure encompasses the creation of a –
not yet completed – operational ten satellite constellation, consisting of two optical, two
radar, four surveillance capability augmentation and two data relay satellites. Also, and
presumably in an attempt to strengthen such a constellation’s resiliency, it is notable here
that the government’s current space programme apparently includes the development of
small satellites that can be put into orbit within a short launch window.
Overall, the IGS constellation is beyond doubt primarily oriented towards fostering the
pursuit  of  the  government’s  current  space-related  national  security  state  preference,
including the target areas of  enhancing the Japanese military’s strategic support system
(especially against such states like China and North Korea), as well as of improving the
US-Japanese  alliance,  with  a  focus  on  furthering  their  deterrence  and  response
capabilities (especially against such states like China and North Korea).
For one, its development was a reaction to the DPRK’s alleged satellite launch in 1998
that  took  many  in  Japan  by  surprise,  flew  over  Japanese  territory  and  was  broadly
perceived as  a North Korean long-range ballistic  missile  test.  Moreover,  the reported
main reconnaissance targets of the IGS constellation are China and North Korea. Also,
observers  reasonably  argue  that  the  Japanese  government  sees  such  a  domestically
controlled  constellation  benefiting  Japan’s  security  status  by  lowering  its  dependency
from US satellite reconnaissance and commercial  remote sensing satellite data. At the
same time, the IGS constellation allows Japan to increase its space-related contribution to
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the  US-Japanese  alliance.  Notably,  while  not  constituting  a  priority,  the  constellation
might in certain situations additionally serve Japan’s disaster management activities.746
For the sake of completion,  this  study wants to point out here that  the government’s
deliberation of the future development of satellite-based early-warning technology, e.g.
infrared sensors, fits into the IGS constellation’s narrative, and thus might warrant some
more analytical attention soon as well.747
   7.6.2.2  Major cooperative measures
In  terms  of  major  government-promoted  cooperative  space-related  remote  sensing
measures,  the  3rd BSP  indicates  that  the  government  currently  considers  especially
collaborations  encompassing ‘joint  development  of satellites,  piggybacking of mission
equipment and materials, and earth observation based on the joint use of satellite data.’748
Excluding  APRSAF-related  measures,  and without  claiming  completeness,  the  (more)
specific  current  major  government-promoted cooperative  space-related  remote  sensing
measures  (with  a  presumed  high  potential  for)  involving  other  preeminent  Asian
governments in the space sector seem to encompass the following:
Japan through JAXA contributes, alongside the space agencies of, among others, China,
India and South Korea, remote sensing data from domestic satellites to the International
Disaster Charter. In particular, Japan shares data derived from ALOS-2 (and before that
the first ALOS), as well as cameras attached to the ISS.749
Japanese government-related entities  engage in  GEO alongside China,  India,  Iran and
South Korea,750 and WMO alongside China, India Iran, North Korea and South Korea.751
746 Based  on  information  in:  Joan  Johnson-Freese,  ‘Japan  Joins  the  Exclusive  Space  Spy  Club’
(YaleGlobal Online,  31 March 2003) <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/japan-joins-exclusive-space-
spy-club> accessed 1 May 2017; Paul Kallender-Umezu, ‘What’s Behind Japan’s Sudden Thirst for
More  Spy  Satellites’  (SpaceNews,  13  November  2015)  <http://spacenews.com/whats-behind-japan-
sudden-thirst-for-more-spy-satellites/>  accessed  1  May  2017;  Mike  Wall,  ‘Japanese  Spy  Satellite
Launches to Watch North Korea’ (Space.com, 16 March 2017) <http://www.space.com/36099-japan-
launches-spy-satellite-igs-radar-5.html> accessed 30 April 2017; Komiya (n 659) 6,17-22; ‘Information
Gathering  Satellites’  (Spaceflight101.com)  <http://spaceflight101.com/spacecraft/information-
gathering-satellites/> accessed 1 May 2017.
747 Komiya (n 659) 55–56.
748 ibid 106.
749 ‘The International Charter Space and Major Disasters’ (n 236) 23.
750 ‘Member List’ (n 238); Komiya (n 659) 103.
751 ‘Members’ (n 240).
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The Indian-Japanese MoU 2016  promotes, among others, (further) collaboration in EO
applications, presumably especially to reap socioeconomic benefits.752
In sum, the information presented in the context of these cooperative measures allows
arguing that their primary orientation is towards serving the pursuit of the government’s
current  space-related  socioeconomic  state  preference,  especially  the  target  area  of
developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set
of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for Japan.
Besides that, the Japanese government is surely aware that such cooperative measures
can, e.g. through its contributions to others’ disaster management, add to the pursuit of its
space-related political  state  preference of advancing Japan’s international  prestige and
influence with its respective partners.
  7.6.3  Communications and broadcasting
   7.6.3.1  Major domestic measures
One of the current major government-promoted domestic space-related communications
and broadcasting measures is the utilisation of domestic(ally controlled) satellite-based
communications  and  broadcasting  capabilities,  presumably  in  the  pursuit  of  the
government’s current space-related socioeconomic state preference.753
Besides  that,  the  government  currently  invests  into  the  development  and launch of  a
domestic optical data-relay communications satellite by around FY2019, presumably to
assist  Japan’s  civil  and  security-related  remote  sensing  undertakings.754 As  such,  the
satellite shall apparently aid the pursuit of all space-related state preferences underlying
the aforementioned major government-promoted space-related remote sensing measures.
Finally,  the  government  presently  promotes  the  development  of  the  domestic(ally
controlled)  X-Band Satellite-based Defence Communication Network under the purview
of its Ministry of Defence. Potentially fully established by FY2020, this network shall
752 ‘Memorandum of  Understanding between  the  Indian Space  Research  Organisation (ISRO) and the
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space’ (n
424).
753 Komiya (n 659) 115–116.
754 ibid 37–38.
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consist  of  three  government-owned  satellites  and  supersede  the  Japanese  military’s
commercial  use  of  secure  X-band  communications  links  aboard  the  Superbird-B2,
Superbird-C2 and Superbird-D communications satellites that are privately owned by the
domestic Sky Perfect JSAT Corporation. The task of implementing and operating the new
network’s first two satellites called DSN-1 and DSN-2 lies with DSN Corporation, a joint
venture of Japanese enterprises SKY Perfect JSAT Corporation (majority owner), NEC
Corporation and NTT Communications  Corporation based on a PFI contract  with the
Ministry of Defence running from 15.01.2013 to 31.03.2031.  Reports indicate that the
purchase of the third satellite is underway.
Undoubtedly, this new network shall primarily support the pursuit of the government’s
space-related national security state preference, especially the target area of enhancing the
Japanese  military’s  strategic  support  system.  After  all,  the  network  shall  reportedly
strengthen  the  Japanese  military’s  command  and  control,  as  well  as  information  and
communications  capabilities.  The  trigger  for  investing  in  this  network  was  the
government’s realisation of the fractured and overburdened status quo of the Japanese
military’s  communications  capabilities.  The  fear  has  been  that  this  situation  causes
problems  in  addressing  the  growing  regional  assertiveness  of  states  like  China
efficiently.755
   7.6.3.2  Major cooperative measures
Excluding APRSAF-related measures, and without claiming completeness, this study has
only  found  these  two  current  major  government-promoted  space-related  cooperative
communications and broadcasting measures:
755 Combined information in: ibid 39–40; SKY Perfect JSAT Holdings Inc., ‘Execution of a Program to
Upgrade and Operate X-Band Satellite Communications Functions by the Subsidiary’ (News Release,
SKY  Perfect  JSAT  Corporation  15  January  2013)
<http://www.sptvjsat.com/wp-content/uploads/130115_hd_DSNPFIEN.pdf>  accessed  4  May  2017;
Peter B de Selding, ‘Japan Selects Military Satellite Telecom Provider’ (SpaceNews,  28 November
2012) <http://spacenews.com/japan-selects-military-satellite-telecom-provider/> accessed 4 May 2017;
Nobuhiro  Kubo,  ‘Sources:  Tarpaulin  Delays  Japanese  Military  Communications  Satellite  by  Two
Years’ (SpaceNews, 19 July 2016) <http://spacenews.com/sources-tarpaulin-delays-japanese-military-
communications-satellite-by-two-years/> accessed 4 May 2017; Peter B de Selding, ‘Japan’s DSN-1
Military Communications Satellite Damaged during Transport to Launch Base’ (SpaceNews, 20 June
2016)  <http://spacenews.com/japans-dsn-1-military-communications-satellite-damaged-during-
transport-to-launch-base/>  accessed  4  May  2017;  Stephen  Clark,  ‘Japan  Puts  Its  First  Military
Communications Satellite into Orbit’ (Spaceflight Now, 24 January 2017) <https://spaceflightnow.com/
2017/01/24/japan-puts-its-first-military-communications-satellite-into-orbit/> accessed 4 May 2017.
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The Indian-Japanese MoU 2016 promotes cooperation in the application of satellite-based
communications, presumably especially to reap socioeconomic benefits.756 As such, the
Japanese government likely engages in this measure primarily in the pursuit of its space-
related  socioeconomic  state  preference,  especially  the  target  area  of  developing  and
applying  space-related  capabilities  and  capacities  to  deal  with  a  broad  set  of
socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for Japan.
Additionally, Japan is, alongside all the other preeminent Asian governments in the space
sector, a member state of ITU. This shall presumably aid the pursuit of all space-related
state  preferences  underlying  the  Japanese  government’s  major  space-related
communications and broadcasting measures.757
Last  but  not  least,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  assume  at  this  point  that  the  Japanese
government also engages in all these cooperative measures in the hope that they assist in
the  pursuit  of  its  space-related  political  state  preference  of  advancing  Japan’s
international prestige and influence with its respective partners.
  7.6.4  Navigation
   7.6.4.1  Major domestic measures
With the Cabinet Office apparently taking on the general management responsibility for
this system, the Japanese government’s current main domestic space-related navigation
project is the development and application of QZSS.
In  short,  QZSS is  a  government-owned  GPS-compatible  regional  satellite  navigation
system  offering  publicly  available  but  also  special  government-regulated  navigation,
positioning and timing signals. Ultimately, it shall consist of seven satellites, including an
integrated SBAS for aircraft,  and relevant ground infrastructure to improve navigation,
positioning and timing services in Japan and the surrounding region. The first satellite
was launched in 2010. The system, with satellites purchased from the domestic private
industry,  may  be  completed  by  around  FY2023,  whereas  SBAS  shall  already  be
operational around FY2020. Quasi-Zenith Satellite System Services Inc. (QSS), a special-
756 ‘Memorandum of  Understanding between  the  Indian Space  Research  Organisation (ISRO) and the
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space’ (n
424).
757 For more information, see this study’s Section 4.6.3.3.
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purpose company established under a PFI between a domestic private industry actor and
the government, functions as the ground system operator, including with regard to the
daily  command  and  control  of  the  satellites.  The  SBAS  project  falls  under  the
responsibility of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.758
Overall, QZSS appears to be primarily aimed at fostering the pursuit of these two space-
related state preferences:
First, there is the pursuit of the government’s current space-related socioeconomic state
preference,  especially  the  target  area  of  developing  and  applying  space-related
capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-
areas for Japan. After all, the available information points out QZSS’s potential use in
such  socioeconomically  relevant  areas  like  agriculture,  construction,  disaster
management, people’s personal lives and transport.
Second, there is the pursuit of the government’s current national security state preference,
in  particular  the  target  areas  of  enhancing  the  Japanese  military’s  strategic  support
system, as well as of improving the US-Japanese alliance. For example, the information
in the context of the 3rd BSP refers to QZSS’s potential contribution to improving national
security capabilities and strengthening the US-Japanese alliance.759
   7.6.4.2  Major cooperative measures
Currently, the general major government-promoted cooperative space-related navigation
measures  (with  a  presumed  high  potential  for)  involving  other  preeminent  Asian
government’s in the space sector seem to be the Japanese government’s active promotion
of the application of GNSS, including QZSS, for socioeconomic development in Japan
and the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the creation of the overseas infrastructure relevant
to Japanese and regional users of QZSS.760
758 Komiya (n 659) 6,9,11-14; Yoshiyuki Murai, ‘Project Overview of The Quasi-Zenith Satellite System’
(Presentation,  56th  CGSIC,  Portland,  12  September  2016)
<http://www.gps.gov/cgsic/meetings/2016/murai.pdf> accessed 29 April 2017; Souichirou Kozuka and
Ingo Baumann, ‘The Emerging Legal Debate Around Japan’s QZSS’ (2016) 11(4) InsideGNSS 39;
‘What  Is  the  Quasi-Zenith  Satellite  System  (QZSS)?’  (Cabinet  Office,  Government  Of  Japan)
<http://qzss.go.jp/en/overview/services/sv02_why.html> accessed 29 April 2017.
759 Based  on  information  in:  Komiya  (n  659)  11–14;  Murai  (n  758);  ‘User  Guide’  (Cabinet  Office,
Government Of Japan) <http://qzss.go.jp/en/usage/useimage/index.html> accessed 29 April 2017.
760 Komiya (n 659) 81-82,109.
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A  more  specific  measure  in  this  regard  appears  to  be  the  involvement  of  Japanese
government-related  (and  non-governmental)  entities  in  Multi-GNSS  Asia (MGA).  In
short,  MGA,  which  shows  some  similarities  with  APRSAF  regarding  its  internal
structure,  was  established  on  04.09.2011  and  has  its  roots  in  the  Multi-GNSS
Demonstration Campaign in the Asia-Oceania region, which was originally proposed by
JAXA in 2009. Overall, MGA aims at ‘promot[ing] social progress and better standards
of life in the Asia Oceania region through the application of “Multi-GNSS” technologies
for such purposes as, for example, the mitigation of environmental and natural hazard
impacts so as to ensure a safe and secure society, and the encouragement of economic
growth  by  peaceful  utilization  of  “Multi-GNSS”  products  and  services.’  The  related
approach ‘is to encourage GNSS signal and service providers and user communities in the
Asia  Oceania  region  to  develop  new  applications,  and  to  carry  out  experiments  or
demonstrations  by using  all  available  “Multi-GNSS” systems whose  interface  control
documents are public, on a best efforts basis in the spirit of international cooperation.’761
MGA has governmental  and non-governmental  participants  from the Asian and some
other world regions. Notable Japanese participants comprise, among others, JAXA and
NEC Corporation, which is a private industry actor connected to QZSS. Except for the
participation of the South Korean government-affiliated National Geographic Information
Institute, all other South Korean and all Indian members are currently non-governmental.
There  are  no  Iranian  or  North  Korean  participants,  and  the  sole  Chinese  member  is
presently a China-based campus of a UK university.762
Besides that, the Indian-Japanese MoU 2016 also promotes cooperation in the application
of satellite-based navigation, presumably especially to reap socioeconomic benefits.763
From all that, it is a reasonable conclusion that these cooperative measures are primarily
directed  towards  serving the  pursuit  of  the government’s  current  socioeconomic  state
preference,  especially  the  target  area  of  developing  and  applying  space-related
capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-
areas for Japan.
761 Multi-GNSS  Asia  (MGA)  TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  (adopted  October  2014,  effective  from  11
October 2014, latest revision on 15 November 2016).
762 ‘Members’ (Multi-GNSS Asia) <http://www.multignss.asia/members.html> accessed 30 April 2017.
763 ‘Memorandum of  Understanding between  the  Indian Space  Research  Organisation (ISRO) and the
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space’ (n
424).
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Yet,  this  study  contends  that  the  Japanese  government  might  also  hope  that  these
measures additionally aid the pursuit of its current space-related political state preference
of advancing its international prestige and influence with its respective partners.
  7.6.5  Science and technology research
   7.6.5.1  Major domestic measures
Without claiming completeness, this study has identified various specific current major
Japanese government-promoted domestic space-related science and technology measures
outside of lunar, planetary and asteroid exploration missions. In short, the more science-
oriented  measures  comprise  EQUilibriUm  Lunar-Earth  point  6U  Spacecraft
(EQUULEUS),764 Exploration  of  energization  and Radiation  in  Geospace’  spacecraft
(ERG; dubbed: ARASE),765 Solar Physics Satellite (SOLAR-B; nicknamed: HINODE)766
and  X-ray Astronomy Satellite (ASTRO-H).767 The more technology-oriented measures
are the Super Low Altitude Test Satellite (SLATS) series,768 the Advanced Satellite with
New system ARchitecture for Observation (ASNARO) series, which saw its first launch in
2014,769 and the long-standing Japanese Engineering Test Satellite (ETS) series.770
764 ‘International Partners Provide Science Satellites for First SLS Mission’ (SpaceDaily, 30 May 2016)
<http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/International_Partners_Provide_Science_Satellites_for_Americas
_Space_Launch_System_Maiden_Flight_999.html> accessed 5 May 2017.
765 Based on information in: Komiya (n 659) 59; ‘Exploration of Energization and Radiation in Geospace
“ARASE”  (ERG)’  (JAXA)  <http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/erg/>  accessed  5  May  2017;  ‘ERG:
Exploration  of  Energization  and  Radiation  in  Geospace’  (Pamphlet,  JAXA)
<http://global.jaxa.jp/activity/pr/brochure/files/sat36.pdf> accessed 5 May 2017.
766 ‘Solar  Physics  Satellite  “HINODE” (SOLAR-B)’ (JAXA)  <http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/solar_b/>
accessed 5 May 2017.
767 Based  on  information  in:  Komiya  (n  659)  59;  ‘“Hitomi”  (ASTRO-H)  Science  Goals’  (JAXA)
<http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/astro_h/goals.html>  accessed  5  May  2017;  Jeff  Foust,  ‘JAXA
Abandons  Efforts  to  Recover  Hitomi  Satellite’  (SpaceNews,  28  April  2016)
<http://spacenews.com/jaxa-abandons-efforts-to-recover-hitomi-satellite/>  accessed  5  May  2017;
‘International  Collaboration’  (JAXA)  <http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/astro_h/collaboration.html>
accessed 5 May 2017.
768 Based  on  information  in:  Komiya  (n  659)  31;  ‘SLATS ： Super  Low  Altitude  Test  Satellite’
<http://global.jaxa.jp/activity/pr/brochure/files/sat37.pdf>  accessed  2  May  2017;  Maciej  Heyman,
‘Super Low Altitude Test Satellite Planned for Fiscal Year 2017 – SatNEWSwire’ (satNEWSwire, 3
May  2017)  <http://satnewswire.com/super-low-altitude-test-satellite-planned-for-fiscal-year-2017/>
accessed 18 May 2017.
769 Based on information in: Komiya (n 659) 33–34; Stephen Clark, ‘Japanese Satellites Launched on
Soviet-Era  Missile’  (Spaceflight  Now,  6  November  2014)
<https://spaceflightnow.com/2014/11/06/japanese-satellites-launched-on-sovietera-missile/> accessed 3
May 2017; ‘Technology Demonstration Satellite ASNARO-1 Was Successfully Launched’ (Ministry of
Economic,  Trade  and  Industry  of  Japan)  <http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2014/1106_02.html>
accessed 3 May 2017; ‘ASNARO : Advanced Satellite with New System Architecture for Observation’
(Japan Space Systems) <http://www.jspacesystems.or.jp/en_project_asnaro/> accessed 3 May 2017.
770 Based on information in: Komiya (n 659) 35–36; ‘Mitsubishi Electric Chosen as Prime Contractor of
Japanese Government’s Engineering Test Satellite 9’ (Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, 7 April 2017)
<http://nl.mitsubishielectric.com/en/news-events/releases/global/2017/0407-a/index.page>  accessed  3
May 2017.
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Despite sometimes involving international collaboration, all can be considered domestic
measures due to Japan’s apparent domestic control over them.
SOLAR-B, launched in 2006, is a Japanese-US-UK mission to study solar explosions and
predict solar events relevant for Earth. ERG, launched in 2016, aids the study of high-
energy  electrons  in  geospace,  e.g.  to  advance  weather  research  and  mitigate  satellite
malfunctions,  equipment  damage  and  radiation  threats  to  astronauts.  EQUULEUS,
developed between JAXA and the University of Tokyo, is a cubesat mission scheduled
for 2019 to study Earth’s plasmasphere and the plasma distribution around Earth, e.g. to
improve  measures  protecting  humans  and  electronics  from radiation  damage  in  outer
space. Moreover, it shall demonstrate low-energy trajectory control techniques within the
Earth-Moon region. ASTRO-H, which included contributions from Canada, ESA and the
USA but failed soon after its  launch in 2016, was supposed to strengthen humanity’s
understanding of the structure and evolution of the universe, e.g. by studying black holes,
galaxy clusters, heavy elements and physics in extreme conditions.
SLATS, scheduled for launch in FY2018, will test Japanese EO satellite technology at
super low altitudes to reduce future EO satellite manufacturing and launch costs and to
enhance domestic EO resolution capabilities. ASNARO-2, launched in January 2018, is a
technology  test  mission  that  serves  the  domestic  development  of small-sized,  high-
performance and low-cost satellite series that can be launched within a short time-frame.
ETS-9, scheduled for launch around FY2021, shall test domestic satellite technology to
enhance  Japan’s  national  research  and  development  infrastructure  and  space  industry
capability. Also, the government apparently hopes that these activities ultimately improve
Japan’s international commercial competitiveness in the satellite market.771
For the sake of completion, this study wants to add here that the Japanese  government
apparent promotion of domestic research and development into space solar power system
technology fits into this technology development narrative, and thus might warrant some
more analytical attention soon as well.772
771 These findings are based on the information presented in the footnotes regarding the specific missions.
772 Komiya (n 659) 81–82.
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Arguably,  these  measures  are  mainly  directed  towards  fostering  the  pursuit  of  the
government’s  current  science  and  technology  state  preference  of  developing  Japan’s
space science and technology per se.
However,  the government presumably promotes such measures further with an eye to
their potential future contribution to the pursuit of other space-related state preferences.
For  example,  as  indicated  above,  the  government  apparently  hopes  that  its  satellite
technology  development  activities  also  enhance  domestic  EO  resolution  capabilities,
allow cutting costs, and improve Japan’s international commercial competitiveness in the
satellite  market.  Moreover,  the  science-oriented  measures  that  shall  improve  the
understanding of dangers in the space environment additionally suit the pursuit of the
government’s current space-related autonomy-oriented state preferences of ensuring the
stable use of outer space for Japan.
   7.6.5.2  Major cooperative measures
Excluding  APRSAF-related  measures,  and  without  claiming  completeness,  the  major
government-promoted  cooperative  space-related  science  and  technology  research
measure (with a presumed high potential for) involving preeminent Asian governments in
the space sector seems to encompass only the following:
The Indian-Japanese MoU 2016 promotes cooperation on space exploration and science,
as well as research and development regarding space systems and technology.773 Before
that,  the  Indian  and  Japanese  space  agencies  apparently  entered  an  agreement  for
cooperation on space x-ray observations in 2007.774
In short, it is reasonable to assume that these measures are directed towards serving the
pursuit  of  the  Japanese  government’s  space-related  science  and  technology  state
preference, and, to some degree,  its space-related political state preference of advancing
Japan’s international prestige and influence (with India).
773 ‘Memorandum of  Understanding between  the  Indian Space  Research  Organisation (ISRO) and the
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space’ (n
424).
774 ‘Joint Statement On the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership between
India and Japan’ (n 465).
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  7.6.6  Human spaceflight
   7.6.6.1  Major domestic measures
This study has found no serious intention by the Japanese government to establish an
independent human spaceflight project under its current space programme.
   7.6.6.2  Major cooperative measures
The Japanese government’s primary cooperative human spaceflight measure remains its
participation in the ISS alongside the USA, Russia, ESA and Canada.775
Concerning  specific  major  government-promoted  cooperative  human  spaceflight
measures  (with  a  presumed  high  potential  for)  involving  other  preeminent  Asian
governments in the space sector, the closest measures are the already introduced Kibo-
ABC within APRSAF, as well as the three-year-long United Nations/Japan Cooperation
Programme on CubeSat Deployment from the International Space Station (ISS) Japanese
Experiment Module (Kibo) "KiboCUBE" set up by  JAXA and UNOOSA in September
2015. The latter programme supports developing countries in conducting space activities
and  developing  their  spacecraft  capabilities  by  offering  to  deploy  cubesats  linked  to
developing countries’ educational or research institutions from the Kibo module.776
Overall,  the  Japanese  government  likely  conducts  these  two  specific  cooperative
measures in the context of its participation in the ISS mainly in the pursuit of its current
space-related  political  state  preference  of  advancing  its  international  prestige  and
influence  with its  respective  partners  (developing countries),  as  well  as to add to  the
pursuit of its current space-related science and technology state preference.
775 Komiya (n 659) 61–62.
776 ‘Collaboration between JAXA and UNOOSA to Offer Small Satellite Deployment Opportunity from
Kibo to Contribute to Developing Countries to Improve Space Technology’ (JAXA, 9 August 2015)
<http://global.jaxa.jp/press/2015/09/20150908_unoosa.html>  accessed  19  June  2017;  ‘The  United
Nations/Japan Cooperation Programme on CubeSat Deployment from the International Space Station
(ISS)  Japanese  Experiment  Module  (Kibo)  “KiboCUBE”’  (UNOOSA)
<http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/psa/hsti/kibocube.html> accessed 19 June 2017.
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  7.6.7  Exploration of celestial bodies, including the Moon
   7.6.7.1  Major cooperative measures
Within the 3rd BSP’s timeframe, the Japanese government continues with some previously
commenced as well as promotes several new specific major domestic lunar, planetary and
asteroid exploration measures.
Without  claiming  completeness,  the  most  prominent  missions  as  of  2017,  several  of
which  involve  international  but  no  notable  regional  intergovernmental  cooperation,
appear to be Hayabusa-2,777 Martian Moons eXploration (MMX),778 Outstanding MOon
exploration  Technologies  demonstrated  by  NAno  Semi-Hard  Impactor
(OMOTENASHI),779 Smart  Lander  for  Investigating  Moon (SLIM),780 Spectroscopic
Planet Observatory for Recognition of Interaction of Atmosphere (SPRINT-A; dubbed:
HISAKI),781 and Venus Climate Orbiter (Planet-C; dubbed: AKATSUKI).782
In terms of lunar  exploration,  the  SLIM mission,  scheduled for around FY2019, is  a
Japanese lunar lander project to enhance domestic landing technology and techniques for
future space exploration activities. OMOTENASHI, developed between JAXA and the
University of Tokyo, is a cubesat mission scheduled for 2019 to test domestic technology
777 Based  on  information  in:  ‘HAYABUSA  A  Technology  Demonstrator  for  Sample  and  Return’
(Pamphlet,  JAXA)  <http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/muses_c/files/hayabusa_return.pdf>  accessed  5
May  2017;  For  Hayabusa  see:  ‘HAYABUSA  Return  to  the  Earth’  (Press  Kit,  JAXA)
<http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/muses_c/files/presskit_hayabusa_e.pdf>  accessed  5  May  2017;  For
Hayabusa-2  see:  ‘Astroid  Explorer  Hayabusa2’  (Pamphlet,  JAXA)
<http://global.jaxa.jp/activity/pr/brochure/files/sat33.pdf> accessed 5 May 2017.
778 Based  on  information  in:  Komiya  (n  659)  59–60;  ‘Martian  Moons  EXploration  (MXX)  Mission
Overview’  (Presentation,  Signing  Ceremony  for  the  Implementation  Arrangement  with  CNES  on
Cooperative  Activities  in  MMX  (Martian  Moons  eXploration),  Tokyo,  10  April  2017)
<http://www.isas.jaxa.jp/en/topics/files/MMX170412_EN.pdf>  accessed  5  May  2017;  ‘MMX  -
Martian  Moons  EXploration’  (Institute  of  Space  and  Astronautical  Science,  JAXA)
<http://mmx.isas.jaxa.jp/> accessed  5 May 2017;  ‘JAXA and CNES Make and Sign Implementing
Arrangement on Martian Moons Exploration (MMX)’ (Institute of Space and Astronautical Science,
JAXA, 10 April 2017) <http://www.isas.jaxa.jp/en/topics/000950.html> accessed 5 May 2017.
779 Based on information in: ‘International Partners Provide Science Satellites for First SLS Mission’ (n
764);  Stephen  Clark,  ‘NASA  Confirms  First  Flight  of  Space  Launch  System Will  Slip  to  2019’
(Spaceflight  Now,  28 April  2017) <https://spaceflightnow.com/2017/04/28/nasa-confirms-first-flight-
of-space-launch-system-will-slip-to-2019/> accessed 7 August 2017.
780 Based  on information  in:  Komiya (n  659)  59;  ‘Japanese  Lunar  Lander  to  Be Built  by Mitsubishi
Electric’  (Nikkei  Asian  Review,  18  May  2016)  <http://asia.nikkei.com/Tech-Science/Tech/Japanese-
lunar-lander-to-be-built-by-Mitsubishi-Electric>  accessed  24  May 2017;  ‘SLIM’  (Institute  of  Space
and  Astronautical  Science,  JAXA)
<http://www.isas.jaxa.jp/en/missions/spacecraft/developing/slim.html> accessed 5 May 2017.
781 ‘Spectroscopic Planet Observatory for Recognition of Interaction of Atmosphere “HISAKI” (SPRINT-
A)’ (JAXA) <http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/sprint_a/> accessed 5 May 2017.
782 ‘Venus  Climate  Orbiter  “AKATSUKI”  (PLANET-C)’  (JAXA)
<http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/planet_c/> accessed 5 May 2017.
196
in the development of low-cost and very small spacecraft for lunar surface exploration. It
shall further measure the lunar radiation environment.
Regarding planetary exploration, SPRINT-A, launched in 2013, has been the world’s first
space telescope for  remote  observation  of  planets  from Earth  orbit.  Japan’s  Planet-C,
launched in 2010, continues to deliver data on Venus’ climate and atmosphere.  MMX,
scheduled  to  launch  around  2024,  shall  be  a  sample  return  mission  from Mars’  two
Moons, Phobos and Deimos, to bolster knowledge of, e.g., their origin and the formation
of  planetary  systems.  While  presumably  remaining  a  primarily  Japanese  controlled
mission,  JAXA  and  the  French  space  agency  already  signed  an  implementation
agreement for MMX’s research and development stage.
Finally,  Hayabusa-2,  launched  in  2014,  is  an  ongoing  Japanese-controlled  asteroid
sample  return  mission  to  demonstrate  space  exploration  technology  and to  foster  the
study of asteroids and the universe. However, it also  involves a German-French lander
and received some technical support from the USA.783
Altogether,  these measures seem to mainly fit  the pursuit  of the government’s current
space-related  science  and technology state  preference,  but might,  considering the still
limited scope of such missions worldwide, also be considered useful by the government
concerning the pursuit of its two current political state preferences.
   7.6.7.2  Major cooperative measures
Presently,  the  government’s  specific  major  cooperative  space-related  measure  (with  a
presumed high potential for) involving preeminent Asian governments in the space sector
regarding the exploration of celestial bodies, including the Moon, seems to be following:
The Indian-Japanese MoU promotes cooperation on space exploration and science,  as
well  as  research  and  development  regarding  space  systems  and  technology  for
presumably scientific purposes and to better the understanding of outer space.784 This can
likely  cover  cooperation  in  the  exploration  of  celestial  bodies,  including  the  Moon.
783 Based on information provided in the footnotes regarding the specific missions.
784 ‘Memorandum of  Understanding between  the  Indian Space  Research  Organisation (ISRO) and the
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space’ (n
424).
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Regarding  lunar  exploration,  the  Japanese  and  Indian  space  agencies  have  already
announced that they commenced discussions on a joint mission to explore the lunar polar
regions  for  water.  Mission  results  might  be  important  for  the  development  of  future
human lunar habitations. Their mission proposal may be finalised around early 2019.785
In  short,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  Japanese  government  hopes  that  such
collaboration serves the pursuit of its current science and technology state preference, as
well as its two current space-related political state preferences.
  7.6.8  Stable use of outer space
   7.6.8.1  Major domestic measures
With a view to its current autonomy-oriented state preference of ensuring the stable use
of outer space for Japan, the Japanese government presently especially promotes setting
up an operational domestic Space Situation Awareness framework, e.g. for debris and
satellite orbit monitoring. By FY2022, it shall encompass an optical telescope, radar and
analysis system, capable of observing the low-earth orbit (objects as small as 10 cm) and
the geostationary orbit.786 Also,  JAXA engages in the development  of domestic space
debris removal technology.787 This includes support for Japanese industry actors in their
attempts to create such technology.788
   7.6.8.2  Major cooperative measures
Regarding  major  government-promoted  cooperative  space-related  measures  (with  a
presumed high potential for) involving preeminent Asian governments in the space sector
to  address  the  stable  use of  outer  space  for  Japan,  the  government  currently  sees  an
importance in the formulation of suitable international regulations. e.g. in the form of a
code of conduct, and the advancement of the rule of law in outer space.789
785 Harding and Kazmin (n 477).
786 Based  on  information  in:  ‘Space  Situational  Awareness  (SSA)  System’  (JAXA)
<http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/ssa/> accessed 27 March 2018; Komiya (n 659) 51–52.
787 ‘On-Orbit Demonstration of Electrodynamic Tether on the H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV) (Kounotori
Integrated  Tether  Experiments  (KITE))’  (JAXA)
<http://www.kenkai.jaxa.jp/eng/research/kite/kite.html> accessed 25 March 2018.
788 ‘ASTROSCALE  and  JAXA  Conclude  Joint  Agreement  to  Counteract  Space  Debris’  (JAXA,  12
September 2017) <http://global.jaxa.jp/press/2017/09/20170912_elsa-d.html> accessed 25 March 2018.
789 Komiya (n 659) 101–102.
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Moreover, the Japanese space agency participates in  IADC, which also involves,  inter
alia, the space agencies of China, India and South Korea.790
  7.6.9  Launchers
   7.6.9.1  Major domestic measures
The development and maintenance of domestic space launcher capabilities and capacities
are a central element in the government’s current space programme.
The particular focus is on the further development and maintenance of the two domestic
space launching sites (Tanegashima Space Center; Uchinoura Space Center) and related
facilities,791 as well as Japan’s three current main government-promoted launcher series,
namely the H-IIA series, H-IIB series and  Epsilon rocket series. Altogether, they allow
for  domestic  launches  of  near-Earth  to  deep  space  missions,  including  for  uncrewed
services to the ISS. Notably, the production of all three launcher series involves private
sector contractors. H-IIA and H-IIB launch services have already been privatised, and the
current launcher under development, named H3, shall be privatised in the future. In the
end, H3 shall  supersede the H-IIA series and improve Japan’s competitiveness in the
international launch market.792
Table 4: Overview of main launcher series currently promoted by the Japanese government
Launcher Maiden flight Project responsibility Primary contractor for launchers Launch service provider Launchi
ng site
H-IIA 2001 MEXT through JAXA Since  2002:  Mitsubishi  Heavy
Industries, LTD
Privatised 2007: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD Tanegashima Space Center,
JAXA
H-IIB 2009 MEXT through JAXA Since  2003:  Mitsubishi  Heavy
Industries, LTD
Privatised 2013: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD Tanegashima Space Center,
JAXA
H3 (FY2020) MEXT through JAXA Since  2014:  Mitsubishi  Heavy
Industries, LTD
To be privatised: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD Tanegashima Space Center,
JAXA
Epsilon 2013 MEXT through JAXA IHI Aerospace Co. JAXA Uchinoura  Space  Center,
JAXA
The Epsilon launcher series, constituting a next-generation solid propellant rocket series,
shall allow for simpler, more frequent and cheaper launches from Japanese soil, reducing
790 ‘Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee’ (n 343).
791 ‘Field  Centers’  (JAXA)  <http://global.jaxa.jp/about/centers/>  accessed  30  May 2017;  ‘Tanegashima
Space Center’  (JAXA) <http://global.jaxa.jp/about/centers/tnsc/> accessed 30 May 2017; ‘Uchinoura
Space Center’ (JAXA) <http://global.jaxa.jp/about/centers/usc/> accessed 30 May 2017.
792 Based  on  information  in:  Komiya  (n  659)  41–44;  ‘Company  History’  (MHI)
<http://h2a.mhi.co.jp/en/launch/history/index.html#anc01>  accessed  30  May  2017;  ‘H-IIA  Launch
Vehicle’  (JAXA) <http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/h2a/> accessed 30 May 2017; ‘H-IIB Launch
Vehicle’  (JAXA)  <http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/h2b/>  accessed  30  May  2017;  ‘H3  Launch
Vehicle’  (JAXA)  <http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/h3/>  accessed  30  May  2017;  ‘Tanegashima
Space Center’ (n 791).
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the  price  tag  by  –  depending  on  the  report  –  from  a  third  to  a  half  of  that  of  its
predecessor, the M-V rocket.793
Adding to all that, Japan also takes steps towards improving domestic launcher services
by promoting  research and development  of reusable space  transportation  systems and
creating  the  world’s  best  performing,  cheapest  and  lightest  Liquefied  Natural  Gas
propulsion system.794
Overall, three space-related state preferences arguably underlie these measures:
First, there is little doubt that these measures fit the pursuit of the government’s space-
related autonomy-oriented state preference of developing and maintaining the domestic
human,  industrial,  scientific  and technological  capabilities  and capacities  necessary to
engage, at least on a basic level, independently in the pursuit of other space-related state
preferences. The autonomous implementation of the government’s other domestic space
undertakings rests on domestic launch capabilities and capacities.
Second,  these  measures  are  clearly  oriented  towards  supporting  the  pursuit  of  the
government’s space-related socioeconomic state preference, especially the space industry
and market-related target areas.
Third, it is likely that these measures shall contribute to the pursuit of the government’s
two space-related political state preferences. After all, there is still only a limited number
of  states,  especially  in  the  Asian  region,  with  a  broad  range  of  domestic  launching
capabilities and capacities. Japan’s impressive capabilities and capacities can foster the
domestic  standing  of  the  democratically  elected  Japanese  government,  as  well  as
showcase Japan’s technological sophistication to the international community.
793 Based  on  information  in:  Komiya  (n  659)  41,45-46;  ‘Epsilon  Launch  Vehicle’  (JAXA)
<http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/epsilon/>  accessed  30  May  2017;  Stephen  Clark,  ‘Japan’s
“affordable”  Epsilon  Rocket  Triumphs  on  First  Flight’  (Spaceflight  Now,  14  September  2013)
<https://spaceflightnow.com/epsilon/sprinta/130914launch/#.UjSh0cbkt8E>  accessed  30  May  2017;
Stephen Clark, ‘Japan Schedules Launch of Innovative Epsilon Rocket’ (Spaceflight Now, 5 November
2012) <https://spaceflightnow.com/news/n1211/05epsilon/> accessed 30 May 2017; ‘Uchinoura Space
Center’ (n 791).
794 Komiya (n 659) 77–80.
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   7.6.9.2  Major cooperative measures
This study has found no major government-promoted cooperative launcher measure (with
a  presumed high potential  for)  involving other  preeminent  Asian  governments  in  the
space sector.
  7.6.10  Human resources
   7.6.10.1  Major domestic measures
It is well-known that the Japanese government promotes a variety of domestic measures
to foster Japan’s space-related human resource development. Thus, this topic does not
need to be discussed in detail here. For example, JAXA has a Space Education Center.795
Also, various Japanese universities offer space-related education.796
Overall,  these  measures  mostly  fit  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  space-related
autonomy-oriented state preference of developing and maintaining the domestic human,
industrial, scientific and technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at
least on a basic level, independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences.
After  all,  the  successful  implementation  of  domestic  space  undertakings  depends  on
access to the relevant experts within the country.
   7.6.10.2  Major cooperative measures
Excluding APRSAF-related measures, there appear to be not many major government-
promoted cooperative space-related human resources-specific measures (with a presumed
high potential for) involving other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector.
The most prominent attempt in this regard seems to be the Indian-Japanese MoU 2016
addressing  the  exchange  of  personnel,  joint  organisation  of  workshops  and  training
programmes regarding their cooperative undertakings.797
795 ‘Space Education Center’ (JAXA) <http://edu.jaxa.jp/en/> accessed 14 October 2018.
796 Eg:  ‘Best  Global  Universities  for  Space  Science  in  Japan’  (U.S.  News)
<https://www.usnews.com/education/best-global-universities/japan/space-science>  accessed  14
October 2018; ‘Institute of Space Law’ (Keio University) <http://space-law.keio.ac.jp/> accessed 14
October 2018.
797 ‘Memorandum of  Understanding between  the  Indian Space  Research  Organisation (ISRO) and the
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space’ (n
424).
201
State  preference-wise,  this  study  finds  it  reasonable  to  argue  that  the  Japanese
government  presumably  considers  the  engagement  with  India,  at  a  minimum,  as  a
temporarily useful tool for the pursuit of its current space-related autonomy-oriented state
preference of developing and maintaining the domestic human, industrial, scientific and
technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level,
independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences.
Also, the Japanese government might hope that such cooperation benefits the pursuit of
its space-related political state preference of advancing Japan’s international prestige and
influence (with India).
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8  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK / North Korea)  
 8.1  Analytical considerations
One  of  this  study’s  main  challenges  in  its  particular  assessment  of  the  DPRK
government’s  current  space  programme  is  that  public  access  to  (translated)  domestic
space-related  political  and  legal  documents  is  sparse.798 In  addition,  all  government
policies and strategies are subject to, and all domestic legislation ranks below the – easily
shiftable and not necessarily always publicly distributed – words and directives of the
national leader.799 Also, there is the great challenge that foreign media articles about the
country are prone to engaging in wild speculations and spreading rumours.800 Altogether,
the  limited  public  access  to  such  documents  and  the  national  leader’s  words  and
directives, as well as the emergence of speculations and rumours, presumably result from
the North Korean government’s strict control over the flow of information on domestic
matters and the well-known infusion of its officially distributed information with state
propaganda.  According to Green,  Kim Jong-il  (KJI),  North Korea’s previous  national
leader,  held  the  position  ‘that  it  is  to  North  Korea’s  advantage  for  the  international
community to be unable to understand, preferably not even to know, what is going on
inside the country and by what principles it is being run.’801
This study tackles these issues by carefully considering and interpreting a wide array of
English  material  addressing  aspects  of  the  DPRK  government’s  current  space
programme, with special  attention given to the national  leader’s positions.  Ultimately,
this produces relatively robust findings regarding this study’s primary research interest.
 8.2  Main domestic political and legal documents
Without claiming completeness and while acknowledging that they are subordinate to and
easily modified or overturned by the national leader’s words and directives, this study’s
798 This  is  coherent  with  Goedde’s  statement  that  ‘[l]egal  materials  on  North  Korea  in  the  English
language  are  not  readily  available  to  the  general  public,  with  the  exception  of  a  few law journal
articles.’  Patricia  Goedde,  ‘UPDATE:  Overview  of  the  North  Korean  Legal  System  and  Legal
Research’ (Hauser Global Law School Program, New York University School of Law, March 2011)
<http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/North_Korea1.html> accessed 27 February 2018.
799 For more information on the national leader’s authority, see this study’s Section 8.3.
800 Anna Broinowski, ‘True or False: The “kooky” North Korea Stories They Couldn’t Make up – but Did’
(The  Guardian,  1  June  2015)  <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jun/01/true-or-false-kooky-
north-korea-stories> accessed 13 March 2017.
801 Christopher Green,  ‘Wrapped in a Fog: On the North Korean Constitution and the Ten Principles’
(Sino-NK,  5  June  2012)  <http://sinonk.com/2012/06/05/chris-green-on-10-principles/>  accessed  18
April 2016.
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accessed material  suggests that at  least  the following few domestic political  and legal
documents play an important role in guiding the government’s current space programme.
Their known substance receives special scrutiny throughout this chapter.
Even though not much information about its particular provisions is publicly available,
the  central  piece  of  domestic  legislation  affecting  the  government’s  current  space
programme  seems  to  be  the  country’s  national  space  law  called  ‘DPRK  Law  on
Developing  Space’.  Reportedly,  the  Supreme  People’s  Assembly  (SPA),  constituting
North Korea’s unicameral national legislature, adopted it in 2013.802 Also, there is the
‘Bylaw  of  the  National  Aerospace  Development  Administration  of  the  Democratic
People’s Republic  of Korea’803 (NADA Bylaw).  Apparently,  it  primarily  regulates the
National  Aerospace Development  Administration  (NADA) that  serves  as  the DPRK’s
national space agency.
Based on the  known content  of  the NADA Bylaw, the national  space law steers  the
government’s  space  policy.804 Document-wise,  the  latter  appears  to  encompass,  at  a
minimum,  ‘5-year  plan[s]  for  national  aerospace  development.’805 The  first  such plan
supposedly run from 2012-2016 and the  second and presumably  currently  active  one
commenced in 2017. Their specific content remains obscure.806
 8.3  Basic domestic decision-making system
Coherent with the aforementioned opaqueness of domestic matters, the basic domestic
decision-making system behind the formulation and implementation of the government’s
802 ‘7th Session of the 12th SPA Held (Updated)’ (North Korea Leadership Watch, 1 April 2013) <https://
nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/2013/04/01/7th-session-of-the-12th-spa-held/>  accessed  22  April
2016. This study was unable to obtain an English translation of this law.
803 For an unofficial English translation of the NADA Bylaw, see: UNSC ‘Report of the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)’  (27 February 2016) UN Doc S/2016/157 112–113.
Further references to the NADA Bylaw are to this translation.
804 This is particularly indicated in NADA Bylaw arts 2,5. Since there is no evidence for two national
space laws in the DPRK, the ‘Law of the DPRK on the Space Exploration’ referred to in NADA Bylaw
art 2 can be considered to be identical with the aforementioned ‘Law on Space Development’. For more
information on NADA, see this study’s Section 8.3.
805 For example, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the DPRK ‘launched a sci-tech
satellite  Kwangmyongsong  3-2  in  December  2012  and  an  earth  observation  satellite
Kwangmyongsong-4 in February 2016 under the 2016 plan of the 5-year plan for national aerospace
development.’ ‘DPRK, Full-Fledged Space Power’  (KCNA,  31 August 2016) <http://www.kcna.kp>
accessed 6 February 2017.
806 ‘DPRK  Launch  Plans’  (GlobalSecurity.org)
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/dprk/launch.htm> accessed 11 April 2017. This study was
unable to obtain English copies of these plans.
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current space programme is not known in detail. In the end, this study deems it sufficient
for its particular assessment of the said programme to be aware of the following context,
which also showcases the already stressed domestic political and legal dominance of the
national leader.
Proclaimed by Kim Il-sung (KIS) under the prospect of Socialism in 1948, the DPRK
has, de facto, developed into a totalitarian dictatorship. It is politically organised through
a  ‘monolithic  leadership  system’807 that  is  enshrined  in the  quasi-supra-constitutional
document titled ‘Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System’ (10
Principles).808 The 10 Principles in their current version determine, inter alia, that a single
political party, namely the Workers’ Party of Korea809 (WPK), governs the DPRK. The
party has absolute authority over the state and the military.810 However, what is more, the
10 Principles and the ‘Charter of the Workers’ Party of Korea’ (WPK Charter) together
stipulate that the WPK is ultimately under the absolute authority of a sole leader. It makes
the latter, nowadays usually addressed as ‘Supreme Leader’ in English (or ‘Suryeong’ in
a transliteration from the Korean language), consequently the highest military authority
and  effectively  –  but  not  nominally  –811 the  head  of  the  North  Korean  state  and
government.812 Observers  agree  that  SPA  merely  acts  as  a  rubber-stamp  institution
807 ‘Kim Jong Un Elected Chairman of WPK’ (KCNA, 10 May 2016) <http://www.kcna.kp> accessed 16
May 2016.
808 Based  on  information  in:  ‘Ten  Principles  for  the  Establishment  of  the  One-Ideology  System’
(Columbia Law School, 8 April 2003) <http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North
%20Korea%20materials/10%20principles%20of%20juche.html>  accessed  18  April  2016;  Green  (n
801); Fyodor Tertitskiy, ‘The Party’s 10 Principles, Then and Now’ (NK News, 11 December 2014)
<https://www.nknews.org/2014/12/the-partys-10-principles-then-and-now/>  accessed  16  April  2016;
Robert Collins, ‘Marked for Life: Songbun North Korea’s Social Classification System’ (Report, The
Committee  for  Human  Rights  in  North  Korea  2012)  15
<https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_Songbun_Web.pdf>  accessed  11  April  2017.  The  10
Principles’ title here follows the translation offered by the Columbia Law School. For slight variations
of their English title, see Tertitskiy’s and Collins’ texts.
809 ‘Workers’ Party of Korea’ (Naenara) <http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/politics/?organization> accessed
20 March 2017.
810 Tertitskiy (n 808). Since their first publication in 1974, the 10 Principles have been merely revised once
in 2013. Tertitskiy’s article includes an unofficial English translation of the basic content of the updated
10 Principles.
811 The DPRK’s current nominal head of state is Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of SPA:
Sang-Hun Choe, ‘Sister of North Korean Leader Arrives in South Korea for Highly Symbolic Trip’
(The  New  York  Times,  8  February  2018)  <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/world/asia/north-
korea-kim-sister-olympics.html> accessed 30 August 2018; the DPRK’s current Premier is Pak Pong-
ju: ‘Pak Pong Ju’ (North Korea Leadership Watch) <http://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/pak-pong-ju/>
accessed 30 August 2018.
812 For information on the WPK Charter as of 2010, see: Jin Ha Kim, ‘The North Korean Workers’ Party
Charter Revisions and Their Political  Dynamics’ (2011) CO 11-08 Online Series 1, 1–2; and as of
2016, see: ‘Fourth and Final Day of the 7th Party Congress’ (North Korea Leadership Watch, 10 May
2016)  <https://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/2016/05/10/fourth-and-final-day-of-the-7th-party-
congress/> accessed 13 March 2017; for information on the 10 Principles, see: Tertitskiy (n 808); see
also the argument in: Collins (n 808) 15–16. For the English and Korean title of the national leader, see,
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publicly approving the Supreme Leader’s and his WPK’s decisions.813 Similarly, ‘[t]he
courts  and  procuracies  are  dependent  on  the  KWP814[...]’,815 and  thus  ultimately  the
Supreme Leader.
It  is  from this  context  that  the  Supreme Leader’s  decisions  and positions  need to  be
treated as politically and legally dominant in the formulation and implementation of the
government’s  space  programme.  Overall,  by putting  Collins’  findings  for the time of
previous Supreme Leader  KJI into a more general layout,  ‘[t]he specific  hierarchy of
authority in North Korea is the words or personal directives of [... the Supreme Leader];
followed by the [… 10 Principles], KWP directives—particularly the policy guidance of
the KWP Secretariat’s  Organization and Guidance Department;  the KWP Charter and
domestic  civil  laws;  and  finally  the  [...]  North  Korean  Constitution[,  titled  ‘Socialist
Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (DPRK Constitution)]816.’817 
Kim Jong-un (KJU) - son of previous Supreme Leader KJI and grandson of state founder
and  the  DPRK’s  first  national  leader KIS – has  assumed  the  (apparently  hereditary)
position as Supreme Leader since the death of KJI in December 2011.818 His control over
the WPK, the state, including the government, and the military is fully formalised by
granting him the officially  most  influential  party,  state  and military  offices  and some
particular titles established in the WPK Charter and the DPRK Constitution.  In short,
KJU currently leads the party as Chairman of the WPK (previously: First Secretary of the
WPK). He guides the state, and thus effectively the DPRK Cabinet, SPA and other state
for example, Kim’s paper and Collins’ report.
813 Maria Rosaria Coduti, ‘The State Affairs Commission and the Consolidation of Kim Jong Un’s Power’
(NK  News,  13  July  2016)  <https://www.nknews.org/2016/07/the-state-affairs-commission-and-the-
consolidation-of-kim-jong-uns-power/>  accessed  29  January  2017;  Seol  Song  Ah,  ‘Inside  North
Korea’s  Supreme  People’s  Assembly’  (The  Guardian,  22  April  2014)
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/22/inside-north-koreas-supreme-peoples-assembly>
accessed  21  April  2016;  Dae-Kyu  Yoon,  ‘The  Constitution  of  North  Korea:  Its  Changes  and
Implications’ (2003) 27(4) Fordham International Law Journal 1289, 1292–1294.
814 KWP stands for Korean Workers’ Party. It is another translation and abbreviation for the WPK.
815 Goedde (n 798).
816 For  an  English  translation  of  the  DPRK  Constitution  (as  last  amended  2016),  see:  ‘Socialist
Constitution’ (Naenara) <http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/politics/?rule> accessed 27 January 2017. If
not mentioned otherwise, future references to the DPRK Constitution are to this English version.
817 Collins (n 808) 15.
818 Based  on  information  in:  ‘North  Korean  Leader  Kim  Jong-Il  Dies  “of  Heart  Attack”’  (BBC,  19
December 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16239693> accessed 18 January 2018; Ken E
Gause, North Korean Leadership Dynamics and Decision-Making under Kim Jong-Un. A Second Year
Assessment (COP-2014-U-006988-Final,  CNA  2014)  <https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/COP-
2014-U-006988-Final.pdf> accessed 14 April 2016; Chad O’Carroll, ‘Kim Jong Un yet to Consolidate
Power: Expert’ (NK News, 2 November 2015) <https://www.nknews.org/2015/11/kim-jong-un-yet-to-
consolidate-power-expert/> accessed 14 April 2016.
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institutions, as Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK819 (previously:
First Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK).820 Furthermore, the
DPRK  Constitution  officially  links  this  chairman  position  to  the  title  of  ‘supreme
leader’.821 On the military side, KJU is Chairman of the Central Military Commission of
the WPK,822 while the DPRK Constitution declares that as Chairman of the State Affairs
Commission he also controls all the state’s armed forces and receives the additional title
of ‘supreme commander’.823
The domestic  actors  under  KJU with the  most  influence  on  –  the  Supreme Leader’s
decisions and positions regarding – the government’s current space programme are likely
high-ranking members in the WPK, the state and the military, as well as loyalists in other
positions  close  to  the  Supreme  Leader,  e.g.  certain  family  members824 and  personal
political staff.825
While the provisions in the NADA Bylaw allow for it being considered the government’s
national space agency on paper,826 the actual role of NADA, presumably replacing the
Korean Committee of Space Technology827 (KCST) that was established in the 1980s
under  the  rule  of  KIS,828 in  the  formulation  and implementation  of  the  government’s
819 See especially DPRK Constitution arts 103,106,109,123-126.
820 Combination of information in: Coduti (n 813); Gause (n 818) 1, 9; ‘Seventh Congress of WPK Closes’
(KCNA, 5 October 2016) <http://www.kcna.kp> accessed 12 May 2016.
821 DPRK Constitution art 100.
822 ‘Fourth and Final Day of the 7th Party Congress’ (n 812).
823 DPRK Constitution art 102.
824 For example, his sister Kim Yo-jong: Choe (n 811).
825 See the State Affair Commission members chosen during the 4th Session of the 13th SPA in 2016:
Coduti (n 813); Pinkston holds that the main domestic actors for space policy-making under KJI were
the national leader and his senior advisors, whereas the latter are made up by loyalists connected to the
WPK,  the  National  Defence  Commission,  and  the  military:  Daniel  A Pinkston,  ‘North  and  South
Korean Space Development: Prospects for Cooperation and Conflict’ (2006) 4(2) Astropolitics 217–
218 <207-227>.
826 According to NADA Bylaw art 3, the administration belongs to the DPRK Cabinet and is led by an
administrator in the rank of a minister. Pursuant to NADA Bylaw art 4, its tasks involve drawing up
comprehensive plans for the state’s space undertakings, whereas these plans have to be approved by
SPA through the DPRK Cabinet;  offering  unified guidance for  the implementation of  those plans;
monitoring and controlling all  elements related to national  space undertakings;  guiding production,
assembly and launch of necessary space equipment and launchers; processing and disseminating space-
derived data; being responsible for the safety of space activities and authentication of space exploration
technology;  and  engaging  in  cooperation  and  exchanges  with  foreign  and  international  space
organisations.
827 Sometimes: Korean Committee for Space Technology.
828 UNSC ‘Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)’ (23 February
2015) UN Doc S/2015/131 22; Moltz (n 32) 170.
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present space programme since its creation in 2013829 remains speculative.830 The same is
true for less prominent domestic institutions thought or claiming to contribute to national
space undertakings.831
 8.4  Space-related state preferences
The  evaluation  of  the  state  preferences  underlying  the  government’s  current  space
programme  profits  considerably  from  certain  knowledge  of  the  domestic  satellite
launches as of 2017 and a basic understanding of the present main pillars of the North
Korean state ideology.
  8.4.1  Domestic satellite launches as of 2017
In  short,  the  government  has  promoted  the  domestic  launches  of  five  domestically
manufactured  satellites  christened  Kwangmyongsong (KMS) between  1998 and 2016.
The  satellites’  designations  were  KMS-1/-2/-3/-3-2/-4,  respectively.  The  domestic
launcher series used were Paektusan-1, Unha-2, Unha-3 and (apparently with an identical
name to the satellite series) Kwangmyongsong. The government’s official position is that
all these satellite missions except for KMS-3 were successful. However, reliable foreign
observers argue that the KMS-1, KMS-2 and KMS-3 missions failed entirely. Also, they
consider the KMS-3-2 and KMS-4 missions as to have been (at most) partially successful
because these two satellites seem to have reached outer space but to have never been
(fully)  operational.  Table  5  provides  a  quick  overview of  these  and  some additional
fundamental facts and assumptions surrounding the five KMS missions:832
829 SPA initially decided on 01.04.2013 to set up a DPRK State Space Development Bureau: ‘7th Session
of the 12th SPA Held (Updated)’ (n 802); this bureau was later rebranded into NADA. See: ‘National
Aerospace Development  Administration of DPRK’ (KCNA,  31 March 2014) <http://www.kcna.kp>
accessed 1 April  2016; ‘For North Korea,  New Space Agency Name and Logo Are Anything but
“Nothing”’  (collectSPACE,  2  April  2014)  <http://www.collectspace.com/news/news-040214a-north-
korea-nada-space-agency.html> accessed 1 April 2016.
830 This study’s Section 8.4.5 addresses one particular issue in this regard.
831 For example, there is a Korea Space Association with the official ‘mission [...] to promote the peaceful
development and utilization of space, a wealth common to mankind, through brisk academic exchanges
at  home  and  abroad.’  ‘Korea  Space  Association  Organized  in  DPRK’  (KCNA,  27  June  2016)
<http://www.kcna.kp> accessed 11 April 2017; and a potential contribution of the State Academy of
Science: Harvey, Smid and Pirard (n 500) 449.
832 Overview in Table 5 based on information in: Harvey, Smid and Pirard (n 500) 441–485; Moltz (n 32)
170–171; Lele,  Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality? (n 32) 70-72,130-132; Harding (n 534) 175–
177;  ‘DPRK  to  Launch  Application  Satellite’  (NCNK,  16  March  2012)
<http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/DPRK%20March%2016%20Satellite
%20Announcement.pdf>  accessed  5  March  2017;  Nick  Macfie,  ‘North  Korea  Gives  Details  of
“Weather”  Satellite Launch’  (Reuters,  27 March  2012) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-
summit-satellite/north-korea-gives-details-of-weather-satellite-launch-idUSBRE82Q01S20120327>
accessed  5  March  2018;  ‘North  Korea  Rocket  Launch  Fails’  (BBC,  13  April  2012)
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Table 5: Overview of North Korean satellite launch attempts between 1998-2016
Launch date Launcher Payload Official mission Additional information
31.08.1998
(KJI)
Paektusan-1 KMS-1 Laying the foundation
for development and 
launch of practical 
satellites
• On 04.09.1998, the DPRK announced that it put a satellite into orbit 
successfully;
• Independent sources failed to confirm this claim. Foreign observers 
mostly treat the mission either as a failed satellite launch attempt or argue 
that it was a concealed long-range ballistic missile test;




Unha-2 KMS-2 Experimental 
communications 
satellite to foster 
development and 
launch of practical 
satellites
• The DPRK claims that the mission was successful;
• Foreign observers determined that the launcher and its potential payload 
fell into the Pacific ocean. Foreign researchers either treat the mission as a 
failed launch attempt or argue that it was again a concealed long-range 
ballistic missile test;




Unha-3 KMS-3 EO for weather 
forecasting to foster 
agriculture and other 
economic fields
• The DPRK acknowledged that the mission failed;
• The launcher and potential payload fell into the ocean;
• Some foreign observers consider the launch a concealed long-range 
ballistic missile test;
• Launcher presumably was an upgraded Unha-2 launcher.
12.12.2012
(KJU)
Unha-3 KMS-3-2 EO for crops 
surveying, forest 
resources and natural 
disasters
• The DPRK claims that the mission was successful;
• Payload presumably was a replacement for KMS-3;
• Foreign observers confirmed that the satellite reached orbit, but their 
further observations indicate that it was tumbling and never operational.
07.02.2016
(KJU)
Kwangmyongsong KMS-4 EO • The DPRK claims that the mission was successful;
• Foreign observers confirmed that KMS-4 reached orbit. However, first 
observations indicated that it was tumbling and missed its intended orbit 
slightly. Later observations suggest that the DPRK has been able to 
communicate with the satellite and to stabilise it. So far, foreign observers 
have been unable to detect any data transmission from the satellite. 
Consequently, they consider the satellite not (fully) operational;
• Launcher may have been a renamed (and upgraded) Unha-3 launcher.
Notably,  the  designations  Paektusan-1,  referring  to Mount  Paektu,  and
Kwangmyongsong, meaning ‘Lodestar’ or ‘Bright Star’, are homages to Supreme Leader
KJI.833 According to the official KJI biography, the soldiers who first congratulated on his
birth in Paektusan Secret Camp were ‘[w]ishing him to become the lodestar that would
brighten the future of Korea, [… and] hailed him as the Bright Star of Mt. Paektu.’834
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17698438>  accessed  6  April  2017;  ‘DPRK  National
Aerospace  Development  Administration  Releases  Report  on  Satellite  Launch’  (KCNA,  7  February
2016) <http://www.kcna.kp> accessed 1 April 2016; John Schilling, ‘North Korea’s Space Launch: An
Initial  Assessment’  (38  North,  9  February  2016)  <http://38north.org/2016/02/jschilling020816/>
accessed 8 April 2016; Andrea Shalal and David Brunnstrom, ‘North Korea Satellite in Stable Orbit but
Not Seen Transmitting: U.S. Sources’ (Reuters, 9 February 2016) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
northkorea-satellite-orbit/north-korea-satellite-achieves-stable-orbit-u-s-official-idUSKCN0VI1XN>
accessed  8  March  2018;  Michael  Ellemann,  ‘North  Korea  Launches  Another  Large  Rocket:
Consequences  and  Options’  (10  February  2016)  <http://38north.org/2016/02/melleman021016/>
accessed 5 April 2017; UN Secretariat ‘Information furnished in conformity with the Convention on
Registration of  Objects  Launched into Outer  Space  Note  verbale  dated  22 January  2013 from the
Permanent  Mission of  the Democratic  People’s  Republic  of Korea to the United Nations (Vienna)
addressed to the Secretary-General’  (24 January 2013) UN Doc ST/SG/SER.E/662; UN Secretariat
‘Information furnished in conformity with the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space Note verbale dated 25 April 2016 from the Permanent Mission of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea to the United Nations (Vienna) addressed to the Secretary-General’ (9 May 2016)
UN Doc ST/SG/SER.E/768.
833 Based on information in: ‘Kwangmyongsong No. 1 “Satellite” Compendium’ (North Korean Economy
Watch)  <http://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/military/rocket-tests/paektusan-1/>  accessed  11
March 2017; Harvey, Smid and Pirard (n 500) 445–446.
834 Kim  Jong  Il  Biography  1 (Foreign  Languages  Publishing  House  2005)  3
<www.naenara.com.kp/en/book/download.php?4+4013> accessed 4 April 2017.
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  8.4.2  Main pillars of North Korean state ideology
The North Korean state ideology usually endorses the national leader’s primary political
agenda.835 As such, a basic understanding of the present main pillars of the state ideology
can assist in the correct identification of the (leader-subservient)  government’s current
space-related state preferences. As of 2017, this study holds that the main pillars are the
Byungjin line, Juche philosophy, Songun politics and Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.
   8.4.2.1  Byungjin line
On 31.03.2013,  the  WPK under  KJU adopted  ‘a  new  strategic  line  on  carrying  out
economic  construction[,  which  is  often  connected  with  a  call  to  improve  the  North
Korean people’s living standard,]836 and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously
under the prevailing situation and to meet the legitimate requirement of the developing
revolution.’  Through its  implementation,  the country is  thought to ‘emerge as a great
political,  military  and socialist  economic  power  and a  highly-civilized  country  which
steers the era of independence.’837 This line is nowadays commonly known as  Byungjin
line, meaning to ‘move two things forward simultaneously’.838
   8.4.2.2  Juche philosophy
Juche,  commonly referred to as meaning ‘self-reliance’,  is  a political  philosophy first
introduced in the 1950s and attributed  to  the political  thought  of KIS. It  is  currently
promoted through, e.g., the 10 Principles and Art. 3 DPRK Constitution. For this study, it
is  enough  to  understand  that  Juche advocates  three  principles  of  self-reliance.  More
precisely, the principles are ‘the line of [a)] independence, [b)] self-sustenance, and [c)]
self-defense to [a)]  consolidate  the political  independence of the country (chaju),  [b)]
835 This argument rests upon the discussions of key ideological phrases in: Rüdiger Frank, ‘Can North
Korea Prioritize Nukes and the Economy At the Same Time?’ (2014) 9(1) Global Asia 38, 39; Grace
Lee, ‘The Political Philosophy of Juche’ (2003) 3(1) Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 105, 112;
‘Juche  [Self-Reliance  or  Self-Dependence]’  (Globalsecurity.org)
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/juche.htm>  accessed  5  May  2016;  ‘Songun
Chongch’i  [Army  First]’  (Globalsecurity.org)
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/songun-chongchi.htm> accessed 5 May 2016.
836 For example: ‘Kim Jong Un Reviews Successes Made by WPK in Period under Review’ (KCNA, 7
May 2016) <http://www.kcna.kp> accessed 12 May 2016; ‘Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry
Urges  U.S.  to  Choose  between  Two  Options’  (NCNK,  12  February  2013)
<http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/DPRK_FM_3rd_Nuke_Test.pdf>  accessed  5  March
2017.
837 As cited in: ‘2013 Plenary Meeting of WPK Central Committee and 7th Session of Supreme People’s
Assembly’  (North  Korean  Economy  Watch,  1  April  2013)
<http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2013/04/01/2013-plenary-meeting-of-wpk-central-committee-and-
supreme-peoples-assembly/> accessed 11 May 2016 (first citation originally in bold).
838 Frank (n 835) 38.
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build up more solidly the foundations of an independent national economy capable of
insuring the complete unification,  independence,  and prosperity of our nation (charip)
and [c)] increasing the country’s defense capabilities, so as to safeguard the security of
the fatherland reliably by our own force (chawi), by splendidly embodying our Party’s
idea  of  juche in  all  fields.’839 The  Byungjin line  appears  to  accentuate  Juche’s  self-
sustenance and self-defence principles politically.
   8.4.2.3  Songun politics
Presumably  first  put  in  place  around  1995,  the  emergence  of  Songun politics,  often
referred to as ‘military-first’ politics,840 is generally attributed to KJI.841 In sum, it seems
to  give  domestic  prevalence  to  military  affairs  and  the  advancement  of  the  DPRK’s
military power (especially in the form of nuclear weapons), all with a particular view on
guaranteeing regime survival and upholding Juche’s self-defence principle.842 On paper, it
is still promoted through the DPRK Constitution (especially in its preamble and Art. 3),
the  WPK  Charter843 and  the  10  Principles.844 In  practice,  the  newly  embraced,  two-
pronged  Byungjin line  appears  to  have  replaced  Songun politics’  relevance  for  the
government.
   8.4.2.4  Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism
In 2012, the WPK adopted Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism as the WPK’s guiding ideological
compass. A closer look indicates that this has brought little new to the table in terms of
domestic politics. The phrase seems to mainly sum up the already officially promoted
political thought of KIS and KJI, of which Juche philosophy and Songun politics are core
elements, under a single ideological term.845
839 Lee, ‘The Political Philosophy of Juche’ (n 835) 105–107. As cited on 105-106 (numbering added); see
also: ‘Juche [Self-Reliance or Self-Dependence]’ (n 835).
840 Subin  Kim,  ‘“Songun”  Now  Fading  Away  in  North  Korea:  Expert’  (NK  News,  9  April  2015)
<https://www.nknews.org/2015/04/songun-now-fading-away-in-north-korea-expert/> accessed 7 April
2016.
841 ‘Songun Chongch’i [Army First]’ (n 835).
842 This  argument  rests  upon  the  information  and  discussions  in:  ‘Songun  Politics’  (Naenara)
<http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/politics/?songun>  accessed  27  September  2018;  Han  S  Park,
‘Military-First Politics (Songun): Understanding Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea’ (2007) 2(7) On Korea:
Academic Paper Series 1; Patrick DeRochie, ‘THE DRIVING FACTOR: Songun’s Impact on North
Korean  Foreign  Policy’  (2011)  XX(1)  International  Affairs  Review 1;  ‘Songun  Chongch’i  [Army
First]’ (n 835).
843 Kim, ‘The North Korean Workers’ Party Charter Revisions and Their Political Dynamics’ (n 812) 1–2.
844 Tertitskiy (n 808).
845 Based on information and statements in: Kim, ‘“Songun” Now Fading Away in North Korea: Expert’
(n 840); ‘KIMILSUNGISM-KIMJONGILISM-AN INTRODUCTION’ (Association for the Study of
Songun  Politics  UK)  <http://www.uk-songun.com/index.php?p=1_351_KIMILSUNGISM-
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  8.4.3  Socioeconomic state preferences
The government’s current space-related socioeconomic state preference appears, at least
publicly, to be the advancement of North Korea’s socioeconomic development.
In  2013,  KJU  prominently  linked  domestic  space-related  undertakings  to  the
implementation of the new party line. As introduced in Section 8.4.2.1, this (Byungjin)
line  calls,  among  others,  for  economic  construction  and  improvement  of  the  North
Korean people’s living standard. Coherently, NADA was established as a government-
related institution ‘[t]o step up economic construction and improve the people’s standard
of living by radically developing the space science and technology of the country and
manage all the space activities of the DPRK in a uniform way[…].’846 The NADA Bylaw
mirrors this.847 Also, later North Korean media articles have continuously corroborated
the national space programme’s socioeconomic orientation.848
The  publicly  available  information  further  allows  arguing  that  the  development  and
application  of  space-related  capabilities  and  capacities  to  deal  with  a  few
socioeconomically highly relevant issue-areas for North Korea is the primary target area
under  this  space-related  socioeconomic  state  preference.  After  all,  the  (ultimately
completely failed) KMS-3 mission should have supported weather forecasting to foster
North Korean agriculture and other economic fields, whereby the (at least partially failed)
KMS-3-2 mission should have served the areas of crop surveying, disaster management
and forestry.849 On paper, these make for very reasonable applications. The DPRK has
KIMJONGILISM-AN-INTRODUCTION> accessed 12 May 2016; ‘Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at
Military  Parade  and  Public  Procession  of  Pyongyang  Citizens’  (NCNK,  11  October  2015)
<http://www.ncnk.org/resources/news-items/kim-jong-uns-speeches-and-public-statements-1/kim-jong-
un-makes-speech-at-military-parade-and-public-procession-of-pyongyang-citizens>  accessed  7  April
2016.
846 ‘2013 Plenary Meeting of WPK Central Committee and 7th Session of Supreme People’s Assembly’ (n
837).
847 NADA Bylaw arts 2,5.
848 For example: ‘National Aerospace Development Administration of DPRK’ (n 829); ‘NADA Director
on  Successes  in  Outer  Space  Development’  (KCNA,  14  September  2015)  <http://www.kcna.kp>
accessed  13  April  2016;  ‘N.  Korea  Vows  to  Launch  More  Satellites’  (Yonhap  News  Agency,  30
December  2017)
<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/10/30/0200000000AEN20171030002800315.html>
accessed 28 February 2018.
849 Based  on information  in:  Macfie  (n 832);  and the  annex attached  to:  UN Secretariat  ‘Information
furnished in conformity with the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
Note verbale dated 22 January 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea to the United Nations (Vienna) addressed to the Secretary-General’ (24 January 2013) UN
Doc ST/SG/SER.E/662.
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only a limited volume of high-quality farmland. It also experienced a horrible famine in
1990, which was partly caused by natural disasters.850
The  analytical  problem at  this  point  is  that  the  government  has  never  provided  any
tangible proof whether this state preference and its primary target area have ever actually
been in place. There is a chance that they are nothing more than empty words. Several
previous studies of the DPRK government’s space programme have suggested that a mix
of political and national security-oriented considerations has dominated this programme
so far.851 Considering that and its further sections’ detection of much more signs for the
existence of other space-related state preferences,  this study has ultimately decided to
take this space-related socioeconomic state preference and its related target area only into
account  tentatively.  In  the  future,  more  and better  information  might  be  available  to
ascertain the DPRK government’s policy position beyond doubt.
  8.4.4  Political state preferences
Despite no official emphasis on them, the government currently appears to pursue two
space-related political state preferences. These are the securing of the legitimacy of the
Supreme  Leader’s  rule  over  the  DPRK,  and  the  advancement  of  North  Korea’s
international prestige and influence.
The first one develops from the narrative that the domestic satellite launches since 2012
seem, to some extent,  to be officially  displayed in a way that features North Korea’s
national  progress under KJU’s (new) rule and heaps praise on him. For example,  the
attempted but ultimately failed launch of KMS-3 took place in the wake of state founder
KIS’s 100th birth anniversary in 2012,852 which was a high-profile national event, and
only a few months after KJU assumed the position as Supreme Leader.853 Moreover, the
North Korean side presented – in contrast to reliable foreign observers that deem them as
partially successful at most – the launches of KMS-3-2, which followed only around eight
850 Jordan  Weissmann,  ‘How  Kim Jong  Il  Starved  North  Korea’  (The  Atlantic,  20  December  2011)
<https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/12/how-kim-jong-il-starved-north-korea/250244/>
accessed 11 April 2017.
851 For  example,  Harding  argues  that  the  DPRK pursues  its  space  programme to  uphold  its  strategic
position against South Korea and the USA as well as to foster national pride: Harding (n 534) 176–177;
Lele discusses the possibility that the DPRK uses its space programme for political and military power
projection: Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality? (n 32) 72.
852 ‘DPRK to Launch Application Satellite’ (n 832).
853 As introduced in Section 8.3, KJI died in December 2011.
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months after the DPRK officially acknowledged the failure of the KMS-3 mission, and
KMS-4 prominently as demonstrations of ‘[t]he DPRK’s tremendous strength as a space
power […] under the guidance of supreme leader Kim Jong Un.’854 Additionally, NADA
reportedly referred to the KMS-4 launch as ‘a gift of most intense loyalty presented by
our space scientists and technicians to the great Comrade  Kim Jong Un, our dignified
party, state and people.’855 Finally, according to a North Korean news report, KJU himself
lauded the DPRK’s alleged hydrogen bomb test in January 2016 and the KMS-4 mission
in February 2016 under his watch together ‘as landmarks in the nation’s history spanning
5  000  years,  thus  raising  the  dignity  and might  of  Juche  Korea  to  the  highest  level
possible[...].’856
Notably,  the  pursuit  of  this  space-related  political  state  preference  of  securing  the
legitimacy of the Supreme Leader’s rule over the DPRK also offers a reasonable (partial)
explanation for the government’s public yet inaccurate insistence that all except one of its
domestic satellite  missions have been successful.  An admission of complete  or partial
failure of more missions might undermine KJU’s status as an effective Supreme Leader
and thus ultimately his legitimacy to reign.
The  second  space-related  political  state  preference  of  advancing  North  Korea’s
international prestige and influence materialises, for one, from the state media’s linkage
of the launches of KMS-1, KMS-2, KMS-3-2 and KMS-4 to the display of the DPRK’s
national power.857 Reportedly, KJU further described the KMS-4 mission and the alleged
North Korean hydrogen bomb test in 2016 as to raise the might of Korea.858 Lastly, it
should not be forgotten that all DPRK satellite launches since 2009 have taken place in
spite of UNSC sanctions that have, inter alia, aimed at prohibiting North Korean satellite
launches  using  ballistic  missile  technology.859 Similar  to  the  Iranian  case,  it  is  not
unrealistic to interpret  this  space-related defiance as a deliberate  attempt to create  the
international  perception  of  an  independently  powerful  North  Korean state,  eventually
854 ‘DPRK, Full-Fledged Space Power’ (n 805). Citation in this first link (bold words as in source); for the
acknowledgement of launch failure, see: ‘North Korea Rocket Launch Fails’ (n 832).
855 ‘DPRK National Aerospace Development Administration Releases Report on Satellite Launch’ (n 832)
(bold words as in source).
856 ‘Kim  Jong  Un  Makes  Opening  Address  at  Seventh  Congress  of  WPK’  (KCNA,  6  May  2016)
<http://www.kcna.kp> accessed 12 May 2016.
857 ‘DPRK, Full-Fledged Space Power’ (n 805).
858 ‘Kim Jong Un Makes Opening Address at Seventh Congress of WPK’ (n 856).
859 For more information on these UNSC sanctions, see this study’s Section 8.5.
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designed to increase the country’s prestige and influence in a challenging international
environment.
Based on some further available information, this study concludes that there is at least
one  particular  target  area  under  this  second  space-related  political  state  preference,
namely the advancement of North Korea’s international status as a technologically and
scientifically powerful independent state vis-à-vis South Korea.
The main indicator is that some North Korean satellite launches so far appear to have
been linked to South Korean space launch attempts. For example, Moltz thinks that the
attempted but failed launch of KMS-2 in April 2009 might have been a North Korean
reaction  to  the  earlier  South  Korean announcement  to  conduct  the  (ultimately  failed)
maiden  flight  of  the  South’s  first  domestically  owned  satellite  launcher  around  June
2009.860 The KMS-3 and KMS-3-2 launch attempts in 2012 also took place at  a time
when the South Korean side was still laboriously trying to achieve the first successful
launch of a domestically owned satellite launcher.861 It is not farfetched to assume that the
DPRK government wanted to preempt such a South Korean success to ensure that the
first  internationally  recognised  satellite  launch  from Korean  soil  is  in  North  Korea’s
books after most of the international community has come to agree that KMS-1, and later
KMS-2 and KMS-3, never reached space. A successful domestic launch of a satellite is
commonly recognised as a notable scientific and technological feat and a generator of
international prestige. For both Koreas, international prestige can be considered a quite
important currency in the context of their inter-Korean competition of (quite different)
political  visions  for  the  Korean  unification.862 Ultimately,  North  Korea  received  the
international  launching  state  status  and  related  international  prestige  ahead  of  South
Korea  through  the  widely  recognised  launch  success  of  KMS-3-2,  even  though  the
satellite was likely never (fully) operational. Notably, this study has found no evidence
that the North Korean government has abandoned this exposed policy direction after its
launch success over the South. The inter-Korean competition is, after all, still alive and
well  by  2017.  It  needs,  however,  to  be  taken  into  account  that, while  the  DPRK
860 Moltz (n 32) 171.
861 For more information on the South Korean launch attempts, see this study’s Section 9.6.10.
862 For more information on these visions, see: Young Ho Park, ‘South and North Korea’s Views on the
Unification  of  the  Korean  Peninsula  and  Inter-Korean  Relations’  (2nd  KRIS-Brookings  Joint
Conference,  Seoul,  21 January 2014) <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Park-
Young-Ho-paper.pdf> accessed 16 August 2018.
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government might see itself in some sort of space race with the South, the latter does not
necessarily participate in it.863
  8.4.5  National security state preferences
The government has usually avoided linking its space programme to national security.
Nonetheless, the narrative outlined in this section suggests that the national security state
preference of safeguarding North Korea’s national security underlies the government’s
current space programme. Also, this narrative indicates that there are three related target
areas, namely the enhancement of the North Korean military’s strategic support system,
the establishment of efficient domestic nuclear weapon (counter-)strike capabilities, and
the prevention of the weaponisation of and an arms race in outer space.
A first indicator for the national security-orientation of the government’s current space
programme and the related target area of enhancing the North Korean military’s strategic
support system, presumably especially through remote sensing satellite capabilities and
capacities, is  NADA’s reported reference to the KMS-4 remote sensing mission as ‘the
proud fruition of the great Workers’ Party of Korea’s policy on attaching importance to
science  and  technology  and  an  epochal  event  in  developing  the  country’s  science,
technology,  economy  and  defense  capability.’864 A  second  indicator  is  the  DPRK
government’s presentation of satellite-derived images (of unknown origin) that allegedly
show the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defence system (THAAD system) deployed in
South Korea.865
Besides that, a robust sign for the space programme’s national security-orientation and
the related target area of establishing efficient domestic nuclear weapon (counter-)strike
capabilities is  the  connection  that  can  be  drawn  between  the  government-promoted
development and use of domestic space launchers and the  Byungjin line’s call to build
North Korean nuclear-armed forces. Most relevant here, KJU wants these forces to have
nuclear-armed ballistic missile strike capabilities.866
863 One observer at least made this conclusion about the DPRK space programme around a decade ago:
Harvey, Smid and Pirard (n 500) 474.
864 ‘DPRK National Aerospace Development Administration Releases Report on Satellite Launch’ (n 832).
865 ‘N. Korea Unveils “satellite Photos” of THAAD in S. Korea’ (Yonhap News Agency, 10 May 2017)
<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2017/05/10/0401000000AEN20170510009000315.html>
accessed 8 March 2018.
866 ‘Statement  of  DPRK  Government  on  Successful  Test-Fire  of  New-Type  ICBM’  (Naenara,  29
November 2017) <http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/news/?19+8709> accessed 5 March 2018.
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To start with, a report of the Panel of Experts set up by UNSC Resolution 1874 (2009) 867
emphasises that high-ranking officials related to the Munitions Industry Department of
the WPK Central Committee, which is understood to have a hand in the DPRK’s nuclear
weapon and ballistic missile programmes, already observed the launch of KMS-2 in 2009
together with KJI. Later, military-related individuals were a part of KJU’s selected small
delegations that inspected the  Unha-3 satellite launcher prior to its scheduled launch of
KMS-3-2, observed this satellite launch, and visited the launching site two days later.868
This has put officials  responsible for domestic space launches,  at  that  time especially
KCST members,  and officials  responsible  for  the DPRK ballistic  missile  and nuclear
programme in close proximity.869
Additionally,  the same Panel of Experts concluded in another report  that the DPRK’s
claim in March 2013 to have a nuclear strike capability that can reach the US mainland,
despite having never achieved a successful intercontinental ballistic missile test by then,
‘only derive[s credibility] from the successful launch of the Unha-3 [carrying KMS-3-2 in
December 2012] and, in the Panel’s view, shows the substantive overlaps between the
country’s ballistic missile and space launch programmes.’870 Harding somewhat similarly
surmised that the DPRK’s satellite launches serve as measures of psychological warfare
against its opponents like Japan, South Korea and the USA.871 Obviously, the latter cannot
rule out that such launches do not translate into a certain North Korean (nuclear-armed)
missile strike potential,  especially considering the seclusion of the North Korean state,
including its military and space-related entities.
The establishment of NADA in 2013, including an assumed transfer of KCST’s space-
related functions, responsibilities and facilities to this new administration, has also not
provided  for  a  clear  division  between  domestic  space  launcher  and  ballistic  missile
development.  NADA’s  creation  happened  just  around  three  months  after  UNSC
867 The Panel assists the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) in its
sanction-related tasks. For more information, see: ‘1718 Sanctions Committee (DPRK)’ (UN) <https://
www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718> accessed 1 March 2017.
868 UNSC ‘Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)’ (11 June 2013)
UN Doc S/2013/337 19–20.
869 UNSC ‘Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)’ (23 February
2015) UN Doc S/2015/131 21; for KCST’s role in the KMS-3-2 launch, see also: ‘Kim Jong Un Visits
General Satellite Command and Control Center to Order U’nha-3 Launch’ (North Korea Leadership
Watch, 14 December 2012) <https://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/2012/12/14/kim-jong-un-visits-
general-satellite-command-and-control-center-to-order-unha-3-launch/> accessed 1 March 2017.
870 UNSC ‘Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)’ (6 March 2014)
UN Doc S/2014/147 16–17. Citation on 17.
871 Harding (n 534) 176.
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sanctioned  KCST,  as  well  as  some  of  this  committee’s  personnel,  due  to  KCST’s
suspected contributions to the country’s ballistic  missile programme.  It  allows for the
claim that NADA is primarily the new public front of KCST and an attempt to free the
latter’s involvement in domestic ballistic missile development from UNSC sanctions.872
Further supporting this claim, NADA has arguably been made an institution responsible
for all instead of just for civil space undertakings.873
Adding to the above, it should not be forgotten that the Paektusan-1 launcher allegedly
carrying  KMS-1  into  orbit  in  1998  can  also  already  be  traced  back  to  the  DPRK’s
Taepodong ballistic  missile  family  and  a  facility  with  responsibilities  for  its  weapon
programme.874 Various foreign observers even interpreted the launch event as a disguised
long-range ballistic missile test.875 Withal, it is suspicious that the DPRK left the six-party
talks with China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the USA, which aimed at  finding a
peaceful  solution  for  the  denuclearisation  of  the  Korean  peninsula,  after  a  UNSC
Presidential  Statement  criticised the KMS-2 launch in 2009.876 Lastly,  it  is  unlikely a
coincidence that the launches of KMS-2, KMS-3-2, and KMS-4 took place within one to
two months of the DPRK’s second, third and fourth nuclear weapon test, respectively.877
In support of its findings regarding the North Korean government’s other space-related
state preferences, this study further wants, similar to the Iranian case, to add here that,
despite the arguments for the existence of this  second national security-specific target
872 Based on information in: UNSC ‘Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874
(2009)’  (23  February  2015)  UN  Doc  S/2015/131  21–24;  UNSC ‘Report  of  the  Panel  of  Experts
established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)’ (27 February 2016) UN Doc S/2016/157 25; for the
sanctions, see: UNSC Res 2087 (22 January 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2087 annexes I,II.
873 Based  on  information  in:  Seong-Whun  Cheon,  ‘The  Kim Jong-Un  Regime’s  “Byungjin”  (Parallel
Development)  Policy of  Economy and Nuclear  Weapons  and  the “April  1st  Nuclearization  Law”’
(2013) CO 13-11 Online Series  1,  3;  ‘2013 Plenary  Meeting of WPK Central  Committee and 7th
Session of Supreme People’s Assembly’ (n 837); notably, NADA Bylaw art 5 apparently speaks of an
undefined ‘state interest’ in addition to a socioeconomic development purpose: ‘NADA [...] is obliged
to supervise and control all the space activities for successes achieved from them to be put into peaceful
purposes including the state interest, economic development and the improvement of people’s living as
specified in the [... national space law (that, unhelpfully in terms of confidence building, has still not
been made fully available to the international community)].’ Governments usually consider national
security a primary state interest.
874 Harvey, Smid and Pirard (n 500) 448.
875 Based  on information  in:  ibid 461–465;  Lele,  Asian  Space  Race:  Rhetoric  or  Reality? (n  32)  71;
Harding (n 534) 175.
876 ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Vehemently  Refutes  UNSC’s “Presidential  Statement”’  (KCNA,  14 April
2009)  <https://web.archive.org/web/20120910123631/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200904/
news14/20090414-23ee.html> accessed 8 March 2018.
877 Sam Kim, ‘A Timeline of North Korea’s Missile Launches and Nuclear Detonations’ (Bloomberg, 6
March  2017)  <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-06/north-korea-missile-launches-
nuclear-detonations-timeline> accessed 11 April 2017.
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area, it is short-sighted to try to understand this government’s present space programme
merely  from a  ballistic  missile  development  perspective.  For  example,  Ellemann  has
already found that all five North Korean satellite launch attempts between 1998 and 2006
‘were designed to maximize performance as a satellite launcher. In each case, the [...]
rockets  flew  on  trajectories  fully  consistent  with  a  satellite  launch.’878 Moreover,
renowned  ballistic  missile  expert  Schiller  has  concluded,  especially  after  analysing
salvaged wreckage of the Unha-3 rocket carrying KMS-3-2, that the Unha-3 model has
technical  specifications  that  point  towards  its  deliberate  deployment  as  a  satellite
launcher.  Such  specifications  have  likely  limited  its  overall  contribution  to  the
development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.879
Last but not least, a solid indicator that the North Korean government’s space programme
has a national  security-orientation,  as well  as the related target area of preventing the
weaponisation of and an arms race in outer space, is its opposition to the weaponisation
of outer space. Reportedly, the government has a voting pattern regarding related United
Nations  General  Assembly  (UNGA)  resolutions.880 Also,  the  national  space  law
apparently codifies this standpoint.881 Moreover, it is quite reasonable to argue that the
government  wants  to  prevent  the  weaponisation  of  and  an  arms  race  in  outer  space
considering that the DPRK’s national security might be challenged considerably if outer
space becomes truly weaponised and such an arms race commences. North Korea’s still
limited success in operating satellites suggests that the country would have a hard time to
keep up with the potential space weapon capabilities and capacities employed by such
states like the USA, Russia and China.
All  in all,  the available material  indicates that the North Korean government sees the
country’s national security mainly endangered by the USA, South Korea and Japan. The
878 Ellemann (n 832).
879 Based  on  information  in:  David  Wright,  ‘Markus  Schiller’s  Analysis  of  North  Korea’s  Unha-3
Launcher’  (All  Things  Nuclear,  22  February  2013)  <http://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/markus-
schillers-analysis-of-north-koreas-unha-3-launcher> accessed 8 April 2016; ‘How Worrisome Is a N.
Korean Rocket Launch, Really?’ (CBS News, 5 February 2016) <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-
korea-rocket-launch-fueling-experts-not-test-icbm-missile-technology/>  accessed  8  April  2016;
Schilling comes to a quite similar conclusion: John Schilling, ‘Satellites, Warheads and Rockets: Is
North  Korea’s  Space  Program Really  about  Missile  Development?’  (38  North,  5  February  2016)
<https://www.38north.org/2016/02/schilling092815/> accessed 8 March 2018.
880 Aliaksandr  Starun,  ‘North  Korean  Space  Program  Legitimization  Efforts:  Review  and  Policy
Recommendations’ (2017) 15(3) Astropolitics 251, 257–258.
881 ‘National Aerospace Development Administration of DPRK’ (n 829).
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government  refers  to  them as  hostile  nations.882 It  is  no surprise  considering  that  the
DPRK has never entered a peace treaty with South Korea and the USA since they halted
the  Korean  War  with  an  armistice  in  1953.883 Japan  and  North  Korea  also  failed  to
normalise their relationship since the end of Japan’s colonial rule over Korea.884
  8.4.6  Science and technology state preferences
Even though scientific and technological development is undoubtedly necessary for the
implementation of the major North Korean government-promoted space-related identified
in this study, there is no reliable evidence that the DPRK government currently pursues a
dedicated  space-related  science  and technology  state  preference  like  any of  the  other
preeminent Asian governments in the space sector. The North Korean government seems
to concentrate on the pursuit of other space-related state preferences.
Whether this situation changes in the coming years remains to be seen. Reportedly, North
Korea  intends  to  engage  in  human  spaceflight,  space  exploration  and  scientific
experiments in space in the future.885 As argued in, for example, the Chinese and Japanese
cases, activities in this context might be (partially) directed towards serving the pursuit of
a dedicated space-related science and technology state preference.
  8.4.7  Autonomy-oriented state preferences
This study contends on the basis of two indicators that the government currently has the
space-related  autonomy-oriented  state  preference  of  developing  and  maintaining  the
domestic  human,  industrial,  scientific  and  technological  capabilities  and  capacities
necessary to engage primarily independently in the pursuit of other space-related state
preferences.
882 Based  on information  in:  ‘Launch  of  Satellite  Kwangmyongsong-3 Is  Legitimate Right  of  DPRK:
KCNA’  (DPRK  Korean  Friendship  Association  Forum,  18  March  2012)
<http://korea-dpr.co/forum/index-p=1117.html> accessed  5  March  2017;  ‘Japan’s  Moves  for  Space
Militarization Censured by Rodong Sinmun’ (KCNA, 20 May 2014) <http://www.kcna.kp> accessed 13
April 2016; ‘Rodong Sinmun Accuses Japan of Stretching Its Tentacles of Aggression Even to Space’
(KCNA, 2 December 2015) <http://www.kcna.kp> accessed 13 April 2016.
883 ‘The Korean War Armistice’ (BBC, 5 March 2015) <http://www.bbc.com/news/10165796> accessed 6
March 2018.
884 Rachel Blomquist and Daniel  Wertz,  ‘An Overview of North Korea-Japan Relations’ (NCNK,  June
2015)  <https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/overview-north-korea-
japan-relations> accessed 17 March 2018.
885 Eric Talmadge, ‘AP Exclusive: North Korea Hopes to Plant Flag on the Moon’ (AP, 4 August 2016)
<http://bigstory.ap.org/article/88fa76909dec40b299658a34b489dc1a/ap-exclusive-north-korea-hopes-
plant-flag-moon> accessed 11 April 2017.
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First, the Juche philosophy is a central and longstanding element of North Korea’s state
ideology. As introduced in Section 8.4.2.2,  Juche endorses North Korean self-reliance,
especially  in  terms  of  political  independence,  economy-directed  self-sustenance  and
military-oriented self-defence. Thus, the government presumably prefers to develop and
maintain domestic space-related capabilities and capacities for the independent pursuit of
its present space-related political, socioeconomic and national security state preferences.
After all, these state preferences link quite well with the three principles of Juche.
Second, the current set of UNSC resolutions against the DPRK severely limits the latter’s
options  to  partake  in  international  space  cooperation.886 Therefore,  the  North  Korean
government  has to concentrate  on national  development  and maintenance of domestic
space-related capacities and capabilities in the pursuit of its present space-related state
preferences.
 8.5  Basic pol. & leg. framework concerning IGO-based regional space cooperation
The  DPRK  government  has  not  entered  any  regional  space-specific  IGO  so  far.
Moreover, there is no evidence that it has undertaken any serious steps in this direction in
recent years. Yet, there are indicators that it is, at least in theory and based on several
principles, presently not opposed to participating in such a cooperation mechanism.
Most prominently, according to a North Korean news report, ‘[t]he [national space] law
[from 2013] calls for cooperation with international agencies and other countries on the
principle of ensuring equality and mutual benefits, respecting international law and orders
for  the  space.  Clarified  in  the  law is  also  the  DPRK’s principled  stand to  reject  the
application of selectivity and double-standards in space activities and the weaponization
of  outer  space.’887 Within  the  confinements  of  the  national  space  law  and  the
government’s current space plan, the NADA Bylaw further authorises NADA to enter
into cooperation with foreign and international institutions, ‘to review and approve the
space-related agreements and contracts between government organizations or groups and
other foreign organizations, and to monitor their successful implementation.’ Even more,
NADA  encourages  international  space  cooperation  and  seeks  to  become  an  active
member of, among others, space-related IOs.888
886 For more information on the UN resolutions, see this study’s Section 8.5.
887 ‘National Aerospace Development Administration of DPRK’ (n 829).
888 NADA Bylaw arts 4-6.
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In practice, however, a combination of several UNSC resolutions against North Korea
that primarily aim at discouraging the country from continuing its nuclear weapon and
ballistic  missile programmes firmly curb the DPRK government’s  current potential  to
engage  in  intergovernmental  space  cooperation,  especially  in  such  that  supports  the
development and use of space launchers and satellites.
Overall,  the  main  set  of  UNSC  resolutions  against  the  DPRK  in  place  as  of  2017
comprises UNSC Resolution 1695 (2006),889 UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006),890 UNSC
Resolution  1874 (2009),891 UNSC Resolution  2087 (2013),892 UNSC Resolution  2094
(2013),893 UNSC Resolution 2270 (2016),894 and UNSC Resolution 2321 (2016).895
With regard to outer space, UNSC Resolution 2087 (2013), which is UNSC’s response to
the launch of KMS-3-2, generally recognises ‘the freedom of all States to explore and use
outer space in accordance with international law’, but adds that international law allows
‘including restrictions imposed by relevant Security Council resolutions’.896 Within this
context,  UNSC  Resolution  2270  (2016),  which  is  UNSC’s  reaction  to  the  DPRK’s
proclaimed hydrogen bomb test in January 2016 and its launch of KMS-4 the following
month,  demands  that  North  Korea  does  ‘not  conduct  any  further  launches  that  use
ballistic missile technology[…] and […] suspend[s] all activities related to its ballistic
missile  program and in this  context  re-establish[es]  its  pre-existing commitments  to a
moratorium on missile launches’, as well as ‘abandon[s] all other […] ballistic missile
programs  in  a  complete,  verifiable  and  irreversible  manner’.897 Additionally,  UNSC
Resolution 2270 (2016) determines that paragraph 8 (c) of UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006)
‘prohibits  the  DPRK from engaging in  any form of  technical  cooperation  with other
Member States on launches using ballistic missile technology, even if characterized as a
satellite launch or space launch vehicle’. The same resolution further regulates ‘that all
Member States shall prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals within
their territories or by their nationals of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK’s
889 UNSC Res 1695 (15 July 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1695.
890 UNSC Res 1718 (14 October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1718.
891 UNSC Res 1874 (12 June 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1874.
892 UNSC 2087.
893 UNSC Res 2094 (7 March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2094.
894 UNSC Res 2270 (2 March 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2270.
895 UNSC Res 2321 (30 November 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2321.
896 UNSC 2087 preamble. The resolution does not mention the satellite’s and the launcher’s name, but the
launch date put forward in the document makes clear that it refers to the KMS-3-2 mission.
897 UNSC 2270 para 2-3. The resolution does not mention the satellite’s and the launcher’s name, but the
launch date put forward in the document makes clear that it refers to the KMS-4 mission.
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[...] development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including teaching or training in
advanced  physics,  advanced  computer  simulation  and  related  computer  sciences,
geospational  navigation,  nuclear  engineering,  aerospace  engineering,  aeronautical
engineering  and  related  disciplines’.898 Besides  that,  UNSC  Resolution  2321  (2016)
establishes that ‘[i]nertial equipment for any application, particularly for civilian aircraft,
satellite, geophysical survey applications and their associated test equipment’ constitutes
‘Nuclear- and/or Missile-usable Items’.899
Altogether, this arguably translates into a full prohibition for the DPRK government to
engage domestically, and for the DPRK government and other governments to engage
cooperatively in the development and use of space launcher and satellite capabilities and
capacities.  As  indicated  in  Section  8.4.5,  North  Korean  space  launcher  and  ballistic
missile  development  projects  presumably  are  somewhat  interlinked  to  foster  the
development of domestic nuclear weapon (counter-)strike capabilities. Moreover, there is
no  guarantee  that  the  DPRK  military  might  not  employ  satellite  technology  for  the
efficient  use of ballistic  missiles,  e.g.  regarding target  selection and missile  guidance.
This  argument  is  further  supported  by  UNSC  Resolution  2087  (2013)  and  UNSC
Resolution  2270  (2016)  putting  forward  an  institutional  asset  freeze  on  the  DPRK
government’s official main space-related entities in the past decades, namely KCST and
NADA, and a travel ban and an individual asset freeze on some of their  personnel.900
Also,  the  UNSC sanctions  led  to  the  International  Astronautical  Federation  revoking
NADA’s membership less than one week after the approval of membership in 2015,901
and India-based CSSTEAP, which the DPRK joined in 1996, cancelling the participation
of North Korean citizens from training on sanction-related space-related subjects.902
As proven by its  four domestic satellite launches between 2009 and 2016, the DPRK
government does not accept these sanctions.903 It argues that it has the right of accessing
and using space independently for peaceful purposes as recognised under international
898 ibid para 5,17.
899 UNSC 2321 annex III.
900 UNSC 2087 annex I-II; UNSC 2270 annex I-II.
901 Chad O’Carroll, ‘N. Korean Membership of Intl’ Astronautical Federation “Revoked”’ (NK News, 19
October  2015)  <https://www.nknews.org/2015/10/n-korean-membership-of-intl-astronautical-
federation-revoked/> accessed 22 April 2016. Direct sanctions against NADA were not in place then,
but the aforementioned Panel of Experts had already recommended NADA to be included in them.
902 UNSC ‘Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)’ (27 February
2016) UN Doc S/2016/157 23-24.
903 ‘Launch of Satellite Kwangmyongsong-3 Is Legitimate Right of DPRK: KCNA’ (n 882).
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law, thus disregarding the UNSC’s standpoint that its resolutions are a legitimate part of
such  law.904 Presumably  to  underline  the  legitimacy  of  its  space  programme  under
international  law and potentially  to  present  itself  as  a  reliable  actor  (and  partner  for
cooperation)  within  the  international  space  sector,  the  North  Korean  government  has
gotten  into the habit  of  informing relevant  international  institutions  about  its  satellite
launches905 and joined, similar to the other preeminent Asian governments in the space
sector, four of the five main international space agreements since 2009.906 For example,
based on two North Korean news reports,  the DPRK’s accession to these agreements
officially  aims  at  fostering  international  confidence  and  cooperation  regarding  North
Korea’s scientific research of space and its satellite launches for peaceful purposes.907 It
acceded to the Outer Space Treaty on 05.03.2009908 and the Registration Convention on
10.03.2009.909 Coherent with the latter, it even established a NADA-administered national
registry of objectives launched into outer space in 2015910 and registered KMS-3-2 and
KMS-4 with the UN Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space.911 In February 2016,
904 ‘DPRK  Foreign  Ministry  Spokesman  on  Satellite  Launch’  (NCNK,  12  December  2012)
<http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/DPRK_FM_on_Dec12_Launch.pdf>  accessed  5  March
2017; ‘National Aerospace Development Administration Clarifies Its Principled Stand’ (KCNA, 8 May
2015) <http://www.kcna.kp> accessed 1 April 2016; ‘NADA Director on Successes in Outer Space
Development’ (n 848); ‘DPRK National Aerospace Development Administration Releases Report on
Satellite Launch’ (n 832).
905 ‘N.  Korea  Informs  of  Satellite  Launch  Plans’  (CNN,  12  March  2009)
<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/03/12/nkorea.launch/index.html>  accessed  8  March
2018; Martyn Williams, ‘Foreigners, Media Invited to Satellite Launch’ (North Korea Tech, 19 March
2012)  <https://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/03/19/foreigners-media-invited-to-satellite-launch/>
accessed  8  March  2018;  Wright,  ‘North  Korea  Gives  Location  of  Splashdown  Zones,  Begins
Assembling  Rocket’  (All  Things  Nuclear,  4  December  2012)
<https://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/north-korea-gives-location-of-splashdown-zones-begins-
assembling-rocket>  accessed  8  March  2018;  Martyn  Williams,  ‘DPRK  Signals  February  Satellite
Launch’  (North  Korea  Tech,  2  February  2016)  <https://www.northkoreatech.org/2016/02/02/dprk-
signals-february-satellite-launch/> accessed 8 March 2018.
906 Moltz  (n  32)  170–171;  Harding  (n  534)  175;  Elizabeth  Shim,  ‘North  Korea  Says  It  Has  Signed
International  Space  Treaties’  (UPI,  23  February  2016)
<http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/02/23/North-Korea-says-it-has-signed-
international-space-treaties/4191456237104/> accessed 6 April 2017.
907 ‘KCNA Report  on  DPRK’s  Accession  to  International  Space  Treaty  and  Convention’  (KCNA,  12
March  2009)  <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200903/news12/20090312-11ee.html>  accessed  6
April 2017; ‘DPRK Accedes to Space-Related International Agreements’ (KCNA, 23 February 2016)
<http://www.kcna.kp> accessed 1 April 2016.
908 ‘Democratic  People’s  Republic  of  Korea’  (United  Nations  Regional  Centre  for  Peace  and
Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific) <http://unrcpd.org/region/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/>
accessed 6 April 2017.
909 Communication from the Secretary-General,  ‘Convention On Registration of Objects Launched Into
Outer Space New York, 12 November 1974 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Accession’ (10
March 2009) C.N.154.2009.TREATIES-1 (Depositary Notification).
910 UN Secretariat ‘Information furnished in conformity with the Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space Note verbale dated 26 February 2015 from the Permanent Mission of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations (Vienna) addressed to the Secretary-
General’ (11 March 2015) UN Doc ST/SG/SER.E/INF/31.
911 UN Secretariat ‘Information furnished in conformity with the Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space Note verbale dated 22 January 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the
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shortly after its KMS-4 launch and when a new resolution against the country was already
under discussion, the government acceded to the Rescue Agreement  and the Liability
Convention.912
 8.6  Major domestic and cooperative space-related measures
  8.6.1  Remote sensing
   8.6.1.1  Major domestic measures
Based on the statements of Hyon Kwang-il, the Director of NADA’s Scientific Research
Department,  in  2016,  the  current  major  government-promoted  domestic  space-related
remote sensing measure is the domestic development and application of more advanced
EO satellites by 2020.
Hyon’s further comments indicate that these satellites shall help with crop and forestry
assessments,  and  thus  are  apparently  oriented  towards  serving  the  pursuit  of  the
government’s  space-related  socioeconomic  state  preference  and  related  target  area  of
developing  and  applying  space-related  capabilities  and  capacities  to  deal  with  a  few
socioeconomically highly relevant issue-areas for North Korea.913 This fits neatly with the
government’s previous claim that, as presented in Table 5 in Section 8.4.1, KMS-3 and
KMS-3-2  were  EO  satellites  with  a  socioeconomic  orientation.  KMS-3  should  have
supported  weather  forecasting  to  foster  North Korean agriculture  and other  economic
fields, whereby the (at least partially failed) KMS-3-2 mission should have served the
areas of crop surveying, disaster management and forestry. The North Korean report that
a  seminar  by the Korea Space Association saw papers on computer-aided analysis  of
satellite images with similar application areas, as well as an application regarding North
Korean fishing grounds, additionally supports the government’s official position that its
upcoming remote sensing satellites have a primarily socioeconomic orientation.914
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations (Vienna) addressed to the Secretary-
General’  (24  January  2013) UN Doc  ST/SG/SER.E/662;  UN Secretariat  ‘Information  furnished  in
conformity with the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space Note verbale
dated 25 April 2016 from the Permanent Mission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the
United  Nations  (Vienna)  addressed  to  the  Secretary-General’  (9  May  2016)  UN  Doc
ST/SG/SER.E/768.
912 According  to  KCNA,  the  DPRK  acceded  on  22.02.2016:  ‘DPRK  Accedes  to  Space-Related
International Agreements’ (n 907); according to a UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee report, the DPRK
acceded on 24.02.2016: UNGA ‘Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its fifty-fifth session, held in
Vienna from 4 to 15 April 2016’ (27 April 2016) UN Doc A/AC.105/1113 11.
913 Talmadge (n 885).
914 ‘Korea Space Association Organized in DPRK’ (n 831).
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However,  it  shall  not  be forgotten  that  Section  8.4.5 has  established that  the KMS-4
remote sensing satellite shall have presumably also served the development of, among
others,  the DPRK’s defence capability.  Moreover,  the government  published satellite-
derived images allegedly showing the THAAD system stationed in South Korea. As such,
this study does not want to rule out that the upcoming domestic remote sensing satellite
missions might, in practice, be further directed towards strengthening the pursuit of the
government’s current space-related national security state preference, especially the target
area of enhancing the North Korean military’s strategic support system.
   8.6.1.2  Major cooperative measures
As determined in Section 8.5, the government is hampered by UNSC sanctions in its
potential  to  enter  international  cooperation  in  the  field  of  satellite  development  and
application. Consequently, it is no surprise that this study has found little evidence for
current major government-promoted cooperative space-related remote sensing measures
(with a presumed high potential for) involving other preeminent Asian governments in
the space sector.
The  only  measure  worthwhile  to  be  addressed  here  is  that  North  Korea  apparently
engages in the WMO alongside China, India, Iran, Japan and South Korea.915
  8.6.2  Communications and broadcasting
   8.6.2.1  Major domestic measures
According  to  NADA  representative  Hyon  in  2016,  the  current  major  government-
promoted domestic space-related communications and broadcasting measure is to put the
first North Korean geostationary communications satellite into orbit by 2020. Regarding
its  specific  application  area,  he merely  indicates  that  the  satellite  shall  enhance  the
DPRK’s communications capabilities.916
Previously,  the  only  known  attempt  by  the  government  to  launch  a  domestic
communications satellite was the KMS-2 mission in 2009. As mentioned in Table 5 in
Section 8.4.1, sources describe KMS-2 as an experimental communications satellite to
foster the development and launch of future practical satellites.
915 ‘Members’ (n 240).
916 Talmadge (n 885).
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Considering this study’s findings on communications and broadcasting satellites by other
preeminent Asian governments in the space sector, it is reasonable to assume that the first
domestic  geostationary  communications  satellite  shall  foster  the  pursuit  of  the
government’s space-related socioeconomic and national security state preferences. The
prevalent  target  areas  likely  are  the  development  and  application  of  space-related
capabilities and capacities to deal with a few socioeconomically highly relevant issue-
areas  for  North  Korea,  as  well  as  the  enhancement  of  the  North  Korean  military’s
strategic support system.
   8.6.2.2  Major cooperative measures
As determined in Section 8.5, the UNSC sanctions against the DPRK curb its potential to
enter international cooperation in the field of satellite development and application. As
such, current major government-promoted cooperative space-related communications and
broadcasting measures (with a presumed high potential for) involving other preeminent
Asian governments in the space sector are nearly non-existent.
At most, North Korea seems, alongside all the other preeminent Asian governments in the
space  sector,  to  be  a  member  state  of  ITU.  Similar  to  the  Chinese,  Indian,  Iranian,
Japanese and South Korean cases, this shall presumably foster the pursuit of all space-
related  state  preferences  underlying  the  North  Korean  government’s  (rather  limited)
space-related communications and broadcasting measures.917
  8.6.3  Navigation
   8.6.3.1  Major domestic measures
This study has found no definite information for a current major government-promoted
domestic space-related navigation measure.
   8.6.3.2  Major cooperative measures
There is no evidence for a current major government-promoted cooperative space-related
navigation  measure  (with  a  high  potential  for)  involving  other  preeminent  Asian
governments in the space sector.
917 For more information on the ITU, see this study’s Section 4.6.3.3.
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However, based on Brown’s account, this study takes into account that the government
might seek collaboration in the application of globally and regionally available navigation
satellite  systems  in  the  pursuit  of  its  current  space-related  national  security  state
preference. A particular focus might presumably be on the target areas of enhancing the
North  Korean  military’s  strategic  support  system,  as  well  as  of  establishing  efficient
domestic nuclear weapon (counter-)strike capabilities. After all, satellite navigation can
aid troop movements and help with the guidance of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.
In this regard, the DRPK government’s preferred navigation satellite system option is
likely the Chinese-controlled BDS. China is not only a long-term military ally but might
be even willing to grant North Korea access to BDS’s militarily more useful restricted
signal capability. As one observer puts it, the DPRK’s regional military anti-access/area
denial objective, including against US forces, is complementary to China’s. The Chinese
side has yet to clarify if it already provides such access through or intends to act towards
such a collaboration.918 Overall, it is not out of the question that the DPRK will receive
access to high-precision BDS services since China has apparently done so with Iran.919
The reported participation of North Korean engineers in a multinational training session
on BDS-related technology organised by a Chinese government-related entity in 2014
further  supports  the  argument  for  a  North  Korean preference  for  BDS and a  related
potential collaboration with China. Also, the DPRK military is unlikely to rely heavily on
or enter into serious collaboration in the use of the navigation satellite systems of Japan,
South Korea and the USA. As discussed in Section 8.4.5, North Korea considers each of
them a major military opponent. Additionally, some states try to deny the North Korean
military access to American GPS technology overall.920
Notably,  this  study  deems  it  implausible  that  the  DPRK government  seeks  to  apply
globally or regionally available navigation satellite systems in a significant manner in the
pursuit  of  its  current  other  state  preferences,  e.g.  to  advance  its  socioeconomic
development. A crucial factor in this regard is likely that the government wants to avoid
918 Peter J Brown, ‘Is North Korea Using China’s Satellites to Guide Its Missiles?’ (Asia Times, 24 May
2017) <http://www.atimes.com/article/north-korea-using-chinas-satellites-guide-missiles/> accessed 15
November 2017.
919 For more information, see this study’s Section 6.6.4.2.
920 Martyn Williams, ‘North Koreans Learn about China’s Beidou Satellite Navigation System’ (North
Korea  Tech,  31  July  2014)  <https://www.northkoreatech.org/2014/07/31/north-koreans-learn-about-
chinas-beidou-satellite-navigation-system/>.
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the provision of accurate satellite navigation technology to its citizens on a general level
because it might challenge the government’s control over their lives, and thus the pursuit
of its  current space-related political  state preference of securing the legitimacy of the
Supreme Leader’s rule.921
  8.6.4  Science and technology research
This  study was  unable  to  identify  any dedicated  current  major  government-promoted
domestic  or  cooperative  science  and  technology  research  measure.  Whether  this  will
change in  the  near  future,  e.g.  regarding lunar  and planetary  exploration  activities  or
scientific experiments in space indicated by a NADA official, remains to be seen.922
  8.6.5  Human spaceflight
There is no evidence for a current major government-promoted domestic or cooperative
human spaceflight  measure.  Yet,  a  NADA representative  mentioned  in  2016 that  the
DPRK has, in the long run, an intention to conduct human spaceflight.923
It is reasonable to assume that at least the government’s political state preferences will
underlie  such  measures.  After  all,  only  a  few  states  have  so  far  achieved  human
spaceflight capabilities, and thus are an excellent feat to improve the Supreme Leader’s
domestic standing and to generate international prestige for the DPRK.
  8.6.6  Exploration of celestial bodies, including the Moon
As  of  2017,  the  government  seems  to  promote  no  major  domestic  or  cooperative
measures related to the exploration of celestial bodies, including the Moon.
However, according to NADA representative Hyon’s comments in 2016, the government
might engage in – presumably primarily domestic – lunar and planetary exploration in the
921 Conclusion based on the information provided in the following material: ibid; as stated by Bruce, the
DPRK government ‘limits the flow of information into, out of,  and within the country to maintain
control over the population.’ Official access to, for example, information technology is granted only
within  a  carefully  crafted  domestic  framework  and  by  integration  of  such  technology  into  the
government’s  system of social  controls:  Scott  Thomas Bruce,  ‘Information Technology and Social
Controls in North Korea’ (2014) 8 On Korea: Academic Paper Series 1. Citation on 1.
922 Talmadge (n 885).
923 ibid.
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future. This might include the planting of the DPRK’s flag on the lunar surface, which
Hyon hopes to take place within a decade.924
Notably,  Schilling  points  out that  a  government-promoted domestic  lunar  undertaking
will  need,  especially  if  the  flag  shall  be  put  on  the  Moon  through  a  soft-landing
procedure,  huge  domestic  technical  advancements  in  launcher  and  spacecraft
development, as well as relevant control and communication systems, compared to the
capabilities the DPRK has shown so far. This may put a heavy financial burden on an
already  economically  challenged  country.  Thus,  proclaimed  North  Korean  lunar  and
planetary exploration projects should be treated with some suspicion whether they will be
able to come to fruition.925
Any initial North Korean lunar and planetary exploration project might be driven mostly
by the pursuit of the government’s space-related political state preferences. Target area-
wise,  the  government  might  especially  hope  to  advance  North  Korea’s  status  as  a
technologically  and  scientifically  powerful  independent  state  vis-à-vis  South  Korea,
which has already declared to have a lunar mission in the making.926
  8.6.7  Stable use of outer space
This  study  has  found  no  hard  evidence  for  a  current  major  government-promoted
domestic or cooperative measure addressing issues regarding the stable use of outer space
for North Korea.
  8.6.8  Launchers
   8.6.8.1  Major domestic measures
Access to and enhancement of domestic launcher capabilities and capacities is a long-
standing major government-promoted domestic measure.
As introduced in Section 8.4.1, the DPRK has developed and launched various domestic
satellite  launcher  series  (Paektusan-1;  Unha-2;  Unha-3;  Kwangmyongsong) between
924 ibid.
925 John  Schilling,  ‘North  Korea’s  Man  on  the  Moon?’  (38  North,  15  August  2016)
<http://38north.org/2016/08/jschilling081516/> accessed 11 April 2017.
926 The argument partially follows Schilling in: ibid. For more information on the South Korean lunar
programme, see this study’s Section 9.6.7.
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1998 and 2016 that – presumably – technologically build upon one another. According to
one  analysis,  the  available  three-stage  Unha-3 series,  and  by  extension  the
Kwangmyongsong series,927 are capable of launching small satellites into an orbit up of at
least a few hundred and potentially a few thousand kilometres.928 Yet, their launch record
is still meagre. As further outlined in Section 8.4.1, only the Unha-3 carrying KMS-3-2
and Kwangmyongsong carrying KMS-4 actually delivered their payload into outer space,
while reliable observers consider these satellites to have never been fully operational.
Reportedly,  KJU directed military and scientific personnel to complete the development
of a new launcher by September 2018.929 This new launcher series shall maybe capable of
putting payloads into geostationary orbit. A related successful jet engine test took already
place  in  September  2016.930 This  is  reasonable,  as  explained in  Section  8.6.2,  it  is  a
current major government-promoted domestic space-related measure to put the first North
Korean geostationary communications satellite into orbit by 2020.
Besides that, North Korea recently completed an expansion of its satellite launch pad at
the DPRK’s Sohae Satellite Launching Station to enable launches of larger rockets than
Unha-3, which would be needed to successfully implement future domestic geostationary
satellite, lunar and human spaceflight projects.931
State preference-wise, the findings in Section 8.4.5 allow reasoning that enhancing the
domestic launcher capabilities and capacities contributes to some degree to the pursuit of
the government’s current space-related national security state preference, especially the
target area of establishing efficient domestic nuclear weapon (counter-)strike capabilities.
927 Chandrashekar  and others  determine similarities  between the December  2012 and the 2016 launch
vehicles and refer to both as Unha-3 launchers: S Chandrashekar, N Ramani and Arun Vishwanathan,
‘Analysis  of  North Korea’s  February  2016 Successful  Space  Launch’  (ISSSP Report  No 02/2016,
International Strategic and Security Studies Programme, National Institute of Advanced Studies April
2016)  <http://eprints.nias.res.in/1057/1/2016-North%20Korean%20Feb%202016%20Successful
%20Space%20Launch.pdf> accessed 8 March 2018.
928 Schilling, ‘North Korea’s Man on the Moon?’ (n 925).
929 Ankit Panda, ‘Why North Korea Is Likely Planning a Satellite Launch in 2018’ (The Diplomat, 12
January 2018) <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/why-north-korea-is-likely-planning-a-satellite-launch-
in-2018/> accessed 12 January 2018.
930 ‘Kim Jong Un Guides Ground Jet Test of New-Type High-Power Engine of Carrier Rocket for Geo-
Stationary Satellite’ (KCNA, 20 September 2016) <http://www.kcna.kp> accessed 11 April 2017.
931 Nick Hansen, ‘North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Major Upgrade Program Completed;
Facility  Operational  Again’  (38  North,  1  October  2014)
<https://www.38north.org/2014/10/sohae100114/> accessed 8 March 2018; Schilling, ‘North Korea’s
Man on the Moon?’ (n 925).
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At the same time, the same section indicates that it is short-sighted to look at that merely
from that perspective. 
Following Section 8.4.4, access to and the enhancement of domestic launcher capabilities
and capacities presumably further serves the pursuit of the government’s current space-
related political state preferences. This includes the related target area of advancing North
Korea’s international status as a technologically and scientifically powerful independent
state vis-à-vis South Korea.
Lastly, access to and the enhancement of domestic launcher capabilities and capacities are
clearly pertinent to the implementation of the aforementioned (alleged or potential) major
government-promoted domestic space-related measures in the fields of remote sensing,
communications and broadcasting, exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies, as
well  as  human  spaceflight.  They  fit  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  space-related
autonomy-oriented state preference of developing and maintaining the domestic human,
industrial,  scientific  and technological  capabilities  and capacities  necessary  to  engage
primarily autonomously in the pursuit of the other space-related state preferences.
   8.6.8.2  Major cooperative measures
In accordance to the assessment in Section 8.5 that the government is hampered by the
UNSC sanctions in its potential to enter international cooperation in the development and
use of space launchers, this study has found no sign for any major government-promoted
cooperative measure in the field of space launchers (with a presumed high potential for)
involving other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector.
However, various researchers theorised or found indicators that North Korea might have
previously  collaborated  with  states  like  China,  Iran  and  Pakistan  in  this  regard.  The
DPRK might have even supported Iran in building a launch pad.932 As such, it should not
be excluded that the DPRK government might seek to promote some major cooperative
space launcher measures after the UNSC sanctions are lifted.
932 Moltz (n 32) 172–173; Harvey, Smid and Pirard (n 500) 450,453,459,464,481-482; Schmucker and
Schiller make the argument that all North Korean ballistic missile development, at least until 2010,
depended heavily on foreign support: Robert H Schmucker and Markus Schiller, ‘The DPRK Missile
Show. A Comedy in (Currently)  Eight Acts’  (Draft  paper,  Schmucker  Technologie 05 May 2010)
<http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/schmucker-schiller-the_missile_show_draft_10-05-05-
1.pdf> accessed 2 April 2016.
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Notably,  this  study  holds  that  the  existence  of  these  sanctions,  the  rarity  and  many
problems of North Korean space launches since 1998, as well as the lack of public offers
to launch payloads for foreign entities on domestic launchers, counter speculations that
the North Korean government works towards such collaborative measures like providing
commercial space launches and satellite services to foreign entities in the near future.933
  8.6.9  Human resources
   8.6.9.1  Major domestic measures
Due to the opaqueness of North Korea in domestic matters, it is hard to pinpoint major
government-promoted domestic space-related human resources-specific measures. 
However, considering that UNSC sanctions hamper the DPRK space programme but the
country  has  managed  to  develop  some  space  launcher  and  satellite  capabilities  and
capacities, it is safe to say that the government gives domestic education and training in
these  fields  considerable  attention.  At  least  one  report  suggests  that  North  Korean
universities have expanded their rocket science programmes in recent years.934
This is no surprise considering that the country needs a broad range of experts to pursue
its  space-related  state  preference  of  developing and maintaining  the  domestic  human,
industrial,  scientific  and technological  capabilities  and capacities  necessary  to  engage
primarily autonomously in the pursuit of the other space-related state preferences.
   8.6.9.2  Major cooperative measures
This study has found no major government-promoted cooperative space-related human
resources-specific  measures  (with  a  presumed  high  potential  for)  involving  other
preeminent Asian governments in the space sector. This is surely a consequence of the
UNSC sanctions  against  the country.  As mentioned  under  Section  8.5,  North Korean
citizens  are even banished for now from attending training on sanction-related space-
related subjects under CSSTEAP, in which it is a member.
933 Moltz refers to such speculations in: Moltz (n 32) 171–172.
934 Talmadge (n 885).
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9  Republic of Korea (ROK / South Korea)  
 9.1  Analytical considerations
This study’s main challenge in its particular evaluation of the South Korean government’s
current space programme is the limited public access to (unofficial) English translations
of the known main domestic space-related political documents. However, thanks to the
availability  of  seemingly  reliable  unofficial  translations  of  the  main  domestic  space-
related legal documents and a range of other English material addressing aspects of the
ROK government’s space programme in the 21st century, this study deems it possible to
arrive at plausible findings concerning its primary research interest. In this regard, this
study is very grateful to two South Korean space law and policy experts for pointing out
or providing parts of the latter material.935
 9.2  Main domestic political and legal documents
Without claiming completeness, the accessed material allows concluding that at least the
following domestic political and legal documents strongly guide the ROK government’s
current space programme. Similar to the previous five country-specific chapters,  these
documents’ known content deserves special attention throughout this chapter.
The ‘Space Development Promotion Act’936 (SDPA) appears central to the government’s
current space programme. Initially adopted in 2005 by the National Assembly, which is
the ROK’s unicameral national legislature, SDPA can be considered South Korea’s core
national  space  law.  Most  importantly  here,  SDPA,  as  amended  in  2015,  requires  the
government to formulate a basic mid- and long-term plan for the promotion of national
space development  (henceforward:  Basic Space Development Plan;  BSDP) every five
years, as well as to formulate and execute an annual ‘Action Plan for Promotion of Space
Development’ in accordance with BSDP. Based on its legally prescribed table of content,
935 See also this study’s ‘Acknowledgements’ chapter. Any mistakes in this study are its author’s alone.
936 For an unofficial English translation of the act (as last amended 20.01.2015), see: ‘Space Development
Promotion Act’  (Korea Legislation Research Institute)  <http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?
hseq=33560&type=part&key=18> accessed 28 January 2018. Further references to SDPA are to this
translation; there is a presidential decree that provides further details on the act’s implementation. For
an unofficial English translation of the decree (as last amended 31.12.2015), see: ‘Enforcement Decree
of  Space  Development  Promotion  Act’  (Korea  Legislation  Research  Institute)
<https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=39231&type=sogan&key=54>  accessed  28
January 2018.
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(the currently active) BSDP unquestionably constitutes the government’s (present) main
space policy and strategy document.937
Alongside the quite broad BSDP, SDPA further calls upon the government to formulate a
specialised ‘Master Plan for Utilization of Satellite Information’ every five years, as well
as a specialised ‘Basic Plan for Preparing against Dangers in Space’ every ten years. This
shall be accompanied by the formulation and execution of an adequate annual ‘Action
Plan  for  Utilization  of  Satellite  Information’  and  a  fitting  annual  ‘Action  Plan  for
Preparing against Dangers in Space’.938
The government issued the 1st BSDP in 2007 and  the 2nd BSDP in 2011. In 2013, and
apparently constituting a revision of the 2nd BSDP, it  established a mid- to long-term
space  development  plan  covering  the  years  until  2040  (BSDP2013).939 By  2017,
BSDP2013 appears to have still been the government’s main space policy and strategy
document. However, the government has already worked towards the creation of its 3rd
BSDP, which was reportedly released in early 2018.940 As far as this study was able to
ascertain, this new BSDP builds upon and extends the development direction put forward
in  BSDP2013.  As  such,  this  study’s  research  findings  for  the  government’s  space
programme as of 2017 presumably remain overall true for the period of the 3rd BSDP.941
On a different note, the government seems to have released the first specialised plans
addressing the utilisation of satellite information and dangers in space in 2014.942
In addition to SDPA, other major domestic space legislation supposedly encompass the
‘Act  on  Compensation  for  Damage  Caused  by  Space  Objects’,  which  focuses  in  its
amended version as of 2017 on compensation and liability issues,943 and the ‘Astronomy
937 See especially SDPA arts 5,5-2.
938 SDPA arts 5-3,5-4,15,15-2.
939 Jong Bum Kim,  ‘Space  Activities  in  Korea’  (Presentation,  APRSAF-24,  Bengaluru,  16  November
2017)  <https://aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf24/data/day16/2_7_KARI.pdf>  accessed  28  January
2018. This study was unable to obtain English translations of these plans.
940 Based on information in: ibid; Han-joo Kim, ‘(LEAD) S. Korea Aims to Explore the Moon by 2030’
(Yonhap  News  Agency,  5  February  2018)
<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2018/02/05/0502000000AEN20180205005851320.html>
accessed 5 February 2018. This study was unable to obtain an English translation of the 3rd BSDP.
941 Derived from information provided by a ROK space policy expert in 2018.
942 Daniel A Pinkston, ‘Joining the Asia Space Race: South Korea’s Space Program’ (2014) 8 On Korea:
Academic Paper Series 1, 6,9; regarding the plan on dangers in space, see also: E Choi, ‘Preparedness
Plan for Space Hazards in Republic of Korea’ (Presentation, 57th UNCOPUOS, Vienna, 13 June 2014)
<http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/copuos2014/tech-12.pdf> accessed 2 February 2018. This study was
unable to obtain English translations of these plans.
943 For  an  unofficial  English  translation  of  the  act  (as  last  amended  26.07.2017),  see:  ‘Act  On
Compensation  For  Damage  Caused  By  Space  Objects’  (Korea  Legislation  Research  Institute)
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and Space Act’, which concentrates in its  amended version as of 2017 mostly on the
promotion of research, training and education concerning astronomy and space as well as
the dissemination of related knowledge.944 Moreover,  there is  the ‘Aerospace Industry
Development and Promotion Act’ (AIDPA), which calls  in its amended version as of
2016,  among others,  for  the  establishment  of  a  ‘Master  Plan  for  Aerospace  Industry
Development’.945 Such a plan, or some related document, seems to date back to 2013.946
Lastly, and without being able to verifiably link them to any of the documents introduced
above,  this  study also  wants  to  point  out  here  that  the  government  apparently  has  a
‘Korean  Launch  Vehicle  Development  Plan’  in  place,947 and  the  ROK’s  Ministry  of
National Defence has expanded the government’s space programme by the adoption of a
‘Basic Plan for the Development of Defense Space Power’ in 2014.948
 9.3  Basic domestic decision-making system
Domestic  actors  covering  a  variety  of  portfolios  appear  to  be  involved  in  the  basic
domestic  decision-making  system  behind  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  the
ROK  government’s  present  space  programme. This  study  deems  it  sufficient  for  its
particular assessment of the said programme to have the following knowledge.
<https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=46485&type=sogan&key=54>  accessed  28
January 2018.
944 For an unofficial English translation of the act  (as last amended 26.07.2017), see: ‘Astronomy and
Space  Act’  (Korea  Legislation  Research  Institute)  <https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?
hseq=45894&type=sogan&key=54> accessed 28 January 2018. Further references to this act are to this
translation; there is a presidential decree that provides further details on the act’s implementation. For
an unofficial translation of the decree (as last amended 26.07.2017), see: ‘Enforcement Decree of the
Astronomy  and  Space  Act’  (Korea  Legislation  Research  Institute)
<https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=45896&type=sogan&key=54>  accessed  28
January 2018.
945 For an unofficial English translation of the act (as last amended 29.03.2016), see: ‘Aerospace Industry
Development  Promotion  Act’  (Korea  Legislation  Research  Institute)
<http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=43106&type=part&key=28> accessed  10 February
2018. Further references to AIDPA are to this translation. This study was unable to obtain an English
translation of said plan.
946 See  the  reference  to  an  ‘Industrialization  Strategy  of  Space  Technology’  in:  ‘The  Government,
Establishing a Foothold for the Takeoff of Korea as an Aerospace Powerhouse’ (KARI, 26 November
2013)  <https://www.kari.re.kr/cop/bbs/BBSMSTR_000000000031/selectBoardArticle.do?
nttId=1019&kind=&mno=sitemap_02&pageIndex=2&searchCnd=&searchWrd=> accessed 3 February
2018.
947 See the reference to the ‘Amendment of the Korean Launch Vehicle Development Plan’ in: ibid. This
study was unable to obtain an English translation of this plan.
948 Ministry  of  National  Defense,  Republic  of  Korea,  ‘2016  Defense  White  Paper’  (White  Paper,
Publication Registration Number 11-1290000-000446-11, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of
Korea  2017)  74–75
<http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mndEN/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201705180357180050.pdf>
accessed 18 February 2018. This study was unable to obtain an English translation of this plan.
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In short, the highest domestic institution behind the formulation and implementation of
the government’s current space programme seems to be the (15-member) Korea National
Space Committee (KNSC), set up by SDPA under the direct control of the South Korean
President.  Pinkston  summarises  KNSC’s  main  task  neatly  as  ‘oversee[ing]  the  inter-
agency  production  of  the  space  development  plan,  and  [...]  subsequently  [… being]
responsible for drafting policies and procedures for implementation of the plan.’949
Under  KNSC,  the  Ministry  of  Science  and  ICT950 is  the  most  relevant  government
ministry. Its minister is the chair of KNSC. Moreover, national legislation transfers many
other domestic space-related planning, administrative and implementation responsibilities
to this ministry or its minister.951 Also, it is the parent ministry of the Korea Aerospace
Research Institute  (KARI).  Initially  established in  1989 and affiliated  with the Korea
Institute of Machinery and Materials, KARI can be described as South Korea’s present
national space agency. For example, KARI leads the development of the domestic space
launcher  project,  the  national  lunar  programme  and  various  domestic  satellite  series.
Moreover,  it  fosters  the  utilisation  and  commercialisation  of  space  technology  and
information. It interacts with the space industry and other entities like research institutes
and universities to accomplish its ascribed tasks.952
Further  government-related institutions  under  – but partly  also being represented in  –
KNSC with an important role in the formulation and implementation of the government’s
current space programme appear to encompass, at a minimum, the Ministry of Strategy
and Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy,
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry
of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries, the Ministry
of  National  Defence,  the  National  Intelligence  Service,  the  Ministry  of  Interior  and
Safety,  the  Korea  Meteorological  Administration  and  the  National  Radio  Research
949 SDPA art 6; Pinkston (n 942) 3.
950 ICT stands for ‘Information and Communications Technology’.
951 Based on the various provisions in: ‘Space Development Promotion Act’ (n 936); ‘Enforcement Decree
of Space Development Promotion Act’ (n 936); ‘Aerospace Industry Development Promotion Act’ (n
945); ‘Act On Compensation For Damage Caused By Space Objects’ (n 943); ‘Astronomy and Space
Act’ (n 944); ‘Enforcement Decree of the Astronomy and Space Act’ (n 944).
952 Based  on  information  in:  Pinkston  (n  942)  2,7-8;  ‘Major  Functions’  (KARI)
<https://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub01_02.do> accessed 28 January 2018; Kim, ‘Space Activities in Korea’
(n 939).
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Agency. Notably, AIDPA even calls for a (15-member) Aerospace Industry Development
Policy Council under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy.953
Additionally, such government-related or academic research institutions like the Agency
for Defence Development (ADD), the Electronic Telecommunication Research Institute,
the Korea Astronomy and Space Science Institute, and the Korea Advanced Institute of
Science and Technology (KAIST), especially through its Satellite Technology Research
Centre  (SaTReC),  seem to be given a  considerable role  in the implementation  of the
government’s current space programme.954 Prominent entities within the – still relatively
small – South Korean space industry that partake in this programme’s implementation
apparently are Korea Aerospace Industries, SaTReC Initiative and KT SAT.955
 9.4  Space-related state preferences
This study identifies various state preferences that seem to underlie the South Korean
government’s  current  space  programme.  Ultimately,  these  appear  somewhat  coherent
with  findings  on  motivating  factors  behind  the  government’s  space  programme  in
previous  years.  For  example,  An determines  that  South  Korean aspirations  regarding
outer space from the 1950s to 2013 can be divided into four periods, each driven by a
dominant  ‘imagination’.  These  have  been  modernisation  (1950s~1960s),  self-defence
(1970~1984),  economic  security  (1985~1997)  and  national  prestige  (1998~2013).956
Moltz  argues  that  economic  development,  national  security,  national  pride  and
international prestige motivated the government’s space undertakings by around 2012.957
953 Based on information in: ‘Space Development Promotion Act’ (n 936); ‘Enforcement Decree of Space
Development Promotion Act’ (n 936); ‘Aerospace Industry Development Promotion Act’ (n 945); Kim,
‘Space Activities in Korea’ (n 939); Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea (n 948) 75.
954 ‘South Korea’, in Euroconsult, Profiles of Government Space Programs. Analysis of over 80 Countries
& Agencies (2015) 45–2.
955 Based  on  information  in:  Hyoung  Joon  An,  ‘National  Aspirations,  Imagined  Futures,  and  Space
Exploration: The Origin and Development of Korean Space Program 1958-2013’ (PhD thesis, Georgia
Institute of Technology 2015) 135-142,200 <https://smartech.gatech.edu/bitstream/handle/1853/54426/
AN-DISSERTATION-2015.pdf>  accessed  7  May  2017;  ‘About  KT  SAT’  (KT  SAT)
<https://www.ktsat.net/about/> accessed 6 February 2018; ‘KAI Chosen as a Company of Korea Space
Launch...’  (Korea  Aerospace  Industries,  LTD.,  21  January  2014)
<http://www.koreaaero.com/english/pr_center/cpr_view.asp?pg=1&seq=25734&bbs=10>  accessed  10
February 2018.
956 An (n 955) 205–208.
957 Moltz (n 32) 137-138,156.
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  9.4.1  Socioeconomic state preferences
There are various indicators that the government’s current space-related socioeconomic
state preference is the advancement of South Korea’s socioeconomic development.
Most prominently, the purpose of SDPA, upon which the government’s BSDPs rest, is,
among others, ‘to contribute to [...] the sound growth of the national economy, and the
betterment of citizens’s [sic!] lives by systematically promoting the development of outer
space and by efficiently using and managing space objects.’958 Also, AIDPA’s purpose ‘is
to contribute to the sound development of the national economy and the improvement of
people’s lives life [sic!] by supporting and promoting rationally the aerospace industry,
and researching and developing efficiently aerospace science and technology.’959
One target area under this state preference seems to be the development and application
of space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set of socioeconomically
relevant  issue-areas for South Korea.  This is apparent  by this  study’s findings on the
current  major  government-promoted  space-related  measures.  For  example,  certain
measures  supposedly address,  in  general  terms,  issues  in  such areas  like  the  climate,
disaster  management,  the  environment,  meteorology,  land  use,  natural  resources  and
transportation (e.g. through navigation-related projects).960
The three additional – and somewhat interlinked – target areas of expanding the domestic
(private) space industry, extending the domestic space market and enhancing the South
Korean space industry’s role in the international space market arise from the following
narrative.
Based on the available information regarding BSDP2013, the government considers the
country’s space industry to be still quite small in size. However, it recognises that this
industry  can  potentially  contribute  to  domestic  economic  progress.  For  example,  a
national space industry usually involves high-tech businesses and high paying jobs and
can create an economic ripple effect worth billions of dollars. Fittingly, the government’s
national space technology industrialisation strategy published in 2013 apparently outlines
that the government wants to generate growth by, e.g., supporting the domestic private
958 SDPA art 1.
959 AIDPA art 1.
960 See especially this study’s Sections 9.6.1-4.
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industry’s role in space development, broadening the domestic industrial use of satellite
information,  transferring  related  technology  and  applications  to  the  domestic  private
sector for national and international commercial mass marketing, and strengthening the
export  of  South  Korean  space-related  products  and  services.  In  the  long  run,  South
Korean entities  might  even provide  international  commercial  space  launch services.961
The new 3rd BSDP shall reportedly help to ‘begin an era of private companies launching
orbital  space programs in 2026, with a goal of sending up small-sized spacecrafts  by
private companies starting in 2030.’962
  9.4.2  Political state preferences
Presently, the government arguably pursues two space-related political state preferences.
One is the advancement of South Korea’s international prestige and influence. It emerges
from this  study’s  evaluation  of  the  current  major  government-promoted  space-related
measures.  Some measures  can  be  (partially)  explained  by the  pursuit  of  such a  state
preference.963
With the long-standing political  and military feud between South and North Korea in
mind,  a researcher  can be tempted to  assume that  the advancement  of South Korea’s
international prestige and influence vis-à-vis North Korea is a particular target area under
this state preference. However, as one observer at least concluded about the DPRK space
programme around a decade ago, while the DPRK government might see itself in a space
race with the South, the latter  does not necessarily participate in it.964 Ultimately,  this
study has decided to take this target area into account tentatively because it has failed to
find clear-cut  evidence,  e.g.  in the form of a government  statement,  for either  policy
direction in the available material. One reason for this lack of data might be the fact that –
and on which most researchers familiar with the Asian region will agree – South Korea is
nowadays already visibly ahead of its Northern neighbour in most space-related (as well
961 Based on information in:  Pinkston (n 942) 5–8; ‘The Government,  Establishing a Foothold for the
Takeoff of Korea as an Aerospace Powerhouse’ (n 946); Harry Kim, ‘South Korea’s Race to Space Is
Lagging Behind’ (The Diplomat, 20 November 2017) <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/south-koreas-
race-to-space-is-lagging-behind/> accessed 3 February 2018; ‘Utilization of Satellite Images’ (KARI)
<https://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub03_05.do> accessed 28 January 2018. The first two publications are at
the core of this narrative. The other two links provide mostly some supporting information.
962 Kim, ‘(LEAD) S. Korea Aims to Explore the Moon by 2030’ (n 940).
963 See especially this study’s Section 9.6.7.
964 Harvey, Smid and Pirard (n 500) 474.
240
as other technology) activity fields. This circumstance decreases the current necessity for
the government to address this topic publicly even if it is of some relevance.965 
The  second  space-related  political  state  preference  of increasing  national  pride  and,
tentatively,  public  support  for  the  democratically  elected  government  arises  from the
following context.
First, this study has found that the current major government-promoted space exploration
measures seem partially directed towards increasing the South Korean people’s national
pride.966 Second, and similar to the cases of India and Japan, it is, tentatively speaking, a
reasonable  assumption  that  any  democratically  elected  South  Korean  government  is
aware  that  successfully  implemented  space  undertakings,  especially  technologically
complex ones (e.g. a lunar mission), allow presenting itself to its people as the driver of
national progress. This might translate into higher support for the government among the
South Korean people.
  9.4.3  National security state preferences
Safeguarding  South  Korea’s  national  security  is  arguably  the  national  security  state
preference underlying the government’s current space programme.
Most prominently, SDPA’s purpose is, among others, ‘to contribute to national security
[...] by systematically promoting the development of outer space and by efficiently using
and managing space objects.’967 Furthermore, a KARI official indicated a link between
South Korea’s space undertakings  and its  national  security,  while  a  ministerial  South
Korean press release referred to the dual-use nature of the country’s space technology.968
There  appears  to  be  at  least  one  target  area  under  this  state  preference,  namely  the
enhancement  of  the  South  Korean  military’s  strategic  support  system,  seemingly
especially aiming against North Korea and partially involving interaction with the USA.
965 A comparative  look at  current  major  North  and South Korean  government-promoted space-related
measures in this study’s Chapters 8 and 9 makes this an easy conclusion.
966 See especially this study’s Section 9.6.7.
967 SDPA art 2.
968 Clint Work and Seonhee Kim, ‘It’s Not About the Moon: The Military and Economic Logics to South
Korean Space Exploration’ (Sino-NK, 31 May 2016) <https://sinonk.com/2016/05/31/its-not-about-the-
moon-the-military-and-economic-logics-to-south-korean-space-exploration/>  accessed  3  February
2018.
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One strong indicator for that is the apparent government-promoted development of some
domestic  satellite  systems  for  military  support.969 Another  is  the  government’s  ‘2016
Defense  White  Paper’  directly  mentioning  support  functions  of  satellite-based
communications and reconnaissance to the national military, as well as the importance of
the  (space-related)  alliance  with  the  USA for  South Korea.970 Also,  according to  one
account,  the  ROK  Air  Force  has  set  up  a  Space  Development  Branch  within  its
headquarters and entered into an MoU with, among others, KARI to recruit space-related
experts, as well as engaged in sending some officers to train on space and security topics
with its US counterpart each year.971 Finally, the accessible information suggests that the
ROK has a strong interest in using space-related capabilities to monitor North Korea and
improve  South  Korea’s  regional  early  warning  system  and  military  counterstrike
capabilities, including against North Korean (ballistic missile) attacks.972
  9.4.4  Science and technology state preferences
The government’s current space-related science and technology state preference appears
to be the advancement of South Korea’s scientific and technological level per se; whereby
the reference to ‘per se’ indicates here more of a basic research and knowledge gathering
orientation.
After all, SDPA shall, among others, ‘facilitate the peaceful use and scientific exploration
of  outer  space’.973 Moreover,  the  domestic  Astronomy  and  Space  Act  promotes
astronomical and space research, education and training, as well as the dissemination of
related knowledge.974 Also, this study’s evaluation of current major government-promoted
space-related measures has revealed that some of them seem to be (partially) directed
towards serving such a state preference.975
At the same time, and similar to the Indian case, it  shall be noted here that the ROK
government’s actual pursuit of this state preference apparently still subsists in a limited
969 See especially this study’s Sections 9.6.2-4.
970 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea (n 948) 106,110,148-149.
971 Work and Kim (n 968).  This  article  also mentions that  the South Korean  government’s  ‘National
Security Strategy’ from 2014 and its previous defence white papers from 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014
already featured the role of space capabilities for the South Korean military.
972 Based  on  information  in:  ibid;  Kim,  ‘South  Korea’s  Race  to  Space  Is  Lagging  Behind’  (n  961);
Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea (n 948) 110.
973 SDPA art 2.
974 ‘Astronomy and Space Act’ (n 944).
975 See especially this study’s Sections 9.6.5 and 9.6.7.
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fashion. The identifiable number and scope of current major government-promoted space-
related measures serving the pursuit of this state preference seemingly are rather limited
within the ROK government’s overall space programme, as well as in comparison to the
pursuit of a similar state preference in the Chinese and Japanese cases.976
  9.4.5  Autonomy-oriented state preferences
The  South  Korean  government’s  current  space  programme  arguably  incorporates  the
pursuit of two autonomy-oriented state preferences.
The first one is to ensure the stable use of outer space for South Korea. It emerges from
the following context.
As  mentioned  under  Section  9.2,  SDPA  calls  upon  the  government  to  formulate  a
specialised Basic Plan for Preparing against Dangers in Space every ten years. This plan
shall at least address ‘[m]atters concerning environmental protection and surveillance of
space; [...] forecasts and alarms of dangers in space; [...] research and development for the
prevention of and preparing against dangers in space; [and …] international cooperation
for the prevention of and preparing against dangers in space’. Also, SDPA allows for the
governmental designation of a domestic space environment surveillance agency.977 Lastly,
Section  9.6.9  has  identified  some  current  major  government-promoted  space-related
measures that suit the pursuit of such a state preference.
The  second  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state  preference  is  the  development  and
maintenance of the domestic human, industrial, scientific and technological capabilities
and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level, independently in the pursuit
of other space-related state preferences.
After  all,  the  government’s  space  programme  during  the  BSDP2013  period  has
apparently  aimed  at  advancing  the  domestic  launcher  and  satellite  development
capabilities, including through the participation of private actors, and at achieving a South
Korean space sector that is competitive with that of advanced states.978 Section 9.4.1 has
976 Compare especially the findings on these governments’  current  major government-promoted space-
related measures in this study’s Sections 4.6, 7.6 and 9.6.
977 SDPA arts 15,15-2,15-3. For the citation, see SDPA art 15.
978 ‘The Government, Establishing a Foothold for the Takeoff of Korea as an Aerospace Powerhouse’ (n
946).
243
also indicated that the government gives relevance to strengthening and expanding the
domestic  (private)  space  industry.  Finally,  the  findings  in  this  study’s  South  Korea
chapter suggest that the government presently puts more emphasis on promoting major
domestic than major cooperative space-related measures.979
 9.5  Basic pol. & leg. framework concerning IGO-based regional space cooperation
While the information in the accessed material is sparse, there are some indicators that the
South Korean government currently is, in general,  open to participating in IGO-based
regional space cooperation.
First,  domestic  legislation  has  the  government  consider  international  cooperation  in
various  space-related  topics,  without  excluding  cooperation  through regional  space-
specific IGOs. For example, SDPA explains that the government’s BSDP shall include,
inter alia, ‘[m]atters concerning international cooperation for the invigoration of space
development[...].’ Similarly, the government’s Basic Plan for Preparing against Dangers
in Space shall address ‘[m]atters concerning international cooperation for the prevention
of  and  preparing  against  dangers  in  space[...].’980 Besides  that,  AIDPA  has  the
government’s  Master Plan for Aerospace Industry Development incorporate  ‘[m]atters
concerning  international  cooperation  to  revitalize  the  development  of  the  aerospace
industry[...]’.981 The Astronomy and Space Act further wants the government to prepare
and  implement  policies  covering  ‘[m]atters  concerning  cooperation  with  foreign
governments, international organizations, etc. with respect to astronomical work[...].’982
Second, the South Korean government has some history of taking part in institutionalised
regional  space  cooperation.  It  was  an  active  participant  within  the  Asia  Pacific
Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications (AP-MCSTA) regime,
which had its origin in 1992 and later transformed into APSCO, yet ultimately without
South  Korea  becoming  a  member  of  the  latter.983 South  Korea  even  hosted  the  3rd
Conference  of  AP-MCSTA  in  1996984 and  signed,  alongside  China,  Iran,  Mongolia,
979 See the findings throughout this study’s Section 9.6.
980 SDPA arts 15,15-3.
981 AIDPA art 3.
982 Astronomy and Space Act art 4.
983 ‘Convention  History’  (APSCO)  <http://www.apsco.int/sitesearchOne.asp?ID=76>  accessed  7
September 2018.
984 ‘AP-MCSTA  Workshop(Beijing,1992)’  (AP-MCSTA)
<http://www.apmcsta.org/Conferences/conferences.htm> accessed 7 September 2018.
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Pakistan and Thailand, an MoU on cooperation concerning an AP-MCSTA-related Small
Multi-Mission  Satellite project  in  1998.985 Moreover,  South  Korea  through  KARI  is,
alongside such states like India, Iran and North Korea, a member of CSSTEAP.986 Lastly,
South  Korean  government-related  (as  well  as  non-governmental)  entities  have
participated  in  APRSAF,987 which  has  also  seen  an  involvement  of,  among  others,
Chinese, Indian and Japanese government-related entities.988
This study has not come across precise data on the principles governing South Korea’s
current  intergovernmental  space  cooperation.  However,  it  appears  that,  similar  to  the
other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector, the ROK government at least
abides by the principles outlined in the main international space agreements. It signed and
ratified the Outer Space Treaty in 1967,989 signed the Rescue Agreement in 1968 and
ratified it in 1969,990 signed the Liability Convention in 1972 and ratified it in 1980,991 and
acceded  to  the  Registration  Convention  in  1981.992 It  has  not  entered  the  Moon
Agreement.
Finally, it is notable here that South Korea is, together with such states like India and
Japan, an MTCR partner.993 Therefore, the ROK government, if it submits to this regime
in earnest,  presumably has merely a limited present potential  to engage cooperatively
with  non-partners  of  MTCR like  China,  Iran  and  North  Korea  in  the  field  of  space
launcher development.
985 ‘Joint Technical Coordination Meeting of the Small Multi-Mission Satellite (SMMS) Project Held in
Beijing’ (AP-MCSTA) <http://www.apmcsta.org/Projects/projects.htm> accessed 7 September 2018.
986 ‘Governing Board’ (n 652).
987 ‘REPUBLIC  OF  KOREA’  (APRSAF)  <https://www.aprsaf.org/participants/countries/korea.php>
accessed 27 September 2018.
988 ‘Countries and Regions’ (n 405).
989 ‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including  the  Moon  and  Other  Celestial  Bodies’  (United  Nations  Treaty  Collection)
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280128cbd>  accessed  8  September
2018.
990 ‘Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space’ (United Nations Treaty Collection)
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIV-
1&chapter=24&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en> accessed 8 September 2018.
991 ‘Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects’ (Gov.uk, 1 September
2017)  <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/641718/10._Damage_caused_by_Space_Objects__1972__Status_List.pdf>  accessed  8  September
2018.
992 ‘Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space’ (n 990).
993 ‘MTCR Partners’ (n 407). For more information on MTCR, see this study’s Section 5.5.
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 9.6  Major domestic and cooperative space-related measures
  9.6.1  APRSAF
The participation of South Korean government-related (and non-governmental) entities in
Japan-led APRSAF appears to be the current major South Korean government-promoted
institutionalised  regional  cooperative  space-related  measure  (with  a  presumed  high
potential for) involving other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector.
Without claiming completeness, the specific major South Korean government-promoted
cooperative space-related measures under APRSAF in recent years seem to have been as
follows:
South Korean government-related entities, alongside, among others, Chinese, Indian and
Japanese  government-related  (and  non-governmental)  entities,  have  contributed  to
Sentinel Asia, which aims at improving disaster management in the Asia-Pacific region.
The  South  Korean space  agency is,  together  with,  for  example,  the  space  agency  of
Japan, a member of Kibo-ABC that aims at enhancing the utilisation of the Japan-owned
and ISS-linked Kibo module in the Asia-Pacific region.
(Presumably  somewhat  government-approved)  entities  from  India,  Japan  and  South
Korea  participated  in  the  already  completed  Climate  R³.  It  was  directed  toward
determining  the  ability  of  APRSAF countries  and institutions  to  benefit  from certain
upcoming climate-related satellite missions.994
Following from that and further information on APRSAF provided in Section 7.6.1, the
ROK government’s engagement in APRSAF appears, for one, to be intended to support
the pursuit of its current space-related socioeconomic state preference, in particular the
target area of developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal
with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for South Korea.
Furthermore, it is  – at least tentatively  – plausible to assume that the ROK government
hopes  that  the  South Korean participation  in  APRSAF and various  APRSAF-specific
undertakings  somewhat  aid  the  pursuit  of  its  current  space-related  political  state
994 For this and more information on APRSAF and the specific measures, see this study’s Section 7.6.1.
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preference of advancing South Korea’s international prestige and influence. For example,
other participants in  Sentinel Asia might profit from the South Korean contribution to
their disaster management, which can bolster their positive perception of South Korea.
Also, the planned exchange of information and opinions on,  inter alia, applications of
space science and technology among APRSAF participants as well as Kibo-ABC’s partial
application for scientific endeavours allows arguing that the ROK government might see
APRSAF as an opportunity to foster the pursuit of its current space-related science and
technology state preference.
Lastly,  it  is not unreasonable to consider  that the ROK government  finds APRSAF a
useful  mechanism that  can temporarily  bolster  the pursuit  of its  current  space-related
autonomy-oriented  state  preference  of  developing  and  maintaining  South  Korea’s
domestic  human,  industrial,  scientific  and  technological  capacities  and  capabilities
necessary to engage, at least on a basic level, independently in the pursuit of other space-
related state preferences. After all, APRSAF is open to the participation of governmental
and non-governmental entities, including regional companies, universities and research
institutes, has already featured the involvement of South Korean entities, shall include the
exchange of information and opinions on space programmes and has seen its plenary
meeting hosted by South Korea as far back as 2003.995
  9.6.2  Remote Sensing
   9.6.2.1  Major domestic measures
With  these  series’  roots  partially  reaching  back  to  the  1990s,  the  current  major
government-promoted domestic space-related remote sensing measures appear to be the
development and application of these four domestic(ally controlled) satellite series:
First,  there is  the  Korea Multi-Purpose Satellite (KOMPSAT; dubbed  Arirang)  series
with  high-  to  very  high-resolution  optical,  radar  imaging  and  infrared  observation
capabilities.  Developed  under  the  responsibility  of  KARI,  five  such  satellites
(KOMPSAT-1,-2,-3,-5,-3A)  have  been  launched  (1999-2015)  so  far.  While  writing,
KOMPSAT-6, an all-weather observation satellite, and KOMPSAT-7, a high-resolution
EO satellite,  are  under  development.  They shall  be  launched  around 2020 and 2021,
995 Concerning the 2003 plenary meeting, see: ‘About APRSAF’ (n 412).
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respectively.996 Additionally, the government apparently considers to promote the launch
of two more KOMPSATs by 2030, and four more by 2040.997
Second,  there  is  the  Geostationary  Korea  Multi-Purpose  Satellite (GEO-KOMPSAT;
dubbed  Cheollian)  series  with  remote  sensing and partially  also  communications  and
space weather observation capabilities. GEO-KOMPSAT-1, launched in 2010, provides
ocean, meteorological and communications services. Scheduled for launch around 2018
and  2019,  respectively,  two  more  satellites  currently  under  development  are  GEO-
KOMPSAT-2A for weather and additional space weather monitoring, as well as GEO-
KOMPSAT-2B for ocean and environmental monitoring.998 The government might invest
into eleven more GEO-KOMPSATs by 2030, and 14 additional ones by 2040.999
Third,  there  is  the  Compact  Advanced Satellite  500 (CAS500) series.  As part  of this
series’ ongoing first development phase, KARI wants to create a 500kg class standard
platform that can be outfitted with domestically developed payloads. The series’ second
development  phase  then  is  the  construction  of  two  high-resolution  remote  sensing
satellites referred to as CAS500-1 and CAS500-2. Their launch shall take place around
2019  and  2020,  respectively.1000 For  later,  the  government  apparently  deliberates  the
launch of 23 more CAS500s by 2030, and a further 43 by 2040.1001
Fourth,  the  government  currently  promotes  the  development  and  application  of  a
dedicated reconnaissance satellites series for the South Korean military under the code-
name  425 Project1002. Reportedly, the military shall receive five such satellites between
2022 and 2024. Relevant South Korean authorities have already planned to engage in
996 ‘Korea  Multi-Purpose  Satellite  (KOMPSAT,  Arirang)’  (KARI)
<https://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub03_02_01.do> accessed 28 January 2018.
997 Kyung-Ju  Min,  ‘Space  Activities  in  Korea’  (Presentation,  APRSAF-22,  Bali,  3  December  2015)
<https://aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf22/pdf/program/plenary/D3_1400_Korea_1203_korea_APR
SAF22_Plenary_Session_Space_Activities_in_Korea_Dr_Kyung-Ju_Min_final.pdf>  accessed  28
January 2018.
998 ‘Geostationary  Korea  Multi  Purpose  Satellite(GEO-KOMPSAT,  Cheollian)’  (KARI)
<https://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub03_02_02.do> accessed 28 January 2018.
999 Min (n 997).
1000‘CAS500 (Compact Advanced Satellite  500)’ (KARI) <https://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub03_02_03.do>
accessed 28 January 2018.
1001Min (n 997).
1002‘S.  Korea  To Get  Five  Military  Spy  Satellites  Worth  US$880M By 2023’  (defenseworld.net,  25
August  2017)
<http://www.defenseworld.net/news/20390/S__Korea_To_Get_Five_Military_Spy_Satellites_Worth_
US_880M_By_2023> accessed 3 February 2018.
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negotiation about a related ₩1.25 trillion ($1.15 billion) satellite development contract
with LIG Nex1, a domestic defence company.1003
Altogether, the government seems to promote these major domestic measures especially
with a view to foster the pursuit of its current space-related socioeconomic and national
security state preferences, including all related target areas.
Indicators for the pursuit of the government’s current space-related socioeconomic state
preference are, for example,  KARI describing the KOMPSAT series as to serve South
Korea’s  national  needs  and  referring  to  the  satellites’  usefulness  in  such
socioeconomically  relevant  areas like disaster management,  environmental monitoring,
land and resource management,  and public  safety.  Moreover,  the series’  development
background  indicates  that  its  construction  shall  improve  the  domestic  industry’s
involvement in satellite development and enhance the country’s industrial base.1004 Also,
Work and Kim hold that the series shall ‘promote the satellite industry for both domestic
and export markets.’1005 Besides that, KARI explains that the GEO-KOMPSAT series is
applied  in  such  socioeconomically  relevant  areas  like  atmospheric  environment  and
weather monitoring, marine environment monitoring and communications.1006 While there
is little information on the CAS500 series, KARI at least mentions that this series shall
meet  public  needs  and has a great  potential  for commercialisation.  Also,  the institute
wants,  based  on  the  CAS500-1  project,  transfer  satellite  technology  to  the  domestic
industry so that CAS500-2 can be fully developed by the latter.1007 As such, the CAS500
series displays a socioeconomic orientation as well.
The  pursuit  of  government’s  current  space-related  national  security  state  preference
appears to,  at  a minimum, underlie  its  KOMPSAT series and the satellites developed
under  the  425 Project. Building  on Work and Kim’s  argumentation,  the  KOMPSAT
series  has  not  only  a  socioeconomic  orientation  but  is  nowadays  likely  also  directed
towards  strengthening  the  South  Korean  military’s  intelligence,  surveillance,  and
reconnaissance  capability,  presumably  especially  regarding  North  Korea  that  has
1003‘Military to Begin Talks with LIG Nex1 for Spy Satellite Project: Source’ (Yonhap News Agency, 3
December  2017)  <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.html>  accessed  3  February
2018.
1004‘Korea Multi-Purpose Satellite (KOMPSAT, Arirang)’ (n 996).
1005Work and Kim (n 968).
1006‘Geostationary Korea Multi Purpose Satellite(GEO-KOMPSAT, Cheollian)’ (n 998).
1007‘CAS500 (Compact Advanced Satellite 500)’ (n 1000).
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conducted various missile and nuclear weapon tests over the past decade.1008 Probably
taking over the additional national security role of the KOMPSAT series in the future, the
available  information  suggests  that  the  primary  application  of  the  reconnaissance
satellites series under the  425 Project is to improve the domestic military’s intelligence
gathering  capabilities  on  the  DPRK’s  nuclear  and  missile  activities  as  well  as  other
regional security-related issues. Moreover, it  is likely that the government invests into
these satellites to help the South Korean military reduce its strong dependency from US
military intelligence gathering capabilities; of course, without challenging the ROK-US
alliance.1009 Notably, this study has not found reliable data on whether the remote sensing
elements of GEO-KOMPSAT series and the CAS500 series serve a particular national
security purpose. It cannot be ruled out completely.
   9.6.2.2  Major cooperative measures
Excluding APRSAF-related measures, current major government-promoted cooperative
space-related remote sensing measures (with a presumed high potential  for) involving
other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector seem to be limited to these few:
South Korea through KARI contributes, alongside the space agencies of, among others,
China,  India  and  Japan,  remote  sensing  data  from  domestic  satellites  within  the
International Disaster Charter framework.1010
South  Korean  government-related  entities  engage  in  GEO  alongside  those  of  China,
India, Iran and Japan,1011 UN-SPIDER alongside those of China, India and Iran,1012 as well
as WMO alongside those of China, India, Iran, Japan and North Korea.1013
1008Work and Kim (n 968).
1009Combined information in: ‘Military to Begin Talks with LIG Nex1 for Spy Satellite Project: Source’
(n 1003); ‘S. Korea To Get Five Military Spy Satellites Worth US$880M By 2023’ (n 1002); Ministry
of  National  Defense,  Republic  of  Korea  (n  948)  54;  Yossi  Melman,  ‘Report:  South  Korea  Mulls
Leasing Israeli  Spy Satellite’ (The Jerusalem Post,  20 October 2016) <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-
News/Report-South-Korea-mulls-leasing-Israeli-spy-satellite-470485> accessed 3 February 2018.
1010‘The International Charter Space and Major Disasters’ (n 236) 13.
1011‘Member List’ (n 238).
1012‘Republic  of  Korea’  (UN-SPIDER Knowledge  Portal)  <http://www.un-spider.org/network/national-
focal-points/republic-korea> accessed 14 October 2018.
1013‘Members’ (n 240).
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The Indian-South Korean MoU 2010 indicates that the two space agencies are open to
exchanging  information  and  entering  discussions  for  (further)  cooperation  in,  among
others, remote sensing and its application.1014
Based  on  the  information  presented  in  the  context  of  these  measures,  their  primary
orientation presumably is in most instances  towards bolstering the pursuit of the South
Korean government’s current space-related socioeconomic state preference, especially the
target area of developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal
with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for South Korea.
Besides that, the ROK government might consider these measures as useful to foster, e.g.
by contributing to others’ disaster management, the pursuit of its space-related political
state preference of advancing South Korea’s international prestige and influence with its
respective partners.
  9.6.3  Communications and broadcasting
   9.6.3.1  Major domestic measures
Except  for  the  government-promoted  GEO-KOMPSAT  series  that  includes
communications  capabilities  and has been already introduced under Section 9.6.2,  the
only other South Korean communications and broadcasting satellite series is the Koreasat
(dubbed  Mugunghwa)  series. However,  for  the  most  part,  it  is  no  longer  a  mainly
government-promoted measure. The government has excluded the series from its BSDP
since 2005. KT SAT, a domestic company wholly owned by KT Corporation, which was
previously  a  state-owned  enterprise  but  nowadays  constitutes  a  private  company,  is
currently  primarily  responsible  for  the development  of the series  and related  services
provision (in a primarily commercial capacity). Between 1995 and 2017, eight satellites
(Koreasat-1,-2,-3,-5,-6,-8,-7,-5A)  were  launched.  All  have  been  turnkey  satellites
commercially  obtained  from  foreign  manufacturers  and  launched  by  foreign  launch
providers.1015
1014‘Memorandum of Understanding Between Indian Space Research Organization And Korea Aerospace
Research Institute For Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ (n 425) 2.
1015Combined information in: ‘About KT SAT’ (n 955); An (n 955) 136-142,185; ‘Fleet & Coverage’ (KT
SAT)  <https://www.ktsat.net/coverage-map/> accessed  6 February  2018;  ‘South Korea  and Satellite
Communication  Systems’  (Globalsecurity.org)
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/rok/comm.htm> accessed 6 February 2018.
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The government’s current limited involvement in the Koreasat series is mostly aimed at
serving the pursuit of its space-related national security state preference, especially the
target  area  of  enhancing  the  South  Korean  military’s  strategic  support  system.  Most
prominently, Koresat-5 is jointly owned and operated by KT Corporation and ADD, and
has  commercially  available  and  military-controlled  transponders.  The  ROK  military,
aware  of  the  benefits  of  satellite-based  communications,1016 uses  its  capacities  to
strengthen  its  communications  infrastructure  for  regional  operations  and  the
interoperability of South Korean forces.1017
   9.6.3.2  Major cooperative measures
As  far  as  this  study  was  able  to  ascertain,  the current  major  government-promoted
cooperative space-related communications and broadcasting measures (with a presumed
high  potential  for)  involving  preeminent  Asian  governments  in  the  space  sector
encompass only the following two:
According  to  the  Indian-South  Korean  MoU  2010,  the  two  sides want  to  exchange
information  and  enter  discussions  for  cooperation,  among  others,  in  the  field  of
communications.1018 There is little data that allows determining  the specific underlying
space-related state preferences. However, it is likely that the ROK government partakes in
that  in  the  pursuit  of  its  space-related  socioeconomic  state  preference,  especially  the
target area of developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal
with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for South Korea.
Furthermore, South Korea is, alongside all the other preeminent Asian governments in the
space sector, a member state of ITU. This might be particularly aimed at fostering the
pursuit of all space-related state preferences underlying the South Korean government’s
space-related communications and broadcasting measures.1019
1016Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea (n 948) 106.
1017Work and Kim (n 968); Stephen Clark, ‘South Korean Satellite Launched to Serve Dual Purpose’
(Space.com,  22  August  2006)  <https://www.space.com/2782-south-korean-satellite-launched-serve-
dual-purpose.html> accessed 3 February 2018.
1018‘Memorandum of Understanding Between Indian Space Research Organization And Korea Aerospace
Research Institute For Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ (n 425).
1019For more information, see this study’s Section 4.6.3.3.
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Within  all  that,  it  is  not  out  of  the  question  that  the  government  thinks  that  such
cooperative measures also aid the pursuit of its space-related political state preference of
advancing South Korea’s international prestige and influence (with India).
  9.6.4  Navigation
   9.6.4.1  Major domestic measures
This  study holds  that  the  government  currently  promotes  two major  domestic  space-
related navigation measures.
The first one is the creation of  KASS. It shall constitute a South Korean satellite-based
augmented system for the US-controlled GPS and potentially other navigation satellite
systems in the future.  An open service  – free-of-charge except  for aircraft  – shall  be
available by around July 2020. The Safety of Life service for aviation is scheduled to
commence in October 2022. Notably,  the reported involvement of a contract between
KARI and Thales Alenia Space in the development of KASS does not necessarily counter
the ‘domestic’ label attributed to this system here. Ultimately, South Korean entities shall
control this system.
The expectation is that KASS allows for more overall and less congested air traffic while
upholding aviation security and supports domestic industrial growth. Also, it is expected
that  KASS  enhances  terrestrial  and  marine  navigation,  improves  the  performance  of
information and communication devices and helps with social issues like locating senior
citizens and lost children, and emergency situations.1020 As such, KASS seems strongly
aimed at  serving the pursuit  of the government’s  current space-related socioeconomic
state  preference,  especially  the  target  area  of  developing  and  applying  space-related
capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant issue-
areas for South Korea.
Adding to that, this study deems it reasonable to argue that the government might further
develop  this  system  to  foster  the  pursuit  of  its  space-related  national  security  state
1020Combined information in: ‘Satellite Navigation’ <https://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub03_06.do> accessed
28  January  2018;  ‘Thales  Alenia  Space  Wins  Contract  for  South  Korean  Augmentation  Satellite
System  (KASS)  with  KARI’  (Thales,  26  October  2016)
<https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/worldwide/press-release/thales-alenia-space-wins-contract-south-
korean-augmentation-satellite-system> accessed 29 January 2018; Kim, ‘Space Activities in Korea’ (n
939).
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preference, in particular the target area of enhancing the South Korean military’s strategic
support system. To name just a few, military fighter jets and missiles can benefit from
better navigation signals.
The second major  domestic  space-related  navigation  measure  is  the  development  and
application  of  the  Korean  Positioning  System (KPS),  a  domestically-controlled  –
presumably regional – navigation satellite system. Even though it is a new project under
the 3rd BSDP published in early 2018, this study has decided to consider KPS somewhat
as  a  part  of  the  government’s  space  programme as  of  2017.  Deliberations  on the 3rd
BSDP, and thus on KPS, have already taken place throughout most of 2017.1021
Reportedly, KPS shall consist of seven satellites and improve the accuracy of satellite
navigation services in South Korea from around 10 meters to less than one meter. It shall
be operational by around 2034/2035. Towards that end, ‘the KPS initiative will develop a
ground  test  in  2021,  core  satellite  navigation  technology  by  2022  and  begin  actual
satellite production in 2024.’ The available information on KPS further suggests that the
government wants to use the new system to reduce the South Korean dependency from
foreign  satellite  navigation  and  positioning  systems  like  the  American  GPS.  Loss  of
signal to such foreign systems for any reason might have severe effects on daily life in
South Korea.1022
Based on this information, the aforementioned state preferences underlying KASS and
this study’s findings regarding other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector’s
involvement in the field of navigation, it is reasonable to assume here that the government
sees KPS ultimately especially serving the pursuit of its space-related socioeconomic and
national security state preferences. For example, it is well-known that areas like modern
agriculture, fishing, transportation and missile delivery systems benefit from more precise
navigation signals.
1021Extrapolated from information provided by a South Korean space policy expert.
1022‘South Korea to Build Its  Own Korean Positioning System’ (Geospatial  World,  5 February 2018)
<https://www.geospatialworld.net/news/south-korea-build-korean-positioning-system/>  accessed  5
February 2018; Kim, ‘(LEAD) S. Korea Aims to Explore the Moon by 2030’ (n 940).
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   9.6.4.2  Major cooperative measure
This  study  has  found  only  evidence  for  one  current  major  government-promoted
cooperative space-related navigation measure (with a high potential for) involving other
preeminent Asian governments in the space sector:
The  Indian-South  Korean  MoU  2010  holds  that  the  two  sides  want  to  exchange
information and enter discussions for cooperation in, inter alia, the field of navigation.1023
They  seem  to  have  especially  engaged  in  collaboration  to  establish  interoperability
between the Indian GAGAN and South Korean KASS. Moreover, they want to share their
experience in using their respective system.1024
Lacking detailed information, the ROK government might engage in all that mainly in the
pursuit of its space-related socioeconomic state preference, in particular the target area of
developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set
of socioeconomically relevant issue-areas for South Korea. 
Furthermore,  the ROK government might  hope that this  aids the pursuit  of its  space-
related political state preference of advancing South Korea’s international prestige and
influence (with India).
  9.6.5  Science and technology research
   9.6.5.1  Major domestic measure
This study holds that only the development and application of the  NEXTSat series, a
100kg next-generation small satellite series, by SaTReC somewhat fits the category of a
current  major  government-promoted  domestic  space-related  science  and  technology
research measure outside of the government’s lunar programme.
According to SaTReC, but without specifying the government’s particular involvement,
NEXTSat-1 ‘plays a central role in national space development.’ In short, the domestic
development  and  application  of  this  first  satellite  shall  improve  the  South  Korean
capabilities  regarding  miniaturisation,  modularisation  and  standardisation  of  satellite
1023‘Memorandum of Understanding Between Indian Space Research Organization And Korea Aerospace
Research Institute For Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ (n 425) art 2.
1024‘India - Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Special Strategic Partnership (May 18, 2015)’ (n 458).
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technology.  Also,  it  shall  involve  scientific  activities,  and further  the  development  of
independent space development capabilities and the training of South Korean researchers
and scientists in space science and technology.1025
Considering all  that,  this  new series appears to serve the pursuit  of the government’s
current  space-related  science  and  technology  state  preference,  as  well  as  the  current
space-related  autonomy-oriented  state  preference  of  developing  and  maintaining  the
domestic  human,  industrial,  scientific  and  technological  capabilities  and  capacities
necessary to engage, at least on a basic level, independently in the pursuit of other space-
related state preferences.
   9.6.5.2  Major cooperative measure
There appears to be merely one current major government-promoted cooperative space-
related navigation measure (with a high potential for) involving other preeminent Asian
governments in the space sector:
In  particular,  the  Indian-South  Korean  MoU  2010  holds  that  the  two  sides  want  to
exchange information and enter discussions for cooperation in, among others, the field of
space science.1026
Overall, for South Korea, this measure might be primarily aimed at serving the pursuit of
its current space-related science and technology state preference.
Moreover,  the  ROK government  might  hope that  this  measure  aids  the  pursuit  of  its
space-related political state preference of advancing South Korea’s international prestige
and influence (with India).
1025‘NEXTSat-1’  (SaTReC,  KAIST)  <http://satrec.kaist.ac.kr/e_02_03.php>  accessed  28  January  2018.
Notably, the KITSAT and STSAT series mentioned on the homepage seem to be already completed.
1026‘Memorandum of Understanding Between Indian Space Research Organization And Korea Aerospace
Research Institute For Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ (n 425) art 2.
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  9.6.6  Human spaceflight
Based on this study’s findings, human spaceflight is no priority within the government’s
current  space  programme.  This  might  have  to  do  with  the  fact  that  a  South  Korean
astronaut already spent ten days onboard the ISS in 2008.1027
  9.6.7  Lunar exploration
   9.6.7.1  Major domestic measures
This study holds that  the government promotes one major  – mostly domestic  – lunar
exploration measure, namely the Korean Lunar Exploration Programme (KLEP), under
its current space programme.
In short, KLEP has two consecutive phases. KARI acts as its lead institution. The first
phase, running from 2016-2020 and with a budget of around $170 million, shall mainly
involve  the  development,  launch  (by  2020)  and  application  of  the  Pathfinder  Lunar
Orbiter, the development and test of further lunar exploration technology, as well as the
establishment of a Korean deep-space network. Naturally, all that shall help to build the
necessary  South  Korean foundation  for  the implementation  of  the  second programme
phase. However, at the same time, these activities shall also contribute to such areas like
lunar mapping, lunar resources surveying and the study of the lunar environment  and
surface, as well as allow for the testing of space internet technology. Reportedly, KARI
has already signed a cooperation agreement with the USA’s  National Aeronautics and
Space Administration in December 2016 for assistance in the implementation of KLEP’s
first  phase.  The  following  second  phase  shall  then  see  the  primarily  domestic
development,  launch and application  of an uncrewed lunar  orbiter  and lander.1028 The
1027For more information on this astronaut mission, see: An (n 955) 149,189-194; Pinkston (n 942) 8;
‘Korea  Sends  Its  First  Astronaut  into  Space’  (KARI,  21  April  2008)
<https://www.kari.re.kr/cop/bbs/BBSMSTR_000000000031/selectBoardArticle.do?
nttId=924&kind=&mno=sitemap_02&pageIndex=6&searchCnd=&searchWrd=> accessed  28  January
2018; ‘Korea’s First Astronaut Returns to Earth on April 19, with Mission Accomplished’ (KARI, 25
April  2008)  <https://www.kari.re.kr/cop/bbs/BBSMSTR_000000000031/selectBoardArticle.do?
nttId=925&kind=&mno=sitemap_02&pageIndex=6&searchCnd=&searchWrd=> accessed  28  January
2018; Moltz (n 32) 146.
1028Combined information in: Gwanghyeok Ju, ‘Korean Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter (KPLO) Status Update’
(Presentation, Annual Meeting of the Lunar Exploration Analysis Group, Columbia, 10 October 2017)
<https://www.hou.usra.edu/meetings/leag2017/presentations/tuesday/ju.pdf>  accessed  29  January
2018;  ‘Korean  Lunar  Exploration  Program’  (KARI)  <https://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub03_04_01.do>
accessed 28 January 2018; ‘The Government, Establishing a Foothold for the Takeoff of Korea as an
Aerospace Powerhouse’ (n 946); Kim, ‘(LEAD) S. Korea Aims to Explore the Moon by 2030’ (n 940).
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Korean landing on the lunar surface shall  take place around 2030.1029 A lunar  sample
return mission might be added in the future.1030
The available information suggests that a combination of the government’s current space-
related  political,  science  and  technology  as  well  as  socioeconomic  state  preferences
underlies KLEP for now.
The argument that KLEP shall aid the pursuit of the government’s current space-related
political  state  preferences emerges,  on the one hand,  from  KARI directly  stating  that
space  exploration  can  strengthen  national  pride.  Moreover,  KARI  indicates  that  the
successful  implementation  of  KLEP  can  showcase  the  country’s  scientific  and
technological competitiveness in the world and increase Korea’s brand value.1031 In this
regard,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume that  the  competition  with its  political  and military
opponent North Korea is somewhat on the mind of the South Korean government.
One indicator that KLEP shall foster the pursuit of the government’s current space-related
science  and  technology  state  preference  is  the  aforementioned  involvement  of  lunar
research  and  technology  testing  in  the  programme.  Also,  KARI  suggests  that  lunar
exploration undertakings help to advance Korea’s space technology level vis-à-vis other
states and function as a stepping stone for deep space exploration.1032
The pursuit  of the government’s current space-related socioeconomic state preference,
especially  the  related  industry  and  market-related  target  areas,  arises  from  KARI
mentioning that KLEP’s expected tangible and intangible economic value is five times as
much as the investment costs. In numbers, the expected economic value is up to ₩3.8
trillion ($3.55 billion).1033
1029Kim, ‘(LEAD) S. Korea Aims to Explore the Moon by 2030’ (n 940).
1030As indicated by a KARI presentation in 2016: Joo-Jin Lee, ‘Space Activities in Korea’ (Presentation,
APRSAF-23,  Manila,  17  November  2016)  slide  10
<https://aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf23/pdf/program/plenary/AP23_D3_1330_CR-
06_Korea.pdf> accessed 28 January 2018. Notably, the launch dates given for the 1st and 2nd phase
changed since then.
1031‘Prospective  of  Korean  Space  Project,  Lunar  Exploration’  (KARI)
<https://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub03_04.do>  accessed  28  January  2018;  ‘Korean  Lunar  Exploration
Program’ (n 1028).
1032‘Prospective of Korean Space Project, Lunar Exploration’ (n 1031).
1033ibid.
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   9.6.7.2  Major cooperative measures
This study has found no notable current step of the ROK government towards promoting
a  major  cooperative  lunar  exploration  measure  (with  a  presumed  high  potential  for)
involving other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector. However, considering
that there has been a South Korean-Indian agreement that includes the sharing of lunar
surface and radiation data gathered by the Indian Chandrayaan-1 mission,1034 it should be
not disregarded as a future possibility.
  9.6.8  Exploration of other celestial bodies
This study was unable to identify any current major government-promoted domestic or
cooperative measure regarding the exploration of other celestial bodies than the Moon.
This might change in the future. According to a presentation by a KARI representative in
2016, the government has already considered promoting the launch of a Mars probe by
around 2030, and further deep space exploration missions, e.g. to asteroids and other parts
of the solar system, by 2040.1035
It  is  reasonable to assume that  state  preferences  similar  to those in the field of lunar
exploration – as introduced in Section 9.6.7 – will underlie such potential  other space
exploration measures.
  9.6.9  Stable use of outer space
   9.6.9.1  Major domestic measures
Coherent with the government’s adoption of a Basic Plan for Preparing against Dangers
in  Space,1036 this  study has  found three current  major  government-promoted domestic
measures  that  are  primarily  oriented towards fostering the  pursuit  of  its  space-related
autonomy-oriented state preference of ensuring the stable use of outer space for South
Korea.
Two such measures concentrate on the tracking and monitoring of space objects. More
precisely,  the  government  wants  to  establish  a  domestically-controlled  system for  the
tracking and monitoring of space objects, e.g. space debris, to improve the security of
1034‘India - Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Special Strategic Partnership (May 18, 2015)’ (n 458).
1035Lee, ‘Space Activities in Korea’ (n 1030) slide 10.
1036 For more information, see this study’s Section 9.2.
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South Korean space assets. By 2020, this system shall be able to track space objects of
around 10 cm diameter, and, by 2040, objects of around 1 cm diameter. Besides that, the
government wants to create another domestically-controlled system for the tracking and
monitoring of space objects with a potential to hit South Korean territory. By 2023, this
second system shall be able to assess not only the trajectory but also expected impact sites
of space objects with 50 meters in diameter. Overall, the government aims at achieving
80% of US capabilities for the tracking and monitoring of space objects by 2025 and 90%
by 2035.  Since  South  Korean  entities  shall  control  both  systems,  the  setup  of  some
systems-related tracking and monitoring facilities abroad does not run counter to putting
the ‘domestic’ label to these measures.
The  third  major  government-promoted  domestic  measure  in  this  regard  is  the
improvement  of  early  warning capabilities  against  potential  damages  caused by solar
flares to electronics and electrical systems onboard of South Korean spacecraft as well as
on Earth. For this, domestic spacecraft, e.g. GEO-KOMPSAT-2A, are (to be) equipped
with special sensors.1037
   9.6.9.2  Major cooperative measures
This study has only come across one current major government-promoted cooperative
space-related measure (with a presumed high potential for) involving preeminent Asian
governments  in the  space sector  that  is  primarily  aimed at  serving  the pursuit  of  the
government’s  autonomy-oriented  state  preference  of  ensuring  the  stable  use  of  outer
space for South Korea.
This is the South Korean participation in IADC that involves,  inter alia, also the space
agencies of China, India and Japan.1038
  9.6.10  Launchers
   9.6.10.1  Major domestic measures
Developing and maintaining domestic space launch capabilities and capacities is a long-
standing major government-promoted domestic space-related measure.
1037Pinkston (n 942) 9–11; Choi (n 942).
1038‘Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee’ (n 343).
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KARI  developed  and  launched  three  Korean  Sounding  Rocket series  between  1998-
2002.1039 It  became the foundation for the development  of the domestically-controlled
Korea Space Launch Vehicle-I (KSLV-I; dubbed: Naroho/Naro) series. 
Notably,  South  Korea  entered  into  a  partnership  with  Russia  to  shorten  the  KSLV-I
development  timeline,  after  –  for  the  development  of  South  Korean  space  launchers
important step of – revising the US-ROK missile guidelines alongside joining MTCR in
2001.  In  the  end,  Russia  provided  the  series’  first  stage,  and KARI was,  with  some
Russian technical support, responsible for the second stage. Both further collaborated in
the  construction  of  the  Naro  Space  Centre,  South  Korea’s  space  launch  facility,  and
KSLV-I launch operations. After two failed satellite launch attempts in 2009 and 2010, a
domestically-controlled KSLV-I finally put a domestic satellite successfully into orbit in
2013.1040 Since South Korean entities have ultimately control over the KSLV-I series and
the space centre, this study considers it reasonable to discuss them as part of the domestic
space launch capabilities and capacities.
All this laid the groundwork for the development of the domestic  Korea Space Launch
Vehicle-II  (KSLV-II) series, which officially  commenced in 2010, involves a ten-year
budget of ₩1.957 trillion (ca.  $1.9 billion)  and appears to be still  ongoing under the
government’s current space programme. In short, the plan is to have the KSLV-II series,
with a capability of transporting a 1.5t satellite into an orbit of around 600-800km, fully
operational by around 2020-2021. For the future, the government further considers the
development  of  the  domestic  Korea  Space  Launch  Vehicle-III series  with  a  launch
capability of a 3t payload to mid-level orbit and smaller payloads to geostationary orbit
by around 2027, as well as the development of even larger domestic launch vehicles by
around 2033. The Naro Space Centre shall also be continuously expanded until 2040 to
allow for the domestic launch of the various generations of South Korean launchers.1041 
1039An (n 955) 150–159.
1040Combined information provided in: ibid 157-158,176-184,200-203. Citation on 179; Pinkston (n 942)
3–4;  ‘First  Korea  Space  Launch  Vehicle  Naroho  (KSLV- )’  (Ⅰ KARI)
<https://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub03_03_02.do>  accessed  28  January  2018;  ‘Space  Launch  Vehicle’
(KARI)  <https://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub03_03.do>  accessed  28  January  2018.  For  more  specific
information on the South Korean path to becoming an MTCR member and the revision of the US-ROK
missile guidelines, see this footnote’s first reference.
1041Combined information in: Pinkston (n 942) 4–5; An (n 955) 203–204; ‘Korea Space Launch Vehicle
KSLV- ’  (Ⅱ KARI)  <https://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub03_03_01.do>  accessed  28  January  2018;  ‘Space
Launch Vehicle’ (n 1040).
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One  space-related  state  preference  underlying  the  development  and  maintenance  of
domestic  space  launch  capabilities  and  capacities  seems  to  be  the  pursuit  of  the
government’s current space-related political state preferences. In terms of international
prestige, political competition with North Korea might sometimes play a role. After all,
the  launch  of  North  Korea’s  KMS-3-2  onboard  its  domestic  Unha-3 launcher  in
December 2012 reportedly shocked South Koreans and strengthened national support for
South Korea’s space programme.1042 Also, only a small number of states have domestic
space launch capabilities.1043 As such, South Korea joining this relatively exclusive club
can translate into national pride and international prestige and influence. 
Second,  there  is  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  current  space-related  socioeconomic
state preference, especially the industry and market-related target areas. For example, the
government  hopes to enter  the international  launch service market  and create a space
industry fitting a technologically advanced country.1044 The KSLV-II series shall be the
first step into this market. After 2025, KARI intends to involve domestic private sector
actors in the field of satellite launch services.1045
Naturally,  the  development  and  maintenance  of  domestic  launcher  capabilities  and
capacities link to the pursuit of the government’s current space-related autonomy-oriented
state preference of developing and maintaining the domestic human, industrial, scientific
and technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level,
independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences. They are necessary
to enable the implementation of many of the aforementioned major government-promoted
domestic  measures.  According  to  An’s  research,  a  partial  motivation  behind  the
development of the KSLV-I series was a ‘desire to emerge from a long dependency on
foreign technology.’1046
1042Dong-jun Lee,  ‘South  Korea  Quietly  Determined  to  Tackle  Space  after  North’s  Launch’  (Global
Times,  30  January  2013)  <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/759158.shtml>  accessed  31  January
2018; An (n 955) 203–204; Moltz also mentions the competition between North and South Korea in
launcher development in 2009 and 2010: Moltz (n 32) 147.
1043‘Space Launch Vehicle’ (n 1040).
1044ibid;  ‘The  Government,  Establishing  a  Foothold  for  the  Takeoff  of  Korea  as  an  Aerospace
Powerhouse’ (n 946); An (n 955) 203.
1045Pinkston (n 942) 4–5.
1046An (n 955) 203.
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   9.6.10.2  Major cooperative measures
This  study  has  found  no  hard  facts  regarding  a  current  major  government-promoted
cooperative  space  launcher  measure  (with  a  presumed  potential  for)  involving  other
preeminent Asian governments in the space sector.
At most,  India and South  Korea apparently  agree that  there  might  be a  potential  for
technical cooperation in satellite launching.1047 However, the Indian side seems to focus
here on offering commercial launch services to South Korea.1048
  9.6.11  Human resources
   9.6.11.1  Major domestic measures
The  available  English  literature  provides  merely  a  limited  amount  of  information  on
major government-promoted domestic space-related human resources-specific measures.
Nevertheless, this study has found that the government acknowledges that domestic and
cooperative space-related human resource development needs to be incorporated in its
evolving space programme. Experts have to be in place for the proper implementation of
the  government’s  more  and  more  complex  and  broader  space  undertakings,  e.g.  to
develop the necessary technology or to increase the public and commercial utilisation of
satellite imagery. For this, the government apparently promotes in its various plans and
strategies the education and training of relevant South Korean students and personnel,
including by setting up relevant domestic facilities and encouraging joint research and
international cooperation. It also supports national activities that help job seekers to get in
contact with suitable public and private space-related actors.1049 Furthermore, there are
national  activities  like  an  annual  Cansat  Camp  and  Competition  to  engage  more
elementary  and  college  students  in  satellite  development  and  space  science  and
technology.1050 Notably, deliberations regarding the 3rd BSDP also speak of hiring around
1500 additional space-related experts in South Korea by 2022.1051 
1047‘India - Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Special Strategic Partnership (May 18, 2015)’ (n 458).
1048‘India- Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Expansion of the Strategic Partnership’ (n 425).
1049‘The Government, Establishing a Foothold for the Takeoff of Korea as an Aerospace Powerhouse’ (n
946); Kim, ‘(LEAD) S. Korea Aims to Explore the Moon by 2030’ (n 940); Pinkston (n 942) 7–8.
1050‘Cansat  Camp  &  Competition  Korea’  (SaTReC,  KAIST)  <http://satrec.kaist.ac.kr/e_02_04.php>
accessed 28 January 2018.
1051Kim, ‘(LEAD) S. Korea Aims to Explore the Moon by 2030’ (n 940).
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Altogether,  this  space-related  human resource development  approach,  which seems to
have a  strong domestic  orientation,  fits  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  space-related
autonomy-oriented state preference of developing and maintaining the domestic human,
industrial, scientific and technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at
least on a basic level, independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences.
   9.6.11.2  Major cooperative measures
Outside  of  APRSAF,  and  without  claiming  completeness,  the  major  government-
promoted cooperative space-related human resources-specific measures (with a presumed
high potential  for)  involving other  preeminent  Asian governments  in the space sector
apparently encompass only the following:
First of all, South Korea is a member of CSSTEAP that offers joint training and education
in a variety of activity fields in the space sector among its member states, which, among
others, encompass three other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector, namely
India, Iran and North Korea.1052
Second, the Indian-South Korean MoU 2010 has the two sides exchange information and
enter discussions concerning personnel exchange.1053
In  short,  the  South  Korean  government  likely  sees  these  measures  primarily  as  a
temporarily  useful  instrument  for  the  pursuit  of  its  current  space-related  autonomy-
oriented state preference of developing and maintaining the domestic human, industrial,
scientific and technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a
basic level, independently in the pursuit of other space-related state preferences.
1052‘Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific’ (n 27).
1053‘Memorandum of Understanding Between Indian Space Research Organization And Korea Aerospace
Research Institute For Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ (n 425) art 2.
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10  Conclusions  
 10.1  Current ASA potential
  10.1.1  Analytical proceeding: second and third methodological step
As outlined in Section 2.3.2 and Table 2, this study’s second methodological step is the
comparison of the current space-related state preferences amongst the preeminent Asian
governments in the space sector1054 to detect current space-related mixed-motive games
amongst them.1055 The particular focus is on determining the (set of) current space-related
mixed-motive game(s) amongst the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector
that arguably involves at least a majority of these governments and concerns the pursuit
of  a  significant  portion  of  the  latter’s  overall  current  space-related  state  preferences.
Analytically, these  governments are considered to be situated in a space-related mixed-
motive  game  if  a  plausible  argument  can  be  made  that  their  space-related  state
preference-based situation is mixed such that cooperation in the pursuit of their space-
related state preferences can notably improve benefits or reduce or prevent losses for each
side relative to the unilateral pursuit of their space-related state preferences.
In this regard, Section 10.1.2 first works out the set of current space-related mixed-motive
games that involves at least a majority of the preeminent Asian governments in the space
sector. It then resolves whether the just identified set of games also concerns the pursuit
of a significant portion of the involved governments’ overall current space-related state
preferences. It finds that it is hard to make a compelling argument that this set of games
meets this specific ‘significance’ condition, which challenges this study’s hypothesis.
Finally, Section 10.1.3 takes a special combined look at this study’s third methodological
step  as  outlined  in  Section  2.3.3  and  Table  2  and  its  findings  on  the  six  selected
governments’  second  current  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state  preferences.
Arguably, this suffices to draw a tenable conclusion about this study’s primary research
question. In short, the conclusion contradicts this study’s hypothesis. There is no need to
apply the third methodological step in full.
1054As identified throughout the country-specific Chapters 4-9.
1055After  all,  this  study  deems space-related  mixed-motive  games,  in  general,  as  the  most  suitable
springboard  for  governments  to  reasonably  engage  in  negotiations  towards  establishing  an
intergovernmental space cooperation mechanism.
265
  10.1.2  Application of second methodological step
   10.1.2.1  Space-related socioeconomic mixed-motive games
As shown in Table 6, this study has determined that, generally speaking, five of the six
preeminent Asian governments in the space sector, namely the Chinese, Indian, Iranian,
Japanese  and  South  Korean  governments,  currently  pursue  the  similar  space-related
socioeconomic  state  preference  of  advancing  their  respective  country’s  domestic
socioeconomic development.
Table 6: Comparative overview of space-related socioeconomic state preferences
China India Iran Japan South Korea North Korea
Space-related socioeconomic state preferences
Advancing the 
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(Colour key: mixed-motive game / no mixed-motive game)
A further comparison of the specific target areas under each of these five governments’
similar  space-related  socioeconomic  state  preference  (see  also  Table  6)  then  allows
arguing that a  current space-related socioeconomic mixed-motive game amongst these
governments exists regarding their common target area of developing and applying space-
related capabilities and capacities to deal with a broad set of socioeconomically relevant
issue-areas for one’s respective country.
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First, this study’s country-specific findings suggest that these five governments have an
interest in tackling issues in a somewhat similar pool of socioeconomically relevant areas,
including  such  frequently  transnational  ones  like  the  climate/climate  change,  disaster
management, the environment, meteorology and transportation.
Second, while each of these governments surely profits from addressing this common
target area unilaterally,1056 it is reasonable to assume that a committed intergovernmental
partnership in this context potentially offers more benefits to each of them. For example,
collaboration in the development  of the target area-specific  capabilities and capacities
can, for each side, reduce the associated development price tags (e.g. by sharing of costs),
result in capabilities with an overall higher technological quality and reliability, as well as
speed up capacity building (e.g. through specialisation and exchange of technology and
expertise). Besides that, an agreed mutual application of the jointly developed target area-
specific capabilities and capacities can lead to a higher and faster learning effect among
the partners in using such items and the derived data, as well as to the creation of more
effective  and  efficient  issue-area-pertinent  products  and  services  for  each  side.
Additionally,  even  collaborative  application  in  the  form  of  steady  sharing  and  joint
interpretation of data generated by their respective domestically controlled target area-
specific  capabilities  and  capacities  can  notably  benefit  each  side  in  verifying  and
expanding its datasets employed to deal with its socioeconomically relevant issue-areas,
as well as in bringing about more precise and reliable issue-area-pertinent products and
services.  Moreover,  an  agreed  reciprocal  application  of  their  respective  domestically
controlled target area-specific capabilities and capacities like in the form of allowing each
other access to some data transponders within the domestic space-related infrastructure or
mutually guaranteeing to generate special domestic satellite-derived datasets upon request
by a partner can help each side to overcome (temporary) shortcomings in dealing with
socioeconomically relevant issue-areas adequately. For instance, a government might be
confronted  with  a  (suddenly)  malfunctioning  domestic  space-related  system,  suffer
(unexpected)  delays  in  domestic  space-related  capacity  building  or  have  to  address
(unforeseen) events overburdening domestic space-related capabilities and capacities.
This study considers the DPRK government  only tentatively and partially to be party to
the space-related socioeconomic mixed-motive game just outlined above. As argued in
1056After all, this study has shown throughout its country-specific chapters that each of these governments
has apparently engaged in major domestic measures in this direction.
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this study’s North Korea chapter, the North Korean government has, while there are some
indicators in this regard, yet to provide tangible proof for its actual pursuit of the space-
related state preference of advancing the country’s socioeconomic development.  Also,
and similarly lacking tangible  proof,  the DPRK government  seems, in contrast  to the
other  five  preeminent  Asian  governments  in  the  space  sector,  target  area-wise  to  be
primarily interested in developing and applying space-related capabilities and capacities
to deal  with  issues  in  merely  a  few socioeconomically  highly  relevant  areas  for  the
country.  In  sum,  the  DPRK government  appears,  if  at  all,  only  to  be  a  part  of  the
aforementioned space-related socioeconomic mixed-motive game concerning the areas of
agriculture, disaster management, forestry and meteorology.
With the North Korean government’s current space programme not displaying any such
policy direction, this study finally holds that the Chinese, Indian, Iranian, Japanese and
South Korean governments’ respective space industry and market-specific target areas in
the wake of the pursuit of their similar space-related socioeconomic state preference do
not line up to form space-related mixed-motive games amongst them.
Arguably,  all  these  governments  are  less  likely  to  profit  substantially  from
intergovernmental  cooperation  than  from  their  respective  unilateral  engagement  in
addressing  these  target  areas.  After  all,  any  government  that  aims  at  expanding  its
domestic  (private/non-governmental)  space  industry,  extending  its  domestic  space
market/domestic  commercialisation  of  space  technology  and  enhancing  its  country’s
entities’/space industry’s role in the international space market in a stable and sustainable
manner does well to create conditions that favour the growth of its domestic (private/non-
governmental) industry and its country’s entities’/space industry’s competitiveness in the
national and international space market over foreign entities/space industries.
   10.1.2.2  Space-related political mixed-motive games
As outlined in Table 7, the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector’ current
space  programmes  seem  somewhat  devoted  to  serving  domestic  governance-oriented
political state preferences. More specifically, the Chinese government wants to secure the
legitimacy of the CPC’s rule over all of China. Similarly, the North Korean government
wants to secure the legitimacy of the Supreme Leader’s rule over the DPRK. The Iranian
government wants to increase the Iranian people’s support for the authoritarian political
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system.  Besides  that,  this  study has  decided  to  take  into  account  tentatively  that  the
democratically  elected  governments  of  India,  Japan  and  South  Korea  promote  space
endeavours with a view to increasing public support for the respective government among
their respective people. Notably, the Iranian and South Korean governments apparently
also hope to strengthen their respective people’s national pride through their respective
space programmes.  This is  likely  linked with their  respective  aforementioned goal  of
increasing  the  Iranian  people’s  support  for  the  authoritarian  political  system  and
increasing public support for the democratically elected South Korean government.
Overall,  the  pursuit  of  their  respective  domestic  governance-oriented  space-related
political  state  preferences  arguably  constitutes  no  space-related  mixed-motive  game
amongst  them.  A  government’s  successful  realisation  of  (complex)  space-related
undertakings  through  intergovernmental  cooperation  might  usually  be  much  less
advantageous to consolidating its respective domestic governance system or improving its
standing among its people than if it can highlight that its space-related accomplishments
resulted solely from its unilateral engagement.
Table 7: Comparative overview of space-related political state preferences
China India Iran Japan South Korea North Korea
Space-related political state preferences (I)
Securing the legitimacy
of the CPC’s rule over 
all of China
Increasing public 




Increasing the Iranian 
people’s national pride 









pride and public 





of the Supreme 
Leader’s rule over the 
DPRK




" " " " "








China’s striving for 
influence in Asia
Attaining the regional 
first place in the 
conquest of space 
(region likely means 
here: Islamic world; 
Middle East and 
neighbouring states, 
Central Asia and the 
Caucasus region)
Becoming a top ten 















(Colour key: mixed-motive game / no mixed-motive game)
Withal, and as also shown in Table 7, each preeminent Asian government in the space
sector  currently  pursues  the  similar  second  space-related  political  state  preference  of
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advancing its  respective  country’s  international  prestige  and influence.  Arguably,  this
state preference-based situation does likewise not constitute a space-related mixed-motive
game amongst them.
First, the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector’s respective unilateral space-
related  engagement or  respective  cooperation  with  technology-wise  asymmetrically
dependent states presumably advance their respective country’s international prestige and
influence much more than their direct intergovernmental space-related cooperation. For
one,  it  is  plausible  to  assume  that  external  observers  usually  mark  a  government’s
unilaterally  realised  successful  (complex)  space-related  undertakings  as  much  more
impressive than if it has relied on intergovernmental cooperation in this regard. Also, by
being the main partner of technology-wise asymmetrically dependent states, a preeminent
Asian government in the space sector presumably gains more influence over such latter
states than the other preeminent Asian governments in the space sector. Adding to all
that,  the identified  target  areas under the preeminent  Asian governments  in the space
sector’s similar second space-related political state preference suggest that some of these
governments  are  in  some  sort  of  zero-sum  games  regarding  the  space-related
advancement of their respective country’s (regional) prestige and influence.
Notably,  this  study  is  aware  that  there  might  be  circumstances  in  which
intergovernmental space cooperation amongst the preeminent Asian governments in the
space  sector  might  considerably  contribute  to  the  advancement  of  their  respective
country’s international prestige and influence. For example, as indicated in this study’s
deliberation  of  current  space-related  national  security  and  autonomy-oriented  mixed-
motive  games  in  Sections  10.1.2.3  and  10.1.2.5,  a  jointly  developed  and  promoted
standpoints on specific issues can presumably increase their position of influence during
the discussion of and their impact in pushing for a sustainable, long-term solution of such
issues  (on  the  international  level).  Yet,  in  this  context,  the  influence  aspect  seems
inextricably linked to the pursuit of another space-related state preference and thus can be
considered  to  belong  more  to  the  latter  than  to  the  advancement  of  a  country’s
international prestige and influence in the main.
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   10.1.2.3  Space-related national security mixed-motive games
As  showcased  in  Table  8,  this  study’s  country-specific  findings  suggest  that  the
preeminent Asian governments in the space sector presently pursue the similar space-
related  national  security  state  preference  of  safeguarding  their  respective  country’s
national security.
Table 8: Comparative overview of space-related national security state preferences
China India Iran Japan South Korea North Korea
Space-related national security state preferences
Safeguarding the 




support system of the 
country’s military " " "
(presumably especially 
against China, Iran and
North Korea)
Improving the US-
Japanese alliance, with 
a focus on furthering 
their deterrence and 
response capabilities
(presumably especially 




against North Korea 
and partially in 




against Japan, South 
Korea and the USA)
Preventing the 
weaponisation of and 




the prevention of the 
weaponisation of and 
an arms race in outer 
space is presumably 






the prevention of the 
weaponisation of and 
an arms race in outer 
space is presumably 




potential enemies’ use 
of their space 
capabilities during 




















against Japan, South 
Korea and the USA)
(Colour key: mixed-motive game / no mixed-motive game)
A further comparative look at these governments’ respective related target areas – as far
as this study was able to identify them (see also Table 8) – then allows arguing that there
currently is,  at  most,  one space-related national  security  mixed-motive game amongst
271
them. More specifically, the six selected governments can, with some uncertainties, be
considered to be in a space-related national security mixed-motive game concerning the
target area of preventing the weaponisation of and an arms race in outer space.
To start with, this study’s country-specific chapters have determined that the Chinese,
Indian and North Korean governments include this target area within their current space
programmes. In the Japanese government’s case, the accessed information at least allows
taking such a target area into account tentatively. In contrast to that, this study was unable
to  identify  evidence  or  strong indicators  for  the  existence  of  a  similar  target  area  in
Iranian and South Korean governments’ present space programmes. However, it is not
farfetched to argue and thus assume tentatively that these two governments likewise do
not want to see a weaponisation of and an arms race in outer space occur anytime soon.
Such a development would presumably be detrimental to their  national security status
considering that states like the USA, Russia and China are known to have a much higher
(willingness  and  capacity  to  expand  their)  military  budget.  In  support  of  these
considerations about the Japanese and South Korean governments, it is notable here that
this  study  has  not  come  across  robust  indicators  that  these  two  would,  despite  the
importance that each of them gives to its respective (space-related) alliance with the USA,
necessarily benefit from a potential US engagement towards the weaponisation of and an
arms race in outer space. Their alliances seem to focus on other topics.
The preeminent Asian governments in the space sector’s space-related national security
mixed-motive  game  regarding  this  (tentatively  assumed)  common  target  area  then
emerges from the following narrative.
These governments’ unilateral  activities to forestall  the weaponisation of and an arms
race in outer space (among themselves and internationally), e.g. in the form of calling out
or sanctioning others’  related  undertakings  to  discourage further developments  in this
direction, likely have no sustainable, long-lasting impact. Their cooperative engagement,
however, has the potential to provide them with some notable benefits. For example, by
entering into an intergovernmental agreement amongst themselves forbidding activities
that can contribute to the weaponisation of and an arms race in outer space, as well as
establishing a control mechanism to monitor their respective adherence to such a ban,
they  can  avoid  inadvertently  triggering  such a  weaponisation  and arms  race  amongst
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themselves.  Moreover,  their  agreement  might  make  it  less  likely  that  their  space
undertakings  are  misinterpreted  by  other  actors  as  to  be  aimed  at  weaponising  or
commencing an arms race in outer space, which might also reduce the danger that these
actors inadvertently  engage in such a direction.  Finally,  by partnering up, exchanging
information and ideas, developing joint standpoints and presenting a united front globally,
the  six  selected  governments  might  be  in  a  much  stronger  position  to  influence  the
discussion  of  and  push  for  a  sustainable,  long-term  solution  of  this  topic  at  the
international level.
Concerning  their  other  (tentatively  assumed)  target  areas  under  their  similar  current
space-related national security state preference, the preeminent Asian governments in the
space sector arguably are not situated in space-related mixed-motive games.
One problem for these governments to enter into meaningful space-related cooperation
with each other regarding their present common target area of enhancing their respective
country’s military’s strategic support system is that such cooperation might, in the long
run, create space-related dependencies among them. These dependencies might ultimately
diminish  their  respective  potential  to  safeguard  their  national  security  effectively  and
efficiently. Another problem for their space-related cooperation in this target area is that
some of the governments currently seem to aim at enhancing their respective country’s
military’s  strategic  support  system,  including through space-related  means,  to  address
perceived threats to their respective national security status emanating from some of the
others’  military  capabilities.  For  example,  the  South  Korean  government  apparently
considers the North Korean military a danger to its national security, whereby the North
Korean government  supposedly views, among others,  the Japanese and South Korean
militaries as to endanger its national security. Also, the Japanese government apparently
worries about Chinese, Iranian and North Korean military capabilities. Besides that, it
shall not be forgotten here that, as shown in the respective country-specific chapters, the
Japanese and South Korean governments seemingly have decided to ally especially with
the USA in the context of enhancing their respective country’s military’s space-related
strategic support system. If they want to keep these alliances up, the Japanese and South
Korean governments presumably have to forgo engaging in substantial cooperation on
this topic with China, Iran and North Korea because, as is well-known, the USA eyes,
inter alia, these latter countries’ military development critically. Finally, it is noteworthy
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that China and North Korea have a mutual defence treaty,1057 which might complicate
setting  up  significant  Sino-South  Korean  and  Sino-Japanese  space-related  military
support system relations.  The Indian and Chinese militaries also sometimes engage in
skirmishes at  a disputed Sino-Indian border region,1058 which might make establishing
notable Sino-Indian space-related military support system relations a real challenge.
In terms of the (tentatively assumed) respective target areas of some preeminent Asian
governments in the space sector concerning the hedging against potential enemies’ use of
their space capabilities during armed conflict,  as well as the establishment of efficient
domestic  long-range  (nuclear-armed)  ballistic  missile  strike  capabilities/efficient
domestic nuclear weapon (counter-)strike capabilities, the pursuit of any of these target
areas by one side arguably constitutes a problem for the national security quality of all the
others. As such, they seem to be zero-sum and not mixed-motive game situations.
   10.1.2.4  Space-related science and technology mixed-motive games
Table 9 showcases that  the Chinese and Japanese governments,  as well  as in a more
limited fashion also the Indian, Iranian and South Korean governments, currently pursue
the  similar  space-related  science  and  technology  state  preference  of  advancing  their
respective country’s scientific and technological level per se;  whereby the reference to
‘per se’ indicates here more of a basic research and knowledge gathering orientation.
Following a line of argument  akin to the determination of their  specific space-related
socioeconomic  mixed-motive  game,  this  study  holds  that  this  state  preference-based
situation constitutes a space-related science and technology mixed-motive game amongst
these five governments.
It  is  reasonable  to  assume that  these  governments  can,  while  surely  benefiting  from
addressing this common target area unilaterally,1059 expect higher payoffs for each side by
committing  to  an  intergovernmental  partnership  in  this  regard.  For  example,  their
1057Ankit Panda, ‘China and North Korea Have a Mutual Defense Treaty, But When Would It Apply?’
(The  Diplomat,  14  August  2017)  <https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/china-and-north-korea-have-a-
mutual-defense-treaty-but-when-would-it-apply/> accessed 13 December 2018.
1058‘China Blames India for Latest Skirmish in Disputed Border Region’ (South China Morning Post, 21
August  2017)  <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2107668/china-blames-
india-latest-skirmish-disputed-border> accessed 1 September 2018.
1059After all, this study has found throughout its country-specific chapters that many of these governments
have apparently engaged in some major domestic measures in this direction.
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collaboration in developing target area-specific capabilities and capacities, e.g. astronomy
and technology test satellites or space science payloads, can, for each side, reduce the
associated  development  costs  (e.g.  by sharing of  costs),  result  in  capabilities  with an
overall  higher  quality  and  reliability,  and  accelerate  capacity  building  (e.g.  through
specialisation  and  exchange  of  technology  and expertise).  The  latter  aspect  might  be
especially interesting to those three governments that apparently have so far only engaged
in this topic in a limited fashion. Moreover, an agreed mutual application of the jointly
developed target area-specific capabilities and capacities can lead to a higher and faster
learning effect among the partners in using such items and the derived data, as well as to
a  more  effective  and  efficient  basic  research  and  knowledge  gathering  process.
Additionally, even joint application in the form of steady sharing and joint interpretation
of  data  generated  by  their  respective  domestically  controlled  target  area-specific
capabilities  and  capacities  can  strongly  aid  each  side  in  verifying  and  expanding  its
datasets aimed at fostering scientific and technological progress per se.
Table 9: Comparative overview of space-related science and technology state preferences
China India Iran Japan South Korea North Korea
Space-related science and technology state preferences
Advancing the 
country’s scientific and
technological level per 
se
"
(although in a limited 
fashion so far)
"
(although in a limited 
fashion so far)
" "
(although in a limited 
fashion so far)
–
(The advancement of 
North Korea’s 
scientific and 
technological level per 
se might become 
relevant under the 
government’s future 
space programme)
(Colour key: mixed-motive game / no mixed-motive game)
Notably, this study has found no evidence or robust indicators that a dedicated space-
related  science  and technology  state  preference  exists  under  the DPRK government’s
current space programme. However, there are signs that the pursuit of a space-related
science  and  technology  state  preference  similar  to  the  other  five  preeminent  Asian
governments in the space sector might become relevant under the DPRK government’s
future space programme.
   10.1.2.5  Space-related autonomy-orientated mixed-motive games
As summarised in Table 10, this study’s has found  evidence or solid indicators in its
country-specific chapters that the Chinese, Indian, Iranian, Japanese and South Korean
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governments  currently  pursue  the  similar  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state
preference  of  ensuring  the  stable  use  of  outer  space  for  their  respective  country.
Additionally, and while it has not come across such evidence or indicators concerning the
DPRK government’s present space programme, this study holds that it is not outlandish
to consider here tentatively that the North Korean government currently also possesses
such a space-related autonomy-oriented state preference. Eventually, an unstable space
environment – stemming from, e.g., an increasing amount of space debris, the congestion
of space by space assets of a growing number of actors, and space weather events – can
harmfully interfere with North Korean government-promoted space undertakings as well.
In the future, more and better  information might be available to determine the DPRK
government’s policy objective for sure.
Table 10: Comparative overview of space-related autonomy-oriented state preferences
China India Iran Japan South Korea North Korea
Space-related autonomy-oriented state preferences
Ensuring the stable use 
of outer space for the 
country " " " " –
(Tentatively speaking, 
the ensuring of the 
stable use of outer 
space for the country is
presumably also 








capacities necessary to 
engage, at least on a 
basic level, 
independently in the 
pursuit of other space-
related state 
preferences







capacities necessary to 
engage primarily 
independently in the 
pursuit of other space-
related state 
preferences
(Colour key: mixed-motive game / no mixed-motive game)
Ultimately,  this  study concludes  that  the  preeminent  Asian governments  in  the space
sector’s (tentatively assumed) pursuit of the similar space-related autonomy-oriented state
preference  of  ensuring  the  stable  use  of  outer  space  for  their  respective  country
constitutes a space-related mixed-motive game.
Somewhat  following the line of argument  presented during the determination of their
specific current space-related socioeconomic and science and technology mixed-motive
games above, this study is aware that each of these governments can surely profit from
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addressing this state preference unilaterally.1060 However, their cooperation in this regard
probably generates much more beneficial outcomes for each side. For example, their joint
development  of  capabilities  and  capacities  to  track  space  objects,  observe  the  space
weather and mitigate or actively remove space debris can, for each side, reduce associated
development costs (e.g. by sharing of costs), result in capabilities with an overall higher
quality  and reliability,  and speed up capacity building  (e.g.  through specialisation and
exchange of technology and expertise). Furthermore, an agreed mutual application of the
jointly developed target area-specific capabilities and capacities can lead to a higher and
faster learning effect among the partners in using such items and the derived data, as well
as to the creation of more effective and efficient products and services for space-related
tracking and observation and debris mitigation and removal on each side. Besides that,
even a steady sharing and joint interpretation of data derived from and an interlinking of
their respective domestically controlled space tracking and observation capabilities and
capacities across different geographical/spatial locations can notably assist each side in
verifying  and  expanding  its  respective  (real-time)  space  object  and  space  weather
datasets, as well as in bringing about more precise and reliable space object and weather-
pertinent products and services (e.g. to assess collision risks and solar flare hazards). The
partners’ continuous exchange of expertise, experience and ideas concerning space debris
mitigation during space missions can further result in the formulation of more effective
and efficient debris mitigation guidelines and protocols on each side. Finally, and akin to
this  study’s assessment of their  specific  current space-related national  security mixed-
motive game above, by partnering up, exchanging information and ideas, developing joint
standpoints and presenting a united front globally, the six selected governments might be
in a much stronger position to influence the discussion of and push for a sustainable,
long-term solution to ensure the stable use of outer space at the international level.
As  further  showcased in  Table  10,  the  Chinese,  Indian,  Iranian,  Japanese  and  South
Korean  governments’  second  similar  current  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state
preference  seems to  be the  development  and maintenance  of  the  respective  domestic
human,  industrial,  scientific  and technological  capabilities  and capacities  necessary  to
engage, at least on a basic level, independently in the pursuit of their respective other
space-related  state  preferences.  In  the  North  Korean  case,  its  government  goes  in  a
comparable  but  stricter  direction.  More precisely,  it  presently aims at  developing and
1060After all, this study has found throughout its country-specific chapters that many of these governments
have apparently engaged in some major domestic measures in this direction.
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maintaining the domestic human, industrial, scientific and technological capabilities and
capacities necessary to engage primarily independently in the pursuit of its other space-
related state preferences.
Eventually, this study argues that these governments’ pursuit of their respective second
similar/comparable current space-related autonomy-oriented state preference does not fall
into the category of a space-related mixed-motive game.
After all,  these governments would clearly go against their respective state preference’s
basic/prioritised  domestic  independence  quality  if  they  put  the  development  and
maintenance of the respective human, industrial, scientific and technological capabilities
and capacities necessary to engage, on a basic level/in the main, in the pursuit of their
respective  other  space-related  state  preferences  under  a  (sustainable,  long-term)
intergovernmental cooperation mechanism.
Notably, and as discussed further in the upcoming sections, it is the preeminent Asian
governments in the space sector’s pursuit of their respective second similar/comparable
current space-related autonomy-oriented state preference that has the most severe impact
on their present reasonable potential to enter negotiations towards establishing an ASA.
   10.1.2.6  Conclusion of second methodological step: a challenged ASA potential
The findings in this study’s Sections 10.1.2.1-5 allow arguing that, as looked for under its
second methodological step,  there is a set of (tentatively assumed) current space-related
(socioeconomic,  national  security,  science  and  technology  and  autonomy-oriented)
mixed-motive games amongst the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector that
involves an overlapping majority – in most cases even all – of these governments.
More  specifically,  five  of  the  six  preeminent  Asian  governments  in  the  space  sector
appear  to  be  in  a space-related  socioeconomic  mixed-motive  game  regarding  the
development and application of space-related capabilities and capacities to deal with a
broad  set  of  socioeconomically  relevant  issue-areas  for  their  respective  country.  The
DPRK government can tentatively be deemed part of this game concerning issues in the
few areas of agriculture, disaster management, forestry and meteorology. 
278
Furthermore, the Chinese, Indian and North Korean governments, as well as, tentatively
speaking, the Iranian,  Japanese and South Korean governments, seem to be altogether
situated in a space-related national security mixed-motive game regarding the prevention
of the weaponisation of and an arms race in outer space.
Besides that, the Chinese, Indian, Iranian, Japanese and South Korean governments, with
the North Korean government potentially becoming a participant in the future, arguably
are  in  a  space-related  science  and  technology  mixed-motive  game  regarding  the
advancement of their respective country’s scientific and technological level per se.
Lastly, the Chinese, Indian, Iranian, Japanese and South Korean governments, as well as,
tentatively speaking, the North Korean government, altogether seemingly are in a space-
related autonomy-oriented mixed-motive game to ensure the stable use of outer space for
their respective country.
However, this study regards it as quite hard to put forward a compelling line of argument
that this set of current space-related mixed-motive games, as further looked for under this
study’s second methodological step, also concerns the pursuit of a significant portion of
the involved governments’ overall current space-related state preferences. After all, these
governments’  additional  pursuit  of  their  (tentatively  assumed)  respective  two  space-
related  political  state  preferences,  second  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state
preference, and other target areas under their respective space-related socioeconomic and
national  security  state  preferences  outside  of  mixed-motive  games  can  be  reasonably
considered to still encompass the pursuit of a sizeable share of their overall current space-
related state preferences.
Thus, this study already deems it challenging at this point to contend that the preeminent
Asian  governments  in  the  space  sector  can  reasonably  initiate  negotiations  towards
establishing an ASA.
  10.1.3  Appl. and conclusion of third method. step: no current ASA potential
In the case that a researcher recognises the above-identified set of current space-related
mixed-motive  games  to  fully  comply  with  both  conditions  outlined  in  its  second
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methodological step,1061 this study eventually holds that a subsequent particular partial
application of its third methodological step1062 suffices to draw a tenable (unfavourable)
conclusion about its primary research question. There is no need to apply this study’s
third methodological step in full.
More specifically,  an additional application of this study’s third methodological step’s
second element in the context of its findings on the six selected governments’ respective
second similar/comparable current  space-related  autonomy-oriented state  preference  in
Section 10.1.2.5 allows concluding:
In  contrast  to  the  hypothesis  put  forward  in  Section  1.3,  there  is  no
reasonable potential amongst the preeminent Asian governments in the space
sector to commence negotiations towards establishing an ASA based on the
general political and legal status quo of their space programmes as of 2017.
On a more detailed level, it follows from this study’s third ASA-oriented methodological
step that the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector involved in the identified
set of current space-related mixed-motive games1063 also must at least not be opposed to
• entering an agreement for regional IGO-based cooperation, and
• a transfer of a significant portion of their respective current major government-
promoted (domestic and cooperative) space-related measures regarding the pursuit
of  their  mixed-motive  games-defining  current  space-related  state  preferences
under the responsibility of a regional IGO.
However,  the  identified  pursuit  of  their  respective  second  similar/comparable  current
space-related  autonomy-oriented  state  preference1064 arguably  makes  it  extremely
unlikely, presumably even impossible, for them to meet the second of these two elements.
Building on the findings in Section 10.1.2.5, the governments would surely run counter
to this state preference’s basic/prioritised domestic independence quality if they enter
into an  agreement to transfer a significant portion of their respective current major
government-promoted (domestic and cooperative) space-related measures regarding the
1061 For the two conditions and the issue of compliance, see Section 10.1.2.6.
1062 As outlined in Section 2.3.3 and Table 2.
1063 If they are considered to comply with both conditions outlined in the second methodological step.
1064 Again,  their  respective  second  similar/comparable  current  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state
preference is the development and maintenance of the respective domestic human, industrial, scientific
and  technological  capabilities  and  capacities  necessary  to  engage,  at  least  on  a  basic  level,
independently/engage primarily independently in the pursuit of their respective other space-related state
preferences.
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pursuit  of  their  mixed-motive  games-defining  current  space-related  state  preferences
under the responsibility of a regional IGO (or any other intergovernmental cooperation
mechanism for that matter), especially in a sustainable and long-term manner.
IGO-based (and other)  intergovernmental  cooperation  concerning the identified  set  of
current  mixed-motive games amongst the preeminent  Asian governments in the space
sector presumably can mainly incorporate those of their (compatible) major government-
promoted (domestic and cooperative) space-related measures that
• go beyond the already accomplished, or
• allow overcoming temporary shortcomings/impediments in the
development and maintenance of the respective domestic human, industrial, scientific and
technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level,
independently/engage primarily independently in the pursuit of their respective games-
defining space-related state preferences.
Notably, this latter reasoning offers a reasonable (partial) explanation why the scope of
cooperation amongst the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector in the pursuit
of their respective mixed-motive games-specific space-related state preferences, including
within APSCO and APRSAF, has remained rather limited so far.
 10.2  Potential regional space agency variant: ASA light
For a more positive and practical ending, this study uses its ample findings at this point to
discuss generally the closest IGO-based regional space agency variant to its fully-fledged
ASA format1065 about which the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector might
reasonably negotiate regarding the identified set of current space-related mixed-motive
games amongst them. In this regard, it especially builds on and partially adapts the five
basic political and legal ASA characteristics determined in Section 2.2. As a short form, it
refers to this more feasible space agency variant henceforward as an ‘ASA light’.1066
Before going into any detail about an ASA  light, it shall first be acknowledged that a
comparison of the six selected governments’ current basic political and legal frameworks
1065 As stipulated in Section 1.2 and characterised politically and legally on a basic level in Section 2.2.
1066 This designator is appropriate because of the agency’s apparent ASA-orientation. Also, as explained
in Section 2.2, there is no authoritative ‘regional space agency’ definition. Other researchers might
decide to work with a less strict interpretation of an ASA than this study in the first place.
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concerning  IGO-based  regional  space  cooperation  indicates  that  none  of  them  is,  in
general, opposed to entering into an agreement for IGO-based regional space cooperation
to address their  current space-related mixed-motive games.  What is more,  all  seem to
abide by the principles and provisions in the main international space agreements, namely
the  Outer  Space  Treaty,  the  Rescue  Agreement,  the  Registration  Convention  and the
Liability Convention. Their other principles for intergovernmental (space) cooperation, as
far as this study was able to identify them, also appear to be fairly compatible.1067
In  the  context  of  the  five  basic  political  and  legal  ASA  characteristics,  the  main
differences between the (more feasible) ASA light and this study’s (unlikely realisable)
fully-fledged ASA format arguably are regarding those two points:
The first  difference  pertains  to  the  third  basic  political  and legal  ASA characteristic.
Originally, it maintains that an ASA’s purpose is the pursuit of a significant portion of the
overall current space-related state preferences of its government members. The latter, as
laid down in the second basic political and legal ASA characteristic, consist of at least a
majority of the Asian governments with dedicated space programmes, while this group of
governments also covers at least a majority of the preeminent Asian governments in the
space sector.
Yet, as argued in Section 10.1.2.6, this study regards it as quite hard to put forward a
compelling line of argument that the identified set of current space-related mixed-motive
games amongst the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector, while involving an
overlapping majority  –  in most cases even all  – of the latter, concerns the pursuit of a
significant  portion  of  the  involved  governments’  overall  current  space-related  state
preferences. The ASA light’s maximum purpose is, with regard to the preeminent Asian
governments  in  the  space  sector,  limited  to  the  pursuit  of  their space-related  state
preferences  constituting  their  set  of  current  space-related  (socioeconomic,  national
security, science and technology and autonomy-oriented) mixed-motive games.
The second difference pertains to the fourth basic political and legal ASA characteristic.
Originally,  it  holds  that  an  ASA’s  actor  role(s)  and  function(s)  are  such  that  it  is
1067 See especially this study’s findings in Sections 4.5, 5.5, 6.5, 7.5, 8.5 and 9.5.
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responsible  for  a  significant  portion  of  its  government  members’  current  major
government-promoted space-related measures regarding its ascribed purpose.
However, the ASA light’s actor role(s) and function(s) cannot reach such a breadth with
regard to the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector.
First,  and leaning on the argumentation provided in Sections  10.1.2.5 and 10.1.3,  the
transfer  of  a  significant  portion  of  these  governments’  current  major  (domestic  and
cooperative) government-promoted space-related measures regarding the ASA light’s just
identified purpose would surely run counter to their respective second similar/comparable
current  space-related  autonomy-oriented  state  preference’s  basic/prioritised  domestic
independence quality. Generally speaking, the ASA  light’s maximum actor role(s) and
function(s) appear, with regard to the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector,
limited to such that it is responsible for the involved governments’ (compatible) major
government-promoted (domestic and cooperative) space-related measures that
• go beyond the already accomplished, or
• allow overcoming temporary shortcomings/impediments in the
development and maintenance of the respective domestic human, industrial, scientific and
technological capabilities and capacities necessary to engage, at least on a basic level,
independently/engage primarily independently in the pursuit of their respective current
space-related state preferences amounting to the ASA light’s purpose.
Second, the UNSC sanctions situation against Iran and North Korea, the Chinese export
control regime and the Indian, Japanese and South Korean participation in MTCR suggest
some  further  restraints  to  the  ASA  light’s  maximum  actor  role(s)  and  function(s)
involving the respective governments.
For one, the UNSC sanctions against the DPRK presumably translate, collaboration-wise,
into a full  prohibition for other governments to engage cooperatively with the DPRK
government  in  the  development  and  application  of  space  launcher  and  satellite
capabilities and capacities.
Also, the UNSC sanctions situation against  Iran might  limit  the Iranian government’s
potential to engage cooperatively with other governments in space launcher and satellite-
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related  topics.  But  in  contrast  to  the  DPRK’s  case,  the  situation  allows  for  more
flexibility.  The Iranian  cooperation  potential  depends on  the  others’  particular  space-
related interpretation of the UNSC sanctions against Iran, and their respective willingness
to cross the USA and abide by the international agreement from 2015.
The  Chinese  export  control  regime  might  hamper  the  Chinese  government’s  present
potential for intergovernmental collaboration in the development and use of space-related
products  with  a  possible  dual-use  quality  like  space  launch  systems.  Ultimately,  this
regime’s effect depends on whether the Chinese government is willing to use its – due to
China being an authoritarian one-party state – assumed considerable room to manoeuvre.
Finally,  India, Japan and South Korea being MTCR partners presumably restricts their
potential to cooperate with non-partners of MTCR like China, Iran and North Korea in
the field of space launcher development.1068
 10.3  Policy and regulatory recommendations
As its last analytical endeavour, this study uses its ample findings here to provide a few
general  policy  and regulatory-related  recommendations  on how the  preeminent  Asian
governments in the space sector might be able to move towards a broad(er than now)
(IGO-based)  intergovernmental  space  cooperation  mechanism  regarding  their  set  of
current space-related mixed-motive games, potentially up to an ASA  light. This is not
only  worthwhile  because  of  the  many  benefits  associated  to  their  cooperation  in  the
context of such games, but also because it might serve the development towards a fully-
fledged ASA in the future if their space programmes change accordingly.
Process-wise, this study thinks that a first reasonable step to widen and intensify the six
selected  governments’  cooperation  regarding their  set  of  current  space-related  mixed-
motive games is that they enter, e.g. by one’s invitation, into a general space policy and
regulatory consultation in which they acknowledge the existence of these games amongst
them. In this regard, they shall also confirm with each other that, based on their current
space  programmes,  they  are  not  opposed to  (IGO-based)  regional  space  cooperation,
1068 For more details on these regimes and sanctions, see especially this study’s findings in Sections 4.5,
5.5, 6.5, 7.5, 8.5 and 9.5.
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abide by the principles  and provision in  the main international  space agreements  and
follow fairly compatible other principles for intergovernmental (space) cooperation.
This study then considers it a useful second step that the governments’ set up working
groups  for  each  of  their  current  space-related  mixed-motive  games.  These  working
groups shall involve ministerial and other experts from each side and negotiate about and
specify  the  greatest  extent  to  which  the  governments’  current  major  government-
promoted  (domestic  and  cooperative)  space-related  measures  regarding the  pursuit  of
their  current  mixed-motive  games-defining  space-related  state  preferences  can  be  put
under an (IGO-based) intergovernmental cooperation mechanism. This shall  especially
take  the  governments’  respective  current  second  similar/comparable  space-related
autonomy-oriented state preference, their respective basic political and legal framework
concerning (IGO-based) regional space cooperation and the specific compatibility of their
respective current major government-promoted (domestic and cooperative) space-related
measures into account. 
After having done all that, the governments can, in a third step, engage in negotiations
about the most suitable intergovernmental cooperation format. In the case that they find it
hard to sign an agreement for broad collaboration, this study recommends that they first
conduct  a  small  project  in  each  of  their  space-related  mixed-motive  games  as  a
confidence-building measure.
Policy-wise,  this  study’s  primary  recommendation  to  broaden  and  intensify  the  six
selected  governments’  cooperation  regarding their  set  of  current  space-related  mixed-
motive  games  is  that  they  avoid  having  their  major  government-promoted  domestic
space-related measures serve mixed-motive game-defining and non-mixed motive game-
specific space-related state preferences simultaneously.1069 A clear separation simplifies
the determination and potentially increases the scope of domestic measures that can be
reasonably transferred under an intergovernmental cooperation mechanism.
1069 For example, this study has found major government-promoted domestic human spaceflight measures
that presumably serve non-mixed motive game-specific space-related political state preferences, as well
as a mixed-motive game-defining space-related science and technology state preference. Also, there are
major government-promoted domestic space-related remote sensing, communications and broadcasting
and navigation measures that apparently aim at fostering the pursuit of mixed-motive game-defining
socioeconomically-oriented target areas, as well as non-mixed-motive game-specific national security-
oriented target areas.
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Concerning the DPRK, this study recommends that the North Korean government has to
convince UNSC to revoke (at least) the space-related elements from the sanctions bundle
against the DPRK if it ever wants to engage in intergovernmental cooperation involving
space launcher  and satellite  development  and application even in a limited form in a
sustainable manner. This might, among others, necessitate a transparent division of the
measures that the DPRK government employs in the pursuit of its mixed-motive games-
defining space-related state preferences and those regarding its – presumably particularly
UNSC  sanctions-relevant  –  two  non-mixed-motive  game-specific  national  security-
oriented target areas of  establishing efficient domestic nuclear weapon (counter-)strike
capabilities, and enhancing the country’s military’s strategic support system.
In the context of the UNSC sanctions situation against Iran, the Chinese export control
regime and the Indian, Japanese and South Korean governments participation in MTCR,
this study advises all governments to take an as flexible stance as possible regarding such
factors’ influence on their intergovernmental space cooperation potential  to be able to
reap as many benefits as possible in tackling their space-related mixed-motive games. Of
course,  their  stance shall  not corrupt the pursuit  of their  respective non-mixed-motive
game-specific space-related state preferences.
Naturally,  in  all  future  attempts  to  establish  broad(er  than  now)  (IGO-based)
intergovernmental  space  cooperation,  the  preeminent  governments  in  the space sector
shall  especially  take  their  experience  with  and  the  potential  to  evolve  APSCO  and
APRSAF  into  account.  Since  they  already  involve  other  Asian  governments  with
dedicated space programmes, e.g. Malaysia and Pakistan, this study is unable to pinpoint
their exact potential to evolve here. It needs another dedicated research undertaking.
Lastly, for the sake of completion, this study wants to add at this point that it is aware that
the preeminent Asian governments in the space sector might have policy and regulatory-
wise also to deal with non-space-specific factors in working towards a broad(er than now)
(IGO-based) intergovernmental space cooperation mechanism, and maybe an ASA later
on. In  particular,  there  are  various  geopolitical,  historical  and  normative  factors  that
presumably interfere negatively – as some kind of spill-over effect – with these and other
Asian governments’ willingness to cooperate in the space sector.
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Some like the regional alliances of Japan and South Korea with the USA while China,
Iran and North Korea see the USA as a problem to their national security, as well as the
Sino-Indian border skirmishes and the inter-Korean conflict, have already been somewhat
mentioned  throughout  this  study.  Others  that  come  to  mind  are  the  distrust  and
resentment  between  the  Chinese,  Japanese  and  South  Korean  nations  due  to  terrible
events that occurred between them in the past two centuries.1070 Also, Japan and China
have an ongoing territorial dispute about a set of islands (called Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)
in  the  East  China  Sea.1071 Furthermore,  especially  the  North  Korean  government  is
accused of serious human rights abuses,1072 which can limit other states’ willingness to
engage with the DPRK cooperatively. Additionally, there is the still unresolved historical
issue  of  the  North  Korea  government  abducting  Japanese  citizens.1073 Finally,  India’s
ongoing conflictual relationship with Pakistan1074 and the sovereignty dispute in the South
China Sea involving,  inter alia, China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam1075 might
limit the potential establish an intergovernmental space cooperation mechanism involving
certain preeminent Asian governments in the space sector and other Asian governments
with dedicated space programmes.
 10.4  Outlook and future research
While the establishment of an ASA might be out of the question as of 2017, this study
thinks that the six selected governments will use more of their space-related cooperative
potential in the near future. After all, too much can be gained from cooperation.
Future researchers can contribute and add to such a development in many ways. To name
just  a  few,  they  can  build  on this  study’s  results  and attempt  to  offer  an  even more
detailed overview of the six selected governments’ space programmes, especially if they
1070Peter  J  Seybolt,  ‘China,  Korea  and  Japan:  Forgiveness  and  Mourning’  (Asia  Society)
<https://asiasociety.org/china-korea-and-japan-forgiveness-and-mourning> accessed 27 February 2019;
Stephen Evans, ‘Bad Blood between Japan and Korea Persists’ (28 April 2015) <https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-32477794> accessed 27 February 2019.
1071Nyshka Chandran, ‘A Second Territorial Dispute in Asia Could Be More Dangerous than the South
China Sea’ (CNBC, 21 December 2017) <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/20/east-china-sea-could-be-
riskier-than-south-china-sea.html> accessed 27 February 2019.
1072‘North  Korea  Events  of  2017’  (Human  Rights  Watch)
<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/north-korea> accessed 27 February 2019.
1073‘Japan  Struggles  to  Resolve  North  Korea  Abduction  Issue  as  Kin  Age’  (The  Japan  Times,  17
December  2017)  <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/12/17/national/japan-struggles-resolve-
north-korea-abduction-issue-kin-age/> accessed 27 February 2019.
1074Andrew Whitehead, ‘Partition 70 Years on: The Turmoil, Trauma - and Legacy’ (BBC, 27 July 2017)
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40643413> accessed 27 February 2019.
1075‘South  China  Sea  Dispute:  China  Lands  Bombers  on  Island’  (BBC,  19  May  2018)
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-44180773> accessed 27 February 2019.
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are proficient  in  the country’s respective official  language.  They can assess the other
Asian governments with dedicated space programmes’ space-related state preferences and
related  major  measures,  and identify  their  potential  to  engage cooperatively  with  the
preeminent Asian governments in the space sector. Finally, they can draw on this study’s
findings and aim at identifying APSCO’s and APRSAF’s potential to evolve into even
broader intergovernmental space cooperation mechanisms. As introduced in Section 1.1,
Suzuki has already endorsed a merger of APSCO and APRSAF to establish an Asia and
the Pacific Space Agency.
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